### UNITED STATES COAST GUARE

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WI 7 Jamery 1954 (PICHER -WALLECHIFF - e-9 Bd)

From: Chief, Merchant Vessel Inspection Division

To: Comendant

Via: Chief, Office of Merchant Marine Safety

Subj: Marine Board of Investigation; SS PICEER - M/V WALLSCHIFF (German), collision, St. Clair River, 2 October 1953

- 1. The SS PIONEER, a bulk freighter of 5316 g.t., was downbound and the K/V WALLSCHIFF (German), a freighter of 582 g.t., was upbound in the St. Clair River on the evening of 2 October 1953. The weather was clear, no wind, and the visibility was good. The PIONEER downbound with a 3 to 5 mile current passed under the Plne Water Bridge approximately in midchennel with the upbound WALLSCHIFF in sight on the WALLSCHIFF's left side of the channel close to the shore. The PIONEER elected to pass starboard to starboard and gave the required two-blast signal and changed course to the left. The WALLSCHIFF did not comply with the signified election of the PIONEER and changed course to her right, and although collision—avoiding action was then taken by both vessels, a collision resulted at about 230C in approximate position east of Fert Gratiot Bear Range Light on the international boundary line. As a result of this casualty the WALLSCHIFF sank and the pilot en board died of natural causes. The damage sustained by the PIONEER was estimated at \$40,000.
- 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 46 C.F.R. Part 136, the record of the Marine Board of Investigation convened to investigate subject casualty, together with its Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recommendations, has been reviewed and is forwarded herewith.

#### REMALKS .

- 3. Conclusion, paragraph 15, of the Board states as follows:
  - "15. That the master of the WALLSCHIFF violated Rules 20, 23 and 26 (33 USC 285, 288 and 291 respectively) of the Pilot Rules for the Great Lakes and Connecting and Tributery Maters and the St. Mary's River, in that he failed to observe the right of way of the downbound vessel; that he did not respond with the same signal, and that he did not sound the danger signal; and that he failed to reduce his speed to bare steeragoway, and, if necessary, stop and reverse."

7 James y 1954 (Pionees - Wallschiff - s

of, EVI Division, to ummandant

Rules 20, 23, and 26 (33 USC 285, 288, and 289) are not applicable to foreign vessels, as under the provisions of the Act of 8 February 1895 (35 USC 241) such rules are only applicable to public and private vessels of the United States upon the Great Lakes and their connecting and tributary waters. The WALLSCHIFF was, however, subject to the corresponding pilot rules lawfully established by the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard while on the American side of the St. Clair River; but the penalties provided by Sec. 2 are only recoverable for violation of "this Act" (28 Stat 649). In view of this fact, and since the Master of the WALLSCHIFF testified that his navigation was on the Canadian side of the St. Clair River, and the Board found that the collision occurred in the vicinity of the international boundary line, without specifically establishing the position of the WALLSCHIFF at the time the violations are stated to have occurred, the information in the record would not sustain any action for the assessment and collection of any civil penalties.

- 4. The Recommendation, paragraph 3, of the Board that foreign vessels on the Great Lakes be under the control of competent personnel is concurred with. It is noted that paragraph 7 of the Board's Conclusions states that there was no evidence to indicate that the pilot of the WALLSCHIFF failed to perform the duties and responsibilities of his position.
- 5. Subject to the foregoing remarks, it is recommended that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Marine Board of Investigation be approved.

Acting

FIRST ENDORSEMENT OF MVI memorandum of 7 January 1954

M. **20 January 19**54

From: Chief, Office of Merchant Marine Safety

To: Commandant

Forwarded, recommending approval.

Acting

APPROVED:

Marie Harris

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## BEPORT OF A

# MARINE BOARD OF INVESTIGATION

# Convened at

Lorein, Ohio and Port Haron, Michigan
to inquire into and investigate the collision between
the PICHEER and the WALLSCRIFF (German), with loss of life
in the St. Clair River
on 2 October 1953

# After full and rature deliberation, the board finds as follows:

#### FINDINGS OF PACT

- 1. The SS PIONEER. United States registry, a Great Lakes bulk freighter, O.N.. 203941, has a 6316GT and 5021 NT; her registered dimensions are 504'.0 x 54'.2 x 31'.0. She has a times cylinder, triple expansion, reciprocating steam engine of 1650 HP with two Scotch Parine boilers having a working pressure of 180 psi. This vessel, built in 1907 at Myandotte, Michigan, is owned by Cleveland-Cliffs Steam-ship Company, 100 West 10th Street, Wilmington, Delaware, and managed by Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company, 14th Floor, Union Commerce Building, Cleveland 14, Ghio. Wilmington, Delaware, is the home port.
- 2. The NV WALLSCHIFF, German registry, an ocean freighter, 0.N. 96280, has an 882 GT and 756 NT under deck; her registered dimensions are 205'.S x 31'.9 x 16'.6. She has a six cylinder, four cycle disselengine of 1000 HP with direct drive. This vessel, built in 1953 at Lauenburg, Elbe, is owned by the Paitenredd-Wallschiff Corporation. Her port of registry is Hamburg, Germany.
- 3. The SS PIONEER departed Superior, Wisconsin at 0946 (EST), 30 September 1953 with a load of 9,004 tons of Erie iron ore bound for a Lake Erie port. She was to receive her final destination orders at Detroit, Michigan on the downbound run. The PIONEER, carrying a slight starboard list on departure, had the following draft readings: 19'-3" forward, 19'-8" amidship, 20'-1" aft.
- 4. The WALLSCHIFF began her voyage on the 7th of September 1953 at Antwerp, Religion. After several ports of call, she departed Detroit, Michigan, at 1630 (EST), 2 October 1953 having been there for a period of about nine and one half ( $9\frac{1}{6}$ ) to ten and one half ( $10\frac{1}{6}$ ) hours. The motor vessel was carrying 325 metric tons of sheet steel; her draft was  $8^{\circ}$ -6° forward and  $11^{\circ}$ -6° aft. She was upbound to haskegon, Michigan.
- 5. Both vessels continued their trips without incident until arriving in the upper end of the St. Clair River, at the Port Huron, Michigan—Sarnia, Ontario area.
- 6. The weather in the Port Huron—Sarnia area at the time of their arrival and at the time of the collision was clear and calm with good visibility. The night was black. The flow of water in the St. Clair River is from lake Huron Southerly to lake Erie. In the area of the collision the currents are strong, three to five miles per hour under normal conditions.
- 7. The Cleveland-Cliff's vessel logged passing the lake Buron Lightship (IL 749) at 2234 according to her deck log (see Exhibit 2), and 2237 according to her rough engine room log. Captain was piloting his vessel on the Foint Edward's Range (LL-740 and 741) in the approach channel to the St. Clair River entrance; besides the Captain, the 3rd Mate. and the visels man, were in the pilot house. The lookout, was on the port side of the forecastle deck near the bow. The ship was traveling at full speed, about 11 miles per hour, followed by the SS TOM GIRDLER about one half (\frac{1}{2}) mile astern. The PIONEER's radar was turned on and operating.

- mester (Pilot) Patterson to his wiselsman,
  on the port bridge wing as lookout. Their vessel was not equipped with reder.
  They were turning over for a speed of approximately 11.3 knots (or about 13 miles
  per hour) and had passed an upbound lake freighter below Courtwright, Osterio.
  Arriving at the Port Buron Traffic Buoy (IL-735) off Sarmia, they passed this
  buoy about 300 feet on their port side. From that point, according to Capitia
  they headed on Bay Point Light (IL-737) for awhile, then came left at a
  slight angle, passing about 625 feet about of Bay Point Light (see Exhibit 4).
- The Master of the VALISCHIFF testified that he first saw the PIONEER when it was in the vicinity of the Blue Water Bridge, he fixed his own position on the Coredian side of the channel (position II on Exhibit 4). Testimeny of Captain on the PIONEER indicated that he first sighted the WALLSCHIFF when his own vessel was about a boat length (500 feet) South of the Blue Water Bridge. He placed the WALLSCHIFF at this time at the Waterworks crib on the American nice.
- 10. Testimony of both and and and selection, employees of west-cott's Marine Reporting Station, placed the WALLSCHIFF close to the American shors-line as she approached and passed their station. Mr. common observed the situation develop and witnessed the resultant collision from the Westcott Station porch. Mr. was in the Westcott boat and had gone close absent to check the WALLSCHIFF's name. He then pulled ahead or to the Northard to be in a position to intercept the PICREER.
- allow the current to bring the ship around to the left off the Fort Gratiot Range (IL-738 and 739). Seeing the Westcott boat in the vicinity of the upbound vessel, Captain testified that he realised the boat was too close to the American shore to pass him on the one whistle side so he blew two blasts (see Exhibit 1, position X2). According to Mr. PIONEER wheelsman, Captain gave the order "Left some more" at the time he blew two blasts. Hearing no answering signal, the PIONEER blaw the danger signal and rang the ship's general alarm; Mr. Stated that he received the order, "Hard left", immediately after the danger signal was blown.
- 12. Testimony of the PIONEER's master indicated the upbound vessel cut across channel toward the Canadian side after the PIONEER's denger signal was sounded. Third Mate and lookout indicated that Captain blew another two blast signal followed by a second denger signal. The captain was not sure whether or not be had blown a second series of whistle signals.
- 13. On the other hand, Captain testified that the downbound ship blew one blast which he answered on the advice of his pilot, Patterson. He also indicated that he had been swinging on an easy starboard rudder prior to the whistle signals. The master of the WALLSCHIFF went on to state that it might have been two or three minutes after he blew his own one blast signal that he heard the PIOMERR blow a danger signal. Pilot Patterson said nothing in response to the captain's question, "What is wrong there, I see a green light", nor did he say anything more when he

heard the ranger signal blow. Captain then stated that he come hard right, rang up full estern, and blow three blasts.

- time two blasts, and the danger signal again. It. stated he heard two blasts from the FIGHTER and her danger signal. Esither of the latter two witnesses heard the WALLSCHIFF blow a which signal.
- 15. Charted positions and testimony by both captains indicate that they were somewhere between 3,750 and 4,700 feet apart when they first eighted one another and that the first whistle signals were blown when the ships were one-quarter (\$\frac{1}{2}\$) to four-tesths (0.4) of a mile apart.
- indicated he came from full speed shead to full speed estern when the ships were about 200 feet spart, the PICHERR's log indicates the speed change occurred one (1) minute prior to the collision. Captain stated that he put his engine full speed astern about a number or so before the collision. The ships collided at about a ninety degree (90°) angle with the bow of the PICHERR cutting into the WALLSCHIFF's port side about five to eight feet at number three hatch.
- 17. At the time of the collision Captain . Hr. and Mr. placed the heading of the PIONEER at approximately Southeast and the heading of the WALLSCHIFF at about Rortheast. Captain described his ship as heading almost North and the PIONEER approximately East.
- structure and approximately 150 feet from the bow. Captain placed the location of the collision at about 132°T, 1400 feet from Fort Gratiot Front Bange Light (LL-738) which would be about 150 feet from the International Boundary Line on the Canadian side. Question Rumber 180, page 170 of the testimony was incorrectly stated where this bearing was referred to as 148°T. The master of the PIONEER placed it at about 137°, 1050 feet from the same land mark and on the American side of the channel. It was the opinion of both Westcott witnesses that the collision occurred on the Canadian side of the channel. Nr. the checked the time of the collision as 10:58 p.m. by the big reporting clock in the Westcott office.
- 19. After the collision the two vessels remained in contact for about five (5) minutes, during which time Captain stated he tried to show the WALLSCHIFF out of the channel to shallow water. The holed vessel sank in about forty (40) feet of water in the vicinity of the two red spar buoys (Canadian Buoys, unlisted) marking Bay Point Shoal about 1500 and 1200 feet, respectively North of Bay Point Light.

- 20. The impact of the collision knocked the WallSCHIFF's pilot from his fact to the deck of the pilot house. The wheelman was sent immediately to call all hands on deck. After Captain was and lookout was assisted the Sailing-master to his feet he said, "I suspect I broke my leg." Then as the captain allested to the bearing bridge above the wheel house, Mr. Patterson walked very slowly to the door in the wheel house which led down to the captain's quarters. Went art to assist on the boat deck.
- Or Mr. Patterson and keeping one himself. He returned to the pilot house but did not see the pilot. No one saw him alive again; his body was later recovered and examined by a Sarmia physician. The coroner's report indicates the immediate onese of death to be coronery thrombosis (see attached Medical Cartificates of Death).
- 22. Captein watched his men leave in the WALLSCHIFF's port lifeboat. As his ship sank deeper, he climbed the most where he remained until a Coast Quard motor boat from the Port Huron Lifeboat Station rescued him. The Coast Guard boat previously had picked up the eleven (11) men from the WALLSCHIFF's port boat.
- 23. The WallSCHIFF had a port list so that the starboard boat could not be launched. Two (2) men, and went over the starboard side and mean to the Canadian shore. Two (2) others, who had jusped overboard, were picked up by the Westcott boat and taken to the American shore; later, Port huron Police took them to Sarnia. The second mate, the property of the property to the forecastle deck.
- 24. Conflicting testimony exists as to how Mr. ascended to the forecastle of the PICHER. He testified that he jumped from the WALISCHIFF to the stem
  of the PICHER and held onto the towing thock until a ladder was lowered helf the
  height of the PICHER. From there, he climbed the ladder to the deck. Second
  Mate of the PICHER stated that he and another man lowered the 32 foot
  wooden ladder down to the hatch of the WALISCHIFF where Mr. boarded
  it and climbed to the forecastle deck.
- 25. As the two wessels separated and the WALISCHIFF mank, the starboard anchor of the PIONEER was partially pulled out. Captain notified the Port Buren Goest. Guard Station of the sinking by radio-telephone and dropped his port anchor.
- 26. Both of the PICHERR's lifeboats were then lowered in an attempt to assist in resome operations. Hr. from the WALLSCHIFF left the forecastle of the PICHER, went aft, jumped into the PICHER's port lifeboat, and assisted as a member of the boat crew. During resome operations the forward and after searchlights of the PICHER were manual by the captain and 3rd mate, respectively, in an attempt to locate personnel from the WALLSCHIFF.

27. The PIONEER, heading upstream after separating from the MALISCHIFF, and having anchored, have up its anchors and proceeded to lake Buros, where it can shout and returned to Port Buros, Mishigan. She tied up at the doct dock at 0630, 3 October 1953. Surveys were made of the demage and the ship was given permission to proceed to lorain, Chio, for unloading and drydocking.

28. Survey in drydock revealed the following unjor work to be accomplished on the PICHERA due to the collision:

- (1) Remove and renew: Fort side plates C-1, S-1, H-1, J-1, and J-1 doubler, L-1. Starboard side plates E-1, H-1, J-1 and J-1 doubler, L-1.
- (2) Grop, remove, and renew; Fort side plates K-1, and K-1 doubler. Starboard side plates C-1, K-1 and K-1 doubler.
- (3) Remove and renew 27 feet of stem.
- (4) Adjoining plates to be faired.
- (5) Rivets in adjoining plates to be recoved and renewed as necessary.
- (6) Internals in way bow work to be removed, renswed, and replaced.
- 29. Repairs completed and in a seaworthy condition, the PICHEER returned to service at 2255, 15 October 1953.
- 30. The following witnesses were interviewed:

(1)	Master of the	DO PIONEER,	Monse	Number		
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(6)	icense Number					

(7)	License Rusber	<b>.</b>
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(11)	, License Rumber 100	
(12)	License Munder	myram myr yd.
(13)		
(14)		
(15) <b>(15)</b>		•

31.

Harold A. Patterson. Sailingmaster (Pilot) of WALLSCHIFF, Canadian issued Certificate Rumber April 1921.

### CONCLUS TORS

- I. That the PIONER passed downbound under the Blue Mater Bridge approximately in the center of the channel heading on Fort Gratics Range. That shortly after having passed under the bridge and commenced her swing to port, the MALISCHIFF was sighted upbound relatively close to the American shore in the vicinity of the Materworks, Port Buren, Michigan.
- 2. That the Master of the PICHER initiated a passing signal of two (2) blasts for a starboard to starboard passing when approximately one-half () wile from the upbound WALISCHIPP.
- 3. That the Master of the WALLSCHIFF, observing the descending PIONEER, seeing her red light, and hearing the passing signal, elected to seek his starboard side of the channel, which action he instituted, having just passed the Marine Reporting Station (Westcott's Landing).
- 4. That the Master of the WALLSCRIFF failed to understand the passing signal as proposed by the PIONEER.
- 5. That the Mester of the WALLSCHIFF either fuiled to answer the PIONEER's passing signal, or any whistle reply by the WALLSCHIFF was not sufficiently sudible or distinguishable to be recognised as a navigational whistle signal.
- 6. That neither the master nor the mate on watch on the WALLSCHIFF was sufficiently familiar with applicable Pilot Rules.
- 7. That there is no evidence to indicate that the Pilot on the WallSCHIFF failed to perform the duties and responsibilities of his position.
- 8. That all navigation lights on board both the PIONEER and WALLSCRIFF were burning brightly prior to the collision.
- 9. That the pattern of a passing situation was established once the master of the PIONEER had blown a two-blast signal indicating his intention to pass the WALISCHIFF to starboard. The river current, the bend in the river, the restricted channel and the limited maneuverability of the PIONEER under the circumstances rendered a departure from the elected two whistle plan to pass the WALISCHIFF imprudent.
- 10. That the action of the master of the PIONEER in backing was instituted too late to be fully effective. Captain stated When I saw that we couldn't avoid a collision, then I put the engine full speed astern." This backing action should have been taken, at the latest, when the master first blew his danger signal.

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- That the Malisteles was proceeding upbound on the designated doublound channol side of the river just prior to sighting the PICKER in the vicinity of the
  Filus Water Bridge, and that the master's radical turn to starboard in an effort
  to get to the opposite side of the channel without an understanding of the passing signal exposed his vessel to immediate danger.
- 12. That the collision occurred approximately on the International Boundary libe, due East of the Fort Gratiot Rear Range Light (IL-739).
- 13. That the corrective measures taken by the master of the PICRUER in keeping his bow in contact with the WALISCHIFF and in attempting to push the holed vessel into shallow water provided additional time for emergency abandonment and minimised the risk to lives on board the WALISCHIFF. It further prevented the sinking from occurring in the middle of the river.
- 14. That the rescue activity initiated by the PIONEER with its lifeboats lacked direction and effectiveness.
- 15. That the master of the WALLSCHIFF violated Rules 20, 23 and 26 (33 USC 285, 288 and 291 respectively) of the Pilot Rules for the Great Lakes and Connecting and Tributary Waters and the St. Mary's River, in that he failed to observe the right of way of the downbound vessel; that he did not respond with the same signal, and that he did not sound the danger signal; and that he failed to reduce his speed to bare steerageway, and, if necessary, stop and reverse,
- 16. That the master of the PICHER violated Rule 26 (33 USC 291) of the Great Lakes and Connecting and Tributary Waters and the St. Mary's River in that, having approached within one-half mile of the WALLSCHIFF, he failed to reduce his speed to bars steerageway and stop and reverse when he failed to understand the course or intention of the approaching steamer.
- 17. That no failure of material was involved.
- 18. That no personnel of the Coast Guard or any other Government Agency contributed to the casualty.
- 19. That the casualty could have been prevented by compliance with applicable Pilot Rules by both vessels.
- 20. That no uncharted or incorrectly charted area or objects were involved.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the master of the PIONKER be charged with Instantion to Duty (Copy of Charge and Specification attached).

the MF WallsChief to estat for violation of Rules 20, 23 and 26 and 291 respectively) of the Filet Rules for the Great files and large states and the St. Mary's River and that the destatory possibly to imposed. (Copy of Violation Report attached).

3. That when a foreign vessel (excluding Canadian and United States vessels, which are exempt from this recommendation by virtue of Article I of the Convention Concerning Boundary Vaters between the United States and Canada, signed at Washington, D.C., 11 January 1909) operates on the Great Lakes and their consecting and tributory waters, it shall be under the control of an authorized person at all times. An authorized person shall be one who has proven to the antisfaction of either Canadian or United States authorities that he is familiar with the applicable Pilot Rules and waters. Such a requirement would necessarily be a matter for international agreement between the United States and Canada.

(signed)
HAROLD C. MOORE
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Chairman

(signed) GEORGE P. KENNEY
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Mamber

(signed)
LOUIS F. SUDNIK
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Coast Guard,
Komber

(signed)

EDWARD R. THARP

Lioutenant Commender, U.S. Coast Guard

Recorder

The board then, at 5:10 p.m., adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

(signed)
HAROLD C. MOORE
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Chairman

(signed)
EDWARD R. THARP
Lieutement Commander, U.S. Coast Guard
Recorder

Frank Chief, Arrehant Vennel Inspection Misiaten

To: Commissions

Via: Chief, Cifico of Mordesh Merino InColy

Ship: Marine Mearl of Devotigation; copolating of passenger unter reactly Minds M. off Meaburk Point, long Inlant, 11 Orbiter 1959 with long of 150s

- 1. The personner-corrying notorbook FROM H. of 35° 6° length, 12° 6° bean and 3° 6° depth, 1200 with a 145 hip, engles, and measuring 14 g.t. we engaged in pleasure ficking off Bulent Point on the afternoon of 11 fetcher 1953. The weather confidence were not so notice as to make any consider in pleasure ficking operations. The FROM H. apparently approached too clearly to sheel water where a large wave lifted the plane of the versel, and consider for furnational consing her to breach and copies. Beauty processor necessary approach in ficking convenious hundrately approach on the area and personal the personnel from the FROM H., who were in the salar, but we furturately one precessor was lost by drawing.
- 2. Personal to the provinces of 7:the 46 G.P.R. Pert 136, the recent of the Heriza Board of Investigation convend to investigate subject cancelly, together with its Findings of Fact, Opinious and Recommunications, has been perfected and in formation beyonith.
- 3. It is recommended that the Findings of Fact, Opinions and Recommendations of the Harine Board of Eurostigation contend to investigate addition country be approved.

(algant)

hottley

FIRST ENDORSHEESE OF MY memoranism of 3 February 1954

Prens Shief, Office of Novelant Marine Safety

16 Pohrunzz 1954

To: Commandest

Percented, recommeding approval

(elened)

Action

APPROVED:

A. C. RICENCED

Rear Admirel, U. S. Coast Gnard Acting Commandant