

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

ADDRESS REPLY TO:  
COMMANDANT  
U. S. COAST GUARD  
HEADQUARTERS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



30 March, 1949

FILE: CG-L-105-3233

MARINE BOARD OF INVESTIGATION CONVENED AT OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER, THIRD COAST GUARD DISTRICT, 42 BROADWAY, NEW YORK, N. Y., 20 JANUARY, 1949, BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDANT, U. S. COAST GUARD, TO INVESTIGATE THE COLLISION BETWEEN THE USCGC EASTWIND AND THE SS GULFSTREAM, APPROXIMATELY 60 MILES SOUTHEAST OF BARNEGAT LIGHT VESSEL ON 19 JANUARY, 1949, RESULTING IN LOSS OF LIFE.

ACTION BY CONVENING AND FINAL REVIEWING AUTHORITY

The proceedings, finding of facts, opinions and recommendations of the foregoing Marine Board of Investigation are approved, subject to that which is contained herein.

1. Paragraph 9 of the Finding of Facts is amended by inserting the words "with permission" after the words "was absent". The testimony of [REDACTED], the mate on watch, SS GULFSTREAM, discloses that [REDACTED] temporary absence from station was with his ([REDACTED]) permission. (R. 61)
2. Paragraph 75 of the Finding of Facts states, in part, that the experience of Lieutenant [REDACTED] as a deck watch officer was acquired on the SPENCER on weather patrols and on the EASTWIND on an Arctic cruise. This finding should have been more specific. The log of the EASTWIND covering the Arctic cruise referred to indicates that Lieutenant [REDACTED] served as navigator and at no time during that cruise did he serve a regular watch as officer of the deck. Lieutenant [REDACTED] own testimony further indicates that his duty on the SPENCER as deck watch officer upon his own responsibility was very limited. (R. 171, 180)
3. The Board should have found, as a fact, whether the conduct of Seaman [REDACTED], the EASTWIND's lookout, constituted a proper performance of duty under the prescribed standards for lookouts.
4. The Board's opinion numbered 5 is disapproved. As pointed out in Paragraph 1 above, the mate on watch, SS GULFSTREAM, testified that [REDACTED] temporary absence from his watch was permitted.

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5. The Board should have expressed an opinion whether the Commanding Officer of the EASTWIND, Captain John A. Glynn, USCG, under all the circumstances, violated Article 226, Coast Guard Courts and Boards, 1935, and Article 1003(1), Coast Guard Regulations, by (1) permitting an inefficient officer to stand the watch as officer of the deck from 4:00 to 8:00 a. m. on January 19, 1949, and (2) failing to assign an efficient officer to stand said watch.
6. Further, the Board should have expressed an opinion whether the Commanding Officer of the EASTWIND neglected his duty under Article 1009, Coast Guard Regulations, by his failure to see that the EASTWIND's lookout was proficient and of suitable competence and experience to perform the duties of a lookout. (R. 257)
7. The Board's recommendation numbered 3 is disapproved, for the reasons set forth in Paragraphs 1 and 4 above.
8. Had the Board developed a finding and opinion on the matters set forth in Paragraphs 2 and 5 above, an appropriate recommendation as to what, if any, action should be taken against the Commanding Officer of the EASTWIND would have logically followed.
9. The remarks contained in the paragraph immediately preceding are equally applicable with respect to the matters set forth in Paragraphs 3 and 6 above.
10. Action will be taken to bring the Commanding Officer of the EASTWIND, Captain John A. Glynn, U. S. Coast Guard, before a Coast Guard General Court on the following charges and specifications:

#### Charge I

#### VIOLATION OF A LAWFUL REGULATION

In that John A. Glynn, Captain, U. S. Coast Guard, while so serving in command of the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND, making passage from Boston, Massachusetts, to Chesapeake Light Vessel, through active shipping lanes, did neglect and fail to exercise proper care and attention to the safety of said vessel in that, on January 19, 1949, he permitted an officer with insufficient experience and competence to assume the 4:00 to 8:00 a. m. watch as officer of the deck of said vessel on said

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date, namely, Lieutenant [REDACTED] U. S. Coast Guard, and he, the said Glynn, through said negligence, did suffer the said U. S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND to collide with the SS GULFSTREAM at or about 4:35 a. m., on the said date, with resultant loss of life, and damage to both vessels; this in violation of a lawful regulation issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, to wit, Article 226, Coast Guard Courts and Boards, 1935.

Charge II

NEGLECT OF DUTY

Specification 1

In that John A. Glynn, Captain, U. S. Coast Guard, while so serving in command of the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND, making passage from Boston, Massachusetts, to Chesapeake Light Vessel, through active shipping lanes, did, on January 19, 1949, neglect and fail to assign an experienced and competent officer to stand the 4:00 to 8:00 a. m. watch as officer of the deck on board the said vessel on the said date, as it was the duty of the said Glynn to do.

Specification 2

In that John A. Glynn, Captain, U. S. Coast Guard, while so serving in command of the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND, making passage from Boston, Massachusetts, to Chesapeake Light Vessel, through active shipping lanes, did neglect and fail to see that the lookout stationed aboard the said vessel on January 19, 1949, at or about 4:30 a. m., was proficient and of suitable experience and competence in the performance of the duties of a lookout, as it was the duty of the said Glynn to do.

[REDACTED]  
J.F. FARLEY  
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard  
Commandant

### FINDING OF FACTS

1. The GULFSTREAM, Official No. 243852, is a T-2 tanker of 10,195 gross tons, 6,107 net tons, twin screw, turbo-electric drive, owned by the Gulf Oil Corporation. The vessel was not fitted with a radar.
2. The GULFSTREAM was last inspected by the Coast Guard at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on May 2, 1948.
3. All times noted in this report are Eastern Standard Time.
4. The GULFSTREAM sailed from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania at 6:00 p.m. on January 18, 1949, on a voyage to the Persian Gulf. After taking in ballast in the lower Delaware River the drafts were estimated to be 18 feet forward, 21 feet aft.
5. The GULFSTREAM took departure from Five Fathom Bank Light Vessel at 1:50 a.m., January 19, 1949 when the light vessel bore 002° true, distant one-half mile, and then proceeded at a speed of about 15 knots, 91 r.p.m., on course 071° true until 2:15 a.m. when the course was changed to 072° true.
6. About 4:30 a.m. the GULFSTREAM entered fog which quickly became dense. Immediately thereafter "Standby" was rung up on the engine room telegraph; the fog signal was started and sounded at intervals of one minute; and the master of the GULFSTREAM, [REDACTED], holding license No. [REDACTED], who was asleep in the chartroom abaft of the wheelhouse, was called by the mate on watch, [REDACTED], holding master's license [REDACTED], and informed that fog had set in.
7. The master of the GULFSTREAM, although aware that the vessel was running in a fog at a speed of about 15 knots, failed to order a reduction in speed.
8. The mate on watch, [REDACTED], although knowing that the vessel had entered fog at a speed of about 15 knots, made no reduction in the speed of the GULFSTREAM.
9. [REDACTED], ordinary seaman, who was lookout on the port wing of the bridge of the GULFSTREAM, was absent from his station as lookout during the time that vessel was running in fog.
10. Two white lights of a vessel which later proved to be the EASTWIND, were sighted simultaneously by [REDACTED] mate on watch, and the boat

lookout, able seaman, [REDACTED] at a distance of about two ship lengths and bearing one point on the port bow of the GULFSTREAM.

11. Immediately after sighting of the lights of the EASTWIND the rudder of the GULFSTREAM was put hard right.

12. On January 19, 1949 at 4:37 a.m., as observed on the engine room clock of the GULFSTREAM, that vessel collided with the EASTWIND while the GULFSTREAM was making approximately 15 knots with the rudder hard right. At about this time the green side light of the EASTWIND was sighted dead ahead.

13. At 4:39 a.m. GULFSTREAM reduced speed to slow ahead; at 4:41 a.m. stopped; at 4:42 $\frac{1}{2}$  a.m. went full astern; and at 4:44 a.m. stopped -- by that time the GULFSTREAM had cleared EASTWIND, which disappeared in the fog.

14. At no time did any persons on the GULFSTREAM hear any whistle signals by the EASTWIND.

15. The dead reckoning position of the GULFSTREAM at point of collision was 39:02N, 73:34:30W.

16. The United States Coast Guard cutter EASTWIND, Captain John A. Glynn, U. S. Coast Guard, Commanding, sailed from Boston, Massachusetts, at 8:30 a.m., January 18, 1949 for Chesapeake Light Vessel. Her mean draft on sailing was 24 feet and she had on board 8 officers and 152 enlisted men.

17. The EASTWIND is an icebreaker with twin screws, diesel-electric propulsion, and displacement tonnage of approximately 5000 tons.

18. The EASTWIND took departure from Block Island Southeast Buoy at 5:30 p.m., January 18, 1949 and then steered a course of 218° true at a speed of about 14 knots, 110 r.p.m.

19. Shortly before 4:00 a.m., on January 19, 1949, Lieutenant [REDACTED] assumed the watch as officer of the deck on the EASTWIND.

20. At 4:00 a.m. Lieutenant [REDACTED] as navigating officer of the EASTWIND, changed course to 214° true.

21. At 4:00 a.m. there were on watch on the bridge of the EASTWIND, in addition to the officer of the deck, a radarman, a quartermaster, a helmsman, and a messenger; and on the flying bridge there was a lookout.

22. At about 4:15 a.m. Lieutenant [REDACTED] acknowledged receipt of a report by the radar operator of a target picked up by the SO-4 radar, bearing 231° true, range 18,000 yards.
23. Subsequent reports by the radarman that the bearing of the target was not changing and that the range was decreasing rapidly were acknowledged by Lieutenant Estey.
24. At about 4:24 a.m. Lieutenant [REDACTED] acknowledged a report by the radarman that the target bore 231° true and was distant 5 miles.
25. Immediately thereafter Lieutenant [REDACTED] changed course 14° to the left to 200° true because he recognized that the EASTWIND and the target were on collision courses.
26. No plot was made on the EASTWIND to determine the course and speed of the target.
27. After change of course to 200° true the bearing of the target continued to be 231° true and the range decreased rapidly, indicating that the EASTWIND and the target were still on collision courses.
28. The target disappeared in the sea return on the radar scope at range of 1300 yards on bearing 229° true.
29. Although visual search was made along the line of bearing of the target from the time the target was first picked up at 9 miles up to and after the target disappeared at 1300 yards, no lights of the GULFSTREAM were sighted until the vessels were close aboard.
30. The EASTWIND entered fog a few minutes before the collision while making a speed of about 14 knots.
31. After entry into fog, Lieutenant [REDACTED] failed to sound fog signals, to reduce to a moderate speed, and to notify the Commanding Officer.
32. No whistle signals were sounded by the EASTWIND at any time.
33. The EASTWIND and the GULFSTREAM exhibited navigational running lights as required by law.
34. The bow of the GULFSTREAM was sighted by Lieutenant [REDACTED] and two white lights of the GULFSTREAM were sighted by other personnel on watch on the EASTWIND broad on the starboard bow at a distance of about 400 feet.

35. Simultaneously with the sighting of the GULFSTREAM by Lieutenant [REDACTED] he heard a short blast from the whistle of that vessel.
36. Immediately after the sighting of the GULFSTREAM the rudder on the EASTWIND was put hard left and remained at hard left. No reduction in speed was made.
37. A few seconds after sighting of the GULFSTREAM the bow of that vessel struck the EASTWIND on the starboard side just abaft the bridge penetrating to such a depth that the upper portion of her stem brought up against the stack of the EASTWIND. At time of collision both vessels were in a dense fog.
38. At 4:35 a.m., as observed on the clock in the starboard motor control room of the EASTWIND, the GULFSTREAM and the EASTWIND collided.
39. The motors of the EASTWIND continued at 1110 r.p.m., 14 knots, until 4:40 a.m. when they were stopped.
40. Immediately after the collision fire broke out on both vessels.
41. The fire on the GULFSTREAM was confined to the starboard side of the lower forepeak where rubber lifesaving suits and wood planking were ignited. The fire was extinguished at 8:05 a.m.
42. Although the GULFSTREAM was not gas free no fire occurred in the cargo or fuel tanks.
43. The structural damage to the GULFSTREAM extended from the keel to the upper deck and from the stem to frames 97 with several bottom plates buckled abaft of frame 97. The stem and the bulwarks, port and starboard, between the upper deck and the forecastle head were damaged.
44. A contract to repair the GULFSTREAM was awarded the Todd Shipyard, New York, at a price of \$86,727 and a working period of 31 calendar days.
45. The fire on the EASTWIND spread rapidly with devastating effect in the chief petty officers' berthing compartment, which had been opened up by the stem of the GULFSTREAM. From this area fire spread rapidly to the bridge, radio room, and pilot house, forcing all personnel from their stations.
46. The bridge book, smooth log, night order book, charts and other bridge records of the EASTWIND were consumed in the fire.

47. The following areas in the EASTWIND were gutted by the fire:

- (1) Third deck from frame 43 to frame 105.
- (2) Second deck compartments between frames 35 and 105.
- (3) Main deck houses between frames 34 and 92, and partially to frame 105.
- (4) Upper deck houses between frames 50 and 92.
- (5) Pilot house and adjoining compartments between 57 and 92.

48. Flooded areas extended from frame 43 to frame 83; partially flooded areas extended between frames 83 and 105. The forward magazine was purposely flooded to prevent explosion of ammunition.

49. A separate Coast Guard Board of Survey has been convened to determine the actual damage to the EASTWIND.

50. The standing orders and the night orders issued by the Commanding Officer of the EASTWIND required, among other things, that the officer of the deck inform the Commanding Officer if any radar target or vessel would approach within 3 miles of the EASTWIND; that the speed of the vessel be reduced to 50 r.p.m. and fog signals be sounded if fog were encountered and that the Commanding Officer be notified; and that in case of any doubt in the mind of the officer of the deck that the Commanding Officer be called.

51. Lieutenant [REDACTED] officer of the deck, failed to notify the Commanding Officer that a radar target would approach within 3 miles of the EASTWIND.

52. Lieutenant [REDACTED] failed to notify the Commanding Officer that the EASTWIND and a radar target were approaching each other on collision courses.

53. Lieutenant [REDACTED] failed to take proper evasive action to prevent collision with a radar target which proved to be the GULFSTREAM.

54. Captain John A. Glynn, Commanding Officer of the EASTWIND who was awakened by the collision while asleep in his cabin, had no previous knowledge of approaching danger.

55. There is no emergency cabin in the EASTWIND.

56. No personnel of the GULFSTREAM suffered any personal injuries as a result of the collision.

57. Of the 8 officers and 152 enlisted men on board the EASTWIND all are



accounted for; 13 enlisted men died as a result of the collision and 8 officers and 139 enlisted men survived as of January 31, 1949.

58. Of the 13 men who died as a result of the collision, 11 died on board the EASTWIND and 2 died in the Marine Hospital, Staten Island.

59. Of the 11 men who died on board the EASTWIND the bodies of 6 of them were identified as those of

1. BROWN, Harry F. ( ) HMC
2. BUSBY, Ewell ( ) ENC
3. CONNORS, Robert E. ( ) ENS
4. CYWINSKI, Louis ( ) DCC
5. MIDGETTE, Rupert D. ( ) ENC
6. ZERR, John V. ( ) FA

The bodies of the following men could not be identified:

1. BARNETT, William J. ( ) CSC
2. BRYSON, Donald W. ( ) HMC
3. EVERETT, Peter A. ( ) CMC
4. KING, Kenneth S. ( ) SKK
5. MACHANSKY, Anthony G. ( ) RMC

60. The men whose bodies were not identified were known to have been on board the EASTWIND after the vessel sailed from Boston.

61. COINDREAU, Stanislaus ( ), SA and WILLIAMS, Albert P. ( ), SA, died in the Marine Hospital, Staten Island of injuries sustained as a result of the collision.

62. Shortly after the collision the GULFSTREAM sent an SOS on 500 meters. The SS SUZANNE of the Bull Line, the SS JUNIOR of the United Fruit Company, and the SS REPUBLICA de COLOMBIA responded and proceeded to the scene of the collision.

63. The EASTWIND transferred 17 men to the SUZANNE and 83 to the JUNIOR. Personnel transferred were those who were seriously injured and those who were not necessary for the salvage of the vessel.

64. The injured on board the SUZANNE received medical treatment from Dr. ( ) a passenger on that vessel.

65. The injured on the JUNIOR received medical treatment from a nurse, a passenger on that vessel.

66. The SUZANNE and the JUNIOR proceeded to New York where the injured were placed in waiting ambulances and transferred to the Marine Hospital, Staten Island.

67. With the aid of the Coast Guard Tenders GENTIAN and SASSAFRAS, which were sent to assist the EASTWIND, the fire on the latter vessel was ultimately extinguished. The EASTWIND was taken in tow by those vessels and towed, stern first, to Gravesend Bay, New York, arriving there on the morning of January 21, 1949.

68. Bodies identified as those of BUSBY, [REDACTED] ENC, CONNORS, Robert E. [REDACTED] EN3, and ZERR, John V. [REDACTED] FA, were removed upon arrival of the EASTWIND in New York.

69. The badly burned remains of 8 members of the crew were found in the wreckage of the chief petty officers' berthing compartment and were subsequently removed to the Wasmund Mortuary, Fresh Pond Road, Brooklyn, N. Y.

70. Twelve men were admitted to the Marine Hospital for inpatient treatment of injuries received as a result of the collision, namely;

[REDACTED] ENC  
[REDACTED] EN1  
[REDACTED] EN2  
[REDACTED] EN2  
[REDACTED] EN3  
[REDACTED] SA  
[REDACTED] SA  
[REDACTED] SA  
[REDACTED] SA  
[REDACTED] FN  
[REDACTED] FN  
[REDACTED] SA

71. Of the 12 men listed above 2 died as noted in fact No. 61; [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] remain as patients as of January 31, 1949; and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have been discharged from the hospital.

72. The following men received outpatient treatment at St. George Base for injuries as noted:

██████████	GMI	Bruised arch, left foot
██████████	EN1	Burn, left hand, 3rd degree
██████████	SN	Chapped foot, 2nd degree burns
██████████	EN3	Hand burn, 3rd degree
██████████	EN2	Burn, chest, 2nd degree
██████████	EN3	Burns, both feet, 2nd degree
██████████	SA	Burns, both feet, 2nd degree
██████████	BM2	Burns, toes, both feet
██████████	QM2	Burn, left hand, 2nd degree
██████████	FA	Complains of back pains, under observation

73. A navigational plot worked back from the time of the collision using the radar ranges and bearings, and estimated speed of the vessels indicates that the vessels closed at a speed of about 44 feet per second.

74. The GULFSTREAM stood by near the scene of the collision until it was established her services were not required. She then proceeded to New York under her own power.

75. The experience of Lieutenant ██████████ as a deck watch officer was acquired on the SPENCER on weather patrols and on the EASTWIND on an arctic cruise. His watch as officer of the deck of the EASTWIND between 4:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on January 19, 1949 was his first experience as officer of the deck on a vessel underway in active shipping lanes under the conditions which prevailed during that watch.

76. All possible steps were taken on both ships to extinguish the fires which occurred on the respective vessels.

#### OPINIONS

1. That the GULFSTREAM was not proceeding at a moderate speed while in a fog between 4:30 a.m. and 4:39 a.m. on January 19, 1949.

2. That the EASTWIND was not proceeding at a moderate speed while in a fog between about 4:30 a.m. and 4:40 a.m. on January 19, 1949.

3. That [redacted] while serving as Master of the SS GULFSTREAM, was negligent in that he, at or about 4:30 a.m. on January 19, 1949, having been informed that the GULFSTREAM had entered fog while making a speed of 15 knots, did fail to order a reduction to a moderate speed thus contributing to a collision between the GULFSTREAM and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND resulting in the loss of life of 13 persons on the EASTWIND.

4. That [redacted] while serving as Chief Mate of the SS GULFSTREAM, was negligent in that he, as the mate on watch between 4:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on January 19, 1949, knowing that the GULFSTREAM had entered fog at or about 4:30 a.m. on January 19, 1949, while making a speed of 15 knots, did fail to reduce to a moderate speed thus contributing to a collision between the GULFSTREAM and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND resulting in the loss of life of 13 persons on the EASTWIND.

5. That [redacted], while serving as Ordinary Seaman on the SS GULFSTREAM, was inattentive to duty in that he, while assigned to duty as a lookout on the port wing of the bridge of said vessel on the 4:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. watch on January 19, 1949, did, at or about 4:25 a.m. on that date, leave his station as lookout without permission.

6. That [redacted] now a Lieutenant, U. S. Coast Guard, while so serving on board the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND, having, on or about January 19, 1949, on board said ship, been lawfully ordered by one John A. Glynn, then a Captain, U. S. Coast Guard, the Commanding Officer of said ship, to notify the said Glynn of any target which would approach within 3 miles of said ship, did, on or about January 19, 1949, neglect and fail to obey said lawful order, this in violation of a lawful regulation; to wit, Article 192, Coast Guard Courts and Boards.

7. That [redacted], now a Lieutenant, U. S. Coast Guard, while so serving on board the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Eastwind, having on or about January 19, 1949, on board said ship, been lawfully ordered by one John A. Glynn, then a Captain, U. S. Coast Guard, the Commanding Officer of said ship, to reduce the speed of said vessel to 50 r.p.m. should said vessel encounter fog, did, upon encountering fog on or about January 19, 1949, neglect and fail to obey said lawful order, this in violation of a lawful regulation; to wit, Article 192, Coast Guard Courts and Boards.

8. That [redacted], now a Lieutenant, U. S. Coast Guard, while so serving on board the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND, having, on or about January 19, 1949, on board said ship, been lawfully ordered by one John A. Glynn, then a Captain, U. S. Coast Guard, the Commanding Officer of said ship, to commence sounding fog signals when said vessel should encounter fog, did, upon encountering fog, on or about January 19, 1949, neglect and fail to obey

said lawful order, this in violation of a lawful regulation; to wit, Article 192, Coast Guard Courts and Boards.

9. That [REDACTED], now a Lieutenant, U. S. Coast Guard, while so serving on board the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND, having on or about January 19, 1949, on board said ship, been lawfully ordered by one John A. Glynn, then a Captain, U. S. Coast Guard, the Commanding Officer of said ship, to notify the said Glynn when fog should set in, did, upon encountering fog on or about January 19, 1949, neglect and fail to obey said lawful order, this in violation of a lawful regulation; to wit, Article 192, Coast Guard Courts and Boards.

10. That [REDACTED], Lieutenant, U. S. Coast Guard, on or about January 19, 1949, while so serving as officer of the deck on board the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND, making passage from Boston, Massachusetts to Chesapeake Light Vessel, having been informed that the said ship was approaching a radar target, the radar ranges and bearings of which indicated that the EASTWIND and the radar target were on collision courses, did fail to evaluate properly said information supplied by the radar operator, and did then and there fail to issue and see effected such timely orders as were necessary to cause the EASTWIND to keep out of the way of said target by proper change of course, or speed, or both, as it was his duty to do, by reason of which neglect of duty, the said EASTWIND collided with the SS GULFSTREAM, as a result of which collision both vessels were damaged and 13 lives were lost on the EASTWIND.

11. That the SO4 radar, which radar was in operation on board the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter EASTWIND between 4:00 a.m. and 4:40 a.m. on January 19, 1949, was operating such that by proper evaluation of the ranges and bearings furnished thereby, proper evasive action to avoid collision could have been taken.

12. That the fire on the EASTWIND was caused by the heat from impact of collision igniting diesel oil liberated from the ruptured tank of the gig and from the fuel tanks in the way of the damaged hull of the EASTWIND.

13. That the Commanding Officer, and officers and men of the EASTWIND did, under trying conditions, over a period of more than 48 hours, relentlessly take commendable action in saving their ship.

14. That the deaths of

- (1) BROWN, Harry F. ([REDACTED]) HMC
- (2) BUSBY, Ewell ([REDACTED]) ENC
- (3) CONNORS, Robert E. ([REDACTED]) ENS
- (4) CYWINSKI, Louis ([REDACTED]) DCC

- (5) MIDGETTE, Rupert D. ( ) ENC
- (6) ZERR, John V. ( ) FA
- (7) BARNETT, William J. ( ) CSC
- (8) BRYSON, Donald W. ( ) BMC
- (9) EVERETT, Peter A. ( ) CMC
- (10) KING, Kenneth S. ( ) SEC
- (11) MACHANSKY, Anthony G. (2 ) RMC
- (12) COINDREAU, Stanislaus ( ) SA
- (13) WILLIAMS, Albert P. ( ) SA

occurred in line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That [REDACTED], Master of the SS GULFSTREAM, be charged with negligence under authority of R.S. 4450, as amended, the specification to allege the misconduct set forth in paragraph 2 of the Opinions.
2. That [REDACTED], Chief Mate of the SS GULFSTREAM, be charged with negligence under authority of R.S. 4450, as amended, the specification to allege the misconduct set forth in paragraph 3 of the Opinions.
3. That [REDACTED], Ordinary Seaman of the SS GULFSTREAM, be charged with inattention to duty under authority of R.S. 4450, as amended, the specification to allege the misconduct set forth in paragraph 4 of the Opinions.
4. That Lieutenant [REDACTED], U. S. Coast Guard, be brought to trial before a general court on the charge of violation of lawful regulation, the specifications to allege the offenses set forth in paragraphs, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Opinions.
5. That Lieutenant [REDACTED], U. S. Coast Guard, be brought to trial before a general court on the charge of neglect of duty, the specification to allege the offense set forth in paragraph 10, of the Opinions.

[REDACTED]  
EDWARD H. SMITH

Rear Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard

[REDACTED]  
ROBERT H. ROBERTS

Captain, U. S. Coast Guard

[REDACTED]  
EDWARD C. CLEAVE

Captain, U. S. Coast Guard

[REDACTED]  
WILLIAM M. MCGUIRE

Captain, U. S. Coast Guard

[REDACTED]  
JOSEPH A. KERRINS

Captain, U. S. Coast Guard

The board then, at 4:45 p.m., adjourned to await the action of the convening authority.

[REDACTED]  
EDWARD H. SMITH

Rear Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard, President.

[REDACTED]  
JOSEPH A. KERRINS

Captain, U. S. Coast Guard, Member and Recorder