From: Chief, Merchant Vessel Inspection
To: Commandant
Via: Chief, Office of Merchant Marine Safety

Subj: Marine Board of Investigation; collision involving SS CITY OF CLEVELAND III and SS RAVNBFJELL (Norw.) off Harbor Beach, Michigan on 25 June, 1950 with loss of life.

1. Pursuant to the provision of Title 46 U.S.C. Part 136, the record of the Marine Board convened to investigate subject casualty, together with its Findings of Fact, Conclusion and Recommendations, has been reviewed and is forwarded herewith.

2. The American passenger SS CITY OF CLEVELAND III of 4665 g.t. was southbound in Lake Huron on a calculated course midway between the recommended courses of the Lake Carriers Association during foggy weather with an inoperative radar on board. The RAVNBFJELL (Norw.) of 1558 g.t. was bound northward on a calculated course to the west of the recommended northbound course of the Lake Carriers Association during foggy weather with her radar in operation. The CITY OF CLEVELAND was proceeding at approximately 16 miles per hour and the RAVNBFJELL was proceeding at approximately 7 knots and both vessels were sounding regulation fog signals. Upon sighting each other, both vessels were confused as to the intentions of the other and collided at approximately 0608 on 25 June, 1950 off Harbor Beach, Michigan. As a result of this casualty, the lives of 5 persons were lost.

3. The Board made the following Findings of Fact:

   "(1) That the American passenger vessel SS CITY OF CLEVELAND III and the Norwegian freight vessel SS RAVNBFJELL collided in fog off Harbor Beach, Michigan, in Lake Huron on 25 June 1950, resulting in the loss of five lives and extensive damage to the CITY OF CLEVELAND III, and minor hull and equipment damage on the RAVNBFJELL. That both vessels made port under their own power after the collision. The CITY OF CLEVELAND III is a steam, side-wheel vessel. The RAVNBFJELL is a steam, screw vessel.

(2) The SS CITY OF CLEVELAND III, Official Number 204000, a 4568 gross ton passenger vessel owned and operated by the Detroit and Cleveland Navigation Company, departed Grand Haven, Michigan, on 22 June bound for the Straits of Mackinac and various calls en route Detroit, Michigan. On this trip the vessel was chartered by the Benton Harbor Chamber of Commerce. A total of 80 passengers, all men, were aboard at the time of the collision. The vessel's itinerary called for various stops in Lake Michigan and the Straits of Mackinac on the way to Detroit. Due to widespread fog conditions in Lake Michigan most of the stops were omitted. Because of the time lost in fog the passengers asked the Master to call at Harbor Springs, Michigan and omit the rest of the ports of call in order to reach Detroit by Sunday morning, June 26th. This the Master agreed to do."
Chief, NWL Division to
Commandant

CITY OF CLEVELAND III,
RAVNEFJELL (Norw.) a=9 Bu

21 September, 1936

(1) The CITY OF CLEVELAND III passed through the Straits of Mackinac on 26 June, downbound for Detroit. The Master laid out the vessel's course between the upper and downbound Lake Carriers recommended course from Poe Reef Light to Harbor Beach. The vessel made her normal full cruising speed of 16 miles per hour, or 22 revolutions per minute, from Poe Reef Light to the point of collision off Harbor Beach. Point Aux Barques Light bore 196 degrees, true, distant 13 miles at 0100 A.M. Eastern Standard Time on 26 June. Course was altered from 181 to 170 degrees true. Bow and beam bearings were taken on Harbor Beach Light, the run from bow to beam covered 25 minutes. Harbor Beach Light was abeam to starboard distant 16.7 miles by four point bearing at 0540 A.M. EST. The vessel entered fog at 0545 A.M. EST on course 170 degrees true, making 16 miles per hour. Immediately upon entering fog the Master on watch began making the three-blast Great Lakes fog signal at one-minute intervals. The First Mate, who was in the process of being relieved by the Third Mate at that time, told the Third Mate to ring the Master's buzzer. This was done and the Master replied by ringing the pilothouse buzzer. In a very short time the Master appeared in the pilothouse. When the Master arrived in the pilothouse the CITY OF CLEVELAND was making fog signals, making a speed of 16 miles an hour and was on a course of 170 degrees, true and gyro. No change in course or speed was ordered by the Master until approximately 0600 A.M., at which time he ordered course changed to 180 degrees in order to give a vessel, whose fog signals he had picked up two points on his port bow, a wider berth. The Master states that he thought he was overtaking that vessel and since the CITY OF CLEVELAND was west of the downbound course the vessel whose fog signal he could hear would normally be a downbound vessel.

(4) The Master, Third Mate, and Lookout state that the fog signal, which was first picked up at two points, definitely drew back to the left and the bearing increased to approximately 3/4 to 5 points. The Lookout states that he reported the signal to the Master when it was at 2 points, and that the Master acknowledged it verbally. The vessel, which apparently had been making the fog signals, finally appeared through the fog approximately 56 degrees on the port bow of the CITY OF CLEVELAND. Estimates of the time interval between the first sighting of the vessel and the collision could not be obtained, but the Master stated that it was 1 minute, or just time to give the hard right and then the hard left rudder orders. Upon first sighting the vessel, which later proved to be the RAVNEFJELL, the Master ordered full right rudder, but as the two vessels closed the distance the Master of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III suddenly "saw the true picture" and ordered full left rudder. The Helmsman states that he had the helm approximately 1_2 turn from full right, it requiring 4_2 turns to go to full right, when he began turning it to full left. He further states that the helm was full left at the time of the collision but
Chief, LVI Division to Commandant

21 September, 1950

(CITY OF CLEVELAND III
RAVENFJELL (Norw.) a-9 Bd)

that he had noticed no change in course from either the full right or full left rudder. The Master made no change in speed until after the collision, at which time he rang up stop on the engine room telegraph.

(5) The weather conditions at the time of this collision were:
Calm, fog, daylight, no sea or swell. CITY OF CLEVELAND III estimates of the visibility range from 1100 feet to one-half mile. The RAVENFJELL was first sighted from 1100 feet to one-quarter mile away.

(6) The witnesses from the CITY OF CLEVELAND III are unanimous in their statements that no passing signal was heard from the RAVENFJELL and that no danger signal was blown by the RAVENFJELL or the CITY OF CLEVELAND III. The Master of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III states that he blew no passing signal because he thought he was overtaking the RAVENFJELL and the sound of that vessel's fog signal indicated that it was so far away passing signals were not necessary. Both vessels are equipped with radiotelephones, but no radio messages were exchanged until after the collision. Neither vessel put out a "Safety Call".

(7) Despite the full right rudder and full left rudder the CITY OF CLEVELAND III was unable to avoid a collision with the RAVENFJELL. The stem of the RAVENFJELL came into contact with the port side of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III just abaft the port paddle wheel. After the initial contact the bow of the RAVENFJELL plowed through the port sponsors of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III until it reached the hull, and then ranged aft for a distance of approximately 100 feet. The RAVENFJELL was finally forced clear of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III by the force of the impact. The CITY OF CLEVELAND III stopped dead in the water shortly after the collision. The RAVENFJELL remained in the immediate vicinity rendering assistance.

(8) When the collision appeared imminent, the Master of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III ordered the general alarm thrown in. The Third Mate threw in the switch. In addition to all the general alarm bells the sprinkler system alarm was ringing in the engine room because the sprinkler lines on the port side in the collision area had been fractured. The Master ordered a survey of the damage and a count of the passengers. The Steward's department attended the passengers and the mates made a survey of the damage. The Master states that he lowered no boats because he wanted to determine whether the vessel would remain afloat before lowering boats to search for persons in the water. All due precautions were taken to avoid fire. Electrical circuits leading through the damaged area were de-energized by pulling the switches in the engine room. Steam lines and water lines in the damaged area were turned off. The emergency party wet down the wreckage with fire lines to avoid any possibility of fire.
Chief, NMI Division to
Commandant

21 September, 1950
(CITY OF CLEVELAND III -
RAVENFJELL (Norw.) a-9 Rd)

(9) The Norwegian SS RAVENFJELL, a 1538.74 gross ton freight vessel, owned and operated by Olsen & Uglestad of Oslo, Norway, departed Sarnia, Ontario, at 1:15 A.M Eastern Daylight Saving time on 25 June, 1950 bound for Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The vessel's draft on departure was 11' 0" forward, 16' 3" aft. The pilothouse clock on the RAVENFJELL was set back 30 minutes at 1:32 A.M. in the process of changing from Eastern Daylight Saving Time to Central Daylight Saving Time. The clock was set back the remaining 30 minutes at 4:00 A.M. the same day. There also appears to be a six-minute disparity between the clocks on the CITY OF CLEVELAND III and the RAVENFJELL since the collision was logged at 6:08 A.M. on the CITY OF CLEVELAND III and at 6:14 A.M. on the RAVENFJELL. For the sake of clarity, the CITY OF CLEVELAND III clock will be taken as a base in this report. All events logged on the RAVENFJELL between 1:32 A.M. and 4:00 A.M. will be adjusted by subtracting 36 minutes from the ship's time. All events logged after 4:00 A.M. will be adjusted herein by subtracting 6 minutes from ship's time. In this manner all times shown will be given as if they had been logged by the clock on the CITY OF CLEVELAND III.

(10) The RAVENFJELL was abeam of Port Sanilac on course 354 degrees true and gyro, distance 2 1/2 nautical miles; 3.01 statute miles, at 5:09 A.M. corrected time. The vessel's speed at that time was 7 knots. This speed was maintained until 5:24 A.M. corrected time, at which time the vessel entered fog and speed was reduced. All distances and speeds mentioned in connection with the RAVENFJELL are in terms of nautical miles and knots. The vessel streams a taffrail log whenever possible and for that reason, plus the fact that the radar is calibrated in yards, the nautical mile is retained as a unit of measure, even on the Great Lakes.

(11) The RAVENFJELL is equipped with a surface search radar manufactured by Metropolitan - Vickers Electric Co. Ltd., Manchester & Sheffield, England, and installed by Siemens Brothers Company Ltd., Woolwich, London. The plate marking reads: Radar Type U.K. 1, Console Type 202, Serial No. F.379. The range scale shift switch is marked 2000, 6000, 18,000, 54,000 yards. This means that it is possible to operate the radar on any one of those scales. To shift scale it is only necessary to move the switch. This radar is not equipped with a remote plan position indicator scope (PPI). The PPI scope is mounted in a console cabinet together with the transceiver and amplifying unit. The console is mounted in the starboard panel bulkhead of the chartroom, the after portion of the console extending into the radio shack. The door between the pilothouse and the chartroom is just forward of the console on the starboard side of the structure. It is possible to stand at the radar set and look out ahead through the forward pilothouse windows. The photographs of the pilothouse and chartroom layout of the RAVENFJELL illustrate this point. The PPI scope is surrounded

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by two bearing circles. The outer circle is stationary and is calibrated from 0 degrees, top center, around to 369 degrees. The inner circle is rotated by a control mounted below the scope. This circle is calibrated from 0 degrees to 180 degrees on each side. The two halves are painted different colors, the starboard half being painted red and the port half green. Then the inner circle is rotated so that the centerline of the circle bisects the target is is possible to avoid error as to which side of the vessel the target is on by observing the color which appears opposite the outer circle. The Master of the RAVNEFJELL states that all bearings on this radar are relative bearings. He further states that the set was in good operating condition on the day of this collision.

(12) The Master of the RAVNEFJELL states that he had laid out his course so as to be west of the Lake Carriers Association recommended course between Port Huron and Harbor Beach. His chart and navigation work on the charts furnished by the Board indicate that he intended to keep at least 5000 feet to the westward of the upbound course. The Master further states that he is thoroughly familiar with the Lake Carriers Association courses, having made several voyages to Great Lakes ports, and that he always adheres to the limits of those courses.

(13) The area of reduced visibility which the RAVNEFJELL entered at 3:24 A.M. corrected time, was not an area of solid fog. The visibility varied and the vessel passed through open patches from time to time. There is some confusion as to whether the speed of the vessel was actually reduced at 3:24, but the Engineer who was on watch at the time of the collision definitely states that he received a standby order on the engine room telegraph at 3:45 A.M. corrected time, and that he disconnected the turbine at that time. The RAVNEFJELL is equipped with a reciprocating engine for its main propulsion unit and a steam turbine which is cut in for economy and an increase in speed. Both engines are coupled to the same shaft, but only the turbine can be disconnected. When a standby order is received on the telegraph, the turbine is disconnected so that the reciprocating engine may be reversed, if necessary.

(14) The First Mate states that he picked up a target on radar at 3:44 A.M. corrected time, bearing 5 degrees on the starboard bow about 8 nautical miles distant. When the Mate rang up standby on the engine room telegraph at 3:54, the Master went up to the pilothouse to investigate. He found that his vessel was on course 354 degrees true and gyro, that the engine room telegraph indicated standby, and that there was a target on the radar approximately 6 nautical miles distant, 5 degrees on the starboard bow. The RAVNEFJELL was still blowing fog signals, having started blowing them when it entered fog at 3:24 A.M. Both the Master and the Mate state that they first heard the CITY OF CLEVELAND's fog signals at about 5:59 A.M. corrected time, and that
the signals were about 10 degrees on the starboard bow. The Master
states that he took a radar bearing on the target at that time and it
bore 10 degrees on the starboard bow, distant 2 nautical miles. In
order to give the approaching vessel a wide berth the Master ordered
the course changed to 320 degrees true and gyro. This was logged at 5:59
A.M. corrected time. When the course was changed from 354 to 320 de-
degrees true and gyro a two-blast whistle signal was blown by the RAVENEFJELL
to notify the vessel ahead of the change. No answer to this signal
was heard on the RAVENEFJELL. Both the Master and the Mate state that
the course change caused the bearing of the fog signals to draw well
to starboard. The Master states, however, that from 5:59 to 6:04 A.M.
corrected time, he could not tell whether the radar target was "coming in or out". He further states that he maintained radar contact with
the target until 2 minutes before the collision.

(15) The Master of the RAVENEFJELL states that he sighted a vessel
about 15 degrees on his starboard bow, crossing his bow at a high rate
of speed at 6:05 A.M. corrected time. He states that he rang up full
speed astern on the engine room telegraph in an effort to swing the
RAVENEFJELL's bow to starboard. At 6:15 A.M. corrected time he ordered
full right rudder and rang up full speed ahead in an effort to accen-
tuate the swing to starboard. He further states that it was hard to
tell whether his bow was swinging because the CITY OF CLEVELAND was
also swinging, but that the hard right rudder did bring the ship's head
to the right. Captain [REDACTED] estimates the angle of impact at 40 to
50 degrees. He states that the visibility when he went to the pilothouse at 5:54 A.M. corrected time was about one-half nautical mile and
that it remained the same until after the collision. He estimates
that the CITY OF CLEVELAND was about one-half nautical mile away
when he first sighted her bow and foremast, and that she was making
a large bow wave. He states that there was no apparent change in the
speed of the CITY OF CLEVELAND from the time he first sighted her
until the time of the collision. Along this line, Captain [REDACTED]
states that the RAVENEFJELL was almost dead in the water at the time of
the collision. The sequence of engine room telegraph orders on the
RAVENEFJELL (all corrected time) was: 6:06 full astern, 6:07 full ahead,
6:08 full astern, 6:10 stop. The collision occurred at 6:14 A.M.
RAVENEFJELL time; 6:108 CITY OF CLEVELAND III time, which is Eastern
Standard Time. Captain [REDACTED] estimates that the RAVENEFJELL's speed
when he rang up the first full astern bell was between 6 and 7 knots,
and that the vessel would headreach about one-quarter of a nautical
mile before coming to a dead stop if the engine were put full astern.

(16) Immediately after the collision the RAVENEFJELL lowered both of
her lifeboats to search for persons in the water whose cries could be
heard. The CITY OF CLEVELAND III was contacted by radiotelephone con-
cerning her damage and whether she had any persons missing. The Master
of the RAVENEFJELL and his Canadian Pilot state that the CITY OF CLEVELAND
III answered that no one was missing and that she was going to get underway
for Detroit. In the meantime the RAVENFJELL's lifeboats picked up 5 of the CITY OF CLEVELAND's III's passengers from the water. Captain thinking that the report from the CITY OF CLEVELAND III was accurate, ordered his boats alongside. When he learned that there were three injured passengers in his starboard lifeboat he called the CITY OF CLEVELAND III and asked if she had a doctor aboard. Captain rode over to the CITY OF CLEVELAND III in his boat along with three injured passengers. Arriving at the vessel he went up to the pilothouse to see Captain Kessling. He told Captain Kessling that there might be more passengers in the water, and used the CITY OF CLEVELAND's radiotelephone to tell the RAVENFJELL to have the lifeboats continue the search. The search was continued and one body was found, making a total of four of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III passengers that the RAVENFJELL could account for. Both vessels had contacted the Harbor Beach Coast Guard Station and requested assistance shortly after the collision. The Officer-in-charge, Harbor Beach Lifeboat Station, one Kenneth Oil, RNC(L), proceeded to the scene in CG-36852. Oil states that the vessels were south of the position they had given on the radiotelephone. He further states that the Master of the RAVENFJELL asked him to board that vessel and check its position by radar. He did and he found that the vessel was 7,382 yards from Helena Road in latitude 43 degrees, 48 minutes, 35 seconds north; longitude 82 degrees, 52 minutes west. He states that this position was also checked by his course and time run from the station to the scene and, later, by his run from the scene to the station. He states that his run back to the station took 40 minutes at approximately 12.5 miles per hour. 

(17) A survey of the dead, missing, and injured, made shortly after the collision revealed the fact that there were six injured persons and one body transferred from the CITY OF CLEVELAND III to Harbor Beach by CG-36852, one body picked up in the water by the CG-36852, one person missing from the CITY OF CLEVELAND III, one crew member slightly injured on the RAVENFJELL and one crew member slightly injured on the CITY OF CLEVELAND III. Since the collision two of the injured passengers have died in the hospital and one passenger is still missing. The death toll from this collision now stands at four known dead and one missing.

(18) The CITY OF CLEVELAND III is an inspected passenger vessel of the United States, having completed her last annual inspection on 9 June 1950 at Detroit. At the time of this collision she was fully manned in accordance with her certificate of inspection. She is required to carry one licensed Master and First Class Pilot, and three First Class Pilots. The RAVENFJELL was manned in accordance with the applicable Norwegian laws and carried one licensed or certificated Master whose license covers all tons on any ocean, and three licensed or certificated Nates. In addition to the regularly assigned crew
the RAVENSFJELL at the time of the collision carried a licensed Canadian Sailing Master as pilot. The Sailing Master stated that he piloted the vessel in rivers and harbors and moors and unmoors the vessel, but that the ship's officers navigate the vessel in the open lakes. The Sailing Master was asleep in his cabin at the time of the collision. He appeared in the pilothouse immediately after the collision and assisted the Master of the RAVENSFJELL in handling the ship and directing the rescue operations. The Canadian authorities have been requested to furnish the Board with information as to the type of license held by the Sailing Master in order to corroborate his statement, since such he did not have his license with him when he testified before the Board.

(19) Both vessels involved in this collision had the proper lookouts posted. The lookout on the CITY OF CLEVELAND III was stationed on the "C" deck in the bow. The lookout on the RAVENSFJELL was stationed on the wing of the bridge. The CITY OF CLEVELAND III is equipped with a war surplus "RAYTHEON SM-1" radar, but it was rendered inoperable in September 1949 on orders from the General Superintendent of the Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Company and has remained inoperative since that time.

(20) The damage reports on both vessels are so voluminous that they are appended hereto as enclosures. The estimated cost of repairs to the CITY OF CLEVELAND III is $689,809.00. The estimated cost of repairs to the RAVENSFJELL is $22,000.00. Temporary repairs were made of the RAVENSFJELL at Chicago so as to permit the vessel to return to Norway where the permanent repairs will be made. The CITY OF CLEVELAND III will be unable to sail again during the current navigation season.

4. The Board made the following conclusions:

(21) From the above mentioned facts and a study of the exhibits the Board concludes that the CITY OF CLEVELAND III and the RAVENSFJELL collided in fog with the loss of four lives on the CITY OF CLEVELAND III because of a failure to adhere to the pilot rules for the Great Lakes on the part of both vessels. The missing passenger is presumed to be dead.

(22) The testimony of the Master of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III establishes the following violations:

1. The vessel entered an area of low visibility making approximately 16 statute miles per hour.

2. The vessel began making fog signals but did not reduce speed until after a collision had occurred.

3. The fog signal of a vessel apparently not more than four points from right ahead was heard but no reduction in speed was made.
Despite the fact that the course or intention of the vessel ahead was not clear to the Master of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III, he continued to navigate his vessel at 10 statute miles per hour; his only action being to allow courses to the right in an effort to give the vessel a wider berth. When course was altered or whistle signal was given to notify the other vessel of the course change, no danger signal was blown at any time. The vessel was not backed at all.

(24) The testimony of the Master of the RAVENSFJELL constitutes the following violations on the part of his vessel:

1. In an area of low visibility the fog signal of a vessel apparently not more than four points from right ahead was heard, but the RAVENSFJELL did not slow to bare steerageway and navigate with caution.

2. Despite the fact that he was unable to determine the course or intention of the vessel ahead from his radar or from the fog signals of that vessel, the Master of the RAVENSFJELL continued to navigate his vessel at a speed of approximately 6-8 knots. No danger signal was blown and the vessel was not backed until the collision was inevitable.

(25) The recommended courses laid out by the Lake Carriers Association were followed by the RAVENSFJELL, but the Master of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III chose to navigate between the upbound and downbound courses because he wanted to avoid weaving in and out as he overtook slower vessels on the downbound course. The fact that some other vessel might be upbound and might be doing the same thing apparently did not occur to him. The courts have held that, regardless of nationality or ownership, vessels adhering to the recommended courses are practicing prudent seamanship. The fact that the CITY OF CLEVELAND III is owned by a company which is not a member of the association does not foreclose the vessel from using the recommended courses nor does it excuse the vessel from any blame which might attach if the recommended courses could have been the means of avoiding a collision.

(26) As is usually the case, there is considerable disagreement as to the exact position of the point of collision. The RAVENSFJELL shows it as having been 123 degrees, 6-1/8 statute miles from Harbor Beach Light, or 683 degrees 3-3/4 statute miles from the prominent point at Helen Road. The first fix taken by the RAVENSFJELL was by radar. A visual bearing of 311 degrees true on Harbor Beach Light was taken when the fog lifted. The CITY OF CLEVELAND III could not obtain a bearing until the fog lifted. The Master has marked the position of the collision as being 123 degrees true, 9-1/6 miles from Harbor Beach Light. It is believed that the actual collision point lies somewhere between the two. The RAVENSFJELL had a relatively short run from its
last port of departure and the vessel's radar furnishes a very accurate means of obtaining a position, providing the radar is functioning properly. The CITY OF CLEVELAND III had a long run from its last accurate fix and no attempt was made to fix the vessel's position other than the bow and beam bearings on Harbor Beach, and these are subject to doubt. Neither vessel bothered to use the radio direction finder as a means of obtaining an accurate position despite the fact that both vessels are equipped with excellent radio direction finders. Since the weight of the evidence indicates that the HAVNEFJELL's position is more accurate than that of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III the board is inclined to accept that position as being the approximate position of the collision. The CITY OF CLEVELAND III could have been set one way or the other on the long run from Rockport to the course change at Point Aux Barques without the knowledge of the late on watch. No fix was obtained at Point Aux Barques. It is possible that the bearing of the CITY OF CLEVELAND III was actually on the port bow instead of the starboard bow of the HAVNEFJELL, but this is a remote possibility. If only one officer had operated the radar and stated that the bearing was on the starboard bow, the possibility of human error might be strong, but two experienced officers took several separate bearings. The fact that the inner bearing circle is colored so as to avoid error lends weight to the conviction that no error was made. Just how the two vessels managed to go so far off their courses as to collide is a matter for speculation rather than proof. Working with the testimony and exhibits alone it is not possible to establish exactly how they arrived at the point of collision. The violations of prudent seamanship which caused the collision are glaring and they have already been listed herein. No other factor seems to have contributed to this collision. The equipment of both vessels functioned properly and both vessels were able to complete their voyages unassisted, using their main steering gear and controls."

The Board made the following Recommendation:

"(26). In order to expedite the hearing and provide for the presence of all available witnesses, Rudolph J. Kiesling, Master's License No. [obscured] was charged with misconduct on three specifications as soon as the Board finished taking testimony. The hearing began in the Federal Building at Detroit, Michigan, on 6 July and continued through 8 July, at which time both sides rested and an interval was granted on defense motion for filing of briefs. No decision has been handed down in the case at this writing. Since no other personnel on the CITY OF CLEVELAND III appear to have contributed to this casualty it is recommended that no further action be taken insofar as that vessel is concerned."

REMARKS

6. The CITY OF CLEVELAND III was proceeding at a speed of 16 miles and the...
HAVESHELL at 6.5 knots per hour during thick fog prior to the occurrence of the subject collision. Neither vessel was able to stop and reverse in time to avert such collisions with the result that the lives of five passengers were lost. 46 USC 324 provides that no person shall operate any vessel in a reckless or negligent manner as to endanger life, limb or property. 18 USC 1116 provides that every captain because of whose conduct, negligence or inattention to duty the life of any person is destroyed shall be fined not more than $50,000.00 or imprisoned not more than 10 years or both. The violation of 46 USC 324 1 is a misdemeanor and the violation of 18 USC 1116 is a felony.

7. Duplicate record of investigation of subject casualty involving the masters of both vessels will be forwarded to the Attorney General of the United States for consideration with respect to the probable violation of the above-cited safety statutes.

8. Neither the record nor the report of the Board contains the names and addresses of the persons who lost or who are presumed to have lost their lives in the subject casualty. The names and addresses of all persons who have lost or who are presumed to have lost their lives in subject casualty are to be forwarded to Coast Guard Headquarters and added as a supplement to the Finding of Fact 17 of the Board's report.

9. Subject to the foregoing remarks, it is recommended that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Marine Board of Investigation be approved.

/s/ W. C. SHERIDAN
W. C. SHERIDAN

24 October, 1960
(CITY OF CLEVELAND. III- RAVESHELL (Norw.) a-o Ed)

AF: NOV: 26 October 1960

/s/ WELT OHREIL
WELT OHREIL
Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard
Commandant