Commandant's Action on

Marine Board of Investigation; collision between the SS ALCOA CORSAIR and MV LORENZO MARCELLO (Italian), Mississippi River on 22 October 1960 with loss of life

1. The record of the Marine Board of Investigation convened to investigate subject casualty together with its Findings of Fact, Opinions and Recommendations has been reviewed.

2. At 0416 CST, 22 October 1960 on a clear dark night the combination passenger-dry cargo vessel SS ALCOA CORSAIR of United States registry collided in a meeting situation with the Italian freight vessel SS LORENZO MARCELLO in the lower Mississippi River at Mile 32 APh in the vicinity of Tropical Bend Upper Light (AGL 6933).

3. Approaching Tropical Bend Upper Light from New Orleans the axis of the river changes from about 095°T at Mile 35 to 190°T at Mile 33 as it rounds Sixty Mile Point. From there to Mile 32 the river runs fairly straight, then begins a gradual left turn which continues for several miles.

4. The ALCOA CORSAIR was en route New Orleans to San Juan, Puerto Rico with 51 passengers, 99 crew members and 1,535 tons of dry cargo. Her speed over the bottom with a 1/2 knot following current was estimated to be 18 knots. Approaching Sixty Mile Point the lights of the LORENZO MARCELLO were first observed down river across the point. Rounding Sixty Mile Point the MARCELLO came into view over the water. At 0412 while still swinging right and passing a heading of about 180°T the green side light of the MARCELLO was observed ahead. The distance off was established to be two miles by radar. After a minute and a half during which time the bearing of the MARCELLO did not change appreciably and the green light continued to be visible, a two-blast signal was heard from the MARCELLO. The ALCOA CORSAIR's rudder was ordered left 10 degrees and the two-blast signal was answered. The ALCOA CORSAIR's
right turn carried through to a heading of 205.5°T before she started
to swing left. Shortly after the order for 10° left rudder, the order
was given for 20° left. The LORENZO MARCELLO was very nearly dead
ahead still showing a green light. At about 0415 with the two vessels
approximately 1/2 mile apart a danger signal was heard from the
LORENZO MARCELLO and was promptly answered. At the same time the
MARCELLO was observed swinging to her own right. The CORSAIR continued
left at full speed and at 0416 the bow of the LORENZO MARCELLO struck
the ALCOA CORSAIR at about a 35° angle on the starboard side between
No. 2 and No. 3 holds.

5. The LORENZO MARCELLO, en route from Houston, Texas, to New Orleans
with §,500 tons of general cargo was upbound in the Mississippi River
making 13.5 knots over the bottom stemming a one-half knot current.
After passing Empire, La., the MARCELLO took up a heading of 345° or
316°T with Tropical Bend Upper Light slightly on the port bow in order
to angle over to the right descending bank and come up under Sixty
Mile Point. In the meantime the downbound ALCOA CORSAIR was observed
rounding Sixty Mile Point and close out her starboard side light.
When the two vessels were between a mile and a mile and a half apart
the MARCELLO initiated a two-blast signal and received a prompt
reply. As the CORSAIR's red side light continued to be visible
off the starboard bow with no change of aspect the MARCELLO witnesses
claimed their vessel sounded another two-blast signal, not because of
doubt but to reaffirm the previous exchange. The MARCELLO witnesses
claimed further that this two-blast signal was answered but all of the
ALCOA witnesses denied that this second exchange of two-blast signals
occurred. The MARCELLO then ordered hard right rudder, purportedly
to alter course to parallel the west bank and because the vessel was
believed to be getting close to that bank. About 1 minute before
collision the MARCELLO sounded the danger signal. This was promptly
answered by the CORSAIR. Until this time no change in the aspect
of the CORSAIR was noticed. Both red and green side lights of the
CORSAIR were then observed almost dead ahead of the MARCELLO.
Moments before collision, as the CORSAIR's red light closed out,
the MARCELLO shifted rudder to hard left and ordered her engine
back full. Before either the rudder or engine order could take
effect the bow of the MARCELLO struck the CORSAIR at an angle of about
35° measured from the bow of the CORSAIR to the centerline of the
MARCELLO.

6. The two vessels separated shortly after the collision. The ALCOA
CORSAIR was beached on the left descending bank and the LORENZO MARCELLO
anchored upriver of the scene.
7. As a result of the collision five passengers and five crew members were killed, six passengers and four crew members were injured aboard the ALCOA CORSAIR. There were no deaths or injuries aboard the LORENZO MARCELLO.

REMARKS

1. Despite the conflicting versions of material facts the Board's reconstruction of the events leading up to the casualty as set forth in the Findings of Fact and explained in the Opinions is amply supported in the record and is considered to be a more nearly accurate account.

2. It is considered that the primary cause of this casualty was the failure of both vessels to navigate with caution. The initial failure on the part of the ALCOA CORSAIR to make a timely and sufficient alteration of course to port to insure a safe starboard to starboard passing as agreed upon was a major factor in the case. Her subsequent failure to recognize the dangerous situation developing and resultant failure to take timely measures to avoid or minimize the effects of the collision also contributed.

3. The LORENZO MARCELLO similarly failed to recognize the increasing danger of the situation which should have been apparent and had she done so the fatal decision to turn toward the track of the ALCOA CORSAIR might have been avoided.

4. It is further considered that the responsibility for this casualty rests solely with the pilots of the two vessels. The situation was more than just a case of meeting vessels but one of vessels meeting in a river where a knowledge of local conditions and customs dictated the need for the special qualifications of a pilot. Accordingly, the failures of the master of the LORENZO MARCELLO and the watch officer on the ALCOA CORSAIR to realize that their vessels were standing into danger or to conclude that their respective vessels were being improperly navigated prior to the time that collision was imminent are not deemed to be faults under the circumstances.

5. To the extent that there is no conflict with the foregoing remarks the Opinions of the Board are approved.
6. The Board's Recommendations for action against the two vessels under 33 USC 159 are approved to the extent that there is evidence of violation of 33 USC 203 for failure to keep clear after ascertaining to a starboard to starboard passing. There appears to be no evidence of negligent operation on the part of the owners of the two vessels; hence the Recommendation that action against them under 46 USC 5260 be considered, is disapproved.

7. The Recommendations of the Board that the evidence of negligence on the part of the pilots of the two vessels be referred to the American Pilots' Association for possible action are approved.

8. The Board's Recommendations for further action against the master of the LORENZO MARCELLO and the watch officer of the ALCOA CORSAIR are disapproved for the reasons set forth in paragraph 4 above.

9. With respect to the Board's Recommendation 7, it is considered that the record in this case contains evidence of criminal liability within the purview of Title 18 USC 1115 on the part of the pilots of the two vessels. Accordingly this case will be referred to the Department of Justice for possible prosecution.

10. Subject to the foregoing remarks the record of the Marine Board of Investigation is approved.

A. C. RICHMOND
Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard
Commandant
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

From: Marine Board of Investigation  
To: Commandant (MARAD)  
Via: Commander, 8th Coast Guard District  

Subj: SS ALCOA CORSAIR - MV LORENZO MARCELLO (ITALIAN); collision, 22 October 1960, Mississippi River, with loss of life

Findings of Fact:

1. SS ALCOA CORSAIR and MV LORENZO MARCELLO were in collision at Mile 32 A.M., Mississippi River at about 04:16 zone plus six time on 22 October 1960. Five passengers and five crew members of ALCOA CORSAIR lost their lives as a result of this collision and ten persons - six passengers and four crew members aboard the same ship, were injured. There were no deaths or injuries aboard LORENZO MARCELLO.

2. The vessels involved are:

   a. ALCOA CORSAIR, O.N. 251,177, of 8,481 gross and 4,539 net tons, 455 feet in length, 62 feet in breadth, drawing at the time 16 feet 6 inches forward and 23 feet 1 inch aft, powered by steam turbines, a converted VC-2 with accommodations for ninety-five passengers, owned and operated by Alcoa Steamship Corporation, with [REDACTED], Dk. No. [REDACTED] (License [REDACTED]), of [REDACTED], Master.

   b. LORENZO MARCELLO (ITALIAN), O.N. 587, a dry cargo vessel of 6,213 gross and 3,996 net tons, 478 feet in length, 62 feet in breadth, drawing at the time 10 feet 10 inches forward and 21 feet 7 inches aft, a diesel-powered vessel, owned and operated by Societa Italiana Di Armamento (SIDARMA), with [REDACTED] of Genoa, Italy, Master.

3. Deceased are:

   a. Crew members and next of kin:

      John Gorman
      Wife - [REDACTED]
      Waifer - [REDACTED]
Walter H. Orman  Mother -
Walter
Edward W. Ketschke  Sister -
Walter (Captain)
Roy A. Goddard  Mother -
Walter
Herbert J. Sullivan  None known
Walter

b. Passengers and home addresses:
Clayton Colwell -
Miss Helen E. Fox -
Mrs. Virginia S. Kirchenier -
Miss Frances C. Ludd -
Otto Peter Walters -

4. Injured are:

a. Crew members and home addresses:

2nd. 3rd Cook -
3rd. Day Porter -
D1. Messman -
b. Passengers and home addresses:

Mrs. 

Mr. 

Mrs. 

Mrs. 

Mrs. 


5. At the time of casualty, ________________________, ______________________, Second Mate of ALCOA CORSAIR, was mate of the watch. ________________________, Second Mate of ________________________, a commissioned pilot of the State of Louisiana for the New Orleans-Pilottown section of the Mississippi River, and a member of the Crescent River Port Pilots' Association, was compulsory pilot aboard. Aboard LORENZO MARCELLO, ________________________, also a commissioned pilot and member of the Association, was compulsory pilot.

6. At the time of the casualty, the night was dark and clear, visibility was excellent, the river was at low stage with current estimated at about one-half knot. Wind was negligible.

7. At 0025, 22 October 1960, ALCOA CORSAIR, with fifty-one passengers and ninety-nine officers and crew, carrying 1,535 tons of general cargo, bound on a foreign voyage with San Juan, Puerto Rico, as first port, unmoored from the Bienville Street Wharf, New Orleans, and proceeded down the Mississippi River toward the Gulf of Mexico. The early hours of the run were routine. At about the time the 0400-0500 watchstanders relieved the watch, the vessel was slowed to pass Port Sulphur. When the wharf area had been cleared, at 0356, full throttle speed was resumed, giving the vessel a speed of about eighteen knots over the bottom.
8. At about this time the Master, who after clearing the New Orleans port area had ceased to remain continuously in the wheelhouse or on the wingbut instead had moved about from wheelhouse to chart room, remaining always in the bridge area, left the wheelhouse to go to the toilet nearby. Pilot continued conning and Second Mate stationed himself at the engine order telegraph. Prior to 0412, while ALCOA CORSAIR was in the bend above Sixty Mile Point, the white lights of LORENZO MARCELLO were seen over intervening land downriver. However, at 0412 the hull and green side light of LORENZO MARCELLO were first seen directly over water. Second Mate fixed the time as 0412 and observed the radar pips of LORENZO MARCELLO to be just entering the two mile scale. At this time ALCOA CORSAIR was apparently in the middle of the river, about 340 yards north of Bayou Lamogue Light (ACL 6934). The vessel was continuously swinging slowly right, and at the time was passing a heading of about 180 degrees (t).

9. Shortly before 0414, when LORENZO MARCELLO had been observed continuing to show a green light with no perceptible change in the aspect of range lights, a two blast passing signal was heard. ordered the rudder placed ten degrees left and then assented to the proposal with a two blast signal. At 0414 ALCOA CORSAIR reached the end of its right swing at 205.5 degrees (t) and commenced to swing left. The vessel was then about 175 yards from the right descending bank. For the next minute the vessel continued swinging, moving laterally westward in the river, but because of the contour of the bank remaining about the same distance off.

10. About one-half minute after 0414, LORENZO MARCELLO was still showing a green light with no perceptible alteration of range light aspect. Harder left rudder was ordered by the steersman bringing the wheel over to 20 or 25 degrees left.

11. At 0415, the pilot having noted no change in aspect of the range lights of the upbound vessel but Mr. having noted a slight closing of the range, a danger signal was heard from LORENZO MARCELLO and promptly answered with the same. still perceiving no change in range light aspect but sensing that the other vessel, still showing green, was coming toward ALCOA CORSAIR, decided to maintain full throttle speed to maneuver past on his left rudder swing. At 0416 with ALCOA CORSAIR on a heading of about 164 degrees (t), the vessel was struck by the stem of LORENZO MARCELLO at the bulkhead between #2 and #3 holds.

12. Immediately after impact, ALCOA CORSAIR's engine was ordered stopped. When the vessels were disengaged, ALCOA CORSAIR continued to swing left. Its momentum carried it to grounding on the left descending bank below Tropical Bend Upper Light (ACL 6933) across the river. At 0423 the
engine was put slow ahead, with the vessel heading about 010 degrees (t), to hold it aground.

13. The Master of ALCOA CORSAIR had heard a two-blast signal from his own vessel, but felt no concern since such passings are common in the Mississippi River. On hearing his vessel’s danger signal he proceeded to the wheelhouse, entering to see the stem of LORENZO MARCELLO on the starboard bow. After impact, the Master had the alarm sounded and activated damage control procedures. Intact water-tight fittings were secured and, with the vessel aground on the bank, the injured and the passengers were evacuated. Ship’s boats were used to extricate a few of the crew from the hole in the side. Passengers were removed to MV TIoga, an offshore supply boat which had come alongside. Injured were removed to hospitals by Coast Guard helicopter and by ambulance.

14. LORENZO MARCELLO departed Houston, Texas, at 0010 on 21 October 1966, bound for New Orleans with 4,500 tons of general cargo aboard. The voyage across the Gulf and up to Pilottown, Louisiana was uneventful. At Pilottown, the pilot, boarded and the vessel started upriver, making good about 13.5 knots over the bottom. After 0400, the Master, the Chief Mate, a cadet and the steersman were in the wheelhouse, with the pilot’s orders being transmitted by the Chief Mate to the steersman in Italian. No difficulty in execution of orders was experienced. When the vessel was near Empire the white lights of ALCOA CORSAIR, which was above Sixty Mile Point, could be seen over intervening land. The vessel was first seen over water, with both side lights showing, when LORENZO MARCELLO was about 100 yards off the left descending bank, about 400 yards below Point Pleasant. ALCOA CORSAIR’s green light closed out.

15. Intending to make for the right descending bank near Tropical Bend Upper Light, on a heading of 345 degrees (t) or 346 degrees (t), so as to take the point above, initiated a two-blast signal which was heard to be answered in kind by ALCOA CORSAIR. Shortly before 0415, perceiving no change in aspect of ALCOA CORSAIR’s range lights and still seeing the red light, ordered right rudder and then hard right. About 0415 he sounded a danger signal which was answered by ALCOA CORSAIR. Shortly thereafter the green light of the downbound vessel was sighted ahead. The rudder was ordered shifted to hard left and the engine was ordered back full. Before the execution of either order could affect the movement of LORENZO MARCELLO, the vessel’s bow struck ALCOA CORSAIR. The heading of LORENZO MARCELLO at the time of impact was about 019 degrees (t) or 020 degrees (t).
16. After extrication from collision, LORENZO MARCELLO moved upriver and anchored.

17. The point of collision was about 100 yards south of Tropical Bend Upper Light and approximately 330 yards from the right descending bank (the light itself being the nearest point ashore), and about 390 yards from the nearest point on the left descending bank.

18. Physical damage to ALCOA CORSAIR involved the tearing of the starboard side, above and below the water line, from the bulkhead between 32 and 33 holds to the navigating bridge, a distance of about 130 feet. Monetary, damage amounted to $1,250,000.00. Physical damage to LORENZO MARCELLO involved boling from the stem through the forepeak and the starboard forward double bottom. Fracture did not reach the main deck. Monetary, damage amounted to $450,000.00.

19. The customary method of navigating downriver in the area of Sixty Mile Point and Tropical Bend is for the vessel to hold to the bend (left descending bank) until the point is rounded, then when the reach is entered to steer for Tropical Bend Lower Light (ACLL 6932) in order to be near the right descending bank and again "take the bend" past Empire. Upbound vessels "take the point" past Empire, holding the left descending bank until Tropical Bend Upper Light is clear, then heading for that light again to "take the point" at Sixty Mile Point.

20. Both pilots in this case were serving under their commissions from the State of Louisiana and not on Federal licenses.

21. There is no evidence of any gyro error on either vessel prior to collision.
Opinion:

1. In this case marked conflicts in testimony have required resolution and explanation of the elements that have led to the facts found is needed.

2. All witnesses from LORENZO MARCELLO place the point of collision in close under Tropical Bend Upper Light. Witnesses aboard ALCOA CORSAIR place the collision close to the left descending bank, except for Captain [REDACTED] who locates the spot near midriver. The Board is of the opinion that the positions of the vessels recited by the Pilot and Second Mate of ALCOA CORSAIR are inconsistent with the courses followed by that vessel from the time of clear sighting to the time of collision. It appears also that the positions given by LORENZO MARCELLO's pilot and officers are inconsistent with the known movements of ALCOA CORSAIR in that the vessel's leftward swing would have required it to come overland to reach a position as close in to the right descending bank as these witnesses have described.

3. In connection with this, a question was raised by the testimony as to the heading of LORENZO MARCELLO at the time of collision. The Board has found the heading to have been about 020 degrees (t), rather than 354.5 degrees (t) or "not to the right of 000 degrees (t)" as witnesses from LORENZO MARCELLO have maintained.

4. The reason for the adoption of findings as to LORENZO MARCELLO's heading at the time of collision and for the respective positions of the vessels at 0412 is that no other possibilities appear to fit the indisputable fact of collision. To place ALCOA CORSAIR closer to the left descending bank at 0412 requires placing of LORENZO MARCELLO at that time at a point still obscured by the bend. To place ALCOA CORSAIR closer to the right descending bank at 0412 would put it on the bank itself at 0414 and 0415. Similarly, had LORENZO MARCELLO collided on a heading of 354.5 degrees (t) or 000 degrees (t), its necessary displacement from the bank at 0412 to allow clear sighting would also place ALCOA CORSAIR on the right descending bank at 0414 and 0415.

5. Another marked conflict in the testimony appears in the matter of sound signals. All bridge personnel of LORENZO MARCELLO testified to two exchanges of two-blast signals. All bridge personnel of ALCOA CORSAIR and the bow lookout testified to only one such exchange. Additionally Captain [REDACTED] of ALCOA CORSAIR testified that only one two-blast signal was heard by him from his own vessel. (He heard none from the other.) Obviously no resolution based upon misunderstanding or upon a mere failure to hear a given signal can be found. Either both vessels sounded two blasts twice or the second pair of signals
was never given. The Board finds that only one such exchange took place.

6. The proximate physical cause of the collision is believed to have been the turn of LORENZO MARCELLO at hard right rudder. Had this turn not been executed and had LORENZO MARCELLO remained on a course of about 347 degrees (T) the vessels would have passed about 400 to 500 feet apart.

7. The reason for this turn to the right is not satisfactorily accounted for by the testimony of [redacted] who declared that the hard right was not ordered as a collision-averting measure, that there was no imminence or suspicion of danger of collision at the time he gave the order, and that he gave it in the full expectation of completing his "starboard to starboard" agreement. For almost three minutes [redacted] had been looking at the red side light of ALCOA CORSAIR moving from his right toward his left. It is believed that he concluded from this that ALCOA CORSAIR was not carrying out the agreement made and that he came right to "get under the stern."

8. It must obviously be concluded also that even as an emergency measure this step was not well taken, [redacted] never perceived a change in aspect of ALCOA CORSAIR's range lights even to the moment when the green light came into sight, and this although the downbound vessel had been swinging left for two minutes before the collision. Considering the fact that ALCOA CORSAIR had turned forty degrees in that time the failure to observe the change is inexplicable.

9. More remote as a cause of collision, but contributing thereto, is the handling of ALCOA CORSAIR. It is possible, but not necessarily true, that [redacted] should not have assented to a starboard to starboard passing considering his position in the river and the relative speed. However, with somewhat more than a mile separating the vessels the agreed passing could have been executed. Nevertheless, while swinging right at the time, [redacted] ordered but ten degrees left rudder, increasing a bit later. This maneuver permitted the vessel to continue to gain westerly displacement in the river and to run at the same distance from the right descending bank for another full minute during which the red side light was obviously being shown to LORENZO MARCELLO. Once the agreement had been made, a more drastic change of heading by ALCOA CORSAIR should have been made in timely fashion. Such a change would have prevented the misunderstanding which caused LORENZO MARCELLO to come right.

10. Further contributing to the collision is the failure of [redacted] to observe a change in aspect of the range lights of LORENZO MARCELLO. He did not suspect imminence or danger of collision up to
the fatal fact itself, and yet the range lights of LORENZO MARCELLO were closing for a full minute before collision, indicating a turn to the right by the vessel which had instituted a starboard to starboard agreement. Had properly read or interpreted the range lights of LORENZO MARCELLO to see the violation of agreement, a more radical maneuver would have been seen as necessary to avoid.

11. It is impossible to understand why neither pilot saw nor correctly interpreted the aspect of the range lights on the other ship.

12. It is noted also that the Master of LORENZO MARCELLO did not observe or did not correctly interpret the successive aspects of the range lights of ALCOA CORSAIR.

13. The mate on watch aboard ALCOA CORSAIR did observe a closing of the range lights of LORENZO MARCELLO. He took this to be merely a change noncommitting with the vessel's following the contour of the bank. But LORENZO MARCELLO was not following the contour of the bank and the change, considering the positions of the vessels and the agreement made, should have alerted him to the danger. As the mate on watch (especially in the absence of the Master from the wheelhouse), Mr. should have called the pilot's attention to the right turn of LORENZO MARCELLO and, failing adequate action on the pilot's part, should have notified the Master and taken active control of the ship's movements himself.

14. As to the testimony of that a second two blast agreement was made prior to the order for LORENZO MARCELLO to come right, it is apparent that, even though no finding has been made that such an exchange took place, the moment had already come for LORENZO MARCELLO to have sounded the danger signal. In the words of the situation at that time was: "... when he continued on that course of showing his red and his two whites, I didn't know what he was thinking or anything...."

15. It is concluded that there is evidence of three faults on the part of LORENZO MARCELLO:

a. Negligent operation in failure to recognize the leftward movement of ALCOA CORSAIR by observation of range lights (46 USC 526 l);

b. failure to sound a timely danger signal when in doubt as to the intention of the other vessel (33 USC 203 - Rule III);

c. turning right after agreeing to pass starboard to starboard (33 USC 203 - Rule 1).
16. It is concluded that there is evidence of faults on the part of ALCOA CORSAIR:

a. Delay in turning to port after agreeing to a starboard to starboard passing (33 USC 203 - Rule 1);

b. Negligent operation in failing to recognize the rightward movement of LORENZO MARCELLO by observation of range lights (46 USC 526 1).

17. It is concluded that there is evidence that the three faults of LORENZO MARCELLO are personally attributable to pilot [Redacted] and to the Master.

18. It is concluded that there is evidence that the two faults of ALCOA CORSAIR are personally attributable to [Redacted].

19. It is concluded that there is evidence that the fault of ALCOA CORSAIR in delaying a turn to port after agreeing to a starboard to starboard passing is also attributable to Second Mate [Redacted].

20. It is concluded that there is also evidence of fault on the part of Second Mate Sheffield in failing to advise the pilot of the closing of LORENZO MARCELLO's range lights and to take appropriate action to avoid danger.

21. It is concluded that there is no evidence that [Redacted], Master of ALCOA CORSAIR, was negligent or inattentive to duty in failing to be in the wheelhouse or on the wing as the collision situation developed. With a qualified compulsory pilot on duty and with a licensed master serving as mate of the watch, Captain [Redacted] had a right to rely upon their abilities and to leave active supervision of the navigation to them, as he did from time to time after the vessel had cleared the port area. The two-blast signal was not a warning of danger. When the danger signal was heard, the Master responded promptly but found it too late to act.
Recommendations:

1. It is recommended that the evidence of faults of LORENZO MARCELLO (Conclusion 15) be referred to Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, for possible assessment of monetary penalties against the vessel, under 33 USC 159, and the owner, under 46 USC 526 o.

2. It is recommended that the evidence of faults of ALCOA CORSAIR (Conclusion 16) be referred to Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, for possible assessment of monetary penalties against the vessel, under 33 USC 159, and the owner, under 46 USC 526 o.

3. It is recommended that the evidence of fault of [redacted] pilot aboard LORENZO MARCELLO (Conclusions 15 and 17) be referred to the American Pilots' Association.

4. It is recommended that the evidence of fault of [redacted] pilot aboard ALCOA CORSAIR (Conclusions 16 and 18) be referred to the American Pilots' Association.

5. It is recommended that the evidence of fault of [redacted] Master of LORENZO MARCELLO (Conclusions 15 and 17) be referred to Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, for possible assessment of monetary penalties.

6. It is recommended that the evidence of fault of [redacted], License [redacted], be further investigated in proceedings under 46 CFR 137 for possible action looking to the suspension or revocation of license under a charge of Inattention to Duty. In accordance with 46 CFR 136.09-35, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, has been apprised of this matter.

7. It is recommended that this matter be referred to the Department of Justice for determination of whether there is evidence of criminal negligence under 18 USC 1115.

8. It is recommended that all action in this matter be held in abeyance until the action of the Commandant of the Coast Guard has been completed.

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CARL P. OLSEN
Chairman
U. S. Coast Guard

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JOHN P. KETTLE
CAPT, U.S. Coast Guard
Member

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CLINTON J. MAGUIRE
CDR, U.S. Coast Guard
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