From: Chief, Merchant Marine Inspection Division  
Who: Commander  
From: Office of Merchant Marine Safety  
Subj: Marine Board of Investigation: Collision involving SS HIRI HUE and SS JUNE QUICK at the Mississippi River 5 July, 1951 with loss of life

1. Pursuant to the provisions of 46 U.S.C., Part X, the record of this Board convened to investigate subject casualty, together with its findings of Fact, Conclusions, Opinions and Recommendations, has been reviewed and is herewith herewith.

2. On 2 July, 1951, during daylight, the SS HIRI HUE, a Liberty type at-stem tugboat of fully loaded, was approaching and the SS JUNE QUICK of 177 GT, equipped with a 250 HP engine, pushing 2 empty tank barges, was downstream the Mississippi River at the vicinity of Alton, Illinois. The SS HIRI HUE was proceeding at a speed of 9 miles per hour and the SS JUNE QUICK at 14 miles per hour. The weather was clear and calm with current at about 2-3/8 miles per hour, upon approaching each other a mutual part to prevent collision existed. For some unassignable reason probably due to main engine or steering apparatus failure, the SS JUNE QUICK crossed the bow of the SS HIRI HUE. The SS HIRI HUE took collision making collision but to no result and collided with the SS JUNE QUICK of approximately 1000, at 100.7 MPH Mississippi River. As a result of this collision, the SS JUNE QUICK capsized and sank with the loss of 5 crew members, including the Master. Slight damage was sustained by the SS HIRI HUE and the barge ALLEY 700, in tow of the SS JUNE QUICK.

3. The Board made the following findings of Fact:

4. On 2 July 1951, at or about 1025 CST, the SS HIRI HUE, a Liberty type tugboat of American Registry, and the SS JUNE QUICK, one of the barges being pushed ahead by the SS HIRI HUE, were in collision in Alton, Illinois, approximately 100.7 MPH Mississippi River, as a result of which the SS JUNE QUICK capsized and ultimately sank with a loss of five crew members, including the Master.
2. The vessels involved were:

(a) SS IRENE H. S. S. (see Fig. 1), a Liberty-type tank vessel, Official No. 246859, built in 1943, steel hull, length 422.4 ft., breadth 57 ft., gross tonnage 1383, net tonnage 420, cargo 10,023 tons of No. 6 fuel oil, drawing 26 feet forward and 26.04 feet aft, owned and operated by Pan American Steamship Co., Inc., State Street and Seventh Street, New Orleans, La.

(b) Y/F HALE 700, unclassified, built in 1932, steel hull, length 250 feet, breadth 56 feet, gross tonnage 1036, net tonnage 520, as_handler tank barge used in the chemical trade and operating at the klond, owned and operated by Klondike Labor and Transportation Co., c/o Edgar A. Smith, Jr., 2020 Arbor Street, Houston, Texas.

(c) NY BAY OILER, a twin screw diesel type tanker, length 130 feet, breadth 34.0 feet, depth 7.9 feet, gross tonnage 179, powered by two 500 horsepower engines having been re-engined in June, 1942, from the 320 horsepower engines with no structural changes made at that time except to the engine beds, owned and operated by Federal Valley Transportation Co., Houston, Texas.

3. At the time of the accident the weather was clear, wind calm, current 2 to 3 feet per hour, visibility very good. Barometric reading at a permanent land to the right for vessels proceeding on easy right wing channel with vessels upstream following the contour of the left descending bank line, at twenty-five foot levels side, drawing closer to the point on it is rounded. Vessels maintained course to the middle so that they are not drawn too deep into the bank side. The river in this area is 100 feet wide at its narrowest part at navigable depth for the vessels involved. Pilot boats ran to the bank on the outside side but the bank being gradual, the trace do not obscure vision to the extent that a bank signal is required and neither vessel blew a bank signal in this instance. There are no houses on either or both sides of the bank with the exception of the klondike Cigarretts, who resides on the upper side twenty-five feet back, who erected that in early quarters off the bank toward the bank and vessels downstream long to the center and put toward the point side to keep from going too deep in the bank.
On 5 July 1932, at about 0228 hours, the SS "OCEANA" left the Port of New York bound for Liverpool. At 0305 hours, she arrived at the location of an object detected by the bridge officer. At this time, the vessel proceeded without incident through the first bridge and then entered the second bridge at 0305.2 hours. During this period, the vessel was under way and had not yet reached the bridge. The bridge officer, upon observing the object in question, immediately initiated a signal to warn the vessel. He then gave a warning signal, and the bridge officer observed the vessel, which was about 300 to 500 yards away. The vessel proceeded at a steady speed of about 15 knots, and the bridge officer observed a greenish object in the vicinity of the vessel. Shortly after passing under the bridge, the object was observed by another vessel, which was also proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by both vessels, and a third vessel was also observed.}

The object was observed by a fourth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a fifth vessel, which was also proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a sixth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a seventh vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a eighth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a ninth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a tenth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by an eleventh vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a twelfth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a thirteenth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a fourteenth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a fifteenth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a sixteenth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a seventeenth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by an eighteenth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a nineteenth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a twentieth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a twenty-first vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a twenty-second vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a twenty-third vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a twenty-fourth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a twenty-fifth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a twenty-sixth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a twenty-seventh vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a twenty-eighth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a twenty-ninth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a thirtieth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a thirty-first vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a thirty-second vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was also observed by a thirty-third vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. The object was observed by a thirty-fourth vessel, which was proceeding at about 15 knots. 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5. According to Pilots _______ and in part by _______ helmsman, after the vessel cleared the bridge he stood the vessel towards the left descending bank not running any landmark or aid, but relying on position by the contour of the bank line and then began to run parallel therewith. The witness _______ stated the Pilot sought the left descending bank and when about 500 feet off and parallel under the Pilot's small orders of easy right, steady, easy right, steady, etc., the vessel was being navigated along the curving bank line. Anytime were on Pilot and speed over the ground was not exceeding 8 knots.

Approaching Twelve Mile Point, _______ observed a tow of two barges and a tug downbound on the upper side of the land, were in the center or land side of the river. He continued to watch this tow and saw the tow pass across the ship's head. If a line was extended therefore and continued out into the land on the course well clear of his vessel, and as the tow proceeded deeper into the land, suddenly saw the tow and tug change its heading or course so that a line drawn through the tug's head and tow was beginning to angle toward his vessel, and though in the clear of his vessel the change was more of a turn then called for by the land in the river, he described the tug as approaching her head on as though to round up.

He called this to the attention of _______ who had also seen this and was approaching the wharves himself and the pilot gave a one blast warning signal. The tow at this time had not stopped her turning motion and was then about 34/5 miles away and 3 points on the port bow. There was no answer from the tug but the warning signal and the tug and tow began to slow down and were seen by a vessel at an angle of about 39 degrees from his vessel's course line, and in about 20 to 30 seconds interval a one blast signal was blown by the Pilot. The tug was then about 50 miles distant and within 5 to 10 seconds the tug changed with a two blast signal showing Pilot immediately blow the danger signal followed by one blast, to which no answer was received and about 30 seconds later the Pilots again blow a danger signal followed by one blast there being no change in bearing but the distance closing to 1/2 mile and no answering signal from the tug. A third danger signal was blow by the Pilot and no answer heard. He recorded three more danger signals and at the same time received an order from the Pilot to raise the engine which he immediately telegraphed to the Engineer and recorded it at 10:04.

The tugmen entered the bridge about this time and ordered him to proceed the engine. He observed the tug was the just before leaving the bridge, and the was about 3 points on the
part bow and no change in direction. He proceeded down three flights of ladders and heard No. 3 patch when he knew the Captain order everybody to get back and he had returned to about 62 hatch when the impact of collision was felt. After leaving the bridge he heard no further signals from his vessel and none from the tug. He estimated that his vessel's speed over the bottom at the time he left the bridge at 6 knots and slowing down. He returned to the bridge and noted the telegraph was on full astern and received an order to stop the engine which he did. He stated it would have been impossible to change the ship's heading to the right because it would have run up on the bank and that at any time through the first danger signal the tug could have avoided the collision by stopping or helm movement but to his observation no action was taken by the tug.

"6. Pilot, 23 Nov 1923, 23:30, 52 NOBS NSS, a licensed River Pilot, testified he favored the right side of the channel under the main span of the Bay P. Long Bridge and made right easy radar changes to ease the vessel toward the left descending bank, and when approximately 500 to 600 feet off steered to run parallel with the bank. At this time the 52 NO BS NSS was under Twelve Mile Point and opposite or slightly above inbound ChasPM, Mile 108.2 AHP. Engines were full ahead and no traffic was observed. At the angle Pilot approached Twelve Mile Point he described it as forcing 2 points, an upper and lower and when he reached approximately above the Standard Oil Dock and still about 500 feet off the left descending bank he observed a tow about midstream downstream from behind the upper part of Twelve Mile Point, wall in the bend and about 1 mile away, or about 6 of a mile above Eggemoggin Light, Mile 309.1 AHP and he blew a passing signal of one long blast. The tow was then dead ahead and continuing into the bend going about 1 1/2 to 2 point part the bow, which put the tow on the port bow, distant about 3/4 of a mile and receiving no answer, he again blew a passing signal of one long blast which was answered by the tug a few seconds later with a two blast signal. The tug and tow was still crossing the ship's bow from starboard to port and wall close preceding down river, but when the tug blew the two blast answering signal it appeared to him as though she was turning on a left wheel so if to round up. He blew a danger signal followed by one long blast and received no answer waiting long enough to give the tug a chance to reply. He still thought she was trying to round up but the tug was
on a course toward the ship's bow and at about a 45° angle of approach with a starboard quarter bow-on angle. This was because of the HENRY HIS being so close to the starboard bank. The anchor was released from the tug and the Pilot again blew a danger signal followed by one blast and ordered the engines stopped. The Captain ordered the bridge at this time and sent the third mate to stand by the anchor. The engines had been stopped about one minute with the tug and bag being about 1/2 mile away and closing rapidly without making any change of course when another danger signal was sounded followed by one blast and the engines put full astern and hard left rudder ordered. The tug was then about 2 ship lengths, 300 feet, away and the ship was making about 3 miles per hour. The vessel was close to the starboard bank and the hard left rudder and full astern began to take effect so that at the time of impact the angle had changed from about 45° to 20° and speed over the bottom to about 1 knot. He stated the collision occurred about about 1500 feet of Maggie's light and about 40 feet off the left descending bank.

87. The witness [redacted], Third Assistant Engineer, testified he was on watch from 0600 to 0800 on 5 July 1952 and handled the throttle during this period and answered all bells promptly and that the casualty was not due to any failure of machinery. He heard two separate whistle signals from his vessel and then at 1022 by the engineers clock, received an order to "stop" which he immediately executed. Before sounding an astern bell he opened the throttle valve a little in case he was ordered to go full astern and when sounding a full astern bell at 1023, immediately complied by pulling up the lever on the reversing gear and estimated that in 20 seconds the engine reached about 60 revolutions. He then received at 1024 stop, 1026 full astern and 1027 finished with engines. The witnesses [redacted] on the 8 to 12 watch, testified he heard several short blasts at this time and the engine was on full astern, he then received a series of bells which he recorded promptly, using the engineers clock, beginning with 1022 stop to 1027. He felt the impact of collision after the engines were placed on full astern at 1023 and observed that the engine was making good speed astern. He related that the 1026 stop order was received after he felt the impact.

88. The witness [redacted], Chief, 114 DEW WHAM, had the midnight to 0600 watch on 2 July 1952 and had boarded her at Memphis and Bergo's MANO 700 and MANO 500 were at that time strong out ahead.
At Honolulu, it seems the engines were doubled up. These engines were empty drawing about 18%, while the NN MM QM was at 30%. The 2 feet of freeboard midships, was pilotboats controlled, both sides with the 500 horsepower engines and a crew of 6. Then he was relieved at 0600 by Captain 1600, and the tug was between Unuka Light and Orange Grove Light, 1600 HRS, and between Honolulu and Eton Boats the average speed was 20 miles per hour, but he began to slow down after 1800 hours. After being relieved he had breakfast, went back to the pilotboats and talked with Captain 0800 and then went to his cabin located on the port side second deck, read a book and fell asleep. He was awakened by the impact, started to leave his cabin but did not have time as water rushed in pushing him against the bulkhead and then carried him around the room. He managed to get through the small passage leading to the Captain's cabin on the starboard side and shot to the surface. He came up facing the SS HIONE HOSP and its crew engines being handled but he could not reach them. A lifeboat from the SS HONI HOSP came to his aid and he was then put aboard the tug CHIMPANZEE. He heard the whistle signal blown by the NN MM QM prior to the impact. He further stated that while he was on watch he saw the NN MM QM handled her tow well because she was powerful and was not sluggish in running rubber changes. He stated that she was equipped with lifelines with lights contained in racks along the main deck house, to preserve in pilot house and quarters.

"2. The witness, a 2nd Mate, NN MM QM, had a watch from 0600 to 0900 on 5 July 1952, and had been assigned to definite duties that morning except routine duties of clearing up the NN QM, securing the running lights and minor jobs. He down of the steering, and made several visits to the pilothouse that morning and went on the after deck, the first time shortly before the collision. He stated the NN QM was at a speed of 200 and about 200 yards at the edge of the bow. While on the bowsprit and 1600 and 1600, he was able to go up to the pilothouse which he said, and went out to the galley and it was then used. He obtained a drink of water and after a few minutes walked out on the stern starboard side and outside the galley door. While there he saw a ship that could not stop it being tied down. He was impacted from the NN QM on the after part of the now bow, he noticed vibrations and radio noise was caused by the vessel being hard over. He observed no damage to the engines or deck.
its previous full sheet and started the RN Q859 had been making about 12 in 20 miles per hour when running. On the stern near him were the skipper, Mrs. and midshipman, and he heard someone say they were going to hit. He climbed the ladder leading to the second deck and in his vision the top of the ladder he was struck by water and he held on to the mast, went under, struggled out from under the overturned RN Q859 and soon was seeing the MMSV HESS, sunk and came to the surface again and was pulled aboard the hull of the RN Q859 by and subsequently taken ashore by the lifeboat from the MMSV HESS. While he was on the barge and in the pilothouse during the morning he noticed no alcohol from the barge or the midshipman was not open. When he talked with Captain he was in good spirits and there was no indication of illness. The barge did not observe vision from the pilothouse and he seated the RN Q859 and about 2 feet fromboard, with main deck lines 9 feet high, second deck 9 feet high and whistles 7 to 8 feet high.

"10. The only two remaining survivors from the RN RN Q859 were incapacitated and in order to appear their statement was interview was adjudicated in the record at page 1296. The main deck, heard no whistle signals from either vessel from her position on the stern at the time of collision, that the RN Q859 was about mid-silver making standard speed and noticed no change in speed prior to collision. The position was made to be 4 feet was on deck, heard no whistle signals and was first aware of the collision when water entered his room.

"11. There were a number of independent witnesses before the board among whom were and Master, of the tug C1189, which was moored at the main deck of the Standard Oil Company, pending, the DOLPH and handling a barge. He heard the SS JONES HESS blow one blast and saw the crew about unsure of the tug C1189, and at the same time he saw the RN Q859 coming around twelve mile curve with her barge at an angle. He heard no answer from the RN Q859, and after an unrecorded interval of time in which the SS JONES HESS struck witnesses, he heard the SS JONES HESS "what term" the RN Q859, and thereafter heard the ship replied the "what term" and report it a short time. He stated if the RN Q859 there he did not hear it. He prepared exhibits 10 and stated the tugboat looked like it was coming this way underway to the left hand side of the river making four to five miles an hour. He observed the ..."
first danger signal was blown by the SS ROMUS at an angle of about 45° to the bow running ahead at a speed of about 10 knots. The witness stated that the SS ROMUS passed upbound. He heard the SS ROMUS blow one blast and he saw that she was ahead of him. He described the SS ROMUS as coming down the river to cut off the point and making a turn towards the starboard side. He observed the SS ROMUS pass the bow of the ship. He heard the ship pass the SS ROMUS and observed the SS ROMUS run aground.

The witness stated that the SS ROMUS turned over immediately upon collision and they were unable to recover any survivors. They went to the NNQIN and proceeded to the overthrown NNQIN. They stayed off the NNQIN about 75 to 100 feet and the witness dropped over the side and brought them to the stop. He stated that the ship was on fire. He then put the three survivors ashore and returned to the NNQIN and placed a line around the ship. He then put two survivors ashore and another survivor was ashore from the NNQIN to the NNQIN.

The witness stated that the two survivors ashore and another survivor ashore were opposite the river side and made 10 knots to return. While towing and doing this the witness heard a vessel leaving the river side and a vessel called out that there were 3 in the water side.

The tow NNQIN arrived as well as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife's tow NNQIN and the tow NNQIN was dispatched to Avondale for burning equipment. He described the condition of the area. The MMQIN was slowly loading her starboard side and making before the landing started. The witnesses also observed when towing the NNQIN that a log about 60 in diameter was jammed between the port side and the propeller and against the hull. The tow NNQIN, after putting it on fire, made an attempt to stop. We tried to make the line ashore did not pull.

The witnesses were at the scene and saw the SS ROMUS running ahead of the ship and making the port side.
side coming up as far as camp and quartering across the river and below the point in that water. When he first observed the USS
QUEEN she was coming out of the eastern bend, a little above his
camp, and had started a normal swing in the center of the river
north of Twelve Mile Point. He watched her go out of sight and
about that time he heard a boat sounding in the distance and not
long after that heard the USS QUEEN blow a danger ahead of 4
short blasts and a few seconds thereafter heard a crash. As
evidences he knew it was the USS QUEEN's whistle and heard no other
whistles. He rode down the river in his car and through the
willows lining the bank, saw the remains of a vessel very close
to shore. He went to the bank and observed a barge lying across
the bow of the USS QUEEN. He waited until the current moved
the barge along the starboard side of the ship and was told by
someone on the ship to tie it up to the terrrace. He cautioned the
ship to have from 200 feet off the bank and anchored, and about
1500 feet down from his camp by straight line or a mile and a
mile below Mile 110 NW. He received a bearing line from a man
on the barge, pulled the line ashore and made the line fast to a
tree along the bank. He then proceeded to the USS QUEEN and
observed that her starboard mainudder was standing and only the
pipe for the stock was there and trash was in the port wheel.
When the USS QUEEN was raised, he went aboard and in the engine
room he found the port engine lever was in full forward position
and the starboard engine lever was in neutral. He further stated
that normally both vessels come down about the center of the
river and pull hard for Twelve Mile Point holding to the center of
the river because of the cross current which would making them into
the bend and ships and tow upbound ran close along the shore of
the point sides. This same manner of running this point was described
by the witness Nightingale who worked that ship downstream in upper
Twelve Mile Point he generally holds to the middle of the river
until he reaches a position where he can see clear around the
point, then he pulls her down toward the bend to running the
channel lights. He does not run the point side of 3° 44 1/4 closer but
holds to the middle of the river until the tow truck he and
around the point.

13. The starboard side of 4/8 M/1200 500 collided with the stern
and starboard bow of the USS MORGARS 500 at about a 30° angle, the
stern incurred the side of 4/8 M/1200 in the way of twin 3 and 4,
ripping the deck plating. According to witnesses of the USS MORGARS
HMSR upon impact the entire starboard side of 4/8 M/1200 rose
up about 4 feet and the raised deck plating in the way of the
indentation caught on the flukes of the starboard anchor slipping a
large hole in the stern side tanks. 2/3 ALMAD 700 then fell back on an even keel and hung on the awa and starboard bow of the ship. Upon impact the lines between 2/3 ALMAD and 2/3 ALMAD 800, which were made up to and on the port side of 2/3 ALMAD 700, parted and 2/3 ALMAD 800 went down river between the bank and starboard side of the ship. The 2/3 ALMAD 800 which had been made up directly astern of 2/3 ALMAD 800 was observed to turn over to port side and was not seen floating off the stern end of 2/3 ALMAD 700 and down the port side of the SS NORFOLK 7000 bottom side up. Damage to the 105 MM QM-74's starboard side and 105 MM QM-700 port stern column as portrayed by the photograph exhibits and survey by the board and estimate M. Oyler. Estimate indicates that the 105 MM QM-74's beached over as a result of this contact. Latering's were thrown by crew members of the WOODS H HESS towards one person seen drifting downstream (Lighthouse). Pilot ordered the ship's engines stopped while Captain ordered the port anchor dropped at 1027 and 1100 boat launched, which was in the water at 1031.

"14. Five crew members including the Captain of the WYTHUR QM-71 were lost and their names, rates and addresses are as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline
\text{Name} & \\
\hline
\text{Rate} & \\
\hline
\text{Address} & \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

"15. Damage to the ships involved were as follows:

(a) 2/3 ALMAD 800 - 2(1) and 2(2) bulk spaces and three tank upper and lower side of starboard side pipe about 5' above deck in upper forecast slightly distorted and not in approximate 25'. Stern double set in approximately 3' with no listing and damage to be repaired at owner's convenience.

(b) 2/3 ALMAD 700 - starboard side in area of 2(1) and 4(1) tanks disturbed for a distance of about 70 feet and area 50'. Deep and deck plating fractured and torn. No port tank and port void compartment as forecast held and indicated.

(c) 2/3 ALMAD 800 - small fracture 2(3) to 3(1) longitudinal in stern area. Tank under deck starboard side about 8 feet from stern and these tanks encountered slightly to rear for about 18 feet;
8 x 3' lengthwise frames and ship’s starboard side is in way of starboard fuel tank lying about 12' below deck which is at top 32 feet of superstructure starboard overhang; deck set in and rails tilted and foreparted, 9 feet of superstructure port overhang; deck set in and rails tilted and foreparted; pilot house deck set down in shape of scoop facing forward with dragon point being 12' where pilot would stand at controls.

"16. The starboard main rudder of the MV MAI QWIN was observed by a number of witnesses to have been missing. The witnesses described an expanse of water visible. When they proceeded to the scene and placed a line around the ship forming part of the starboard main rudder. This was not bent and according to Mr. Coren. One witness the plating was burned off from stern showing an even degree of corrosion on replaced edge then completed by him in drydock on 9 July 1953. The remaining rudders were in head right position with derris entwined in the port rudder. The bridge controls were found to have 15 notches in the absent position with the port engine lever set on 5 notches from idle to about 1/3 ahead and starboard control set on 7 notches or nearly 1/2 ahead.

"17. Both the MV MURGESS and the MV MAI QWIN were equipped with radar; this apparatus was in use in counting the SS MURGESS prior to the collision and it is not believed that the MV MAI QWIN was using use of her radar set."

The Board made the following conclusions:

1. That the SS MURGESS on an unpainted course and on the right hand side of the channel as prescribed both by the rules and by accepted local practice.

2. That the MV MAI QWIN was in too low a position, while on a downstream course, first one in a position to enter a port to port passage with the isolated vessel when - for some unaccountable reason - proceeded on a course crossing that of the MURGESS.

3. That the unloading in regards to distance from the MURGESS is definite enough that it establishes the one-thirtieth statute of time of the cargo signal.

4. That the testimony concerning the whistle signal to have been given by the MV MAI QWIN is not inconsistent with the fact that the witnesses described that a two blast signal was heard coming from the bowcast while one witness states hearing a single signal therefrom.
Chief, HY Division to
Commandant

5. That there was no failure of equipment, machinery or materials in the SS HAN QUIN, a vessel only inspected by HCCM during inspection.

6. That the evidence adduced indicates probable failure of the starboard engine, steering ability impaired due to loss of starboard rudder, and likelihood of failure of air supply to the air whistle of the SS HAN QUIN.

7. That there is no indication ofcrastination to duty, negligence, or willful violation of any law, rule or regulation on the part of either the licensed or unlicensed personnel of the SS HAN QUIN and on the personnel of the HY AN QUIN.

8. That the HY AN pilot could have taken positive preventive action other than the repeated blowing of the danger signal a few seconds sooner than was the case but that this would not have necessarily averted the collision.

9. That the HY AN QUIN could have avoided the collision by maintaining her original position for a port in port passage. The reason this was not done has not been determined by the Board due to the death of the principal witnesses. It therefore follows that any description of the events on the HY AN QUIN is entirely speculative.

10. That no personnel of the U. S. Coast Guard or any other U. S. Government agency were connected directly or indirectly or contributed in any manner to the casualty.

11. That no claim to navigation were implied.

12. That no unbridled or incorrectly charged non personnel were involved.

13. That no U. S. Government property or equipment was damaged or destroyed.

14. No suggestions are the conclusion of a positive water casualty was actually made by any of the principal witnesses.

Letter 170: that evidence removed from the inquiry, then noted.
of the Harpers, Mates, Photos and Engineers of the U. S. Engineers.

According to this letter it is in the unkindness of the anxious
situation that all ships navigating the Mississippi River be equipped with
ship-to-ship radio telephone and stand-by an Channel Four (Freq. 2390
Kc.) with any information that might add to safer navigation."

The Board expressed the following opinions:

1. That the actual events on the M.V. QUARYN as well as the
reason for her actions will never be known because of the desire
of the witnesses who could furnish the facts. Since it is known
that the Master was well experienced in handling tugs and was
in these waters, and inasmuch as he appears to have enjoyed an
excellent reputation as a reliable and competent man it cannot
be reasonably considered that he deliberately not the M.V. QUARYN's
course across the other vessel's bow when, as first, a perfectly
normal situation for a port to port passing existed.

2. That after considering the facts on hand the only plausible
conclusions one can arrive at is that the M.V. QUARYN was in some
difficulty concerning her maneuvering. It may be that the
starboard rudder was lost upon sighting the SUDDIS M.S.S., or shortly
thereafter. Also that the braces found jammed in her port rudder
interfered with her handling. Again, the fact that her starboard
engine control was found in the "neutral" position may indicate
that there was engine failure at a critical time. The reported
finding of these blades below deck in the vicinity of the engines
definitely lends to support the likelihood of machinery breakdown at
or near the time of the collision. Any of these conditions, or all
of them together, would have caused loss of proper control over the
movements of the bow at least temporarily and most certainly enough
to have contributed to if not actually caused the collision.

3. That in reaching opinions as the principality in the case it
could be stated that the Master should consider avoiding this type of
judgment when he used previous events to regret the disaster initial
basis after failing to receive any answer to the initial change
signal. Taking the very off her ship absolutely then deciding that
the bow had assumed a running course when most certainly it was
the more prudent thing to do even if it has not occurred the collision.
4. That it cannot be rightfully charged that the order made by this time practically in collision and that she was kept 2 seconds the first developed situation was only attempting to warn the vessel that a collision to stand hard was not desirable. The time consumed should have been reasonably considered in forming of the first opinion on the position of the vessel; only a brief period of time elapsed between the moment when 2 seconds the ligament of the first part of the collision. York had no reason to believe he was approaching. The bar was on his part and holding the entrance of the river, heading downstream. The ship was under way and nothing proceeded to bear the order hard. The vessel was under way and on his right channel, and was about to cross the bar, and was approached on the left side of the vessel. (25) years of coasting and had decided the application would be impossible. Now, without any reasonable action will the sea appears good reason, in 1 week, the bar suddenly vanished to cross on another course. Just a few seconds before had been perceived. The vessel was believed in the case of collision. Consequently, the ship and the bar had cleared on each other's positions and York found the position of avoiding to go hard astern and then demonstrated his own ship through the open, not taking effect in a station from the nearby bank. He ordered his course and reducing speed.

5. That it is the opinion of the vessel that it would not be expedient for his decision. His failure to act more positive, precautionary action for the accident alone than he did not only the application to the human element involved. In other words, his opinion have expressed that the vessel had gone wrong on the water and should have been at the right channel and stopped the vessel from any injury as far as the limit, but it was the action that 2 seconds on his left channel the time he did. It is also apparent could not have avoided a marine accident instead of the bar, and the vessel's loss of life was further assisted by the fact that the vessel was not in the course of the vessel in the course or speed may have resulted in her being satisfactory with the vessel cruelty, perhaps, not with his intention.
The question then is to decide is that action did Captain or
Captain alone take on board or whether the damage or collision.
Unfortunately, both then a number of things happened and after the
second damage signal, ordered the engine stopped. There was another
fire at the engine and engine ordered
full astern by the Captain. Now that the smoke was believed
reduced to about 7 miles per hour at this time of collision by these
smokes and that, together with smoke and smoke also by smoke-
was about all that could be reasonably expected from these backups
certain room under the after bridge. The smoke was divided
in arriving of this room on the very black smoke continued to
the after bridge. The damage to the #1068-70 shown an evidence
of the water going having penetrated into the thin saturated Kobe
wheeling. The large hole in the engaged side and deck wheeling
was probably caused by the entries of the steered wheel

6. Finally, it's the opinion of the Board that the condition of the
#1068-70 existing from the point of view of the,#1068-70 existing, the
presence against the汇报 that they no longer
following the initial damage between the #1068-70 and this damage.

The Board made the following recommendations:

1. That since the #1068-70 does not exist under the supervision
to the reconstruction and further test of the

2. That under the circumstances no further action is indicated
and the case should

7. Conclusions of the Chinese, Korea, and Indonesia
of the U.S. Government and the U.S. Army regarding the investigation
be completed with similar action, this investigation by navy inspectors
and work of the work of the war
reconstruction, and the work of the war
and work of the
work of the inspection of the work of the

letter from the Managers, Mates, Pilots and Engineer of the S.S. Engine, will be furnished to the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C., as the subject matter in question is more appropriately under the jurisdiction of that agency.

2. Subject to the foregoing remarks, it is recommended that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions, Opinions and Recommendations of the marine Board of Investigation be approved.

/s/ F. F. GUTMANN
Acting

29 November 1951

Ind-2

From: Chief, Office of Marine Safety
To: Commissioner

Forwarded, recommending approval.

/s/ F. F. GUTMANN
Acting

MINUTES: 1951-001

To: Federal, U.S. Coast and
Commission