



UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

**REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION
INTO THE
COLLISION BETWEEN CGC WINSLOW GRIESSER
(WPC-1116) AND COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL
DESAKATA WITH LOSS OF LIFE OFF THE COAST OF
DORADO, PR AUGUST 8TH, 2022**



U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



Commandant
United States Coast Guard


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16732/IIA #7541737
January 10, 2025

**THE COLLISION BETWEEN U.S. COAST GUARD CUTTER WINSLOW GRIESSER
(WPC-1116) AND COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL DESAKATA WITH THE LOSS
OF ONE LIFE OFF THE COAST OF DORADO, PUERTO RICO ON AUGUST 8, 2022**

ACTION BY THE COMMANDANT

The record and the report of the investigation convened for the subject casualty have been reviewed by the Office of Investigations & Casualty Analysis (CG-INV). The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, and conclusions are approved. This marine casualty investigation is closed.



E. B. SAMMS
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Chief, Office of Investigations & Casualty Analysis (CG-INV)

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



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16732
27 June 2024

**INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE COLLISION
BETWEEN WINSLOW GRIESSER (WPC-1116) AND
COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL DESAKATA OFF THE COAST OF DORADO,
PUERTO RICO ON AUGUST 08, 2022**


ENDORSEMENT BY DISTRICT COMMANDER

The record and the report of the investigation convened for the subject casualty have been reviewed. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are approved. It is recommended that this marine casualty investigation be closed.

ENDORSEMENT ON RECOMMENDATION

Administrative Recommendation: Recommend this investigation be closed.

Endorsement: Concur with this recommendation.



NICOLETTE A. VAUGHAN
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Chief, Seventh District Prevention
By direction



16732
November 15, 2023

**INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE COLLISION
BETWEEN WINSLOW GRIESSER (WPC-1116) AND COMMERCIAL
FISHING VESSEL DESAKATA OFF THE COAST OF DORADO, PUERTO RICO
ON AUGUST 08, 2022**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On August 8, 2022, at approximately 1415 AST, the Coast Guard cutter WINSLOW GRIESSER collided with the commercial fishing vessel DESAKATA approximately four nautical miles north of Dorado, Puerto Rico. As a result of the collision, one crewmember died and one operator was injured on DESAKATA. DESAKATA experienced a total loss as the vessel was split in half where one part was sunk and the other washed ashore. WINSLOW GRIESSER sustained minor damages under the hull, and the fishing vessel loss was estimated at \$65,000.

In accordance with 46 CFR Subpart 4.40 and 49 CFR Subpart 850 (Coast Guard-National Transportation Safety Board Marine Casualty Investigations), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was notified of the collision between WINSLOW GRIESSER and DESAKATA. This incident is a Public - Nonpublic vessel casualty and both agencies have agreed that the NTSB will conduct the marine casualty investigation under the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C. 1131) with the U.S. Coast Guard participating as an equal partner to meet its statutory and regulatory obligations.

WINSLOW GRIESSER departed U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan, San Juan, Puerto Rico on August 8, 2022, and was enroute to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic to embark two crewmembers of the Dominican Navy for a ridership during the patrol. The patrol was scheduled as a regular mission to have coverage in the area for coastal security, fishery patrol, search and rescue, migrant smuggling, and drug interdictions. WINSLOW GRIESSER was scheduled to depart at 0830 but the vessel was experiencing equipment issues with the raw water engine cooling. The engineering department conducted troubleshooting on the engines until approximately 1200 when they were able to fix the raw water pressure to the engines. WINSLOW GRIESSER crew prepared to get underway and completed all tests, navigational brief, pre-evolution risk assessments, and finally departed at 1335.

On the morning of August 8, 2022, the crew of DESAKATA was prepping for a commercial fishing trip departing from Cerro Gordo, Vega Alta to the Fish Aggregate Device (FAD) buoy in Dorado. DESAKATA got underway around 0930 with the operator/owner and his brother as his crewmember. They were fishing the area north of Dorado heading to the FAD at 5 knots.

DESAKATA was heading north to the FAD and WINSLOW GRIESSER was heading west at 28.9 knots with a Course Over Ground (COG) of 282.1. DESAKATA had occasionally changed

direction toward San Juan (east) to favor the visibility of the prevailing weather to observe any incoming vessel traffic. DESAKATA's crew never saw any incoming vessel traffic on their track line. The personnel on the WINSLOW GRIESSER's bridge at the time of the incident was: an Officer of the Deck (OOD), Quartermaster of the Watch (QMOW), two crewmembers getting OOD qualified and the Commanding Officer (CO). The OOD was conducting training in the center of the bridge at the helm station with another crewmember. The QMOW was completing the Cutter Logs at the computer located at the bridge on the portside of the vessel. A fourth crewmember was conducting training at the chart table on the starboard side of the bridge. The CO was seated at the portside forward chair plotting a more effective route for the next port of call.

DESAKATA was heading north at the time that WINSLOW GRIESSER was heading west in a head-on situation. WINSLOW GRIESSER had autopilot engaged when an off-duty crewmember standing outside on the starboard side of the bridge felt contact with an object and then observed DESAKATA as it passed by the starboard side of WINSLOW GRIESSER. WINSLOW GRIESSER's off-duty crewmember alerted the personnel on the bridge by saying "man overboard" after witnessing DESAKATA being split in half.

WINSLOW GRIESSER returned to the location of the impact site to recover two persons in the water. As they maneuvered the vessel alongside the crew deployed a life-ring and the Jacob's Ladder. DESAKATA's owner was treading water while keeping his brother afloat as neither were wearing lifejackets at the time of the collision. DESAKATA's owner was unable to climb the ladder due to rough seas. WINSLOW GRIESSER deployed the Over the Horizon (OTH) small boat with a rescue swimmer. The OTH crew recovered both the owner and his injured, nonresponsive brother and returned to the cutter. WINSLOW GRIESSER's crew treated the owner for head trauma. They medically assessed his brother and found he had no pulse, was not breathing, and unresponsive pupils. He had physical damage to his head, leg, left arm, and his organs were exposed. WINSLOW GRIESSER's crew attempted to reduce bleeding with tourniquets but did not observe blood moving through the body and determined that he was fatally injured.

Coast Guard Sector San Juan Command Center considered various options for medical evacuation of the injured owner: 45-foot response boat-medium, 33-foot special purpose craft, and/or a Sikorsky MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter. Coast Guard Sector San Juan Command Center decided against the helicopter due to the complexity of the evolution and the time of the arrival of the helicopter. WINSLOW GRIESSER departed the scene at 1440 enroute to San Juan Harbor and moored at the Charlie South pier at Sector San Juan at 1550, where medical services were awaiting. DESAKATA's owner was transported to the emergency department at the Hospital of Centro Medico in San Juan for treatment.

Throughout this investigation, U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan investigators worked with the NTSB, sharing appropriate evidence and findings as part of our concurrent marine casualty investigation. The Coast Guard determined the initiating event to be the collision between WINSLOW GRIESSER and DESAKATA which led to serious injuries to the DESAKATA's owner and the death of its crewmember. Casual factors contributing to this casualty include: 1) Failure to follow navigational rules and 2) Lack of situational awareness.



16732
November 08, 2023

**INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE COLLISION
BETWEEN WINSLOW GRIESSER (WPC-1116) COLLISION AND
COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL DESAKATA OFF THE COAST OF DORADO,
PUERTO RICO ON AUGUST 08, 2022**

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

1. Preliminary Statement

1.1. This marine casualty investigation was conducted, and this report was submitted in accordance with Title 46, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Subpart 4.07, and under the authority of Title 46, United States Code (USC) Chapter 63. Under Title 46 USC 6308, no part of a report of a marine casualty investigation, including findings of fact, opinions, recommendations, deliberations, or conclusions shall be admissible as evidence or subject to discovery in any civil or administrative proceedings, other than an administrative proceeding initiated by the United States.

1.2. The authority and purpose of this investigation is to determine, as closely as possible, the factors that contributed to the marine casualty in order to prevent reoccurrence. This investigation must also determine whether there is evidence of misconduct on the part of any person or Coast Guard personnel that caused or contributed to the casualty. To this end, this investigation focused its fact-finding and analysis on the factors that contributed to the collision of WINSLOW GRIESSER and commercial fishing vessel DESAKATA.

1.3. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was the lead federal agency for initial evidence collection activities and led all efforts to recover additional evidence at the casualty site. U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan joined as an equal partner to investigate the August 8, 2022, collision between WINSLOW GRIESSER and commercial fishing vessel DESAKATA. Coast Guard Sector San Juan investigation officers and the NTSB shared all evidence and factual material gathered throughout the course of the investigation. However, Coast Guard Sector San Juan investigation officers and the NTSB worked separately during the analysis phase of their respective investigations in order to prepare independent conclusions and recommendations. MISLE Activity #7541737.

1.5. References to time in this report are approximate. Times are also listed using a 24-hour format and reflect Atlantic Standard Time (AST).

Vessel Involved in the Incident



Figure 1. Undated Photograph of WINSLOW GRIESSER

Official Name:	WINSLOW GRIESSER
Identification Number:	WPC 1116
Flag:	United States
Homeport:	San Juan, Puerto Rico
Vessel Service:	Fast Response Cutter
Year Built:	2015
Hull Material:	Steel
Gross Regulatory Tonnage:	335 LT
Regulatory Length:	153.5 ft.
Regulatory Beam/Width:	25.4 ft.
Regulatory Draft/Depth:	7'9" ft.(forward) 9'9" (aft)
Main/Primary Propulsion:	(2) MTU Model 20V 4000 M93L 3800kW
Managing Owner:	United State Coast Guard
Operator:	United States Coast Guard Sector San Juan



Figure 2. Center – Console boat DESAKATA before collision. (Source: Samuel Rosario)

Official Name:	DESAKATA
Identification Number:	PR5157AA
Flag:	United States
Homeport:	Lajas, Puerto Rico
Vessel Service:	Commercial Fishing Vessel
Year Built:	1977
Hull Material:	Fiber Glass
Gross Regulatory Tonnage:	5000 lb.
Regulatory Length:	23 ft.
Regulatory Beam/Width:	8 ft.
Regulatory Draft/Depth:	19” inches
Main/Primary Propulsion:	2 Outboard Yamaha 115 (2022)
Managing Owner:	[REDACTED]
Operator:	[REDACTED]

2. Record of Deceased, Missing, and/or Injured Persons

Relationship to Vessel	Sex	Age	Status
Operator	Male	33	Injured
Crewmember	Male	52	Deceased

3. Findings of Fact

3.1. The Incident:

3.1.1. On August 8, 2022, at 0730 liberty expired for the twenty crewmembers of WINSLOW GRIESSER. WINSLOW GRIESSER is homeported at Sector San Juan located in the San Juan Harbor. WINSLOW GRIESSER had orders to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic to embark two Dominican Navy crewmembers for a ridership. The patrol was scheduled as a regular mission to have coverage for coastal security, fishery patrol, search and rescue, migrant smuggling, and drug interdictions in the Mona Passage.

3.1.2. The following is the National Weather Service's forecast (Coastal Waters of northern Puerto Rico out 10 nautical miles) at the time of the incident: "East winds 15 to 20 knots. Seas four to six feet with occasional seas up to eight feet. East swell 5.2 feet. Scattered showers. Isolated thunderstorms. A Small Craft Advisory was issued for the northern coastal waters of Puerto Rico out to ten nautical miles".

3.1.3. WINSLOW GRIESSER's crew conducted the initial Navigation Brief and pre-evolution risk assessment (RISK/GAIN: scored as Low Medium by the crew). During the engineering pre-departure checks at approximately 0800, engineers experienced a raw water-cooling pressure issue on the ship's service diesel generators' main engines. The crew completed troubleshooting of the raw water-cooling system at approximately 1245.

3.1.4. DESAKATA's crew was making preparations around 0800 by purchasing gas, food, and supplies.

3.1.5. DESAKATA got underway around 0930, from Cerro Gordo, Vega Alta, Puerto Rico with the operator and one crewmember. DESAKATA was heading to the Fish Aggregating Device (FAD) buoy approximately 7.5 nautical miles from shore.




Figure 3. Chart showing the location of the Fish Aggregating Devices in the North Coast of Puerto Rico. (Background Course: Navionics App)

3.1.6. At approximately 1310, WINSLOW GRIESSER conducted a second Navigation Brief, pre-evolution risk assessment (RISK/GAIN: scored as Low Medium by the crew) and completed all pre-departure tests.

3.1.7. At approximately 1325, WINSLOW GRIESSER set Special Sea Detail, which establishes assignments of personnel to stations and duties during periods when the vessel is being handled in restricted waters and/or to prepare for getting underway or returning to port.

3.1.8. WINSLOW GRIESSER departed San Juan Harbor, Puerto Rico at approximately 1335 with twenty crew enroute to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic.

3.1.9. While the vessel was departing the Conning Officer was under the instruction of the Commanding Officer (CO).

3.1.10. At approximately 1345. The Officer of the Deck (OOD) relieved the CO.

3.1.11. WINSLOW GRIESSER's bridge team, who was responsible for the watch, was composed of the OOD and the Quartermaster of the Watch (QMOW). In addition to the two members standing the watch at the time of the incident, there were three crewmembers on the bridge: the Port Engineer was receiving training at the helm, the CO was in the portside chair, the Training Petty Officer (TPO) was at the chart table.

3.1.12. At approximately 1340, an off-duty crewmember arrived at the aft deck of the bridge of WINSLOW GRIESSER.

3.1.13. See the diagram below for the crewmembers' position on WINSLOW GRIESSER at the time of the collision:




Figure 4. WINSLOW GRIESSER's crew positioning at the time of the collision. (Source: NTSB Report MIR-23-14)

3.1.14. At approximately 1345, the OOD assumed the Deck and Conn with the Port Engineer who was continuing training. Both crewmembers moved to the center of the bridge where the helm and conning station are located.

3.1.15. At approximately 1347, WINSLOW GRIESSER cleared the San Juan Harbor, altered course 350 degrees True and increased speed to 21 knots. The CO was using the

SeaWatch monitor (integrated system used for navigation, radar, and tactical communication) verifying additional tracks to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic to improve the time of arrival.

3.1.16. At approximately 1355, the QMOW was located at the port aft of the bridge performing computer work.

3.1.17. At approximately 1401, WINSLOW GRIESSER's course over ground changed to 278.8 degrees True at 25.9 knots.

3.1.18. Between the times of 1400 and 1415, a passenger on a flight from Miami to San Juan noticed two vessels. The passenger aircraft approached the coastline of Dorado at approximately 5,000 feet of altitude as the passenger observed the two vessels. He described that while watching through his window, he saw WINSLOW GRIESSER heading west at a fast speed. Additionally, he observed DESAKATA heading north at a slow speed on a collision course. As he continued to observe both vessels, neither altered their course or speed. He then saw WINSLOW GRIESSER collide with DESAKATA.

3.1.19. At approximately 1409, DESAKATA was 309 yards off the port bow of WINSLOW GRIESSER, and after 4 seconds it disappeared below the trough of the wave. DESAKATA's crew was talking and setting up the lines as they were heading to the FAD. DESAKATA's operator was sitting on the starboard side operating the vessel and the crewmember was sitting on the portside.



Figure 5. DESAKATA as recorded from the WINSLOW GRIESSER's salt encrusted mast camera at 1416:53, 19 seconds before collision. (Source: Coast Guard)

3.1.20. At approximately 1410, DESAKATA reappeared at WINSLOW GRIESSER port bow nearly 120 yards and remained visible until impact at 1410:13.



Figure 6. DESAKATA as recorded from the WINSLOW GRIESSER's salt encrusted mast camara at 1417:12, immediately before collision. (Source: Coast Guard)

3.1.21. At approximately 1410, DESAKATA had WINSLOW GRIESSER on their starboard side and WINSLOW GRIESSER. DESAKATA didn't clear WINSLOW GRIESSER's bow. The two crewmembers of the vessel DASAKATA were ejected from their vessel and injured.

3.1.22. At approximately 1410, the off-duty crewmember who was sitting at the aft deck of the pilothouse of WINSLOW GRIESSER, heard a noise and felt an abnormal movement of the vessel. The crewmember moved to the starboard side of the vessel, and saw DESAKATA as it had been run over and broken in half by WINSLOW GRIESSER. The crewmember immediately ran inside the bridge and notified all members on the bridge as they were unaware that WINSLOW GRIESSER had collided with DESAKATA.



Figure 7. DESAKATA's bow section adrift immediately after collision. (Source: Coast Guard)

3.1.23. At approximately 1410, WINSLOW GRIESSER reduced speed and turned starboard to head toward the impact site.




Figure 8. Area where WINSLOW GRIESSER and DESAKATA collided, as indicated by the red X. DESAKATA's trackline is approximate. (Source: NTSB Report MIR-23-14)

3.1.24. At approximately 1412, the crew of WINSLOW GRIESSER arrived alongside the impact side. The crewmembers dispatched a life ring buoy to rescue the injured passengers. A crewmember of WINSLOW GRIESSER attempted to grab the life ring to assist the passengers onboard but was unsuccessful due to the sea state and rocking of WINSLOW GRIESSER.

3.1.25. After several failed attempts to get the injured passenger on board WINSLOW GRIESSER the CO assumed the Deck and Conn at approximately 1418. Additionally, the CO notified the U.S. Coast Guard Sector San Juan Command Center that WINSLOW GRIESSER collided with DESAKATA.

3.1.26. At approximately 1426, WINSLOW GRIESSER launched the Over the Horizon (OTH) cutter boat and recovered both of DESAKATA's injured personnel from the water.

3.1.27. At approximately 1435, the OTH was recovered by the cutter after several failed attempts due to the sea stake.



Figure 9. The OTH heading back to WINSLOW GRIESSER after recovering the two persons in the water.



Figure 10. OTH was recover by WINSLOW GRIESSER after recovering the two persons from the water.

3.1.28. At approximately 1437, the operator of DESAKATA was escorted by two crewmembers to the aft deck of the bridge and received medical attention. Another crewmember from WINSLOW GRIESSER entered the OTH to check DESAKATA's second injured crewmember, however, this crewmember had no pulse, was not breathing, and had unresponsive pupils. The second DESAKATA crewmember had physical damage to his head, leg, left arm and his organs were exposed. WINSLOW GRIESSER's crewmember attempted to reduce bleeding with the tourniquets but did not observe blood moving through the body.

3.1.29. At approximately 1440, WINSLOW GRIESSER departed the scene to begin an emergency transit to San Juan Harbor.



Figure 11. Complete trackline of WISLOW GRIESSER on the day of the collision. (Source: Coast Guard)

3.1.30. At approximately 1550, WINSLOW GRIESSER moored starboard side to the Charlie Pier at Sector San Juan, where they were met by the local Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel who declared DESAKATA's second crewmember dead based on their observations. EMS then took the operator of the DESAKATA to the Hospital Centro Medico Puerto Rico.

3.1.31. At approximately 2030, the body of the deceased crewmember from DESAKATA was taken by the Forensic Science Institute in San Juan.

4. Analysis and Opinions

4.1. *Failure to follow Navigational Rules:* DESAKATA and WINSLOW GRIESSER failed to follow the International Regulation for Prevention of Collision at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS).

4.1.1. The investigation revealed DESAKATA was the give-away vessel in a *Crossing Situation under Rule 15* with WINSLOW GRIESSER. DESAKATA had WINSLOW GRIESSER on her starboard side and should have kept out of the way and avoided crossing ahead. Additionally, DESAKATA had the responsibility to actions to *Avoid Collision under Rule 8* and maintain a proper *Look-out* under Rule 5.



Figure 12. DESAKATA's view from the center console on a simulation voyage of the day of the incident. (Source: Coast Guard)



Figure 13. DESAKATA's view from the center console on a simulation voyage of the day of the incident. (Source: Coast Guard)



Figure 14. DESAKATA's view from the center console on a simulation voyage of the day of the incident. (Source: Coast Guard)



Figure 15. DESAKATA's view from the center console on a simulation voyage of the day of the incident. (Source: Coast Guard)

- 4.1.2 The investigation revealed WINSLOW GRIESSER failed to maintain a proper *Look-out* under Rule 5. Additionally, WINSLOW GRIESSER failed to maintain *Safe Speed* under Rule 6. If WINSLOW GRIESSER would have a proper Look-out and maintained a safe speed it would have enabled the crew to take the necessary action to avoid collision.




Figure 16. WINSLOW GRIESSER's view from the bridge on simulation of the voyage of the day of the incident. Source Coast Guard)




Figure 17. WINSLOW GRIESSER's view from the bridge of DESAKATA on a simulation of the voyage of the day of the incident. (Source:



Coast Guard)
Figure 18. WINSLOW GRIESSER's view from the bridge of DESAKATA before the collision on a simulation of the voyage of the day of the incident. (Source: Coast Guard)

4.2 *Lack of Situational Awareness*: WINSLOW GRIESSER and DESAKATA were not maintaining a proper lookout, as the collision was sudden and unavoidable for both parties. That testament is based on DESAKATA's sole survivor's rendition of events and WINSLOW GRIESSER's bridge team continuing transit until the off-duty crewmember who was sitting at the aft deck of the bridge alerted them to the collision/man overboard. DESAKATA's crew was preparing the fishing bait minutes before the collision. WINSLOW GRIESSER's bridge team was distracted at the time of the incident as the two crewmembers on watch and all additional crew on the bridge were not scanning the horizon for any contact or their bearings ascertained visually, via radar or by leveraging the compass-equipped binoculars on the bridge. The OOD was conducting on-the-job training with the Port Engineer at the helm position on the bridge. The QMOW was completing log entries on the computer located on the aft portside of the bridge. The CO was plotting the next port call route at the portside chair forward of the bridge as shown in Figure 4. The TPO was at the chart table (amidship starboard side). As a result of the inattentiveness of the five crewmembers on the bridge of WINSLOW GRIESSER, they never noticed they had collided with another vessel. It took an off-duty crewmember outside the bridge, to notify the personnel on the bridge of the incident and begin emergency procedures to respond to the casualty.

5. Conclusions

5.1. Determination of Cause:

5.1.1. The initiating event for this casualty occurred when DESAKATA and WINSLOW GRIESSER failed to follow the International Regulation for Prevention of Collision at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS). The operator and crewmember of DESAKATA failed to avoid a *Crossing Situation Rule 15* and to *Avoid Collision Rule 8*, or to maintain a proper *Look-out under Rule 5*. If the crew had followed International Regulation for Prevention of Collision at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS) they could have taken necessary actions to avoid the collision.

5.1.2. WINSLOW GRIESSER failed to follow the International Regulation for Prevention of Collision at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS) *Look-out under Rule 5*, *Safe Speed under Rule 6*. Additionally, WINSLOW GRIESSER's crew was distracted at the time of the collision as the crew were conducting different tasks on the bridge and no one appeared to be maintaining a continuous watch of the sea to report any kind of hazard that can be an obstacle in the navigation and cause harm to the ship. If WINSLOW GRIESSER's crew hadn't been distracted and adhered the International Regulation for Prevention of Collision at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS) they could have avoided the collision and its consequences.

6. Actions Taken Since the Incident

6.1. Following the collision, WINSLOW GRIESSER's CO was reassigned to an administrative position while the investigations were conducted. The CO was temporarily relieved of his command on February 17, 2023, due to loss of confidence in the ability to effectively command the cutter by Rear Admiral Brendan McPherson, Commander of the Seventh District U.S. Coast Guard.

6.2. The Coast Guard conducted a Major Incident Investigation (MII), under the provision of the Major Incident Investigation Manual, COMDTINST M5830.4 (series) and LANT memo 5830 dated August 11, 2022. The results of the investigations found that DESAKATA and WINSLOW GRIESSER failed to follow the International Regulation for Prevention of Collision at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS).

6.3. The Major Marine Investigation Board re-created a simulation of the collision between WINSLOW GRIESSER and a center console using a Virtual Bridge Simulator at Coast Guard Training Center Yorktown. The design characteristics of the Fast Response Cutter and a Hi-fidelity model of a center console vessel were included in the software package and used as the models for the simulator. Due to the limitation of the simulator, the center console in the program is 37 feet in length with a 9-foot beam creating a disparity of 14 feet larger than DESAKATA. Therefore, the simulated center console is easier to visually acquire in the video.

The course and speed for WINSLOW GRIESSER and the center console were set apart around 6000 yards. WINSLOW GRIESSER's speed and course were determined by the Sea Watch's recorded data: ordered course of 275 degrees True at 29 knots. DESAKATA's speed and course were determined by reverse engineering a maneuvering board and cross-referencing DESAKATA's operator's statement indicating a northerly course (estimated 010 degrees True) at 5 knots.

In the simulation and from the view WINSLOW GRIESSER's bridge, DESAKATA would appear and disappear at approximately 1200 yards. DESAKATA would appear and disappear at 1200 yards. At approximately 600 yards, DESAKATA mostly remains visible, but it dips below the swell until approximately 300 yards.

In the simulation and from the view of DESAKATA, WINSLOW GRIESSER's superstructure was barely visible at approximately 1500 yards. At 1000 yards, WINSLOW GRIESSER is more recognizable as another vessel, but occasionally dips below the crest of a wave. At 800 yards, WINSLOW GRIESSER is fully visible for the remainder of the scenario.

6.4. The NTSB found that fitting small vessels with equipment—such as radar reflectors or automatic identification systems—when combined with the proper visual lookout, would improve the opportunity for vessels with radar to detect them, therefore reducing the risk of a collision.

Additionally, the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the collision between the WINSLOW GRIESSER and DESAKATA was the failure of both vessels' crews to maintain a proper lookout. Contributing to the casualty was WINSLOW GRIESSER's CO and OOD not taking sufficient measures to increase situational awareness while transiting at a high speed.

6.5 The Coast Guard Investigative Service conducted an independent investigation following the incident and no criminal referrals are pending or anticipated.

6.6 The NTSB issued two recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard in their report MIR-23-14 and issued a Safety Alert SA-087

- 6.6.1 Recommendation M-23-001: Provide information about the circumstances of this collision to cutter crews and emphasize the importance of maintaining a proper lookout and ensuring situational awareness when transiting at high speed.
- 6.6.2 NTSB Recommendation M-23-002: Install equipment on all U.S. Coast Guard cutters that records vessel parametric data and audio information that is equivalent to International Maritime Organization voyage data recorder performance standards.
- 6.7 Safety Alert SA-087 for *Reducing Collision Risk by Improving Small Vessel Detectability*. Additionally, NTSB refers to the U.S. Coast Guard Safety Alert 04-97 for *Wood and Fiberglass Vessels make Poor Radar Target*.
- 6.8 On November 9, 2023, Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier the Deputy Commandant for Operation, U.S. Coast Guard responded to the Chair of NTSB Jennifer Homendy safety recommendation M-23-001 and M-23-002 issued on August 1, 2023, concerning the August 8, 2022, collision between the WINSLOW GRIESSER and DESAKATA.
 - 6.8.1 Response to NTSB M-23-001: “I concur with this recommendation. Steps have been taken to implement case studies of this mishap into the curriculum for all levels of the Coast Guard fleet training. I consider the Coast Guard’s actions complete on this recommendation and the request that it be closed”.
 - 6.8.2 Response to NTSB commendation M-23-002: “I concur with this recommendation. The Coast Guard agrees that parametric data and audio information to a complete and efficient accident investigation. While Coast Guard cutters are primarily designed to meet military operational requirements rather than commercial services, many classes of newer cutters are equipped with mechanisms to record radio, radar, navigation, alarms, and other parametric data. As was done in the CGC WINSLOW GRIESSER case, this data can be retrieved to aid in post-mishap investigations. The Coast Guard will examine the possibility and, where feasible, retrofit existing cutters to add audio recording of bridge conversation and ambient noise. Similarly, the Coast Guard will establish requirements to record this data in new cutters under design. I will keep the Board updated on the above actions to address this recommendation”.


7. Recommendations

7.1. Safety Recommendations:

- 7.1.1. No additional safety recommendation other than the NTSB issued recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard in their report MIR-23-14 and NTSB Safety Alert SA-087.

7.2. Administrative Recommendations:

7.2.1. Recommend this investigation be closed.



GS 12, U.S. Coast Guard
Lead Investigating Officer