



UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

**REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION
INTO THE
COLLISION BETWEEN THE RECREATIONAL
VESSEL TODO BIEN (O.N. 992174) AND THE
OIL TANKER EAGLE SAN ANTONIO (IMO
9594822) RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF TWO
LIVES ON THE CORPUS CHRISTI, TX SHIP
CHANNEL ON JULY 13, 2024**



U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



Commandant
United States Coast Guard


2703 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave SE
Stop 7501
Washington, DC 20593-7501
Staff Symbol: CG-INV
Phone: (202) 372-1032
E-mail: CG-INV1@uscg.mil

16732/IIA # 7957476
23 October 2025

**COLLISION BETWEEN THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL TODO BIEN (O.N. 992174)
AND THE SINGAPORE FLAGGED TANK SHIP EAGLE SAN ANTONIO (IMO#
9594822) RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF TWO LIVES IN THE CORPUS CHRISTI
SHIP CHANNEL NEAR CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS ON JULY 13, 2024**

ACTION BY THE COMMANDANT

The record and the report of investigation completed for this marine casualty have been reviewed by the Office of Investigations & Casualty Analysis. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analyses, and conclusions are approved. This marine casualty investigation is closed.



E. B. SAMMS
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Chief, Office of Investigations & Casualty Analysis (CG-INV)



16732


**COLLISION BETWEEN THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL TODO BIEN (O.N. 992174)
AND THE OIL TANKER EAGLE SAN ANTONIO (IMO 9594822) RESULTING IN THE
LOSS OF TWO LIVES IN THE CORPUS CHRISTI, TX SHIP CHANNEL ON JULY 13,
2024**

**ENDORSEMENT BY THE COMMANDER,
COAST GUARD HEARTLAND DISTRICT**

The record and the report of the investigation convened for the subject casualty have been reviewed. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are approved. It is recommended that this marine casualty investigation be closed.

COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

1. I extend my deepest condolences to the family and friends of the operator and passenger who lost their lives in this tragic accident.
2. I offer my gratitude and appreciation to the captain and crew of the recreational vessel, BLUE RUSH. Their quick and decisive initial actions enabled the rescue of two survivors from this accident.
3. Light pollution in and around our navigable waterways will continue to pose persistent challenges to the maritime community. Understanding that port complexes, waterway terminals, and residential infrastructure will continue to be lit and cause possible confusion to boaters, I urge all recreational boaters to wear Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRB) equipped Personal Floatation Devices (PFDs) and all boat operators to utilize their suite of navigational equipment, such as radar and Automatic Identification System (AIS), for collision avoidance. A mix of factors contributed to this tragedy, and any of the above elements might have saved a life.
2. Radar functionality and background lighting are factors for operators to determine safe speed. Harbor Safety Committees (HSC) can and should evaluate these factors to determine if speed restriction recommendations should be made to authorities. This process is encouraged by HSCs.


J. B. WHEELER
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Chief of Prevention
Coast Guard Heartland (Eighth) District
By Direction

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



Commander
United States Coast Guard
Sector Corpus Christi

Valent Hall
249 Glasson Drive
Corpus Christi, TX 78406
Phone: (361) 939-0201

16732
January 24, 2025

**COLLISION BETWEEN THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL TODO BIEN (O.N. 992174)
AND THE OIL TANKER EAGLE SAN ANTONIO (IMO 9594822) RESULTING IN THE
LOSS OF TWO LIVES ON THE CORPUS CHRISTI, TX SHIP CHANNEL ON JULY 13,
2024**

ENDORSEMENT BY THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, MARINE INSPECTION

The record and the report of the investigation convened for the subject casualty have been reviewed. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are approved subject to the following comments. It is recommended that this marine casualty investigation be closed.

COMMENTS ON THE REPORT

1. I extend my deepest condolences to the family and friends of Colin Ocker and Jared Hunt. It is my hope that this investigation will contribute to preventing future tragedies.

ENDORSEMENT/ACTION ON RECOMMENDATIONS

Administrative Recommendations: None



Torrey H. Bertheau
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection

Enclosures: (1) Executive Summary
(2) Investigating Officer's Report



16732
24 January 2025

**COLLISION BETWEEN THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL TODO BIEN (O.N. 992174)
AND THE OIL TANKER EAGLE SAN ANTONIO (IMO 9594822) RESULTING IN THE
LOSS OF TWO LIVES ON THE CORPUS CHRISTI, TX SHIP CHANNEL ON JULY 13,
2024**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 13, 2024, at approximately 0520 hours, the pleasure craft TODO BIEN departed Turtle Cove and entered the Corpus Christi Ship Channel heading outbound with four individuals on board. Concurrently, the oil tanker EAGLE SAN ANTONIO was navigating inbound through the same channel, enroute to the Port of Corpus Christi.

At approximately 0528 hours, the two vessels collided between lighted buoys 10 and 12 in the Corpus Christi Ship Channel. The collision's force caused the TODO BIEN to break in half, sending three individuals from the bridge into the water, while a fourth individual was initially trapped below deck. The trapped individual eventually escaped through the forward hatch and remained on the bow of the vessel. Nearby Good Samaritans responded promptly, issuing a MAYDAY call to Sector Corpus Christi and recovering three of the four individuals.

The U.S. Coast Guard initiated a Search and Rescue (SAR) operation, deploying a small boat from Station Port Aransas. Upon arrival at the scene, the Coast Guard located and rescued the survivor on the bow of the TODO BIEN and then took custody of the three recovered individuals and transported them to Station Port Aransas, where Emergency Medical Services personnel were standing by to administer medical treatment. The search for the fourth individual continued until he was recovered deceased by Texas Parks and Wildlife (TP&W) two days later near the site of the collision.

As a result of its investigation, the Coast Guard has determined that the initiating event for this casualty was the collision between the two vessels. The impact caused the pleasure craft TODO BIEN to break apart, resulting in three of the four individuals entering the water, while the fourth was initially trapped below deck but eventually escaped through the forward hatch. This sequence of events led to the deaths of the Owner/Operator and Passenger #1. The causal factors that contributed to this casualty include: (1) Light pollution from Port Aransas, (2) Inaccuracies in the radar on the TODO BIEN, (3) Improper bow lookout on the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO, (4) Failure to adhere to Rule 5 of the COLREGs by the TODO BIEN, (5) Failure to adhere to Rule 9 of the COLREGs by the TODO BIEN, (6) Inadequate use of the Automatic Identification System by the TODO BIEN, and (7) Failure to hear danger signal by the Operator and passengers of the TODO BIEN.



16732

January 24, 2025

**COLLISION BETWEEN THE RECREATIONAL VESSEL TODO BIEN (O.N. 992174)
AND THE OIL TANKER EAGLE SAN ANTONIO (IMO 9594822) RESULTING IN THE
LOSS OF TWO LIVES ON THE CORPUS CHRISTI, TX SHIP CHANNEL ON JULY 13,
2024**

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

1. Preliminary Statement

1.1. This marine casualty investigation was conducted, and this report submitted in accordance with Title 46, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Subpart 4.07, and under the authority of Title 46, United States Code (USC) Chapter 63.

1.2. Legal representation for the TODO BIEN, the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO, the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO's flag state Singapore, the Port of Corpus Christi, the Aransas Pilots Association, and OK SPORTFISHING LLC were designated as parties-in-interest in this investigation, in accordance with 46 CFR Subsection 4.03-10.

1.3. The Coast Guard was the lead agency for all evidence collection activities involving this investigation. Due to this investigation involving a loss of lives, the Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) agreed to provide technical assistance as required. No other persons or organizations assisted in this investigation.

1.4. All times listed in this report are approximate, and in Central Daylight Time using a 24-hour format.

2. Vessels Involved in the Incident

Official Name:	<i>TODO BIEN</i>
Identification Number:	992174
Flag:	United States
Vessel Class/Type/Sub-Type	Recreational/General/General
Build Year:	1992
Gross Tonnage:	28 GT
Length:	45.1 feet
Beam/Width:	Unknown
Draft/Depth:	Unknown
Main/Primary Propulsion:	Diesel Outdrive 1100HP
Owner:	OK SPORTFISHING LLC 15 Crested Pines CT The Woodland, TX 77381
Operator:	Colin Ocker



Figure 1. TODO BIEN Post Collision at Aransas Terminal Aransas Pass, TX.
(July 14, 2024/USCG)

Official Name:	<i>EAGLE SAN ANTONIO</i>
Identification Number:	9594822
Flag:	Singapore
Vessel Class/Type/Sub-Type	Tank Ship/Petroleum Oil Tank Ship/ Oil Products Tank Ship
Build Year:	2012
Gross Tonnage:	80783 GT
Length:	899.9 feet
Beam/Width:	160.9 feet
Draft/Depth:	29.9 feet
Main/Primary Propulsion:	Diesel Direct 21992 Ahead HP 18693
Owner:	AET Tanker (Suezmax) PTE. LTD
Master:	[REDACTED]



Figure 2. EAGLE SAN ANTONIO moored Eagle Ford Dock Corpus Christi Inner Harbor Post Collision. (July 13, 2024/USCG)

3. Deceased, Missing, and/or Injured Persons

Relationship to Vessel	Sex	Age	Status
Operator (TODO BIEN)	Male	50	Deceased
Passenger #1 (TODO BIEN)	Male	25	Deceased

4. Findings of Fact

4.1. The Incident:

4.1.1. On July 13, 2024, at 0511 hours, the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO was underway, heading inbound towards the Corpus Christi Sea Buoy when the vessel was boarded by two Aransas Pilots, Captain [REDACTED] and Captain [REDACTED]. Both pilots boarded the vessel on the starboard side using an accommodation ladder. Forward-facing deck lights and a spotlight from the bridge were illuminated at the time of boarding. After boarding, both pilots proceeded toward the bridge to begin their duties.

4.1.2. At 0513, Captain [REDACTED] conducted the pilot-master exchange in English without any communication issues. During this exchange, no deficiencies were reported. All navigational equipment, including radar, Automatic Identification System (AIS), navigational lights, and Global Positioning System (GPS), were functioning properly. The bridge was fully manned with all required personnel, and all operational equipment was in good working order. Captain [REDACTED] requested one man on the bow to act as a lookout. The Master of the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO complied with the request and directed his Bosun to stand as bow lookout.

4.1.3. At 0516, Captain [REDACTED] made his first security callout on VHF channels 12 and 16, informing traffic in the area that the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO was inbound. No vessels responded to the call.

4.1.4. At 0520, the TODO BIEN departed from Turtle Cove with four individuals on board, three of whom were on the bridge while one was sleeping below deck. The vessel's navigational and safety equipment was reported to be functioning properly, and the Operator had conducted a thorough check of all equipment the day prior to departure. None of the crew members were wearing Personal Flotation Devices (PFDs).

4.1.5. At 0524, the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO entered the channel and reported to the Harbor Master on channel 12, providing their pilot numbers and deep draft of 9.1 meters/29.9 feet. Numerous recreational vessels were observed traveling outbound in the Corpus Christi Ship Channel, due in part to the Deep-Sea Round Up fishing tournament. Captain [REDACTED] reported seeing the first recreational vessel near buoy three on their port side. According to both pilots, it was typical for recreational vessels to pass inbound tankers on both sides at close proximity without making passing arrangements.

4.1.6. At 0524, the TODO BIEN exited Turtle Cove and entered the Corpus Christi Ship Channel. The TODO BIEN was subject to the Navigation Rules (contained in 33 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 83), including Rule 5 (Proper Lookout), Rule 18 (Responsibilities Between Vessels), and Rule 9 (Narrow Channels). Radar line of sights had been known to be obstructed by landmasses in that area. According to one of the survivors present on the flybridge, no one on the flybridge, including the Operator, had identified the inbound EAGLE SAN ANTONIO by any means, including through the use of navigational equipment.

4.1.7. At 0526, the Operator on the TODO BIEN steered towards the middle of the ship channel. No communication had been established between the TODO BIEN and the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO to confirm their intentions or discuss passing protocols. The Navigation Rules established the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO, a large oil tanker, restricted in its ability to deviate from its course due to its size and draft, as the stand-on vessel.

4.1.8. At 0526, closed-circuit television footage showed the Bosun positioned at the bow of the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO, assigned to lookout duty. The Bosun was observed loitering near the bow, frequently turning his back and not actively scanning forward. Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) audio indicated that no communication was initiated by the Bosun.

4.1.9. At 0526, the Pilots aboard the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO sounded the danger signal, consisting of five short blasts on the vessel's horn, and instructed the Master to contact the lookout for a report. Initially, the Bosun, who was on lookout, struggled to clearly articulate what he was observing to the bridge due to a language barrier. After some time, the Bosun was eventually able to communicate that the surrounding vessels had cleared. Following this, the Master directed the Bosun to focus on monitoring a vessel directly ahead. The VDR audio revealed the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO did not attempt to establish communication with the other vessels via VHF radio.

4.1.10. At 0527, the TODO BIEN continued in the Corpus Christi Ship Channel, heading 119 degrees at approximately 19.6 knots, slightly favoring the north side of the channel.

4.1.11. At 0527, the TODO BIEN and EAGLE SAN ANTONIO collided in the Corpus Christi Ship Channel between buoys 9 and 11. The TODO BIEN sustained a glancing blow to its starboard bow, while the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO exhibited blue paint transfer directly off the bow of the ship. The impact resulted in the TODO BIEN splitting into two halves. The Operator and two passengers on board the TODO BIEN entered the water, while the third passenger remained trapped below deck.




Figure 5/6. EAGLE SAN ANTONIO post collision photos moored Eagle Ford Dock Corpus Christi Inner Harbor. (July 13, 2024/USCG)



Figure 3/4. TODO BIEN post collision photos at Aransas Terminal Aransas Pass, TX. (July 14, 2024/USCG)

4.1.12. At 0528, the Bosun reported to the Master hearing a light crashing noise and subsequently checked the starboard side but did not see any signs of a collision. Communication between the Master and Bosun was hindered due to a language barrier. Subsequently, Captain [REDACTED] the pilot on board for the second half of the voyage assisting the conning pilot, requested a different lookout due to the language barrier.

4.1.13. The outbound recreational vessel BLUE RUSH witnessed the collision and made the initial MAYDAY call on channel 16 alerting Coast Guard Sector Corpus Christi to the incident. Following the collision, other nearby vessels recovered the Operator and two passengers from the TODO BIEN, including the passenger that had been initially trapped below deck after he exited through a hatch. The Operator was found unconscious and unresponsive. Passenger #1, who was on the flybridge during the collision, remained missing.

4.1.14. The U.S. Coast Guard initiated a Search and Rescue (SAR) operation, deploying a small boat from US Coast Guard Station Port Aransas. Upon arrival at the scene, the Coast Guard took custody of the three recovered individuals and transported them to Station Port Aransas, where EMS personnel were standing by to administer medical treatment. The search for Passenger #1 continued.

4.1.15. At 0900, the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO was secured at the Eagle Ford Terminal in the Corpus Christi Inner Harbor. The Master, crew on watch, and the Aransas Pilots underwent post-casualty drug and alcohol testing in accordance with 46 CFR, Subpart 4.06. All alcohol and drug test results were negative.

4.1.16. On July 15, 2024, at 0946, Passenger #1 was found deceased near the collision site and was recovered by Texas Parks and Wildlife (TP&W). A medical autopsy determined cause of death for both the Operator and Passenger #1 to be from drowning due to ingesting a large amount of water, and the manner of death was accidental.

4.2. Additional/Supporting Information:

4.2.1. The EAGLE SAN ANTONIO was an 899.9-foot oil tanker with an orange steel hull. The vessel last received its Certificate of Compliance Renewal Examination from Sector Houston-Galveston on October 12, 2023, which was valid until October 12, 2025. Due to its size, the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO was restricted in its maneuverability within the Corpus Christi Ship Channel. The vessel and crew had made multiple port calls to Corpus Christi previously. The time stamp on the CCTV footage was set to GMT and was 7 minutes and 43 seconds ahead.

4.2.2. The Master of the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO had been in the maritime industry since 1999 and had visited the Port of Corpus Christi multiple times, including a recent voyage on the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO three days prior to the incident.

4.2.3. The Bosun reported being on the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO for eight days and had been in the maritime industry for over 25 years.

4.2.4. Captain [REDACTED] has been in the maritime industry for approximately seven years, holding a master's endorsement for the same duration, and has been a member of the Aransas Pilot Association for four years. Captain [REDACTED] confirmed that he does not have any medical waivers or conditions not reported to the National Maritime Center. Captain [REDACTED] reported feeling rested, having completed only one prior job. He had no concerns working with Captain [REDACTED] and noted that he had previously completed a voyage on the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO and its Master.

4.2.5. Captain [REDACTED] has been in the maritime industry since 2004, beginning his career as a cadet, and has held his Master's endorsement for seven years. He joined the Aransas Pilot Association in April 2023 and has not been affiliated with any other pilot associations. Captain [REDACTED] does not have any medical waivers or conditions that the National Maritime Center (NMC) is unaware of. Captain [REDACTED] reported completing two jobs before boarding the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO: an inbound voyage to Valero and a shift in the inner harbor. He felt good after these jobs and had no concerns about working with Captain [REDACTED]. Captain [REDACTED] had never previously performed an inbound transit on the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO nor worked with the Master on board.

4.2.6. The recreational vessel TODO BIEN was a 43-foot fiberglass vessel equipped with radar, AIS, GPS, VHF radio, and a depth finder. The vessel had a Certificate of Documentation issued on January 5, 2022. The structural design and reinforcements on

the TODO BIEN were not designed to absorb the impact of a tanker. The vessel was owned by OK Sportfishing LLC.

4.2.7. The Operator had co-owned the TODO BIEN since 2020 and had operated in the Port Aransas area his entire life, including owning and operating multiple vessels prior to purchasing the TODO BIEN. The Operator had no formal navigational training and did not hold any Coast Guard endorsements as a Captain nor required to have them.

4.2.8. The on-scene weather on the day of the incident was an air temperature of 80 degrees Fahrenheit. Winds were out of the South at approximately 2 knots with gusts up to 9 knots. Wave height was 1 foot. Visibility was approximately 4 nautical miles. Current tide was a flood.

4.2.9. The Corpus Christi Ship Channel width ranges from approximately 300 to 400 feet. The authorized depth for the Corpus Christi Ship Channel is generally around 54 feet. Depths can vary slightly due to natural sedimentation, dredging activities, and other factors. These dimensions are critical for navigation, especially for large vessels like the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO, which are restricted in maneuverability due to the channel's dimensions.

4.2.10. The lights emanating from the Port Aransas, Texas can obscure the visual detection of approaching ships, making it difficult for operators to distinguish between vessel lights and the background illumination. This issue becomes more pronounced at night or in low-light conditions, increasing the risk of misjudging the proximity and size of incoming traffic.

5. Analysis

5.1. Light Pollution from Padre Island. The responding coxswain from Station Port Aransas highlighted a significant challenge posed by the bright lights emanating from Padre Island, particularly during low-light conditions. This light pollution can create a confusing backdrop, making it difficult to distinguish between natural navigational cues and artificial light sources. In this case, the bright lights may have hindered the crew of the TODO BIEN from visually identifying the inbound EAGLE SAN ANTONIO. If the light pollution from Padre Island had not been present, the crew of the TODO BIEN may have had a clearer view of the inbound tanker EAGLE SAN ANTONIO, potentially allowing them to identify the vessel earlier. This earlier recognition might have provided sufficient time for the TODO

BIEN to take evasive action or make proper passing arrangements, potentially preventing the collision.



Figure 7. EAGLE SAN ANTONIO inbound in the Corpus Christi Ship Channel with illuminated Navigational Lights. (July 13, 2024/Port of Corpus Christi CCTV)

5.2. Inaccuracies in the radar on the TODO BIEN. The co-owner of the TODO BIEN had previously reported instances where the vessel's radar line of sight was obstructed by nearby landmasses, resulting in inbound ship traffic not being properly displayed. This radar limitation was corroborated by both the responding coxswain from Station Port Aransas and the Operator of the BLUE RUSH, who confirmed that radar visibility in the area can be compromised. The BLUE RUSH Operator also mentioned that while he did not initially detect the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO on radar while in the marina, he was actively looking out for it based on its AIS identification. This compromised radar visibility could have significantly impacted the crew's ability to detect the inbound EAGLE SAN ANTONIO. The reduced radar effectiveness would have forced the crew to rely more heavily on visual detection and other navigational aids. If the Operator of the TODO BIEN had been closely monitoring a fully functional radar, unobstructed by landmasses, the crew might have detected the inbound tanker earlier, potentially allowing for evasive action and preventing the collision.

5.3. Improper Bow Lookout on the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO. Closed-circuit television footage revealed the Bosun was stationed at the bow of the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO for lookout and anchor watch duties. The footage showed the Bosun frequently turning his back and failing to consistently scan the water ahead. VDR audio confirmed the Bosun did not communicate with the bridge to report any potential hazards before the incident. Had the Bosun detected the approaching TODO BIEN earlier and communicated this information to the bridge, it could have prompted the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO to sound the danger signal (five short blasts) sooner, potentially giving the TODO BIEN to take evasive action and avoid the collision.




Figure 8. EAGLE SAN ANTONIO Bow Lookout with back turned to bow.
(July 13, 2024/EAGLE SAN ANTONIO CCTV)

5.4. Failure to adhere to Rule 5 of the COLREGs by the TODO BIEN. According to one of the survivors from the TODO BIEN, no one on the bridge identified the inbound oil tanker EAGLE SAN ANTONIO at any point prior to the collision. This failure to maintain situational awareness is a violation of Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), which mandates that all vessels must maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing at all times. Had the Operator or any crew member on the TODO BIEN identified the inbound EAGLE SAN ANTONIO earlier, they would have had the opportunity to assess the situation, communicate with the tanker, and take evasive action to avoid the collision. A vigilant lookout, compliant with Rule 5, may have prevented the incident.

5.5. Failure to adhere to Rule 9 of the COLREGs by the TODO BIEN. The AIS data indicated the Operator of the TODO BIEN violated Rule 9 of the COLREGs, which addresses vessels navigating in narrow channels. Rule 9 requires vessels operating in such channels to keep as far to the starboard side of the channel as is safe and practicable, and it gives priority to vessels that are constrained by their draft, such as large tankers, which are limited in their ability to maneuver. The EAGLE SAN ANTONIO, a large oil tanker, was restricted in its ability to deviate from its course due to its size and draft, making it the stand-on vessel. Had the Operator adhered to Rule 9 and kept the TODO BIEN out of the middle of the channel the collision may have been avoided.




Figure 9. AIS Screen Shot. (July 13, 2024/USCG NAVCEN)

5.6. Inadequate Use of AIS by the Operator of the TODO BIEN. According to one of the survivors, no one on the flybridge, including the Operator, had identified the inbound EAGLE SAN ANTONIO by any means, including through the use of AIS. Active monitoring of AIS before departing the marina could have made the position and movements of the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO apparent well in advance of the collision. The Operator of the BLUE RUSH stated he identified the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO on AIS before leaving the marina, indicating the AIS on the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO was operational. Additionally, the Coast Guard confirmed this by retrieving AIS data from the Coast Guard Navigation Center (NAVCEN), showing the AIS was functioning prior to the incident. These navigational tools could have provided the TODO BIEN crew with sufficient time to assess the situation and take necessary evasive actions, potentially preventing the incident.

5.7. Failure to hear danger signal by the Operator and passengers of the TODO BIEN. The VDR audio recordings from the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO revealed a failure by both the TODO BIEN and the tanker to establish communication and coordinate passing arrangements. According to Rule 9 of the COLREGs, vessels navigating in narrow channels are required to take necessary precautions, including the use of sound signals or radio communication, to prevent collisions. The VDR recorded the pilot onboard the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO making a security call on channel 12, informing nearby traffic of their position and intention to proceed inbound. However, no vessels, including the TODO BIEN, responded to this security call. The VDR also captured the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO sounding the danger signal prior to the collision, fulfilling the requirements of Rule 9. Despite this, the surviving passenger on the TODO BIEN reported never hearing the danger signal. If effective communication had taken place, both vessels could have coordinated passing arrangements or taken timely evasive actions, potentially preventing the collision.

6. Conclusions

6.1. Determination of Cause:

6.1.1. The initiating event for this casualty was the collision between the two vessels. Causal factors leading to this event were:

- 6.1.1.1. The light pollution emanating from Padre Island potentially making it difficult to distinguish between natural navigational cues and artificial light sources.
- 6.1.1.2. The inaccuracies in the radar on the TODO BIEN due to landmass obstructions.
- 6.1.1.3. The EAGLE SAN ANTONIO bow lookout's lack of communication and vigilance.
- 6.1.1.4. The TODO BIEN Operator's failure to adhere to Rule 5 of the COLREGs.
- 6.1.1.5. The TODO BIEN Operator's failure to adhere to Rule 9 of the COLREGs.
- 6.1.1.6. The TODO BIEN Operator's inadequate use of navigation equipment including AIS to identify the EAGLE SAN ANTONIO.
- 6.1.1.7. The failure of the Operator and passengers aboard the TODO BIEN to hear the danger signal.

6.1.2. The collision resulted in the TODO BIEN parting in two pieces and in three of the four passengers entering the water:

- 6.1.2.1. The vessel's design and construction were not equipped to absorb the impact of such a large and heavy ship, which significantly compromised its integrity upon collision.

6.1.3. The Operator and passengers entering the water led to two subsequent events: the inability to initially locate one of the passengers and the eventual deaths of both the Operator and the missing passenger.

- 6.1.3.1. It was determined that the PFDs on board were not equipped with personal Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs). These devices, which use GPS technology, can be energized in emergencies, transmitting the location of individuals in distress. By providing real-time location data, personal EPIRBs significantly reduce the search area and enhance the speed and efficiency of rescue operations. In addition to location tracking, many personal EPIRBs are outfitted with built-in strobe lights, which enhance visibility during nighttime or in low-visibility conditions. This added visibility can be vital for rescue teams attempting to locate an individual in the water. Had the missing passenger been wearing a PFD equipped with a personal EPIRB, their location could have been transmitted immediately, allowing rescue teams to quickly pinpoint their position. This technological aid could have led to a faster recovery.

6.1.3.2. The autopsy reports classified both deaths as accidental drownings. It is possible that had both individuals been wearing PFDs, their chances of survival would have increased. PFDs are designed to keep individuals afloat, reducing the risk of drowning by keeping their heads above water, even if they are unconscious or fatigued. By staying afloat, individuals also become more visible to rescuers, increasing the likelihood of timely recovery. The buoyancy provided by PFDs would have helped to mitigate the physical strain and potential shock experienced by the individuals, giving them a better chance to remain conscious and alert while waiting for assistance, potentially preventing their deaths.

6.2. Evidence of Act(s) or Violation(s) of Law by Any Coast Guard Credentialed Mariner Subject to Action under 46 USC Chapter 77: There were no acts of misconduct, incompetence, negligence, unskillfulness, or violations of law by a credentialed mariner identified as part of this investigation.

6.3. Evidence of Act(s) or Violation(s) of Law by U.S. Coast Guard Personnel, or any other person: There were no acts of misconduct, incompetence, negligence, unskillfulness, or violations of law by Coast Guard employees or any other person that contributed to this casualty.

6.4. Evidence of Act(s) Subject to Civil Penalty: This investigation did not identify any violations that are subject to civil penalty.

6.5. Evidence of Criminal Act(s): This investigation did not identify violation of criminal law.

6.6. Need for New or Amended U.S. Law or Regulation: This investigation identified no matters needing new or amended U.S. law or regulation.


6.7. Unsafe Actions or Conditions that Were Not Causal Factors; No unsafe actions or conditions that were not causal factors were identified.

7. Actions Taken Since the Incident

7.1. None.

8. Recommendations

8.1. Safety Recommendations: There were no proposed actions to add new or amend existing U.S. laws or regulations, international requirements, industry standards, or U.S. Coast Guard policies and procedures as part of this investigation.



U.S. Coast Guard
Investigating Officer