



Exercise	PE11
Category	Principal Exercises
Type	State Maritime Security Exercise
Security Level	1 and 2
References	1. APEC Manual of Maritime Security Drills and Exercises Vol II Part 1 – Guidelines for the Conduct of Maritime Security Exercises 2. ISPS Code Part A section 18.4 and Part B section 18.6

INTRODUCTION

1. The pursuit of maritime security at the State level involves a large number of organizations that contribute to the security of the sea and its littorals, where port facilities are situated. These include the port authority, police, customs and immigration, territorial army (reserves), coastguard, navy, maritime air forces, and members of the maritime industry. The specific nomenclature of the organizations may be different in each country, but the functions they perform or serve are often similar. Some may not even have the organizations referred to, but their duties are usually absorbed by one or another of the standing forces.

2. Conducting an exercise involving all these entities is a major undertaking. If possible, a State agency with natural authority over the potential participants may be the lead agency for such an exercise, for example, a State organization with responsibility for counter-terrorism coordination across State agency boundaries. Otherwise, the State authorities individually responsible for maritime security, including the littorals, may coordinate with a view to nominating the lead agency. The challenges may be reduced by beginning with a few agencies participating at first, progressing over a period of time to a all-encompassing exercise with all relevant agencies involved.

3. These guidelines are prepared as a tabletop simulation exercise, and involve a scenario that would be applicable to the range of participants mentioned in paragraph 1.

AIM OF THE EXERCISE

4. The aim of this exercise is to practice the coordination demanded in a multi-agency response to a maritime security threat.



OBJECTIVES

5. The objectives of this exercise are to:
 - a. Undertake a methodical process for the development of operational plans in the prosecution of a maritime security threat.
 - b. To practice the command, control, coordination and communications relationships and procedures in the prosecution of a maritime security threat by State forces.

REQUIRED ATTAINMENTS

6. On completion of the exercise, a written operation plan for the maritime security task is to be prepared by each participating organization for execution by their respective forces, in support of the overall task.

PLANNING FOR THE EXERCISE

7. **Timetable**

With an exercise involving a large number of diverse participants, the exercise should be scheduled, and participants notified of the dates at least a year in advance. Preparations for the exercise should commence well in advance of the date of conduct, with at least 6 months lead time allowed for coordinating exchanges between the convener and participants. An example of a time-table for the preparation and conduct of this exercise is given in [Appendix 1](#).

8. **Exercise Planning and Control Team**

a. Exercise Director

The Exercise Director is likely to be a senior officer from the State lead agency. A suitable level of experience and competence in the field will be necessary to lend not just expertise, but diplomatic leadership and management of both the exercise controllers as well as exercise participants.



b. Control Team

(1) The control team should comprise representatives from all participating entities. However, the desire for comprehensive representation should be tempered by the potential challenges of a large and unwieldy EPCT. Organizations of the same type, e.g. ports and/or port facilities could be represented by a group representative instead of a representative each. Some organizations may welcome such an arrangement, as they may otherwise be unable to support the EPCT with staff. The aim would be to manage the exercise with an adequate EPCT.

(2) The Chief Controller may be a senior officer from one of the State security services, usually the lead agency. Personnel from these agencies would be familiar with the systematic planning processes usually employed in operational planning.

(3) **Higher Controllers**

Higher controllers may be nominated from the key State agencies (Coast Guard, Police, National Guard or volunteer home defence paramilitary force, Customs and Immigration, Designated Authority, ports authority, etc.) and stakeholders (ports, port facilities, shipping companies, etc.) for positions in the following areas of responsibility:

- (a) Operations
- (b) Intelligence
- (c) Logistics
- (d) Human Resources
- (e) Communications
- (f) Industry stakeholders

(4) **Lower Controllers**

When the exercise is conducted as a tabletop simulation during its execution phase, the various entities responsible for the implementation or execution of the plans, orders and instructions developed during the exercise would be represented by lower controllers. These will come from the operational level personnel of the agencies and stakeholders mentioned in the plan.

(5) Forces to act as the threat or adversary should be assigned from the most appropriate State agency as described in the scenario. In a tabletop simulation exercise they will participate as lower controllers, and if a combat simulator is to be used to enhance the execution phase, as operations room crew in the simulator.



c. Participants

Participating organizations should be requested to nominate senior management-level personnel who will be responsible for planning the tasks to be undertaken by their respective organizations.

9. **Resources**

a. Location

- (1) Planning/control room(s) for controllers.
- (2) Planning Rooms for participants – Each organization should have a separate planning room, if possible.
- (3) Control Room or Operations Room for the execution phase of the exercise - The lead agency may have a control or operations room, and this should be used by the top-level participants to direct and monitor the proceedings. In a tabletop simulation exercise, participants at the next level down, who are likely to be grouped in their respective organizations, could use their planning rooms to direct and monitor their respective “forces” (simulated by lower controllers). They should have facilities for the compilation of the situational picture as the scenario unfolds. Consideration may be given to having participants dispersed to their respective operations centers to direct and monitor their own forces from there. However, the coordination and communications challenges for the exercise controllers will be significantly increased. Where actual control or operations rooms are used, care should be taken to ensure there is no interference or confusion with normal actual operations
- (4) Conference Room for the presentation of plans, etc.

b. Communications

(1) **Equipment**

- (a) Wherever possible, actual communications means between participants and their respective forces to enable them to direct and monitor their forces should be employed. In a tabletop simulation exercise, the subordinate forces would be represented by Lower Controllers (from the same organization).



(b) If a temporary exercise control room is set up for the respective organizations, adequate communications facilities must be made available in the control room to represent the normal means these organizations would have at their disposal. Irrespective of the degree of communications simulation employed in the exercise, a comprehensive communications plan should be included in their operations plans/orders.

(c) Communications must also be provided between higher controllers and lower controllers, and between controllers and participants.

(2) **Code Words**

Code words are used to provide brevity and clarity in communications during the conduct of an exercise, and must be promulgated to all controllers and participants.

(3) **Security**

Consideration should be given to the possible disclosure of confidential information in all exchanges connected with the exercise, and appropriate precautions taken to avoid the release of such information to persons not authorized to receive it. This will include consideration for secure communications means.

c. Other requirements

(1) Equipment for the planning phase

(a) Local charts, maps and layout plans should be used for the sake of realism, with simulated features (such as boundaries) and facilities (such as ports, port facilities, etc.) marked as appropriate to the narratives. Should geographical features not be suitably situated, the narratives could be adjusted accordingly.

(b) Wyteboards and wyteboard markers

(c) PCs, printers and digital projectors

(d) Photocopier

(e) Stationery



- (2) Equipment for the execution phase will be as per the planning phase, plus standard Control or Operations Room equipment e.g.
 - (a) Status Boards
 - i. Operations status
 - ii. Deployment of forces, teams, personnel, vehicles, vessels, etc.
 - iii. Logistics status (fuel, water, supplies, breakdown & repair, etc.)
 - iv. Personnel status (manning, casualties, etc)
 - (b) Log and Record Books
 - i. Operations Log
 - ii. Communications Log
 - iii. Incident Log
- (3) Victuals and refreshments

CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE

9. Scenario

A scenario synopsis or narrative will be issued to set the stage for the planning process. In this exercise, participants play their roles as citizens of a fictitious country Cepaland, which is beset by security concerns, particularly of a maritime nature, from an unruly neighboring country called Phoney. Amid general lawlessness in Phoney, the threat of a state sponsored, and bandit attacks on Cepaland maritime interests emerges, and the State is obliged to plan and implement countermeasures. Further narratives will be issued to advance the scenario as the exercise unfolds. Examples of narratives are given in [Appendix 2](#).

10. Initiating Directive

The planning process to meet the security challenges posed to Cepaland in the scenario is initiated by the issue of an Initiating Directive by the lead agency, which specifies the tasks to be undertaken in broad terms, to be focused in the planning by the respective agencies. The initiating directive is given in [Appendix 3](#).

11. Planning Process

- a. Various procedures are available that provide a systematic framework for planning a task or operation. State security agencies will have proprietary systematic planning processes to develop their plans against the threats.



b. The planning may take place over a period of one day, on completion of which a written operations plan should be prepared and presented to an appropriate authority, who is likely to be from the lead agency, for formal endorsement. Plans developed must be:

- (1) Suitable – They must meet the requirements of the task, and provide a reasonable response to the threats.
- (2) Acceptable – They must be accepted from a personnel and organizational culture perspective.
- (3) Feasible – The plans must be realistic and achievable.

12. Master Events List

a. A generic Master Events List for this exercise is given in [Appendix 4](#). This Master Events List reflects the bare minimum of injects required and is provided as an example of a possible scenario that may be played in an exercise. Exercise planners from each participating organization must develop their respective scenarios fully and should add to or delete the injects/events in the list as required. The exercise objectives must guide the development of injects at all times. Injects should not overwhelm participants so that the exercise objectives are subverted by random “noise”.

b. The Chief Controller should monitor the development of the plan by the participants closely, and be prepared to introduce injects to test any new operational plan or initiatives formulated during the planning stage. These new injects should be incorporated in the Master Events List.

c. In general, injects should seek to test:

- (1) Command, control and coordination procedures and processes
- (2) Communications channels and procedures.

d. Some topics that may be considered for injects that test command, control, coordination and communications are:

- (1) Pre-emptive action to alleviate the maritime security threat.
- (2) A lack of, or uncertainty over intelligence reports on terrorist activity.
- (3) Preparations and reinforcements in advance of a potential maritime security threat.
- (4) Prosecution of a specific threat to maritime security.



e. The dates and times reflected in the Master Events List are exercise dates and times. Actual dates and times will be determined by the Controllers when planning for the exercise.

f. During the execution phase of a tabletop simulation exercise, injects from the Master Events List are issued by the Chief Controller to be acted upon by the participants. When the participants need to have some action carried out by a subordinate unit or individual e.g. security guards stationed at the entrance to the Port Facility, they are to message the instruction to the lower controller, who will then respond in appropriate time on the outcome of the action. This response should be consistent with the overall objective of the exercise and specific purpose of the inject.

13. Briefings

a. A briefing to controllers will be conducted by the Chief Controller and should include the following:

- (1) Objectives of the exercise.
- (2) Scenario for the exercise.
- (3) Roles to be played by controllers.
- (4) Exercise injects, anticipated responses by participants, and the nature of the feedback to be provided by lower controllers to participants for each response.

b. A briefing to participants upon commencement of the exercise will include:

- (1) Organization for the exercise.
- (2) Details of the administrative and logistics arrangements.
- (3) Exercise objectives.
- (4) Operational brief, to include the task assigned to the respective organizations.
- (5) Issue of narrative no.1 and operations orders.

CONCLUDING THE EXERCISE

14. The exercise is deemed to have been completed when:

a. The operations plans against the maritime security threats prepared by each participating organization are endorsed and printed following any adjustments after the formal presentation for endorsement.

b. The execution phase has been completed with the planned injects employed.

c. The Exercise Director so decides.



15. **Debrief**

- a. Debriefs by respective organizations or forces should be conducted as soon as possible after the exercise. Numerous messages may have been passed in the course of the execution phase of a tabletop simulation exercise. Only those relevant to specific lessons learnt may need to be preserved for the debrief, if only to serve as reminders for the points to be made. Lessons learnt and other observations that may be relevant to the overall task should then be tabled at the main exercise debrief for consideration.
- b. The overall exercise debrief will be conducted after the various participating organizations have completed their internal debriefs. This may be conducted at a later date, as it allows time for reflection on the events and outcomes, but not so late as to become lost in “business-as-usual” activity. A later date may also result in scheduling difficulties. Generally, an interval of one or two days should be adequate.
- c. The Chief Controller should conduct the debrief. Minutes of the debrief should be recorded, in particular the lessons learnt and any follow-up actions and recommendations.

16. **Reports**

A formal report on the exercise should be prepared. It may be endorsed by the Exercise Director and a copy circulated to all participants. If necessary, abridged versions may have to be circulated to some participants owing to security considerations on the contents. The report should cover the following:

- a. Introduction
- b. Exercise aim and objectives
- c. Controllers and participants
- d. Schedule for development and conduct
- e. Format and brief review of the proceedings
- f. Lessons learnt
- g. Recommendations
- h. Follow-up actions



17. Records

Individual organizations will make an entry in their respective records of their conduct and/or participation in the exercise in respect of their obligation to the ISPS Code. The following is an example of such an entry in a participating Port Facility's ISPS Drills and Exercises Record Book:

ISPS Port Facility Drills and Exercises Record Book				
DATE	EVENT	TYPE	SUBJECT	REPORT REFERENCE
	<i>Exercise</i>	<i>State maritime security Exercise "Open Seas"</i>	<i>The Security Manager and PFSO participated in planning and tabletop simulation against a maritime security threat</i>	<i>PF/101/08-PE11 dated xx/yy/zzzz</i>



PE11 TIME-TABLE FOR PLANNING

DAYS TO EXERCISE	DATE	EVENT	CHECK
D -365+		Determination of the lead agency for the exercise	
D -365		Lead agency promulgates exercise proposal and schedule to potential participants, inviting participation	
D -335		Lead agency promulgates the exercise concept and seeks participants' nomination of the level and scope of participation from each	
D -305	(calendar	Consultations for, and confirmation of the exercise schedule	
D -210	dates to be	Coordination for nominations and selection of the Exercise Planning and Control Team (EPCT)	
D -180	inserted)	Convene the initial planning conference	
D -150		Conduct exercise planning conferences to: - refine or define the scenario and narratives - adjust or develop the Master Events List - prepare the exercise administration and logistics requirements	
D -60		Consultations for, and confirmation of the participants	
D -30		Promulgate the Exercise Administrative Instructions	
D -21		Brief the controllers	
D -14		Administrative, logistics and site preparations, final adjustments by controllers, printing of exercise documents (orders, narratives, etc.)	
D		Exercise commencement: Brief the participants: - exercise administration and logistics - scenario and task orders - issue of written operations orders and narratives	
D to D +1		Exercise planning phase	
D+1 to D+2/3		Exercise execution phase	
D +7		Conduct the debrief and record the lessons learnt and follow-up actions	
D +8		Participants to record the conduct of the exercise	
D +30		Lead agency to promulgate a written report on the exercise	



PE 11 SCENARIO SYNOPSIS

These narratives define the scenario in which the exercise may be played.

All participating agencies should have forces assigned to the exercise based on the scope of the scenario, whether they are mentioned specifically in the narratives or not, as they will play a part in the development of the operational plan against the envisaged threat. The actual type and numbers of forces played will have to be specified by the EPCT.

Exercise participants are from “Cepaland”.

NARRATIVE NO. 1

Introduction

1. *Cepaland is a peaceful, stable and prosperous kingdom run by a benevolent ruler who is much loved by his people. Apart from its substantial coastline, Cepaland is completely surrounded by a single neighbor, Phoney. Nominally a parliamentary democracy, Phoney has a former army strongman as President. Feudal warlords operate fiefdoms in the provinces, there is endemic corruption, and brutal repression is resorted to by the police and military as a means to maintaining power for the President. The agricultural country was once a major producer and exporter of rice, but civil strife has made it economically backward and the majority of its people now live in poverty. Relations between the two neighboring states are cordial, but with little influence by the central government of Phoney, the border is a hotbed of rebel activity, and Cepaland has its hands full in the border region, with refugees and illegal immigrants from Phoney among the major concerns of the government.*

2. *An international shipping lane is marked on charts as passing close by the Phoney coastline, but robbery at sea is commonplace near Cepaland’s sea border with Phoney, and shipping usually take a wide detour around the coastline of Phoney, outside the range of the petty thieves operating with speedboats. However, shipping to Cepaland occasionally encounter armed personnel in uniforms far out at sea operating from military vessels, and have to make deals with them. Sea robbers make occasional raids on installations and enterprises along the Cepaland coastline, but are reasonably effectively deterred by Cepaland’s maritime security arrangements.*

3. *Of late, the rise of a “robber baron” (RB) with political aspirations in Phoney has been a significant concern. With his drug-based operations along the vast and thinly populated region near the coastline between Phoney and Cepaland’s northern border, the RB sees Cepaland as a lucrative target, and believes that if he can terrorize and subjugate parts of Cepaland successfully, it will win him many followers in Phoney. Operating with a mercenary band of thugs and thieves, the RB has whipped up religious fervor against Cepaland society as a means to get recruits to undertake terrorist attacks such as suicide bombings and other terrorist tactics as a means to achieve his ends.*



4. *Cepaland has an elected legislature from which the cabinet is selected, but the ruler remains head of government. It is run with an iron hand that brooks no interference with government policies and programmes. However, these policies and programmes are generally beneficial to the economy and the people, and the country has prospered under the able leadership of its ruler, acting in concert with the prime minister and his cabinet. While the people are well-off in relation to their neighbors, there is an undercurrent of despair because of a significant rich-poor divide, and the average person generally has to work long and hard to attain the much-trumpeted quality of life in the country. Moreover, the structure of the electoral process has led to charges internationally that it is less than democratic, and despite the economic prosperity and well-being of the people, there is some resentment among the educated elite over the lack of political choice and freedom. Furthermore, the religious minority in Cepaland have begun to notice and in some ways respond to the RB's call to their religious beliefs.*

Security Situation

5. *A Cepaland coast guard vessel was directed to respond to an SSAS alert initiated on (date: D -90) from a tanker crossing from Phoney to Cepaland territorial waters and encountered a Phoney military vessel alongside the tanker with a few armed uniformed personnel embarked. As the tanker was 5nm inside Cepaland territorial waters, the coast guard warned the Phoney vessel to clear off. In response, the Phoney vessel fired upon the Cepaland coast guard vessel, and in the ensuing firefight, the Phoney vessel was sunk. It was subsequently determined that the tanker had been boarded in Phoney territorial waters and had drifted into Cepaland waters while the boarders were negotiating with the tanker on the price for its release. The Phoney government issued a protest, and demanded exorbitant compensation.*

6. *Cepaland intelligence services established that Phoney was making preparations for a limited military response. Two patrol boats from the Phoney Navy have been seen in base being loaded with live ammunition and other supplies. Some Phoney lawmakers from a religion-based political party have been reported to be encouraging the RB and local criminals to exact revenge on Cepaland. Later reports indicated that with his new found status under state sponsorship, the RB has begun making plans to attack Cepaland maritime facilities on a broad front with the declared aim of avenging the “sinking of our patrol boat and the murder of our loyal naval comrades”. This has been dismissed in both Cepaland and some quarters in Phoney as merely a front, because the RB was at the same time sending feelers out to Cepaland companies in the area, including Humbug port, to extort a fee in return for protection against terrorist acts.*



7. *On (date: D -30), an unattended parcel was discovered in a Cepaland cruise liner terminal containing an improvised explosive device that had failed to explode. The incidence of robberies at sea near the border with Phoney had also increased dramatically over the last month, and shippers are demanding protective escorts by the Cepaland coast guard. Freight insurance rates went up to new highs when 2 cargo vessels were hijacked and subsequently traced to remote rivers in Phoney where their cargo was removed by barge. Raids on ships in the Cepaland port of Humbug near Phoney have also become a constant nuisance. All of them were carried out by thugs operating from speedboats. The thugs were always paid off by the ships crew, and no injuries had been sustained to date.*

8. *Port Facilities have begun to report cases of suspected surveillance being carried out on their premises and operations, with unidentified boats passing close to single-buoy moorings and other oil and fuel handling facilities. On (date: D -14) one of the 3 container cranes at Humbug port was made unserviceable by a short circuit, leading to a meltdown of the main power cable. There was a small fire as a result of the overheated cable, which was quickly put out. The cause of the short circuit has not been established, but Humbug port officers say that the cranes had been operating without mishap ever since they were commissioned.*

9. *Three days ago, the shipping agent reported that MV Fireball, a 7000 dwt tanker carrying a cargo of petrol (benzene) for the local market was hijacked and has disappeared. The port authority and ships reported receiving a brief distress call on the radio that was cut short, and nothing had been heard since. No warning was received from the SSAS, but the Cepaland maritime authority managed to trace the tanker to one of the rivers in Phoney used by sea robbers to hide the 2 ships seized earlier. However, unlike those ships, there is no indication of the cargo being removed from the MV Fireball, and Cepaland intelligence reports suggest that there is a high probability of the tanker being used as a weapon of mass destruction against a Cepaland port.*

Cepaland Intentions

10. *Cepaland has been reasonably successful in containing the sea robbery problem in her ports and waters, and has been holding off increasing the Security Level despite the increase in such attacks, but the intelligence reports of the potential threats could not be ignored any further, and announced on (date: D -1) that Security Level 2 is declared.*



11. *Cepaland intends to defend its sovereign property vigorously against both terrorist activity and Phoney military forces should that threat emerge. The National Security Minister has called on the coordinating agency for national security to plan a response to:*

- a. *The Phoney military threat represented by the patrol boats.*
- b. *The possibility of the tanker laden with petrol being used as a weapon of mass destruction against a Cepaland port or sunk to block the port entrance.*
- c. *A suicide bomb attack and possible hijacking of a cruise liner at Humbug port.*
- d. *Terrorist attacks, including vehicle and vessel bomb attacks on Cepaland port facilities and military bases within easy reach of the Cepaland-Phoney border.*

NARRATIVE NO. 2

1. *The security situation has now become critical, with the threat of terrorist attack increasing dramatically. All key installations in Cepaland have increased or are in the process of increasing their Security Level measures to Level 2, but owing to political sensitivities, the Designated Authority has yet to order ports and port facilities to implement Security Level 2. Military forces have stepped up their readiness and their logistics preparations are proceeding steadily.*

2. *Militants yesterday destroyed a Cepaland police checkpoint set up at Humbug Ferry Terminal 2, killing 7 people and injuring 15. Five soldiers were among the dead. Witnesses say a small car drew up to the checkpoint and as the driver came out to open the boot for inspection, he ran away and the car exploded.*

3. *The Cepaland government today ordered the Navy to seek and capture or destroy the hijacked tanker MV Fireball. The Navy is to maintain sufficient forces in the area of operation in order to defend against an attack by the Phoney Navy, but a pre-emptive attack on Phoney naval forces in the area is deemed unacceptable, as it will draw too much flak internationally.*

4. *The Coast Guard is to implement their defence plan should the tanker enter Cepaland territorial waters. All plans reviewed or developed in response to the latest maritime security situation are to be implemented.*



PE11 INITIATING DIRECTIVE

SITUATION

1. *Cepaland is under grave security threat from Phoney. While our international relations with Phoney remain stable, Phoney is believed to be planning an attack in revenge for the sinking of their patrol boat that was robbing a tanker bound for Humbug port. Another tanker, MV Fireball loaded with petrol (benzene) has disappeared, and our intelligence reports indicate that it may be fitted out as a floating bomb to cause massive destruction in one of our port facilities, or be sunk in the approaches to the port creating a blockage to the port entrance and extensive pollution. At the same time, robberies at sea near our border with Phoney and other maritime security incidents in our ports have increased substantially.*

INTENTIONS

2. *Cepaland will defend the safety and security of our people and property, and sovereignty of our country vigorously. Your task is to plan integrated operations, where appropriate, for the defence of Cepaland interests.*

TASKING ORDERS

3. *The lead agency for the defence of Cepaland is the National Security Ministry, and the lead authority shall be the Chief of the General Staff. All State agencies and organisations shall be required to support each other in their tasks when called upon.*

4. *The following are the lead agencies to plan for the tasks indicated:*

a. **Navy**

(1) *Seek and destroy Phoney patrol boats threatening Cepaland sovereignty.*

(2) *Seek and take MV Fireball into custody.*

b. **Coast Guard**

(1) *Defend Cepaland territorial waters against Phoney Navy incursions.*

(2) *Defend Cepaland ports against possible attack by terrorists on board MV Fireball.*

(3) *Defend Cepaland against maritime security threats (this is a universal task for the Coast guard, but is included here for methodical reasons).*



c. Customs and Immigration Authority

- (1) *Maintain vigilance.*
- (2) *Support the Coast Guard if required.*

d. Designated Authority

- (1) *Direct ports and port facilities to review their PFSPs.*
- (2) *Coordinate the security efforts of the shipping industry (ship owners, ship operators, ship agents, ports and port facilities).*

e. Ports and Port Facilities

- (1) *Respond promptly to directives on the Security Level.*
- (2) *Maintain strict vigilance.*



PE11 MASTER EVENTS LIST

SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
<i>Date: D day</i>				
001	0800	Chief Controller	Exercise briefing	Attend
002	0900	High Control	Issue of Narrative No. 1	Review security plans and report actions for increasing Security Level measures to Level 2.
003	1430	High Control	Issue of Initiating Directive	Commencement of planning phase Participants plan for their respective tasks
004	1500	High Control	Intelligence reports that some Phoney special forces soldiers have been overheard in a pub joking about being seasick on an impending trip, and assesses that special forces may be embarked for a raid by Phoney naval forces.	Navy/Coast Guard participants to factor into operations planning
005	0930	State lead agency	Endorsement of respective participants' plans	Participants should present their operations plans to the lead agency/authority for endorsement
006	1500	High Control	Issue of Narrative No. 2	Commencement of execution phase
007	1600	High Control	Cepaland Designated Authority directs all ports and Port Facilities to report all breaches of security	Participants to note
008	1700	High Control	MV Fireball is reported to be sailing out of the river. It will be 4 hours at the earliest before she leaves Phoney territorial waters	Cepaland navy to launch mission against MV Fireball
009	1730	High Control	Intelligence reports that the two Phoney patrol boats have sailed their base, destination unknown	To inform units at sea and assess situation



SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
010	1745	Low Control	Port Facility No. 2 reported that two men from an unauthorized vessel approached and boarded their SBM. Port Facility SBM crew arrived just in time to see the men on the SBM before the vessel picked them up and sped off.	Port Facility No. 2 participants to report to Designated Authority and seek clarification from the Port Facility staff
011	1755	High Control	Designated Authority requests information from all vessels in the area of the SBM	All participants to query their units
012	1815	Low Control	Coast Guard vessel near the SBM reported that they saw the vessel but thought they were maintenance crew.	To order search for the vessel
013	1900	High Control	MV Fireball is reported to be sailing away from Cepaland	To request report upon interception
014	1930	Low Control	Port Facility No.1 reported that they found a hole cut in their fence and they are in the process of assessing the situation	Port Facility No. 1 participants to report to Designated Authority
015	2030	Low Control	Port Facility No. 2 SBM crew reported nothing unusual at the SBM	To report
016	2100	Low Control	Humbug port cruise terminal reports 1 cruise vessel, MV Courtship in port for the last 2 days; and 1 more cruise vessel, MV Blackjack presently entering port and leaving tomorrow	Recognize risk of infiltration from Phoney
017	2105	High Control	MV Blackjack is known to be a "casino ship" operating 2-day cruises to regional ports. It is very popular with people from Phoney	To request a report on MV Blackjack's last port of call
018	2115	Low Control	Port Facility No. 3 reported an attempt by an unauthorized truck to enter the Port Facility	To request details of the incident



SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
019	2125	High Control	Intelligence reports that a substantial amount of building material such as plywood boards, timber, nails and paint had been sent to MV Fireball	To consider purpose of the materials (For disguise)
020	2140	Low Control	Port Facility No. 3 reported that the truck was unladen. The security staff did not record details of the truck, and the driver was denied entry because he had no identification	Assess and report to Designated Authority. Coordinate to warn other Port facilities
021	2235	Low Control	Humbug cruise terminal reports MV Courtship sailed	To report
022	2245	High Control	DA has ordered Security Level 2 to be implemented for all ports and Port Facilities	To inform all Port Facilities and vessels in port
023	2300	Low Control	Port Facility No. 4 reported that a ship's SSO refused to sign the DoS because he felt his ship could not comply because it had been maintaining Security Level 1	Advise ship SSO of the consequences and coordinate with ship agent if required
024	2320	Low Control	Ship agreed to raise her Security Level measures to those for Level 2	To determine if measures are acceptable
025	2350	Low Control	Port Facility No. 4 and ship exchanged DoS	To report
026	2355	Low Control	Cepaland naval vessels operating outside Phoney territorial waters have not been able to positively identify MV Fireball	To assess situation and provide direction
<i>Date: D +1</i>				
027	0010	High Control	Intelligence reports indicate that MV Fireball may be trying to reach the international shipping lanes out of Phoney port to blend in with the other shipping traffic	Cepaland Navy to re-assess situation if necessary



SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
028	0025	High Control	<i>The Phoney government announces at a World Health Organization Conference in Geneva that it has dispatched a tanker, escorted by 2 Phoney patrol boats on a humanitarian mission to assist a village on a remote atoll that is claimed by Phoney. The atoll, which has its own indigenous people, was struck by an earthquake a month ago. The atoll is the subject of conflicting claims of sovereignty by both Cepaland and a Big Power.</i>	<i>Navy to coordinate with the Coast Guard in a review of plans against MV Fireball and the Phoney patrol boats</i>
030	0045	Low Control	<i>Coast Guard patrol boat has intercepted one speedboat carrying 5 armed personnel as it was speeding away from a cargo ship engaged in coastal trade</i>	<i>To assess situation and provide direction</i>
031	0100	Low Control	<i>Humbug cruise terminal reports that 6 passengers from MV Blackjack could not be traced after they had left on a city tour organized by the ship, and had to delay sailing</i>	<i>Immigration to coordinate with Police for assistance in locating the missing passengers. Port authority to request search of missing passengers' cabins</i>
032	0140	Low Control	<i>Search of missing passengers' cabin revealed nothing incriminating. MV Blackjack requested ship agent to take custody of the missing passengers' belongings</i>	<i>Ship agent to seek Customs approval to land the belongings. Port Administration and Port Facility to be informed</i>
033	0200	Low Control	<i>MV Blackjack sailed without the 6 missing passengers</i>	<i>Crew and passenger lists to be updated and distributed to the appropriate agencies</i>
034	0205	Low Control	<i>An SOS has been received from MV Courtship together with an SSAS alert</i>	<i>Maritime authorities to authenticate source and relay agency; and seek details from ship agent</i>



SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
035	0215	Low control	Report from the agency handling the city tour for MV Blackjack states that the 6 passengers did not join the tour even though their names were on the tour list	To request relevant agencies to investigate the 6 passengers' whereabouts
036	0230	Low Control	MV Courtship has been located just inside Cepaland territorial waters	Coast Guard to deploy vessels to assist
037	0300	Low Control	Hijackers on board MV Courtship have taken over the bridge and have an unspecified number of hostages in the ballroom	To hand over communications for negotiations with the hijackers to the Coast Guard or other State authority
038	0325	Low Control	Hijackers demand a ransom of US\$30M and safe passage to Phoney for the release of the ship and its passengers	To organize for negotiations and plan a military solution
039	0335	High Control	Cepaland government announces the increase of Security Level to Level 3	All participants to activate plans to implement Security Level 3 measures.
040	0345	Low Control	Report from the Foreign Ministry: President of Phoney has sent a confidential note that Phoney will accept the hijackers and take them into custody	To facilitate ground arrangements for transfer of custody
041	0410	High Control	Navy reports that a tanker, MV Lavared of approximately the same dwt as MV Fireball is heading toward Humbug among other shipping. There is no sign of the Phoney patrol boats.	To search database for further descriptors of MV Fireball and provide information to Navy
042	0440	Low Control	Position of MV Lavared is reported by the Navy ship shadowing her to be within reporting range of Humbug port. Humbug port authority has not heard from MV Lavared	To task Navy ship to signal MV Lavared to contact Humbug port authority



SERIAL NO.	TIME	FROM	HIGH CONTROL INJECT / LOW CONTROL RESPONSE	PARTICIPANT'S EXPECTED RESPONSE
043	0455	Low Control	<i>Details of MV Fireball sent to the Navy ship do not exactly correspond with the external features of MV Lavared, but it is assessed that the differences in the latter could be the result of a quick fabrication job with temporary materials. The Navy ship added that an assessment is difficult on this moonless night, using just their signal lantern as a searchlight.</i>	<i>To direct the Navy ship to stop, board and search MV Lavared. To direct all Naval and Coast Guard patrols to sight and identify all shipping heading for Cepaland ports.</i>
044	0515	Low Control	<i>Navy ship reports that MV Lavared has responded that she is proceeding to Humbug port on a routine port call.</i>	<i>To verify MV Lavared's port call with the Humbug port authority</i>
045	0530	Low Control	<i>Port authority confirms that a MV Lavared is scheduled to call at Humbug port this morning</i>	<i>To check identity descriptor of MV Lavared</i>
046	0550	Low Control	<i>Humbug port authority reports that MV Lavared is a container ship of 10,000 dwt</i>	<i>To issue identity descriptor of MV Lavared</i>
047	0600	High Control	<i>Chief of the General Staff Cepaland issues a warning to all ports that MV Lavared may pose a threat of blocking the port entrance by sinking herself in a narrow approach channel</i>	<i>To direct Cepaland special forces to board by helicopter and arrest MV Lavared</i>
048	0630	Chief Control	<i>End of exercise</i>	<i>Participants to summarize their perceptions of the events</i>