



UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT INVOLVING FIRE/EXPLOSION/SINKING OF F/V CAPT. ADAM

ON 01/09/2003



MISLE Activity Number: 1752100
ORIGINATING UNIT: MSO TAMPA
MISLE Activity Owner: COMMANDANT (G-MRI)
MISLE Activity Controller: COMMANDANT (G-MRI)
MISLE Case Number: 108560

I. INCIDENT BRIEF

MAJOR/ SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT
FIRE/SINKING/PERSONNEL CASUALTY
F/V CAPT. ADAM (D618647), 106 GT, SHRIMP TRAWLER
10 NM WEST OF DUNEDIN PASS

Narrative Brief:

While underway in the Gulf of Mexico 10 nautical miles West North West of Dunedin Pass on 09JAN03, the F/V CAPT. ADAM (D618647) experienced an engine room fire at approximately 1815. The Captain of the vessel, Mr. [REDACTED], advised the Mate, Mr. [REDACTED], to muster on the stern and await instructions to abandon the vessel. The Master attempted to extinguish the blaze, stemming from the generator, with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher with negative results. After several attempts to re-enter the space failed due to smoke consuming the engine room, the Captain radioed a nearby vessel for assistance and decided to abandon the vessel. As the Captain proceeded down the port side of the vessel, passing the engine room access door, a large explosion occurred resulting in severe burns to the Master's left and right hands and both forearms. Both the Master and the Mate were able to abandon the vessel wearing life jackets and within 20 minutes, the F/V NATHAN retrieved both crewmembers from the water. The Master was brought to Tampa General Hospital for emergency care to treat his injuries. The vessel sank in approximately 48 feet of water, resulting in a diesel sheen that oil spill recovery contractors eventually subdued within a few days.

Incident Narrative:

On January 09, 2003 at approximately 1500, the F/V CAPT. ADAM departed the dock at Northside Seafood in Tarpon Springs, FL, for the purpose of conducting fishing operations in the Gulf of Mexico from Tarpon to Naples. The Captain of the vessel was Mr. [REDACTED], and the Mate was Mr. [REDACTED]. The F/V CAPT. ADAM is a 66ft, 106 GT, US-flagged, wood hull shrimp trawler home ported in Holiday, FL. In March 2002, the vessel underwent a voluntary dockside examination conducted by TAMMS and was issued Fishing Vessel Safety Decal #91632. At the onset of this voyage, no machinery or electrical problems were noted by the Captain.

At approximately 1815, while transiting SSW on a course of 255 degrees in the Gulf of Mexico, the Captain noted an interruption in electrical power demonstrated by flickering of the vessel's lights. The vessel's operating gauges on the bridge did not indicate any abnormalities. Mr. [REDACTED] departed the bridge to investigate the cause of the power loss and noted smoke coming from the engine room. Mr. [REDACTED] entered the engine room and saw flames in the vicinity of the generator forward of the main diesel engine and returned to the port side main deck and advised the Mate to muster on the stern and await instructions to abandon the vessel. Mr. [REDACTED] re-entered the engine room and attempted to extinguish the blaze with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher, noting that the fire diminished briefly but regained ignition and began to burn out of control.

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Mr. [REDACTED] returned to the wheelhouse and radioed a nearby vessel, the F/V NATHAN, for assistance. The Captain noted that by this time, heavy black/gray smoke was emitting from the engine room. The Captain then attempted to access the engine room through the forward berthing compartment noting that heavy smoke was present in this space as well, deterring him from gaining access. Mr. [REDACTED] returned to the wheelhouse again to ensure that power had been secured to the engine room and made the decision to abandon the vessel. As Mr. [REDACTED] proceeded down the port side of the main deck adjacent to the engine room access door, a large explosion occurred resulting in severe burns to his left and right hands and both forearms. The Captain jumped into the water for fear that his was on fire. Both the Captain and the Mate were able to don their lifejackets after abandoning the vessel into the water that was reportedly 57 degrees Fahrenheit. Within 20 minutes the F/V NATHAN retrieved both crewmembers from the water and proceeded to contact the Coast Guard for assistance.

At approximately 1854, Coast Guard Group St Petersburg received a distress call from the F/V NATHAN requiring medical attention for the two crewmen from the F/V CAPT. ADAM. A Coast Guard Station Sand Key 41' UTB recovered the two crewmen from the F/V NATHAN at 2028 and returned to the Station where EMS awaited for the crewmen. At 2040 the Mr. [REDACTED] was transferred via EMS to Tampa General Hospital to receive treatment for his injuries. The F/V CAPT. ADAM sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28' 04.7" N, 083' 02.0" W.

On January 10, 2003, MSO Tampa Investigators visited Mr. [REDACTED] at Tampa General Hospital to conduct an interview. Mr. [REDACTED] was under the care of the Burn Unit, where he received treatment for 2nd degree burns to his right and left hands and both forearms. His left hand required the most attention according to the Tampa General staff, stating that they intended to conduct a skin graft to repair the damage to his left palm. Hospital staff indicated that Mr. [REDACTED] had not been tested for the presence of drugs in his system when he was admitted. However, they did take blood samples and MSO IO's inquired if drug test results could be ascertained as soon as possible. MSO IO's contacted the owner of the vessel, Mr. John Williams and requested that he ensure drug testing was completed.

At the time of the interview Mr. [REDACTED] was calm, coherent and in relatively good spirits. He stated that he was unsure why the explosion occurred, but believed the diesel fuel tanks on either side of the generator must have ignited. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that when he initially attempted to extinguish the blaze, the exhaust lagging on the generator was on fire and that the fuel line around the generator did not seem to be compromised.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that on January 8, 2003 the vessel's generator, a 3-71 Detroit with approximately 30KW, overheated due to a water leak. Repairs were conducted dockside the same day and the generator was noted to operate without further problems. He also stated that he would occasionally spray Ether into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. Ether was not used to start the generator on January 9, when the vessel departed for the voyage. The can of Ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. According to Mr. [REDACTED], there were no other explosive or flammable materials stored in the engine room, and that the bilges were clean and free of oily waste. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the fuel hose supplying the generator with diesel was fire rated with hydraulic fittings at either end. He also stated that all engine room fuel hoses were in good condition. Approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel was on board the vessel distributed among four fuel tanks.

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Findings of fact:

1. The F/V CAPT. ADAM is a 66ft, 106 GT, US-flagged, wood hull shrimp trawler home ported in Holiday, FL. In March 2002, the vessel underwent a voluntary dockside examination conducted by TAMMS and was issued Fishing Vessel Safety Decal #91632.
2. On January 8, 2003, the vessel's 3-71 Detroit Diesel generator overheated due to a water leak. Repairs were conducted dockside the same day and the generator was noted to operate without further problems. The fuel hose supplying the generator with diesel was fire rated with hydraulic fittings at either end and in good condition. Ether was occasionally sprayed into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. The can of ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. No other explosive or flammable materials were stored in the engine room, and the bilges were clean and free of oily waste.
3. On January 09, 2003 at approximately 1500, the F/V CAPT. ADAM departed the dock at Northside Seafood in Tarpon Springs, FL, for the purpose of conducting fishing operations in the Gulf of Mexico from Tarpon to Naples.
4. At approximately 1815, while transiting SSW on a course of 255 degrees in the Gulf of Mexico, the Captain noted an interruption in electrical power demonstrated by flickering of lights.
5. The Captain of the vessel discovered that the generator in the engine room was on fire and made several attempts to extinguish the blaze with negative results.
6. Mr. [REDACTED] radioed a nearby vessel, the F/V NATHAN, for assistance. It was noted by the crew that by this time, heavy black/gray smoke was emitting from the engine room.
7. Mr. [REDACTED] made the decision to abandon the vessel and he proceeded down the port side of the main deck to the stern of the vessel. When he was adjacent to the engine room access door, a large explosion occurred resulting in severe burns to his left and right hands and both forearms. Both the Captain and the Mate were able to don their lifejackets and abandon the vessel entering the water that was 57 degrees Fahrenheit.
8. The F/V NATHAN retrieved both crewmembers from the water and proceeded to contact the Coast Guard for assistance. At approximately 1854, Coast Guard Group St Petersburg received a distress call from the F/V NATHAN requiring medical attention for the two crewmen from the F/V CAPT. ADAM. A Coast Guard Station Sand Key 41' UTB recovered the two crewmen from the F/V NATHAN at 2028 and returned to the Station where EMS awaited for the crewmen.
9. The F/V CAPT. ADAM sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28' 04.7" N, 083' 02.0" W. Approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel was on board the vessel distributed among four fuel tanks.
10. Mr. [REDACTED] was transferred via EMS to Tampa General Hospital where he received treatment for 2nd degree burns to his right and left hands and both forearms under care

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of the Burn Unit at Tampa General Hospital. His left hand required a skin graft to repair the damage to his left palm.

Conclusions:

On January 9, 2003, The F/V CAPT. ADAM experienced a generator fire and subsequent explosion resulting in severe burns to the operator. Both crewmembers were retrieved and brought to shore safely. The vessel sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28' 04.7" N, 083' 02.0" W, with approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel on board.

The circumstances surrounding the fire, explosion and sinking of the vessel are speculative. This is due to the fact that the vessel was never recovered. Thus, MSO Tampa Investigators could not examine vital evidence that could attribute to the cause of this Serious Marine Incident.

According to the Captain of the F/V CAPT. ADAM, Mr. [REDACTED], the vessel's generator caught fire and began to burn out of control although attempts were made to extinguish the blaze with a CO2 fire extinguisher. Further attempts to extinguish the blaze were thwarted by inaccessibility to the vessel's engine room due to heavy smoke. The Captain stated that on January 8, 2003, the vessel's 3-71 Detroit Diesel generator overheated due to a water leak. Repairs were conducted dockside the same day and the generator was noted to operate without further problems. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the fuel hose supplying the generator with diesel was fire rated and equipped with hydraulic fittings at either end. According to Mr. [REDACTED], all fuel supply and return hoses in the engine room, including the generator, were in good condition. It is likely that the generator fuel supply hose melted and began to burn after the fire re-gained ignition.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he would occasionally spray Ether into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. The can of ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. According to Mr. [REDACTED], no other explosive or flammable materials were stored in the engine room, and the bilges were clean and free of oily waste.

The vessel's diesel fuel tanks were located in the engine room, totaling approximately 4,000 gallons capacity. On the day of the incident, the vessel's tanks were full, having been fueled to capacity for a long fishing trip. Two diesel fuel tanks supplying the generator were located port and starboard, within approximately five feet of the generator. Due to a malfunction of the vessel's generator, possibly overheating, the generator's exhaust lagging caught fire and began to burn out of control, consuming electrical wiring and the overhead of the wooden deck. It is possible that the fuel tanks on either side of the generator ignited and released an amount of energy equivalent to an explosion. It is noted however, that the can of Ether stored in the engine room undoubtedly exploded contributing to the ignition of the vessel's fuel tanks.

Recommendations:

1. Recommend that the U.S. Coast Guard consider implementation of fishing vessel regulations requiring fixed gas fire extinguishing systems be installed on Documented commercial fishing industry vessels operating beyond the boundary line that carry less than 16 individuals on board, regardless of build date and vessel length.

2. MSO Tampa Fishing Vessel Examiners share lessons learned from this casualty and ensure that fishing vessel crews are knowledgeable in proper fire fighting procedures including suppression and containment of the fire.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Incident Summary

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10. Mr. [REDACTED] was transferred via EMS to Tampa General Hospital where he received treatment for 2nd degree burns to his right and left hands and both forearms under care of the Burn Unit at Tampa General Hospital. His left hand required a skin graft to repair the damage to his left palm.

Conclusions:

On January 9, 2003, The F/V CAPT. ADAM experienced a generator fire and subsequent explosion resulting in severe burns to the operator. Both crewmembers were retrieved and brought to shore safely. The vessel sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28' 04.7" N, 083' 02.0" W, with approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel on board.

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The vessel's diesel fuel tanks were located in the engine room, totaling approximately 4,000 gallons capacity. On the day of the incident, the vessel's tanks were full, having been fueled to capacity for a long fishing trip. Two diesel fuel tanks supplying the generator were located port and starboard, within approximately five feet of the generator. Due to a malfunction of the vessel's generator, possibly overheating, the generator's exhaust lagging caught fire and began to burn out of control, consuming electrical wiring and the overhead of the wooden deck. It is possible that the fuel tanks on either side of the generator ignited and released an amount of energy equivalent to an explosion. It is noted however, that the can of Ether stored in the engine room undoubtedly exploded contributing to the ignition of the vessel's fuel tanks.

Recommendations:

1. Recommend that the U.S. Coast Guard consider implementation of fishing vessel regulations requiring fixed gas fire extinguishing systems be installed on Documented commercial fishing

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industry vessels operating beyond the boundary line that carry less than 16 individuals on board, regardless of build date and vessel length.

2. MSO Tampa Fishing Vessel Examiners share lessons learned from this casualty and ensure that fishing vessel crews are knowledgeable in proper fire fighting procedures including suppression and containment of the fire.

Incident Involved: Marine Casualty, Reportable

Level of Investigation: Informal

IMO Classification: Routine

USCG Classification: Major Marine Casualty

Was this a Serious Marine Incident? Yes

Was a Marine Board Convened by Commandant? No

Personnel Casualty Summary

Total Missing (Active Search) = 0

Total Missing (Presumed Lost) = 0

Total Dead = 0

Total Injured = 1

Total Uninjured = 1

Total People at Risk = 2

Other Personnel (Not at Risk) = 0

Vessel(s) Status Summary

Actual Total Loss(es) = 1

Total Constructive Loss, Salvaged = 0

Total Constructive Loss, Unsalvaged = 0

Damaged = 0

Undamaged = 1

Property Damage Summary/Total Damage

Vessel(s) = \$

Cargo = \$

Facility(s) = \$

Other = \$

Waterway Mobility Summary

Vessel Delays (including speed restrictions): None

III. ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THIS REPORT

Actions on Recommendations

Safety Recommendation #5539: the U.S. Coast Guard consider implementation of fishing vessel regulations requiring fixed gas/ water fire extinguishing systems

Recommend that the U.S. Coast Guard consider implementation of fishing vessel regulations requiring fixed gas/ water fire extinguishing systems be installed on Documented commercial fishing industry vessels operating beyond the boundary line that carry less than 16 individuals on board, regardless of build date and vessel length. By doing so, it would enable the crew to more effectively fight a fire on board the vessel without having to enter a space.

Date Created: 03/04/2003
Current Owner Unit: COMMANDANT (G-MOA)
Date Last Modified: 07/25/2003 10:18:59 AM
Priority: Normal

Endorsement(s):

>USER: [REDACTED] W./TAMMS
>TIME: 03/21/2003 12:01
>STATUS: --->Forward
>NEW OWNER: 07M
MSO Tampa concurs with recommendation as written.

>USER: Schauer, Todd J./07M
>TIME: 05/27/2003 11:20
>STATUS: Forward--->Forward
>NEW OWNER: GMOA
D7 endorsement: Partially concur. Fixed fire extinguishing systems should be considered/included in any regulation initiatives for new construction fishing vessels. These requirements should not apply to existing fishing vessels. Most machinery spaces on existing fishing vessels are not designed to prevent the escape of fire fighting agent and would make its use ineffective. The leakage of fire fighting agent could also occur into other adjacent manned spaces creating a hazard for personnel.

>USER: Deaver, David W./GMOA
>TIME: 07/25/2003 10:18
>STATUS: Forward--->Final Agency Action
>NEW OWNER: GMOA
The Final Agency Action has been determined and approved by W. D. Rabe by direction of the Commandant.

Final Agency Action:

Concur- Alternate Acceptable Action
>Deaver, David W./GMOA
>07/25/2003 10:19:

We concur with the intent of this recommendation. However, we do not believe that the implementation of regulations is needed at this time. Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 5-86 provides a comprehensive safety program that owners of small fishing vessels are encouraged to follow. The use of automatic fire detection devices and fixed fire extinguishing systems are both recommended in this document. Since casualty statistics have not shown an upward trend in fires involving small fishing vessels, we believe that the voluntary program highlighted in NVIC 5-86 remains adequate.

Required Actions:

Proposed Start Date: 03/04/2003	Actual Start Date: 03/04/2003
Proposed Completion Date: 03/04/2003	Actual Completion Date: 03/04/2003

Estimated Effort to Complete: 0 Staff Days
Action Status:
Action Commentary:

Safety Recommendation #5540: MSO Tampa Fishing Vessel Examiners share lessons learned from this casualty

MSO Tampa Fishing Vessel Examiners share lessons learned from this casualty and ensure that fishing vessel crews are knowledgeable in proper fire fighting procedures including suppression and containment of the fire.

Date Created: 03/04/2003
Current Owner Unit: MSO TAMPA
Date Last Modified: 03/21/2003 12:04:30 PM
Priority: Normal

Endorsement(s):

>USER: [REDACTED] W./TAMMS
>TIME: 03/21/2003 12:02
>STATUS: --->Final Agency Action
>NEW OWNER: TAMMS
MSO Tampa concurs w/ recommendation as written.

Final Agency Action:

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Required Actions:

Proposed Start Date: 03/04/2003

Actual Start Date: 03/04/2003

Proposed Completion Date: 03/04/2003

Actual Completion Date: 03/04/2003

Estimated Effort to Complete: 0 Staff Days

Action Status:


Action Commentary:

Safety Alerts

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT

Subjects of the Investigation

Vessels. The following vessels were subjects of this investigation. Particulars for each vessel follow.

Vessel Name:	CAPT. ADAM
Flag:	UNITED STATES
Vessel Identification Number:	618647
Call Sign:	
Status:	Actual Total Loss
Role:	Involved in a Marine Casualty
Vessel Class, Type, Sub-Type:	Fishing Vessel, Fish Catching Vessel, General
Gross Tonnage(GRT):	
Net Tonnage(NRT):	
Deadweight Tons:	
Length:	
Home/Hailing Port:	
Keel Laid Date:	
Delivery Date:	
Place of Construction:	ST AUGUSTINE FL, ,
Builder Name:	DESCO MARINE
Propulsion:	
Horsepower:	
Master:	
Classification Society:	
Owner:	WILLIAMS, JOHN A 6631 RIDGE TOP DRIVE NEW PORT RICHEY, FL, 34655
Operator:	 US
Inspection Subchapter:	
Most Recent Vessel Inspection Activity:	

Vessel Name:	F/V NATHAN
Flag:	
Vessel Identification Number:	
Call Sign:	
Status:	Undamaged
Role:	Transiting Vicinity of Primary Subject

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Vessel Class, Type, Sub-Type: Fishing Vessel, Fish Catching Vessel, General
Gross Tonnage(GRT):
Net Tonnage(NRT):
Deadweight Tons:
Length:
Home/Hailing Port:
Keel Laid Date:
Delivery Date:
Place of Construction:
Builder Name:
Propulsion: Diesel
Horsepower:
Master:
Classification Society:
Owner:
Operator:
Inspection Subchapter:
Most Recent Vessel Inspection Activity:

Facilities. The following facilities were subjects of this investigation. Particulars for each facility follow.

Parties and Organizations. The following people and organizations were subjects of this investigation.

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Good Samaritan
Gender: m
Age:
SSN: - -
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number():
Address():
Comments: Master of F/V NATHAN

[REDACTED]
Status: Exposure Injury
Role: Crewmember
Gender: M
Age: [REDACTED]
SSN: [REDACTED]
Birth Date: [REDACTED]
Email Address:
Phone Number(Primary): [REDACTED]

Report of Investigation

Address(Home/Primary Residence):



Comments:

Master/ Operator of F/V CAPT. ADAM

Williams, John A.

Status:

Not at Risk

Role:

Reporting Party

Gender:

M

Age:

SSN:

- -

Birth Date:

Email Address:

Phone Number(Work):

727-395-5083

Address(Mailing):

6631 Ridge Top Dr.

New Port Richie, FL 34655

Comments:

Owner of F/V CAPT ADAM

Drug and Alcohol Testing. The following people have been determined by the Coast Guard, Law Enforcement Personnel, and/or the Marine Employer to have been directly involved in a Serious Marine Incident as defined in 46 CFR 4.03-2:

Williams, John A.; Reporting Party

Response Resources. The following incident response resources were subjects of this investigation.

Other Subjects. The following were subjects of this investigation.

Waterway Segment(s). The following waterway segment(s) were subjects of this investigation.

Gulf of Mexico

Role: Location

Local Name: Gulf of Mexico

Description:

Incident Information

Location(s).

Description

Gulf of Mexico

Aboard Vessel: CAPT. ADAM: Gulf of Mexico

Latitude

28 04.7 N

28 10.0 N

Longitude

083 02.0 E

082 59.0 W

Sequence of Events.

Report of Investigation

01/08/2003 11:27 to 01/08/2003 11:27 (Estimated): VsIs master conducted repairs to the Generator (Gen set was over heating due to a water leak.

Action Type: Engineering Operations - Unscheduled, Corrective Repair
Action Class: Repair generator and electrical systems
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: Aboard Vessel: CAPT. ADAM: Gulf of Mexico
Latitude: 28 10.0 N Longitude: 082 59.0 W

Subject(s) and Details:

Table with 4 columns: Name, Type, Status, Role. Row 1: [Redacted], Party, Exposure Injury, Crewmember

Details Filed: Detail Description

Mr. [Redacted] stated that on January 8, 2003 the vessel's generator, a 3-71 Detroit with approximately 30KW, overheated due to a water leak. Repairs were conducted dockside the same day and the generator was noted to operate without further problems. He also stated that he would occasionally spray Ether into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. Ether was not used to start the generator on January 9, when the vessel departed for the voyage. The can of Ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. According to Mr. [Redacted], there were no other explosive or flammable materials stored in the engine room, and that the bilges were clean and free of oily waste. Mr. [Redacted] stated that the fuel hose supplying the generator with diesel was fire rated with hydraulic fittings at either end. He also stated that all engine room fuel hoses were in good condition. Approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel was on board the vessel distributed among four fuel tanks.

01/09/2003 18:15 to 01/09/2003 18:23 (Estimated): Vessel's generator on fire - spread throughout engine room.

Event Type: Fire
Event Class: Initial - out of control
Event Subclass:
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: Gulf of Mexico
Latitude: 28 04.7 N Longitude: 083 02.0 E

Subject(s) and Details:

Table with 4 columns: Name, Type, Status, Role. Row 1: CAPT. ADAM, Vessel, Actual Total Loss, Involved in a Marine Casualty

Details Filed: Detail Description

SERIOUS MARINE INCIDENT
FIRE/SINKING/PERSONNEL CASUALTY
F/V CAPT. ADAM - D618647, 106 GT, SHRIMP TRAWLER
10 NM WEST OF DUNEDIN PASS

Narrative Brief:

Report of Investigation

While underway in the Gulf of Mexico 10 nautical miles West North West of Dunedin Pass on 09JAN03, the F/V CAPT. ADAM (D618647) experienced an engine room fire at approximately 1815. The Captain of the vessel, Mr. [REDACTED], advised the Mate, Mr. [REDACTED], to muster on the stern and await instructions to abandon the vessel. The Master attempted to extinguish the blaze, stemming from the generator, with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher with negative results. After several attempts to re-enter the space failed due to smoke consuming the engine room, the Captain radioed a nearby vessel for assistance and decided to abandon the vessel. As the Captain proceeded down the port side of the vessel, passing the engine room access door, a large explosion occurred resulting in severe burns to the Master's left and right hands and both forearms. Both the Master and the Mate were able to abandon the vessel wearing life jackets and within 20 minutes, the F/V NATHAN retrieved both crewmembers from the water. The Master was brought to Tampa General Hospital for emergency care to treat his injuries. The vessel sank in approximately 48 feet of water, resulting in a diesel sheen that oil spill recovery contractors eventually subdued within a few days.

Incident Narrative:

On January 09, 2003 at approximately 1500, the F/V CAPT. ADAM departed the dock at Northside Seafood in Tarpon Springs, FL, for the purpose of conducting fishing operations in the Gulf of Mexico from Tarpon to Naples. The Captain of the vessel was Mr. [REDACTED], and the Mate was Mr. [REDACTED]. The F/V CAPT. ADAM is a 66ft, 106 GT, US-flagged, wood hull shrimp trawler home ported in Holiday, FL. In March 2002, the vessel underwent a voluntary dockside examination conducted by TAMMS and was issued Fishing Vessel Safety Decal #91632. At the onset of this voyage, no machinery or electrical problems were noted by the Captain.

At approximately 1815, while transiting SSW on a course of 255 degrees in the Gulf of Mexico, the Captain noted an interruption in electrical power demonstrated by flickering of the vessel's lights. The vessel's operating gauges on the bridge did not indicate any abnormalities. Mr. [REDACTED] departed the bridge to investigate the cause of the power loss and noted smoke coming from the engine room. Mr. [REDACTED] entered the engine room and saw flames in the vicinity of the generator forward of the main diesel engine and returned to the port side main deck and advised the Mate to muster on the stern and await instructions to abandon the vessel. Mr. [REDACTED] re-entered the engine room and attempted to extinguish the blaze with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher, noting that the fire diminished briefly but regained ignition and began to burn out of control.

Mr. [REDACTED] returned to the wheelhouse and radioed a nearby vessel, the F/V NATHAN, for assistance. The Captain noted that by this time, heavy black/gray smoke was emitting from the engine room. The Captain then attempted to access the engine room through the forward berthing compartment noting that heavy smoke was present in this space as well, deterring him from gaining access. Mr. [REDACTED] returned to the wheelhouse again to ensure that power had been secured to the engine room and made the decision to abandon the vessel. As Mr. [REDACTED] proceeded down the port side of the main deck adjacent to the engine room access door, a large explosion occurred resulting in severe burns to his left and right hands and both forearms. The Captain jumped into the water for fear of being on fire. Both the Captain and the Mate were able to don their lifejackets after abandoning the vessel and entering the water that was reportedly 57 degrees Fahrenheit. Within 20 minutes the F/V NATHAN retrieved both crewmembers from the water and proceeded to contact the Coast Guard for assistance.

At approximately 1854, Coast Guard Group St Petersburg received a distress call from the F/V NATHAN requiring medical attention for the two crewmen from the F/V CAPT. ADAM. A Coast Guard Station Sand Key 41' UTB recovered the two crewmen from the F/V NATHAN at 2028 and returned to the Station where EMS awaited for the crewmen. At 2040 the Mr. [REDACTED] was transferred via EMS to Tampa General Hospital to receive treatment for his injuries. The F/V CAPT. ADAM sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28° 04.7' N, 083° 02.0' W.

Report of Investigation

On January 10, 2003, MSO Tampa Investigators visited Mr. [REDACTED] at Tampa General Hospital to conduct an interview. Mr. [REDACTED] was under the care of the Burn Unit, where he received treatment for 2nd degree burns to his right and left hands and both forearms. His left hand required the most attention according to the Tampa General staff, stating that they intended to conduct a skin graft to repair the damage to his left palm. Hospital staff indicated that Mr. [REDACTED] had not been tested for the presence of drugs in his system when he was admitted. However, they did take blood samples and MSO IO's inquired if drug test results could be ascertained as soon as possible. MSO IO's contacted the owner of the vessel, Mr. John Williams and requested that he ensure drug testing was completed.

At the time of the interview Mr. [REDACTED] was calm, coherent and in relatively good spirits. He stated that he was unsure why the explosion occurred, but believed the diesel fuel tanks on either side of the generator must have ignited. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that when he initially attempted to extinguish the blaze, the exhaust lagging on the generator was on fire and that the fuel line around the generator did not seem to be compromised.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that on January 8, 2003 the vessel's generator, a 3-71 Detroit with approximately 30KW, overheated due to a water leak. Repairs were conducted dockside the same day and the generator was noted to operate without further problems. He also stated that he would occasionally spray Ether into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. Ether was not used to start the generator on January 9, when the vessel departed for the voyage. The can of Ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. According to Mr. [REDACTED], there were no other explosive or flammable materials stored in the engine room, and that the bilges were clean and free of oily waste. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the fuel hose supplying the generator with diesel was fire rated with hydraulic fittings at either end. He also stated that all engine room fuel hoses were in good condition. Approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel was on board the vessel distributed among four fuel tanks.

Conclusions:

On January 9, 2003, The F/V CAPT. ADAM experienced a generator fire and subsequent explosion resulting in severe burns to the operator. Both crewmembers were retrieved and brought to shore safely. The vessel sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28' 04.7" N, 083' 02.0" W, with approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel on board.

The circumstances surrounding the fire, explosion and sinking of the vessel are speculative. This is due to the fact that the vessel was never recovered. Thus, MSO Tampa Investigators could not examine vital evidence that could attribute to the cause of this Serious Marine Incident.

According to the Captain of the F/V CAPT. ADAM, Mr. [REDACTED], the vessel's generator caught fire and began to burn out of control although attempts were made to extinguish the blaze with a CO2 fire extinguisher. Further attempts to extinguish the blaze were thwarted by inaccessibility to the vessel's engine room due to heavy smoke. The Captain stated that on January 8, 2003, the vessel's 3-71 Detroit Diesel generator overheated due to a water leak. Repairs were conducted dockside the same day and the generator was noted to operate without further problems. After departing the dock on the day of the incident, no engine room rounds were conducted to verify the performance of the generator and ensure it was operating normally. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the fuel hose supplying the generator with diesel was fire rated and equipped with hydraulic fittings at either end. According to Mr. [REDACTED], all fuel supply and return hoses in the engine room, including the generator, were in good condition. It is likely that the generator fuel supply hose melted and began to burn after the fire re-gained ignition.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he would occasionally spray Ether into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. The can of ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. According to Mr. [REDACTED], no other explosive or flammable materials were stored in the engine room, and the bilges were clean and free of oily waste.

Report of Investigation

The vessel's diesel fuel tanks were located in the engine room, totaling approximately 4,000 gallons capacity. On the day of the incident, the vessel's tanks were full, having been fueled to capacity for a long fishing trip. Two diesel fuel tanks supplying the generator were located port and starboard, within approximately five feet of the generator. Due to a malfunction of the vessel's generator, possibly overheating, the generator's exhaust lagging caught fire and began to burn out of control, consuming electrical wiring and the overhead of the wooden deck. It is possible that the fuel tanks on either side of the generator ignited and released an amount of energy equivalent to an explosion. It is noted however, that the can of Ether stored in the engine room undoubtedly exploded contributing to the ignition of the vessel's fuel tanks.

Details Filed: Fire Details

Was the Vessel Configured with Main Vertical Zones? No

Spaces Affected:

Initial:

Space Where Fire Occurred: Machinery Space
Description of Space: Engine room contained MDE, diesel generator and four diesel fuel tanks
Extent of Damage: Vessel's generator caught fire and burned out of control

Fire Boundaries

Fire Boundaries Intact: Compromised
Fire Boundaries Compromised: Engine room access
Description of Compromise: Engine room door open

Did approved passive fire fighting materials perform as expected: Unknown

Ventilation Fire Dampers Fitted: Unknown
Ventilation System Active: Unknown

Fire Screen Doors Fitted: No

Windows Fitted: Unknown

Ignition and Fuel:

Ignition Source Known: Yes
Source Category: 10.7- Mechanical fault or breakdown
Source Description: Due to a malfunction of the vessel's generator (overheating), the generator's exhaust lagging caught fire and ignited near by equipment and vessel's structure.

Fuel Type(s):

<u>Initial or Secondary</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>HAZMAT</u>	<u>Source (liquid fuel only)</u>
Initial	8.6- Liquid Fuel	Diesel for Generator	No	9.7- Oil soaked insulation material

Pattern of Spread: Slow at first; master used CO2 fire extinguisher at first (was able to put fire out) but then fire re-flashed and spread out of control.

Description of Smoke: Heavy Gray and Black smoke.

Report of Investigation

01/09/2003 18:20 to 01/09/2003 18:22 (Estimated): Master of F/V CAPT ADAMS sent a radio call for assistance. Call was received by F/V NATHAN.

Action Type: Bridge Operations - Bridge Communications
Action Class: Establish and maintain VHF radio communications with other vessels and appropriate shore authorities
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: Gulf of Mexico
Latitude: 28 04.7 N Longitude: 083 02.0 E

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
[REDACTED]	Party	Exposure Injury	Crewmember

Details Filed: Communications Details

Communications Description: The Master radioed a the nearby F/V NATHAN for assistance. F/V NATHAN radioed CG Grp. St. Pete.
Communications Type: Ship to Ship
Sent or Received: Received
Means of Communication: Communications Equipment
Frequency/Channel: Channel 16
Power Setting:
Communication Acknowledged: Yes
Communication Protocols:
Communications Effectiveness: Communication Effective
Effectiveness Description: radio call for assistance recieved and acted on.
Interference Difficulties:
Interference Description:

01/09/2003 18:24 to 01/09/2003 18:25 (Estimated): Explosion occurred in engine room attributed to fuel tanks.

Event Type: Explosion
Event Class: Boiling Liquid / Expanding Vapor Explosion
Event Subclass:
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: Gulf of Mexico
Latitude: 28 04.7 N Longitude: 083 02.0 E

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
CAPT. ADAM	Vessel	Actual Total Loss	Involved in a Marine Casualty

Details Filed: Detail Description

On January 09, 2003 at approximately 1500, the F/V CAPT. ADAM departed the dock at Northside Seafood in Tarpon Springs, FL, for the purpose of conducting fishing operations in the Gulf of Mexico from Tarpon to Naples. The Captain of the vessel was Mr. [REDACTED], and the Mate was Mr. [REDACTED]. The F/V CAPT. ADAM is a 66ft, 106 GT, US-flagged, wood hull shrimp trawler home ported in Holiday, FL. In March 2002, the vessel underwent a voluntary dockside examination conducted by TAMMS and was issued Fishing Vessel Safety Decal #91632. At the onset of this voyage, no machinery or electrical problems were noted by the Captain.

Report of Investigation

At approximately 1815, while transiting SSW on a course of 255 degrees in the Gulf of Mexico, the Captain noted an interruption in electrical power demonstrated by flickering of the vessel's lights. The vessel's operating gauges on the bridge did not indicate any abnormalities. Mr. [REDACTED] departed the bridge to investigate the cause of the power loss and noted smoke coming from the engine room. Mr. [REDACTED] entered the engine room and saw flames in the vicinity of the generator forward of the main diesel engine and returned to the port side main deck and advised the Mate to muster on the stern and await instructions to abandon the vessel. Mr. [REDACTED] re-entered the engine room and attempted to extinguish the blaze with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher, noting that the fire diminished briefly but regained ignition and began to burn out of control.

Mr. [REDACTED] returned to the wheelhouse and radioed a nearby vessel, the F/V NATHAN, for assistance. The Captain noted that by this time, heavy black/gray smoke was emitting from the engine room. The Captain then attempted to access the engine room through the forward berthing compartment noting that heavy smoke was present in this space as well, deterring him from gaining access. Mr. [REDACTED] returned to the wheelhouse again to ensure that power had been secured to the engine room and made the decision to abandon the vessel. As Mr. [REDACTED] proceeded down the port side of the main deck adjacent to the engine room access door, a large explosion occurred resulting in severe burns to his left and right hands and both forearms. The Captain jumped into the water for fear of being on fire. Both the Captain and the Mate were able to don their lifejackets after abandoning the vessel and entering the water that was reportedly 57 degrees Fahrenheit. Within 20 minutes the F/V NATHAN retrieved both crewmembers from the water and proceeded to contact the Coast Guard for assistance.

At approximately 1854, Coast Guard Group St Petersburg received a distress call from the F/V NATHAN requiring medical attention for the two crewmen from the F/V CAPT. ADAM. A Coast Guard Station Sand Key 41' UTB recovered the two crewmen from the F/V NATHAN at 2028 and returned to the Station where EMS awaited for the crewmen. At 2040 the Mr. [REDACTED] was transferred via EMS to Tampa General Hospital to receive treatment for his injuries. The F/V CAPT. ADAM sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28° 04.7" N, 083° 02.0" W.

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At the time of the interview Mr. [REDACTED] was calm, coherent and in relatively good spirits. He stated that he was unsure why the explosion occurred, but believed the diesel fuel tanks on either side of the generator must have ignited. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that when he initially attempted to extinguish the blaze, the exhaust lagging on the generator was on fire and that the fuel line around the generator did not seem to be compromised.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that on January 8, 2003 the vessel's generator, a 3-71 Detroit with approximately 30KW, overheated due to a water leak. Repairs were conducted dockside the same day and the generator was noted to operate without further problems. He also stated that he would occasionally spray Ether into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. Ether was not used to start the generator on January 9, when the vessel departed for the voyage. The can of Ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. According to Mr. [REDACTED], there were no other explosive or flammable materials stored in the engine room, and that the bilges were clean and free of oily waste. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the fuel hose supplying the generator with diesel was fire rated with hydraulic fittings at either end. He also stated that all engine room fuel

Report of Investigation

hoses were in good condition. Approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel was on board the vessel distributed among four fuel tanks.

Conclusions:

On January 9, 2003, The F/V CAPT. ADAM experienced a generator fire and subsequent explosion resulting in severe burns to the operator. Both crewmembers were retrieved and brought to shore safely. The vessel sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28' 04.7" N, 083' 02.0" W, with approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel on board.

The circumstances surrounding the fire, explosion and sinking of the vessel are speculative. This is due to the fact that the vessel was never recovered. Thus, MSO Tampa Investigators could not examine vital evidence that could attribute to the cause of this Serious Marine Incident.

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Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he would occasionally spray Ether into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. The can of ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. According to Mr. [REDACTED], no other explosive or flammable materials were stored in the engine room, and the bilges were clean and free of oily waste.

The vessel's diesel fuel tanks were located in the engine room, totaling approximately 4,000 gallons capacity. On the day of the incident, the vessel's tanks were full, having been fueled to capacity for a long fishing trip. Two diesel fuel tanks supplying the generator were located port and starboard, within approximately five feet of the generator. Due to a malfunction of the vessel's generator, possibly overheating, the generator's exhaust lagging caught fire and began to burn out of control, consuming electrical wiring and the overhead of the wooden deck. It is possible that the fuel tanks on either side of the generator ignited and released an amount of energy equivalent to an explosion. It is noted however, that the can of Ether stored in the engine room undoubtedly exploded contributing to the ignition of the vessel's fuel tanks.

Details Filed: Explosion Details

Type of Explosion:	Mechanical
BLEVE	No
Type of Container Involved:	Other
Description:	Fuel tanks
Contents:	Diesel fuel
Location of Container:	Machinery Spaces
Description:	Port and Starboard side of engine room
Hazardous Location:	No

Report of Investigation

Damage Summary

Damage Characterization: High-order Damage

General Description: Total loss of vessel: vessel was completely consumed by the fire/explosion and thus sank.

The vessel's diesel fuel tanks were located in the engine room, totaling approximately 4,000 gallons capacity. On the day of the incident, the vessel's tanks were full, having been fueled to capacity for a long fishing trip. Two diesel fuel tanks supplying the generator were located port and starboard, within approximately five feet of the generator. Due to a malfunction of the vessel's generator, possibly overheating, the generator's exhaust lagging caught fire and began to burn out of control, consuming electrical wiring and the overhead of the wooden deck. It is possible that the fuel tanks on either side of the generator ignited and released an amount of energy equivalent to an explosion. It is noted however, that the can of Ether stored in the engine room undoubtedly exploded contributing to the ignition of the vessel's fuel tanks.

01/09/2003 18:25 to 01/09/2003 18:26 (Estimated): While proceeding aft on the Port side in an attempt to abandon the vessel an explosion occurred, injuring the operator.

Event Type: Personnel Casualties

Event Class:

Event Subclass:

Location: Known; US Waters

Description: Gulf of Mexico

Latitude: 28 04.7 N Longitude: 083 02.0 E

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
██████████	Party	Exposure Injury	Crewmember

Details Filed: Injury Details

Did death occur:	No
Did injury occur:	Yes
Nature of Event Causing Injuries:	Other Injury Type
Outcome of Injuries:	Pain
Injury Description:	
Type:	Burn
Body Region:	Wrist/Hand
Aspect:	Whole Region
System/Organ:	Muscles

Was Diving Involved:	No
Is the Person Missing:	No
Subject to Chemical Exposure:	No

Exposed to Biological Hazards	No
Exposed to a Confined Space/Respiration Hazard:	No
Exposed to Other Hazards:	No

Narrative Summary: While proceeding aft down the Port side in an attempt to abandon the vessel, an explosion occurred in the engine room while the operator was in the doorway adjacent to the engine room. Operator suffered 2nd degree burns to both hands and forearms. He was treated at Tampa Gen. Hosp.

Report of Investigation

01/09/2003 18:26 to 01/09/2003 18:26 (Estimated): F/V CAPT ADAM's crew entered the water and donned life jackets, then were picked-up by crew of the F/V NATHAN.

Action Type: Safety and Emergency Operations - Abandon Vessel Operations

Action Class: Don survival suits and personal flotation devices

Location: Known; US Waters

Description: Gulf of Mexico

Latitude: 28 04.7 N Longitude: 083 02.0 E

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
██████████	Party	Exposure Injury	Crewmember

Details Filed: Detail Description

On January 09, 2003 at approximately 1500, the F/V CAPT. ADAM departed the dock at Northside Seafood in Tarpon Springs, FL, for the purpose of conducting fishing operations in the Gulf of Mexico from Tarpon to Naples. The Captain of the vessel was Mr. ██████████, and the Mate was Mr. ██████████. The F/V CAPT. ADAM is a 66ft, 106 GT, US-flagged, wood hull shrimp trawler home ported in Holiday, FL. In March 2002, the vessel underwent a voluntary dockside examination conducted by TAMMS and was issued Fishing Vessel Safety Decal #91632. At the onset of this voyage, no machinery or electrical problems were noted by the Captain.

At approximately 1815, while transiting SSW on a course of 255 degrees in the Gulf of Mexico, the Captain noted an interruption in electrical power demonstrated by flickering of the vessel's lights. The vessel's operating gauges on the bridge did not indicate any abnormalities. Mr. ██████████ departed the bridge to investigate the cause of the power loss and noted smoke coming from the engine room. Mr. ██████████ entered the engine room and saw flames in the vicinity of the generator forward of the main diesel engine and returned to the port side main deck and advised the Mate to muster on the stern and await instructions to abandon the vessel. Mr. ██████████ re-entered the engine room and attempted to extinguish the blaze with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher, noting that the fire diminished briefly but regained ignition and began to burn out of control.

Mr. ██████████ returned to the wheelhouse and radioed a nearby vessel, the F/V NATHAN, for assistance. The Captain noted that by this time, heavy black/gray smoke was emitting from the engine room. The Captain then attempted to access the engine room through the forward berthing compartment noting that heavy smoke was present in this space as well, deterring him from gaining access. Mr. ██████████ returned to the wheelhouse again to ensure that power had been secured to the engine room and made the decision to abandon the vessel. As Mr. ██████████ proceeded down the port side of the main deck adjacent to the engine room access door, a large explosion occurred resulting in severe burns to his left and right hands and both forearms. The Captain jumped into the water for fear of being on fire. Both the Captain and the Mate were able to don their lifejackets after abandoning the vessel and entering the water that was reportedly 57 degrees Fahrenheit. Within 20 minutes the F/V NATHAN retrieved both crewmembers from the water and proceeded to contact the Coast Guard for assistance.

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Report of Investigation

01/09/2003 18:45 to 01/09/2003 18:55 (Estimated): Vessel sank 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass, FL, in the Gulf of Mexico.

Event Type: Sinking
Event Class: Damage Control Efforts Not Possible
Event Subclass:
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: Gulf of Mexico
Latitude: 28 04.7 N Longitude: 083 02.0 E

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
CAPT. ADAM	Vessel	Actual Total Loss	Involved in a Marine Casualty

Details Filed: Detail Description

The F/V CAPT. ADAM sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28' 04.7" N, 083' 02.0" W.

Incident Narrative:

On January 09, 2003 at approximately 1500, the F/V CAPT. ADAM departed the dock at Northside Seafood in Tarpon Springs, FL, for the purpose of conducting fishing operations in the Gulf of Mexico from Tarpon to Naples. The Captain of the vessel was Mr. [REDACTED], and the Mate was Mr. [REDACTED]. The F/V CAPT. ADAM is a 66ft, 106 GT, US-flagged, wood hull shrimp trawler home ported in Holiday, FL. In March 2002, the vessel underwent a voluntary dockside examination conducted by TAMMS and was issued Fishing Vessel Safety Decal #91632. At the onset of this voyage, no machinery or electrical problems were noted by the Captain.

At approximately 1815, while transiting SSW on a course of 255 degrees in the Gulf of Mexico, the Captain noted an interruption in electrical power demonstrated by flickering of the vessel's lights. The vessel's operating gauges on the bridge did not indicate any abnormalities. Mr. [REDACTED] departed the bridge to investigate the cause of the power loss and noted smoke coming from the engine room. Mr. [REDACTED] entered the engine room and saw flames in the vicinity of the generator forward of the main diesel engine and returned to the port side main deck and advised the Mate to muster on the stern and await instructions to abandon the vessel. Mr. [REDACTED] re-entered the engine room and attempted to extinguish the blaze with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher, noting that the fire diminished briefly but regained ignition and began to burn out of control.

Mr. [REDACTED] returned to the wheelhouse and radioed a nearby vessel, the F/V NATHAN, for assistance. The Captain noted that by this time, heavy black/gray smoke was emitting from the engine room. The Captain then attempted to access the engine room through the forward berthing compartment noting that heavy smoke was present in this space as well, deterring him from gaining access. Mr. [REDACTED] returned to the wheelhouse again to ensure that power had been secured to the engine room and made the decision to abandon the vessel. As Mr. [REDACTED] proceeded down the port side of the main deck adjacent to the engine room access door, a large explosion occurred resulting in severe burns to his left and right hands and both forearms. The Captain jumped into the water for fear of being on fire. Both the Captain and the Mate were able to don their lifejackets after abandoning the vessel and entering the water that was reportedly 57

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degrees Fahrenheit. Within 20 minutes the F/V NATHAN retrieved both crewmembers from the water and proceeded to contact the Coast Guard for assistance.

At approximately 1854, Coast Guard Group St Petersburg received a distress call from the F/V NATHAN requiring medical attention for the two crewmen from the F/V CAPT. ADAM. A Coast Guard Station Sand Key 41' UTB recovered the two crewmen from the F/V NATHAN at 2028 and returned to the Station where EMS awaited for the crewmen. At 2040 the Mr. [REDACTED] was transferred via EMS to Tampa General Hospital to receive treatment for his injuries.

The F/V CAPT. ADAM sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28' 04.7" N, 083' 02.0" W.

On January 10, 2003, MSO Tampa Investigators visited Mr. [REDACTED] at Tampa General Hospital to conduct an interview. Mr. [REDACTED] was under the care of the Burn Unit, where he received treatment for 2nd degree burns to his right and left hands and both forearms. His left hand required the most attention according to the Tampa General staff, stating that they intended to conduct a skin graft to repair the damage to his left palm. Hospital staff indicated that Mr. [REDACTED] had not been tested for the presence of drugs in his system when he was admitted. However, they did take blood samples and MSO IO's inquired if drug test results could be ascertained as soon as possible. MSO IO's contacted the owner of the vessel, Mr. John Williams and requested that he ensure drug testing was completed.

At the time of the interview Mr. [REDACTED] was calm, coherent and in relatively good spirits. He stated that he was unsure why the explosion occurred, but believed the diesel fuel tanks on either side of the generator must have ignited. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that when he initially attempted to extinguish the blaze, the exhaust lagging on the generator was on fire and that the fuel line around the generator did not seem to be compromised.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that on January 8, 2003 the vessel's generator, a 3-71 Detroit with approximately 30KW, overheated due to a water leak. Repairs were conducted dockside the same day and the generator was noted to operate without further problems. He also stated that he would occasionally spray Ether into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. Ether was not used to start the generator on January 9, when the vessel departed for the voyage. The can of Ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. According to Mr. [REDACTED], there were no other explosive or flammable materials stored in the engine room, and that the bilges were clean and free of oily waste. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the fuel hose supplying the generator with diesel was fire rated with hydraulic fittings at either end. He also stated that all engine room fuel hoses were in good condition. Approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel was on board the vessel distributed among four fuel tanks.

Conclusions:

On January 9, 2003, The F/V CAPT. ADAM experienced a generator fire and subsequent explosion resulting in severe burns to the operator. Both crewmembers were retrieved and brought to shore safely. The vessel sank approximately 10 nautical miles WNW of Dunedin Pass in 48 feet of water in position 28' 04.7" N, 083' 02.0" W, with approximately 4000 gallons of diesel fuel on board.

The circumstances surrounding the fire, explosion and sinking of the vessel are speculative. This is due to the fact that the vessel was never recovered. Thus, MSO Tampa Investigators could not examine vital evidence that could attribute to the cause of this Serious Marine Incident.

According to the Captain of the F/V CAPT. ADAM, Mr. [REDACTED], the vessel's generator caught fire and began to burn out of control although attempts were made to extinguish the blaze with a CO2 fire extinguisher. Further attempts to extinguish the blaze were thwarted by inaccessibility to the vessel's engine room due to heavy smoke. The Captain stated that on January

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8, 2003, the vessel's 3-71 Detroit Diesel generator overheated due to a water leak. Repairs were conducted dockside the same day and the generator was noted to operate without further problems. After departing the dock on the day of the incident, no engine room rounds were conducted to verify the performance of the generator and ensure it was operating normally. Mr. [REDACTED] stated that the fuel hose supplying the generator with diesel was fire rated and equipped with hydraulic fittings at either end. According to Mr. [REDACTED], all fuel supply and return hoses in the engine room, including the generator, were in good condition. It is likely that the generator fuel supply hose melted and began to burn after the fire re-gained ignition.

Mr. [REDACTED] stated that he would occasionally spray Ether into the generator's intake to assist it with starting. The can of ether was stored in the engine room forward of the generator, port side. According to Mr. [REDACTED], no other explosive or flammable materials were stored in the engine room, and the bilges were clean and free of oily waste.

The vessel's diesel fuel tanks were located in the engine room, totaling approximately 4,000 gallons capacity. On the day of the incident, the vessel's tanks were full, having been fueled to capacity for a long fishing trip. Two diesel fuel tanks supplying the generator were located port and starboard, within approximately five feet of the generator. Due to a malfunction of the vessel's generator, possibly overheating, the generator's exhaust lagging caught fire and began to burn out of control, consuming electrical wiring and the overhead of the wooden deck. It is possible that the fuel tanks on either side of the generator ignited and released an amount of energy equivalent to an explosion. It is noted however, that the can of Ether stored in the engine room undoubtedly exploded contributing to the ignition of the vessel's fuel tanks.

01/10/2003 9:00 to 01/10/2003 9:10 (Estimated): MSO Tampa IO's directed the injured crewmembers marine employer to conduct drug testing.

Action Type: Other Actions - Drug and Alcohol Use and Testing
Action Class: Take Drug Test - Post-casualty
Location: Known; US Waters
Description: Aboard Vessel: CAPT. ADAM: Gulf of Mexico
Latitude: 28 10.0 N Longitude: 082 59.0 W

Subject(s) and Details:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
[REDACTED]	Party	Not at Risk	Reporting Party

Details Filed: Drug and Alcohol Test Details

Sample Collection

Reason for Sample: Post-casualty
Date/Time Directed: 01/10/2003
Means of Direction: Verbal (phone call)
Directed By:
Organization: U.S. Coast Guard
Description: MSO Tampa IO's
Directed to get DOT Test: Yes
Chemical Test Sample Provided: No

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Reason: Not Available

Field Sobriety Test

Field Sobriety Test Performed: No

Drug Analysis

Analyzing Laboratory:

DOT Protocols Used: Yes

Test Results:

Medical Review Officer/Coroner:

MRO/Coroner Conclusions:

Sample Transferred and Chain
of Custody Complete: Yes

Drug Re-Analysis

V. CAUSAL ANALYSIS

The Initiating Event of the Incident

Initiating Event:

Fire (01/09/2003 6:15:00 PM)

Production Factors

Active Equipment/Material Failures - Active failures of equipment

On 08 JAN 2003, the vessel's generator experienced cooling problems and was overheating. The crew of the vessel repaired the generator and it seemed to run normally. On 09 JAN 2003, while underway in the Gulf of Mexico, the vessel's generator overhe

Fire: 01/09/2003 6:15:00 PM, Gulf of Mexico, CAPT. ADAM

Preconditions

Workplace Factors

Organization Factors

Defense Factors

Failures of Defense Against Subsequent Events in the Incident

Subsequent Event #1:

Explosion (01/09/2003 6:24:00 PM)

Defense Factors

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Missing engineered defenses

Due to lack of regulatory requirement for the vessel to have an installed fixed gas-fire extinguishing system, the engine room fire burned out of control resulting in a severe explosion.

Explosion: 01/09/2003 6:24:00 PM, Gulf of Mexico, CAPT. ADAM

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Absence of information about potential hazards

The crew of the vessel stored a can of Ether in the engine room space adjacent to the generator, which was used to assist in starting the generator. The can of Ether most likely ignited aiding the ignition of the fuel tanks.

Explosion: 01/09/2003 6:24:00 PM, Gulf of Mexico, CAPT. ADAM

Subsequent Event #2:

Personnel Casualties (01/09/2003 6:25:00 PM)

Defense Factors

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Absence of information about potential hazards

The crew of the vessel stored a can of Ether in the engine room space adjacent to the generator which was used to assist the generator in starting. The can of Ether most likely ignited due to the fire burning out of control, assisting the ignition o

Personnel Casualties: 01/09/2003 6:25:00 PM, Gulf of Mexico, [REDACTED]

Subsequent Event #3:

Sinking (01/09/2003 6:45:00 PM)

Defense Factors

Defenses that could reasonably have been expected but were never put in place - Missing engineered defenses

Due to a lack of regulatory requirement for this vessel to have an installed fixed gas-fire extinguishing system, the generator fire burned out of control resulting in an explosion of the fuel tanks and subsequent sinking of the vessel.

Sinking: 01/09/2003 6:45:00 PM, Gulf of Mexico, CAPT. ADAM

VI. REFERRAL FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTION

The following referrals for enforcement action have been made as a result of this investigation and represent those instances where the Coast Guard has gathered evidence that indicates one or more alleged violations or offenses may have occurred. Any determinations as to whether or not one or more actual violations or offenses have occurred are documented in the appropriate Coast Guard enforcement activities.

NONE

APPENDIX 1 - EVIDENCE

1752100-001: Document/CG-2692 Report of Marine Accident, Injury or Death
Report of Marine Accident, Injury or Death

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/12/2003 4:38:00 PM

Location: MSO TAMPA

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Tracking:

Attachments:

1752100-002: Document/Other Document

Vessel Critical Profile

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/10/2003 4:41:00 PM

Location: MSO TAMPA

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Tracking:

Attachments:

1752100-003: Document/Other Document

Activity Summary Report; Fishing Vessel Exam dated 03/13/2002

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/10/2003 4:44:00 PM

Location: MSO TAMPA

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Tracking:

Attachments:

1752100-004: Document/Fax

TAMMS fax report requesting CG-2692 from vessel owner

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/10/2003 4:46:00 PM

Location: MSO TAMPA

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Tracking:

Attachments:

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1752100-005: Document/Notes

MSO TAMPA IO Notes

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/10/2003 4:48:00 PM

Location: MSO TAMPA

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Tracking:

Attachments:

1752100-006: Document/USCG Message Traffic

GRU ST PETE SITREP P 1003223Z JAN 03: MEDEVAC SITREP ONE AND FINAL
(F/V NATHAN)

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/10/2003 9:05:00 PM

Location: MSO TAMPA

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Tracking:

Attachments:

1752100-007: Document/USCG Message Traffic

MSO TAMPA SITREP: SITREP MARINE CASUALTY ONE AND FINAL
(FIRE/SINKING OF UNINSPECTED F/V CAPT. ADAM)

Collection Information:

Date/Time: 01/10/2003 9:05:00 PM

Location: MSO TAMPA

Collected By: USCG Gathered; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Witnessed By: USCG Witness; LT [REDACTED], TAMMS

Tracking:

Attachments:

APPENDIX 2 - CORRESPONDENCE

NONE