UNITED STATES COAST QUARD

Address Reply to: COMMANDANT U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters mushington 25, D. C. MVI 5 December, 1950 (THERESA A. a-1 Bd)


From: Chief, Merchant Vessel Inspection Division

To: Commandant

Via: Chief, Office of Merchant Marine Safety

Subj: Marine Board of Investigation into disappearance of fishing vessel THEHESA A., with all persons on board, off the Atlantic Coast September, 1950.

- 1. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 46 CFR, Part 136, the record of the Marine board convened to investigate subject casualty, together with its Findings of Fact, Opinions, and Recommendations, has been reviewed and is forwarded herewith.
- The motor vessel THERESA A., as ascertained from the records of the Bureau of Customs, was formerly the QS 56, an Army 104° aircraft rescue boat, built in 1944 at Atlantic City, No Jo This vessel, after private purchase and conversion, was documented for the mackersl fishery on 17 May, 1950. The THERESA A. departed from Fairhaven, Masso, on 9 September, 1950, and was last sighted fishing on Georges Bank, approximately 100 miles E X N of Nantucket Lightship. At 1920, 12 September, 1950, the THERESA A. sent a radio message that she was in distress and at 1957 sent another message stating that the vessel was being abandoned. After a thorough search, no trace of the vessel or its personnel have been found and it is presumed that the THERESA A. foundered with the loss of all persons on board. Very severe weather conditions provailed in the vicinity of the THERESA A. from 11 to 13 September. One fishing vessel skipper on the scene reported that on 12 September very heavy seas prevailed with a N X NE wind reaching a velocity of approximately 55 miles per hour.
- 3. As a result of this casulaty, it is presumed the following crew members lost their lives:



- 4. The Board made the following Findings of Facts.
 - *1. That the THERESA A. of New York, N. Y. official number 253485, of 138 gross tons, was owned by and that the Reconstruction Finance Cop. held a mortgage on same.
 - 2. That the THERESA A. departed Fairhaven, Mass., on September 9, 1950 for the fishing grounds on Georges Bank.


- 3. That the THERESA A was last sighted on the morning of September 11, 1950 at about 1000 Queen on Georges Bank about 100 miles ExN of Nantucket Lightship fishing in company with other fishing vessels.
- 4. That the TIMRESA A communicated with WOU at 1920 Greenwich time, September 12, 1950, advising of distress, ship sinking and taking to dories.
- 5. That at 1957 Greenwich time, September 12, 1950 the THERESA A communicated with WOU, advising of abandoning ship with one lory, twelve men aboard.
- 6. That WOU advised Search and Rescue Control Center, First Coast Guard District, Boston, Masso, at 1527 ween, September 12, 1950 that the fishing vessel THERESA A was in distress.
- 7. That prompt action was taken and a plane dispatched from Salem, which arrived in the distress area before dark.
- 8. That the DEXTER, EASTWIND and COOS BAY were promptly ordered to proceed, and immediately plans for an extended search by sea and air were made.
- 9_{\circ} That a marine broadcast was made and several merchant vessels proceeded to the vicinity and searched.
- 10. That adverse weather conditions hampered vessels in reaching the scene.
- 11. That the COOS BAY and the DEXTER reached the area expeditiously and commenced searching on September 13, 1950 with several planes and the search was continued until September 16 when the case was closed.
- 12. That oh September 13. 10440 square miles were searched by seven planes and two cutters.
- 13. That on September 14, 8230 square miles were searched by seven planes and two cutters.
- 14_{\circ} That on September 15_{\circ} 2880 square miles were searched by five planes and two cutters.
- 15. That on September 16, 1700 square miles were searched by two planes and one cutter.
- 16. That the marine broadcast was continued for several days.
- 17. That the most probable area for any survivors was thoroughly searched with negative results.

- 18. That the search was respende and the CASTIE ROCK diverted on resturning to port to make a search through the area on September 19, 1950 with negative results.
- 19. That this casualty was within the scope of rescue operations of the Coast Guard.
- 20. That communication difficulties were encountered which did not affect the conduct of this case.
- 21. That varying weather conditions prevailed during the search.
- 22. That U. S. Weather Bureau information was broadcast at regular presscribed periods by Radio Green Harbor WOU and Coast Guard Radio, Boston, NMF, for marine purposes.
- 23. That some weather information was also available from commercial broadcast stations.
- 24. That high winds with accompanying high seas prevailed in the vicinity of the THERESA A for an appreciable period from September 11 to September 13, 1950.
- 25. That small craft were cautioned to remain in port for the next thirtysix hours on weather forecast released for broadcast at O311 Zebra, September 11, 1950.
- 26. That ME storm warnings were displayed from Cape Ann to Block Island at 5:00 aomo, September 11 and remained hoisted until 1:00 pomo, September 13.
- 27. That the storm area in connection with the hurricane ranged over a wide area.
- 28° That the master of the LUBENRAY reported very heavy seas, waves very large, N NE winds, fifty-five mopoho at 6:20 pome, September 12°
- 29. That the master of the LUBENRAY after evaluating the situation upon receipt of storm warnings decided it would be safe to stay in his present position because he had plenty of room to drift.
- 30_{\circ} That the LUBENRAY, which was in the vicinity of the THERESA A, rode out the storm successfully, and that other vessels fishing in the vicinity eventually reached port safely and that the LUBENRAY was unable to proceed promptly to the scene of distress due to adverse weather conditions.
- 31. That the THERESA A was originally designed for other than fishing.
- 32. That the vessel was equipped with radio telephone and loran.

- 33. That the dory handling gear was defective prior to the last trip.
- 54. That the THERESA A was equipped with two life rafts and two dorles.
- 35. That life preservers were carried on board.
- 36. That the hand bilge pump was not operating prior to the last trip.
- 37. That the method of securing the main hatch was not in accordance with standard practice in that no metal bars were provided.
- 38. That the engine room bulkbends were tight when the vessel was in the shippard during January 1950.
- 390 That the visible ballast was not secured.
- 40. That the THERESA A had one bilge pump connected to the main engine and one electrically driver suxiliary bilge pump.
- 41. That Urbanus Stange was the last master of record, which was recorded at the Custom House, New Bedford, Masser on August 15, 1950. It is to be noted that Stange, the master of record, appeared as a witness before this board.
- 42. That the F/V SEA RANGER lost her dories during this storm.
- 43. That no trace of the THERESA A or survivors was found."
- 5. The Board expressed the following Opinions:

 - (2) That being an owner of the vessel was master of the THERESA A on this particular voyage.
 - (3) That the structural members of the hull were in apparently good condition.
 - (4) That there was a tendency for some slack practices in the routine operation of the THERESA A on the part of the various masters on previous trips.
 - (5) That it was possible for water to enter the vessel and that the past general operation and management was not in accordance with the practices of good seamanship.
 - (6) That weather information was broadcast sufficiently in advance for fishing vessels in the vicinity of Georges Bank for them to take some precautionary measures.

- (7) That the vessel foundered due to conditions arising out of the bad weather which provailed.
- (8) That the crew of the THERESA A did not abandon ship successfully due to the state of the weather.
- (9) That the following men composed the crew of the THERESA A:



- (10) That the above-named crew members are presumed to have been lost on or about September 12, 1950.
- (11) That all reasonable measures were taken to locate and render assistance to the THERUSA A.
- (12) That facilities and equipment were adequate to cope with the situation.
- (13) That the position given by the THERESA A in her distress message was fairly accurate.
- (14) That the search conducted for the THERESA A and survivors was thoreough and adequate.
- (15) That no persons attached to the Coast Guard or other agency of the Government caused the casualty.
- (16) That no member of the Coast Guard was guilty of any neglect or misconduct.
- (17) That the two dories sighted did not belong to the THERESA A inasmuch as the master reported that they were abandoning ship with one dory.
- (18) That facilities to handle press relations were inadequate but had no bearing on the conduct of the case.
- (19) That all vessels engaged in the fisheries be subject to the laws governing inspection of vessels by the United States Coast Guard."

- 6. The Board made the following Recommendations:
 - "lo That all vessels propelled by internal combustion engines licensed for commercial fishing be brought under existing regulations for merchant vessels.
 - 2. That a study be made of weather information surrounding the hurricane of September 11 to determine whether earlier forecests can be given in the future to assist shipping off the New England Coast,
 - 3. That the fishing industry be advised of the desirability of painting boats and rafts International Orange.
 - 4. That standby equipment for handling distress communications in the Comcenter be evaluated and improved.
 - 5_{σ} That facilities for handling press relations by the district office during serious distress cases be evaluated and improved.
 - 6. That pending approval by the reviewing authority no further action be taken and the case be closed. 9

REMARKS

- 7. Opinion 19 of the Board states that all vessels engaged in the fisheries should be subject to the laws governing the inspection of vessels by the United States Coast Guard and Recommendation 1 of the Board states that all vessels propelled by internal combustion engines licensed for commercial fishing should be brought under existing regulations for merchant vessels.
- 8. From the record it is not clear whether or not the application of morehant vessel safety requirements to the THERESA A. would have prevented her loss. The record does not contain any description of the THERESA A. or information with respect to her seaworthy characteristics, such as strength, subdivision, stability, draft, freeboard, etc. The record does show, however, that the THERESA A. was skippered by a holder of an unlimited chief mate's license and that the material condition of the vessel was satise factory.
- 9. From information available in the record of investigation, together with information obtained from the Department of the Army, with respect to the construction and characteristics of the THERESA A., it would appear that due to her shallow draft and high freeboard, defective steering arrangement, hatch covering and unsecured ballast, the THERESA A. was caught in the trough of the sea from which she could not extricate herself and was overwhelmed by either the shifting of the unsecured ballast or the entrance of water through the defective hatch or both.

- 10. Congressional bills for the extension of the marine safety statutes to fishing vessels as suggested by Recommendation 1 of the Board already are before Congress for consideration and are as follows:
 - (a) H_o R_o 464 = a bill to apply the marine safety statutes and regulations thereunder to all motor-propelled vessels.
 - (b) H_o R_o 3254 ⇒ a bill to extend the marine safety statutes and regulations thereunder to seagoing motor-fishing vessels of 15 gross tons or over_o
- 11. Recommendation 2 of the Board states that a study should be made of weather information surrounding the hurricane of 11 September to determine whether earlier forecasts can be given in the future to assist shipping off the New ingland coast. A copy of this report will be referred to the Department of Commerce for the attention of the Weather Bureau and for such action as may be appropriate in view of the recommendation of the Board.
- 12. The recommendation of the Board that the fishing industry be advised of the desirability of painting boats and rafts International Orange is fully concurred with. Since there is no legal authority to require the fishing industry to paint boats and rafts International Orange, action in this direction can be best brought to the attention of the fishing industry by appropriate personnel under the jurisdiction of the District Commander.
- 13. The evaluation and improvement of the handling of distress communications in the Comcenter and the handling of press relations by the District Office, as indicated in Recommendations # and **of* the Board, are matters more appropriately under the jurisdiction of the District Commander, following which appropriate recommendations, if necessary, may be made to HQ.
- 14. Subject to the foregoing remarks, it is recommended that the Finding* of Fact, Opinions, and Recommendations of the Marine Board of Investigation be approved.

/s/ EDW. C. CLEAVE

Chief, MVI Division to Commendant

IVM 5 December, 1950 (THERESA A. a-1 Bd)

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24 January, 1951

Chief, Office of werchant marine Safety (THERESA A. a.l Ed)

To: Commandant

Forwarded, recommending approval.

/s/ H. C. SHEPHEARD
H. C. STEPHEARD

APPROVED: January 26, 1951

/s/ MERLIN O'NEILL MERLIN O'NEILL

Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard

Commandant