### Deficiencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14104</td>
<td>Oil filtering equipment</td>
<td>Any ship of 10,000 gross tons and above shall be fitted with oil filtering equipment complying with this regulation. The systems shall be arranged to ensure that any discharge of oily mixtures is automatically stopped when the oil content of the effluent exceeds 15 ppm. The OWS systems were arranged in a way that allowed clean water and effluent to be manipulated manually by the Engineering staff, allowing for discharge of greater than 15 ppm. Engineering staff was controlling discharge and effluent via unauthorized joining of clean water line and effluent line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14104</td>
<td>Oil filtering equipment</td>
<td>After any survey of the ship under paragraph 1 of this regulation has been completed, no change shall be made in the structure, equipment, systems, fittings, arrangements or material covered by the survey, without the sanction of the administration, except the direct replacement of such equipment and fittings. Required air vent on top OWS filter assembly was modified with manually operated ball valve and hose by the engineering staff without approval by the RO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01102</td>
<td>Cargo Ship Safety Construction (including exemption)</td>
<td>After any survey of the ship under regulations 7, 8, 9, or 10, has been completed. No change shall be made in the structure arrangements, machine, equipment and other items covered by the survey, without the sanction of the administration. During the course of the exam, a modification to the sludge pipe was discovered that provided a means to attach a hose and drain sludge into the bilge holding tank. Additionally, two modifications were found allowing a bypass of the OWS. (1) A flange was discovered on the emergency bilge suction leading to ballast educator discharge overboard. When connected, this could allow for discharge of the contents of the bilge holding tank through the eductor to the sea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: AEOLOS
Flag: Liberia
IMO Number: 9670901
Date of Action: 4/10/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: New Orleans, Louisiana
Unit: Sector New Orleans

Deficiencies:

0710 - Fire prevention
Oil fuel pipes which, if damage, would allow oil to escape from a storage, settling, or daily service tank having a capacity of 500 liters and above shall be fitted with a cock or valve directly on the tank capable of being closed from a safe position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire. PSCO observe a blocking device in the remotely operate valve on the HFO Settling tank preventing the valve from being closed from the outside of the space in the event of the fire.

0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation
Firefighting systems and applications shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. The fixed local application fire extinguishing system (water mist), required by Regulation II-2/10.5.6.2 was found in the "off" position preventing the system from activating in the event of a fire.

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Laskaridis Shipping Co. Ltd.
Nestus Navigation Inc
Charterers
Oldendorff Carriers GMBH & CO. KG
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2515 - Company responsibility and authority</td>
<td>The company should establish procedures for the implementation of corrective action, including measures intended to prevent recurrence. PSCO found the company is not responding to the ship with corrective action, including measures intended to prevent recurrence of reported non-conformities. The company has not provided resolution of reports made by the master that the ship's PMS system does not address all critical systems planned maintenance. The designated person ashore is not responding to requests from the crew on board nor providing the required support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0999 - Other (Safety In General)</td>
<td>Means shall be provided to control leaks of flammable liquids. PSCO found the pressure absorber in main engine fuel oil system leaking excessively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9800 - Other (Def.Clearly Hazardous To Safety)</td>
<td>In spaces where penetration of oil products is possible, the surface of insulation shall be impervious to oil or oil vapors. PSCO found oil soaked lagging around the main engine creating a potential fire/occupational hazard to the crew.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deficiencies:

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<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2515</td>
<td>The company and the ship shall comply with the requirements of the ISM Code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>these requirements. The company should ensure that appropriate corrective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>action is taken. The vessel has five overdue non-conformities with its SMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manual. These were due to be corrected by 29 Mar 18. The Master forwarded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.A.R. to the company on 02 Jan 18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2515</td>
<td>The company should ensure that the Master is given necessary support so that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Master's duties can be safely performed. Vessel has two of four line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>throwing devices expired as of 01 Jan 18. A requisition was sent on 16 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17 with no response or action from the Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2515</td>
<td>The Company should ensure that the master is given the necessary support so</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>that the Master's duties can be safely performed. The Ship has expired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>medicine on board, along with medicine that will expire this month (April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18). A requisition was sent on 18 Feb 18 with no response or action from the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0111</td>
<td>After any survey of the ship no change shall be made to the structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>arrangements, machinery, or equipment without the sanction of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>administration. Seven soft patches were identified on major salt water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pipes below the waterline on four different systems. These systems include</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#1 and #2 main saltwater cooling pump discharge, evaporator salt water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>supply piping, intake pipe for primary fire/bilge pump, and #1 plate cooler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>piping. Chief Engineer stated that the RO has not been made aware.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0615</td>
<td>Before the ship leaves port and at all times the voyage all lifesaving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. During</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>testing of the rescue boats at idle speed it was observed that the engine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>would not run continually unless a crewman primed it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cargo ships shall carry at least one rescue boat complying with 5.1 of LSA code. Every rescue boat shall be provided with sufficient fuel for four (4) hours. PSC observed the 6 gallon fuel tank with less than 1/2 capacity.
Ship Name: ANL WALWA
Ship Type: Containership

Flag: Liberia

IMO Number: 9317913

Date of Action: 9/6/2018

Action Taken: Detention

Port: San Francisco, California

Unit: Sector San Francisco

Deficiencies:

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04114 - Emergency source of</td>
<td>Each emergency generating set arranged to be automatically started shall be equipped with starting devices approved by the Administration with a stored energy capability of at least three consecutive starts. Primary start for the emergency generator is a battery bank; the batteries failed and were removed from service 27 days ago. Secondary means to start the emergency generator is by manual hydraulic means and cannot operated automatically. The vessel has since called 5 ports but has not taken any mitigating actions or manning the emergency generator space while the primary means of starting is disabled.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deficiencies:

14107 - Oil disch. Monitoring and control system

Description

Oil filtering equipment...shall also be provided with arrangements to ensure that any discharge of oily mixtures is automatically stopped when the oil content of the effluent exceeds 15 ppm. In considering the design of such equipment and approvals, the administration shall have regard to the specification recommended by the organization. The automatic stopping device should consist of a valve arrangement installed in the effluent outlet line of the 15 ppm bilge separator which automatically diverts the effluent mixture from being discharged overboard back to the ship's bilges or bilge tank when the oil content of the effluent exceeds 15 ppm. Port state control officers found that the oily water separator's three way valve is not connected to the system because the valve stem is snapped and the air control system does not actuate the valve. The valve is rusted into the overboard position.
**Ship Name:** ARDMORE SEATRADER  
**Ship Type:** Oil Tankship  
**Flag:** Marshall Islands  
**IMO Number:** 9240847  
**Date of Action:** 9/26/2018  
**Action Taken:** Detention  
**Port:** Los Angeles, California  
**Unit:** Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach  

**Recognized Org:** Lloyd's Register of Shipping  
**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):** Not Class Relat  
**Organization Related to Detention:**  

**Ship Management:** Owners, Operators, or Managers  
River Hudson LLC  
Anglo Ardmore Ship Management Ltd  
Charterers  
Ardmore Shipping (Bermuda) Limited  

**Deficiencies:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07126</td>
<td>Oil accumulation in engine room</td>
<td>In a ship in which oil fuel is used the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. PSCO found excessive fuel leaks on the main engine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07126</td>
<td>Oil accumulation in engine room</td>
<td>In a ship in which oil fuel is used the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. PSCO found oil soaked lagging around the main engine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07113</td>
<td>Fire pumps and its pipes</td>
<td>In cargo ships of 2000GT and upwards, if a fire in any one compartment could put all pumps out of action there shall be an alternative means consisting of a fixed independently driven emergency pump which shall be capable of supplying two jets of water to the satisfaction of the Administration. The emergency fire pump cannot get suction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: **ARGENTINA**  
Ship Type: **Bulk Carrier**  
Flag: **Marshall Islands**  
Recognized Org: **American Bureau of Shipping**  
IMO Number: **9469924**  
Recognized Security Organization (RSO):  
Date of Action: **7/11/2018**  
Recognized Org (RO) Related: **Not Class Relat**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Organization Related to Detention:  
Port: **Baltimore, Maryland**  
Unit: **Sector Maryland-NCR**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0750</td>
<td>Fire prevention</td>
<td>Means shall be provided to control leaks of flammable liquids. There were multiple leaks of oil on the main engine and generators causing an accumulation of oil throughout the engine room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0799</td>
<td>Other (Fire Fighting Equipment)</td>
<td>Fire protection systems shall be kept in good order as to ensure the required performance if a fire occurs. The class “A” self-closing doors leading to the windlass/winch were unable to automatically close and held open with rope.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Charterers: **Phaethon International Ltd.**  
Owners, Operators, or Managers: **Iron Pasha Inc**  
Universal Tanker Management (UTM) Limited  
Charterers: **Phaethon International Ltd.**
Deficiencies:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15113 - Other (ISM)</td>
<td>Every company should develop, implement and maintain a safety management system which includes instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation in compliance with relevant international and Flag State legislation. The Chief Officer did not follow the procedures outlined in the vessel's SMS, in regards to loading of dry bulk cargo, by not recording the GM calculation or draft readings, which resulted in the vessel sailing overloaded. Recommended external audit by Flag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03101 - Overloading</td>
<td>Vessel's load line shall not be submerged at any time when the ship puts to sea, during the voyage, or on arrival. Upon arrival, PSCO observed starboard side load line submerged. Through further investigation, the PSCO observed the port side load line submerged and determined the vessel did not meet minimum freeboard requirements as indicated on the vessel’s International Load Line Certificate (ILLC). The freeboard measurements were 2,555 mm starboard and 2,565 mm portside; the minimum freeboard required by the ILLC is 2,613 mm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: BALTIC MERCUR II
Ship Type: General Dry Cargo Ship
Flag: Malta
IMO Number: 9235361
Date of Action: 6/20/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Miami, Florida
Unit: Sector Miami

Recognized Org: Russian Maritime Register of Shipping
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Class Related
Organization Related to Detention: Russian Maritime Register of Shipping
Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Baltic Mercur JSC
Atlantic Baltic Mercur II Limited
Charterers
MACS Maritime Carrier Shipping PTE LTD

Deficiencies:

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<tr>
<th>Code</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0620</td>
<td>Inflatable liferafts</td>
<td>Each liferaft or group of liferafts shall be stowed with a float-free arrangement so that each floats free and inflates automatically when the ship sinks. All full-sized liferafts were tied down to the vessel with ratchet straps preventing a float-free arrangement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430</td>
<td>Auxiliary engines</td>
<td>Where the emergency source of electrical power is a generator, it shall be started automatically upon failure of the main source of electrical power supply. The vessel’s emergency generator battery suffered an explosion upon the initial testing, rendering the means of automatic start inoperable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0610</td>
<td>Lifeboats</td>
<td>Before giving approval to life-saving appliances and arrangements, the Administration shall ensure that such life-saving appliances and arrangements are tested, to confirm that they comply with the requirements of the Code. A repair was made in the aft port of the hull on the port side of the lifeboat on 21 May 2018. The repair was not verified/approved by the RO or administration and is soft to the touch and therefore no longer rigid in accordance with LSA 4.4.1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: **BALTIC WIND**

Flag: **Liberia**

IMO Number: **9450703**

Date of Action: **4/20/2018**

Action Taken: **Detention**

Port: **New Orleans, Louisiana**

Unit: **Sector New Orleans**

Ship Name: **Bulk Carrier**

Recognized Org: **American Bureau of Shipping**

Recognized Security Organization (RSO):

Recognized Org (RO) Related: **Not Class Relat**

Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: **Owners, Operators, or Managers**
Anglo Eastern Ship Management Ltd.
Baltic Wind Limited

Charterers
RFA International

Deficiencies:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1130 - Stow/pack. dangerous goods</td>
<td>The carriage of dangerous goods in solid form in bulk shall be in compliance with the relevant provisions of the IMSBC Code, as defined in regulation VI/1-1.1. For quantitative measurements of hydrogen, phosphine and arsine, suitable detectors for each gas or combination of gases shall be onboard while the cargo is carried. Gas concentrations shall be measured, during the voyage, at least once during every eight hours at each outlet ventilator and in any other accessible space adjacent to the cargo space carrying this cargo and the results shall be recorded in the log-book. During the voyage to the United States, vessel was not outfitted with suitable detector(s) to sample concentrations of hydrogen, arsine, or phosphine gases as required by the IMSBC Code. Furthermore, the sample taken by the crew, using a multigas (4-gas) meter (O2, LEL CO, HS) were conducted and recorded at intervals of 12 hours.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: BAR
Flag: MONTENEGRO
IMO Number: 9693496
Date of Action: 4/5/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Chalmette, Louisiana
Unit: Sector New Orleans

Deficiencies: 2099 - Other (SOLAS Related Operational Def.)
Description: Crew Members with enclosed space entry or rescue responsibilities shall participate in an enclosed space entry and rescue drill to be held on board the ship at least once every two months. PSCO observed that no enclosed space drill has ever been conducted since construction/delivery. Vessel is required to provide evidence that enclosed space drill has been conducted.

Deficiencies: 2555 - Documentation
Description: The company should ensure that valid documents are available at all relevant locations. PSCO observed during an expands ISM examination that there was a revision made to the vessels safety management system, which included conducting enclosed spaces drills an crew familiarization training on enclosed space rescues. The vessel failed to implement changes. Vessel is required to provide evidence SMS has been update to include enclosed space drills and crew familiarization.
Ship Name: **BBC NAGASAKI**

Flag: **Antigua and Barbuda**

IMO Number: **9559872**

Date of Action: **1/19/2018**

Action Taken: **Detention**

Port: **Houston, Texas**

Unit: **Sector Houston-Galveston**

Ship Type: **Bulk Carrier**

Recognized Org: **Bureau Veritas**

Recognized Security Organization (RSO): **Not Class Relat**

Organization Related to Detention: **Unit: Sector Houston-Galveston**

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<tr>
<td>0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation</td>
<td>A ship when in port of another contracting government is subject to control by officers duly authorized by such government concerning operational requirements in respect of safety of ships when there are clear ground for believing that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to safety of ships. The PSCO observed the hyper mist system (MINIMAX) discharge outlet valves to be in the manually closed position, rendering the system incapable of fighting a fire in high risk fire areas in the engine room. The vessel is classed as automated - unattended machinery space (UMS) and has been operating as a UMS with the system in manual mode for the duration of the vessel's last voyage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2535 - Development of plans for shipboard operations</td>
<td>The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provision if the relevant rules and regulation and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. Vessel's crew could not provide PSCO's with company's SMS procedures or manufacturer's instructions (MINIMAX) containing testing, maintenance, or disabling procedure for hyper mist system. Crew did provide PSCO with proof on monthly inspections, however, there were nonspecific written procedures for testing or inspecting the system.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ship Management: **Owners, Operators, or Managers**

*MarShip GmbH & Co. KG MS "Sinus Aestuum"*

*MarShip Bereederungs GmbH & Co. KG*

Charterers

*Waterline Shipping Limited*
Ship Name: **BERNI**
Flag: **Liberia**
IMO Number: **8900529**
Date of Action: **12/10/2018**
Action Taken: **Detention**
Port: **Norfolk, Virginia**
Unit: **Sector Hampton Roads**

**Deficiencies:**

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<tr>
<td>13102</td>
<td>Auxiliary engine</td>
<td>The machinery and its associated piping systems/fittings shall be of a design and construction adequate for the service in which they are intended and shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons onboard. All ship's service generators have excessive oil and fuel leaks, temporary repairs to piping systems, and pooling oil underneath the generators. Additionally, the #2 generator's turbocharger air filter is oil soaked. These items pose a significant fire hazard to the ship and create an undue risk to the crew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13199</td>
<td>Other (machinery)</td>
<td>The machinery and its associated piping systems/fittings shall be of a design and construction adequate for the service in which they are intended and shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons onboard. The ship's fuel oil purifiers were leaking excessively, lagging was soaked, and significant oil was pooling underneath the purifier. These items pose a significant fire hazard to the ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15109</td>
<td>Maintenance of the ship and equipment</td>
<td>The company and the ship shall comply with the requirements of the ISM Code. During the vessel examination, the PSCO observed a systemic lack of maintenance in the engine and steering gear rooms, which constituted clear grounds for the PSCO to expand the exam in accordance USCG NVIC 04-05. While conducting the expanded exam, the PSCO observed a breakdown in the safety management maintenance procedures, specifically paragraph 4.2 which states that the repairs to damaged equipment must be coordinated with the vessel's technical department. The vessel's crew was unable to provide documentation to the PSCO that the vessel's technical department was notified about the damaged equipment. ISM external audit recommended by the PSCO.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: BETTY K VI
Flag: Panama
IMO Number: 8801216
Date of Action: 3/22/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Miami, Florida
Unit: Sector Miami

Deficiencies:

2510 - Safety and environmental policy

Description
Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following nonconformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM Code through their SMS procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that this ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit.

No. 1 - The company should ensure that any non-conformity is reported. Crew was aware of multiple non-conformities existing on board the vessel, but failed to report these non-conformities to the master and/or company. Non-conformities included issues with watertight integrity, firefighting and occupational hazards such as missing gasket on a side shell door below the deck line, inoperable ventilation in the CO2 space, and numerous electrical shock/fire hazards.

No. 2 - The company should establish procedures for the implementation of corrective action, including measures intended to prevent recurrence. The company was made aware of faulty fire detection panel, however no procedure was in place or implemented to ensure corrective action was taken to repair the panel and no reports were made to the Recognized Organization or flag Administration.

0999 - Other (Safety In General)

Description
The arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of other flammable oils shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and person on board. Generator # 3 is leaking fuel oil at a rate of 2 drops per second. Additionally, the crew has rigged a rubber hose from the fuel supply tank located above the generator to the generator's integral tank. Furthermore, the crew has rigged a separate rubber hose from the generator's fuel injection line into the bilge that leaks fuel oil at a rate of 5 drops per second.
### 0999 - Other (Safety In General)

All electrical apparatus shall be so constructed and so installed as not to cause injury when handle or touched in the normal manner. Protective sheathing is torn as it enters the transformer box located near the cargo workshop. A separate transformer box outside of the steering gear room is broken, exposing the internal wiring to the elements. The protective sheathing on the power cord to the grinder located in the steering room is frayed exposing the wires to the elements. Lastly, the hot water pipe in the steering room is leaking condensation onto an electrical outlet located below.

### 0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation

Maintenance, testing and inspections shall be carried out base the guidelines developed by the organization. The CO2 cylinders have not been hydrostatically tested within the last ten (10) years in accordance with MSC.1/Circ.1432. Their last hydro date was February 2008.

### 0999 - Other (Safety In General)

The machinery boilers, and pressure vessels, associated piping systems and fittings shall be of a design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended and shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons on board. There are holes, each one (1) inch in diameter, in the engine room common exhaust trunk which allows exhaust to leak back into the engine space.
Ship Name: BETTY K VII
Flag: Panama
IMO Number: 7724215
Date of Action: 5/17/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Miami, Florida
Unit: Sector Miami

Ship Type: General Dry Cargo Ship
Recognized Org: Isthmus Bureau of Shipping
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention: Sector Miami

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
MMS Americas LLC
Dorick Navigation, S.A.

Charterers
Dependable Cargo Shipping Lines, LLC

Deficiencies: Code - Category
0620 - Inflatable liferafts

Description
The liferaft shall be stowed as to be readily available in case of emergency. The painter line on the port and starboard liferafts are connected to the ship vice the vice the weak link of the hydrostatic release rendering the automatic release of the liferaft unattainable. This is known deficiency on this vessel as it was previously issued and cleared on Nov 2016.
Ship Name: **BRUSSELS**  
Flag: **Portugal**  
IMO Number: **9200691**  
Date of Action: **5/17/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **Houston, Texas**  
Unit: **Sector Houston-Galveston**  

**Deficiencies:**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0510 - Ventilation Heating work. spaces</td>
<td>Machinery spaces of category A shall be adequately ventilated so as to ensure an adequate supply of air is maintained to the spaces for the safety and comfort of personnel and the operation of the machinery. 02 out of 04 required machinery space ventilation fans were inoperable. PSCOs observed multiple electrical cabinets propped open due to excessive heat as stated by vessel’s crew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0630 - Launch arrangements for survival craft</td>
<td>Before the ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all life saving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. Port and Starboard lifeboats internal release mechanism have been disconnected from the deadman release brake rendering the lifeboats unable to be lowered by the crew from within the lifeboats during emergency and abandon ship (shipboard procedures are to lower from within the lifeboat).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0628 - Stowage of liferafts</td>
<td>Every liferaft shall be stowed with a painter permanently attached to the ship. Both portside liferafts did not have painter line attached to the weak link rendering the liferaft not read for immediate use.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ship Management:** **Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
NSB Niaderelbe Schifffahrts GmbH & Co  
Beteiligungs-Kommanditgesellschaft MS  
Charterers  
Hapag Lloyd
The company should ensure that ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations. In meeting these requirements, the company should ensure that any non-conformity is reported and appropriate corrective action is taken.

Lifeboat servicing company attended vessel on 19 Apr 2018 and in report state "During the inspection of the davits was found that the long links on port and starboard side are in bad condition. Need to be replaced as soon as possible. There is one fall preventer device on boat N2 that is not original. Need to be replaced for one original...until long links are renewed, we cannot perform any test" (i.e., servicing technician was not willing to lower lifeboats due to safety concerns). Vessel sailed for 28 days and made four additional port calls without any corrective action taken for substandard lifeboat condition.

Chief Mate completed weekly visual inspection of both liferafts on 15 May 2018 (work order #79-2945 in shipment PMS system). Deficiency #3 (painter line not attached to week link) provides objective evidence that weekly visual inspection failed to identify this non-conformity / take appropriate corrective action.
Ship Name: BW TYR
Flag: Marshall Islands
IMO Number: 9346122
Date of Action: 7/17/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Houston, Texas
Unit: Sector Houston-Galveston

Ship Type: LPG Gas Carrier
Recognized Org: Lloyd's Register of Shipping
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Aurora Shipping II AS
Synergy Maritime Private Limited
Charterers
Vitol Inc

Deficiencies:
0799 - Other (Fire Fighting Equipment)

Description
On ships carrying flammable products a water spray system for cooling, fire prevention, and crew protection should be installed to cover cargo tank domes, cargo liquid lines and vapour manifolds and boundaries of super structures normally manned. The system should be capable of covering all area with a uniformly distributed water spray.

No deck water spray coverage observed on tank dome #1, tank dome #2, tank dome #3, port manifold, or starboard manifold during initial test of deck water spray system as witnessed by PSCOS. Upon second testing of deck water spray system (after four hours of maintenance), the three tank domes and both manifolds still did not have deck water spray coverage.
Ship Name: CARDIFF
Flag: Liberia
IMO Number: 9629457
Date of Action: 10/15/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: San Pedro, California
Unit: Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach

Ship Type: Containership
Recognized Org: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:
Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Zodiac Maritime Limited
Terquin Shipping Inc.
Charterers
Maersk Line

Deficiencies:
Code - Category
07125 - Evaluation of crew performance (fire drills)

Description
A ship when in the port of another Contracting Government is subject to control by officers duly authorized by such Government concerning operational requirements in respect of the safety of ships, when there are clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the safety of ships. Vessel crew failed to perform a satisfactory fire drill after given multiple attempts. On the second attempt at the drill, the crew was not familiar with donning the fireman’s outfit and its associated equipment. Fire team failed to use the rigid helmet and the aluminized fire resistant hood—during the drill, fire team utilized the ‘training’ helmet which left the neck and portion of the face exposed, which did not offer similar protection. Vessel was fitted with radios specifically for the fire team, but the fire team failed to bring the radios. Vessel was equipped with lifelines but they were not utilized. Communication of the fire team and team leader was limited to face to face interaction. One of the fire team members had his SCBA face mask worn improperly-- face mask was overly fastened and worn to high on the face such that the nose cap was partially blocking his vision. One of the fire team members was not aware he had a flashlight attached to his fireman’s outfit and was not able to provide to PSCO when requested—he only recognized his flashlight after removing the his jacket. The crew had previously only conducted drills using the firefighting ‘training’ outfits which are not identical to the actual firefighting outfits. The actual firefighting outfits were observed to be in a new condition and found in original packaging. During the drills, the crew confused equipment from the training and actual ensembles. The actual fireman’s outfits were not donned as designed, entirely or properly. In the event of a real fire, PSCO believes the crew would not be prepared to attack or mitigate a fire in a timely manner due to their unfamiliarity with the actual fireman’s outfit and equipment.
Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM Exam revealed the following non-conformities. These discrepancies, included with the other material deficiencies, are evidence the ship/company is not implementing the requirements of the ISM code through the approved SMS procedures. An external audit is recommended.

The responsibility and authority of the designated person or persons should include monitoring the safety and pollution-prevention aspects of the operation of each ship and ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, as required. The crew reported the excessive engine room leaks to the DPA on September 11. The DPA replied on September 12 that supplies would be delivered at the next port after overhaul of AE1 (est. 6-8 hours). The vessel has since called on four ports over seventeen days and no supplies have been delivered to address the identified hazardous condition in the engine room. Adequate resources and shore-based support are not being applied, as required.

The company should ensure that the master is: fully conversant with the company's safety management system. The SMS requires that the master report safety/environmental/security issues via various emails. The master did not use the email address and instead attempted to address the issue via the electronic NP5 program onboard, which is an internal messaging system usually used for "work orders, standard jobs, parts or items, equipment and so forth." The company may have not recognized the urgency of the request because an improper medium was used to convey it.

The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel. The crew member assigned the responsibility of checking lifeboat provisions marked the relevant monthly checklist for three months that all provisions were accounted for. However, during the examination of the lifeboat (certified for thirty-two persons) was
found with fourteen food rations damaged by water, and only eighteen of the food ration were viable with nineteen crew members onboard.

The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. The current condition of the engine room is indicative a lack of preventive maintenance to ensure a safe working environment.
Ship Name: **CORAL EMERALD**  
Flag: **Panama**  
IMO Number: **9316892**  
Date of Action: **2/16/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **Seattle, Washington**  
Unit: **Sector Puget Sound**

**Deficiencies:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0630 - Launch arrangements for survival craft</td>
<td>All survival craft required to provide for abandonment by the total number of persons on board shall be capable of being launched with their full complement of persons and equipment within a period of 10 minutes. Port side lifeboat davit mechanically inoperable during multiple launching attempts. Crew was not able to launch portside lifeboat within 10 minutes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0628 - Stowage of liferafts</td>
<td>Each liferaft shall be stowed with a float-free arrangement complying with the requirement of the code so that each floats free and, if inflatable, inflated automatically when the ship sinks. Port liferaft secured to ship directly without weak link. Starboard liferaft painter not attached to ship by any means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation</td>
<td>Firefighting systems and appliances shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. PSCO observed seawater isolation valve for the fixed foam system in the closed position. Fixed fire suppression system could not be energized from a remote location as designed. In addition, PSCO observed the fixed water based extinguishing system in manual mode; vessel is approved for periodically unattended machinery space.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ship Management:**  
**Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
Far East Transport Co, Ltd  
Biko Kisen Co. Ltd  
Picer Marine SA  
**Charterers**  
DS Norden A/S
Deficiencies:  

**Code - Category**  

### 2500 - ISM related deficiencies

Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirement of the ISM Code through their Safety Management System (SMS) procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that the vessel and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit.

The company should establish procedures, plans and instruction including checklist as appropriate for key shipboard operations concerning safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various task should be define and assigned to qualified personnel. The vessel's SMS does not contain any checklists or procedure for testing the Inert Gas system alarm and shutdowns. Furthermore, when conducting a test of the high temperature alarm for the Inert Gas system, the crew created an unsafe condition by completely pulling off the sensor and introducing flue gas into the engineering space.

The company should ensure that the master is fully conversant with the company's safety management system. Per the company's SMS, the vessel crew is required to inspect emergency two-way lifeboat radios weekly. The radio batteries have been expired since April, 2017 and the vessel's crew was not familiar with proper testing procedures. Additionally, the vessel SMS specifically states to verify that the batteries for the radios are not expired.

### 0673 - 2way radiotelegraph app for surv craft

At least 3 two-way VHF radiotelephone apparatus shall be provided on every cargo ship of 500 gross tonnage and upwards. Such apparatus shall conform to the performance standard not inferior to those adopted by the organization. Equipment for which the source of energy is intended to be user replaceable should be provided with a dedicated primary battery for use in the event of a distress situation. All 3 of the required two-way VHF radios had expired batteries, thus requiring the three primary batteries, used for distress situations, to instead be used for weekly testing. Crew did not test two-way radios on a weekly basis as required by vessel's SMS. Crew unable to demonstrate proper testing procedure.
Ship Name: DA MING SHAN
Flag: Hong Kong
IMO Number: 9779745
Date of Action: 2/27/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Baltimore, Maryland
Unit: Sector Maryland-NCR

Ship Type: Oil Tankship
Recognized Org: BureauVeritas
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:

Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation</td>
<td>Firefighting and appliances shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. PSCO discovered oil residue around the valve on the foam tank and the level indicator was missing. Oil residue was present on and around the foam tank through crew admission it was discovered that during bunkering operations the oil was transferred to the foam tank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation</td>
<td>Cargo pump room shall be provided with a system suitable for machinery spaces of category &quot;A&quot;. PSCO discovered the CO2 system was not ready for immediate use as designed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0715 - Detection</td>
<td>Fire detection shall be kept in good order so as to ensure their required performance if a fire occurs. PSCO. Observed fire detection missing from the paint locker. Through crew admission, it was discovered that a smoke detector was moved from the paint locker to the pump room prior to inspection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Charterers
Matcon Marine S.A.
Owners, Operators, or Managers
Tianjin Southwest Maritime Limited
Fortune Tianhe Shipping Limited
Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15101 - Safety and environment policy</td>
<td>Objective evidence discovered during an expended ISM exam revealed the following non conformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirement of the ISM Code through their SMS procedure as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that the ship and or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit. No. 1- The company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations. The Safety Management System should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of such equipment or systems. During routine engine room maintenance fire main valve which supplies water to superstructure hydrants was secured. Rest of crew was not informed of non-availability of firefighting water during this time. Performance of maintenance and securing of valve prevents ‘technical preparedness of ship for possible emergency situations, effective damage control and rendering assistance to people and ships in distress at sea’ as per vessel SMS procedure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07110 - Fire fighting equipment and appliances</td>
<td>Fire extinguishing appliances shall be keep in good order and be available for immediate use. During testing of main and emergency fire pumps, second officer was unable to utilize fire hose hydrants in the superstructure due to closed valves. Ship’s crew was unable to identify and rectify cause for an hour.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Ship Name:** DIAMOND LAND  
**Flag:** Malta  
**IMO Number:** 9262560  
**Date of Action:** 4/11/2018  
**Action Taken:** Detention  
**Port:** Houston, Texas  
**Unit:** Sector Houston-Galveston

**Deficiencies:**

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1420 - Cleanliness of engine room</td>
<td>In a ship in which oil is used. The arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. PSCOs discovered numerous areas in the engine room where fuel oil was allowed to pool. Oil soaked rags were left prominently throughout the engine room. The most notable locations were the main engine in the vicinity of the fuel pumps, between the crankcase and turbo charger of the main diesel engine, shaft-alley and under ship service diesel generators; creating a potential fire hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0910 - Closing devices watertight doors</td>
<td>Structural fire protection, including fire resisting divisions, protection of openings and penetrations in these divisions shall be kept in good order so as to ensure their required performance if a fire occurs. PSCO observed many A-class boundary doors for the main stairway, engine control room, and galley did not self-close due to faulty door latches, hinges, hold-backs, to include wasted and missing door seals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ship Management:** Owners, Operators, or Managers  
Fjord Schifffahrtsgesellschaft mbH  
Vineta Bereederungsgesellschaft MbH  
Charterers  
MACS Maritime Carrier Shipping PTE LTD
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02105 - Steering gear</td>
<td>The main steering gear and rudder stock shall be: capable of putting the rudder over from 35 degrees on one side to 35 degrees on the other side with the ship at its deepest seagoing draught and running ahead at the maximum ahead service speed and, under the same conditions, from 35 degrees on either side to 30 degrees on the other side in not more than 28 seconds. During operational test, #2 Emergency Steering gear could not achieve 35 to 35 degrees operation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: **DORIC SPIRIT**  
Flag: **Greece**  
IMO Number: **9230763**  
Date of Action: **11/11/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **Baltimore, Maryland**  
Unit: **Sector Maryland-NCR**

**Deficiencies:**

- **0630 - Launch arrangements for survival craft**  
The launching mechanism shall be so arranged that it may be activated by one person from a position within the survival craft. The launching mechanism within the port side lifeboat failed.

- **0696 - Record of inspections/maintenance**  
Lifeboats on cargo ships shall be moved from their stowed position to demonstrate satisfactory operation of launching appliances weekly. Ship is not moving lifeboats from their stowed position weekly due to lack of procedures in the SMS.

**Ship Management:**

- ** Owners, Operators, or Managers**
  Ocean Spirit Navigation Inc  
  Chios Navigation (Hellas) Ltd

- **Charterers**
  ED&F Man Shipping Ltd

**Recognized Org:** **Lloyd's Register of Shipping**

**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):**

**Recognized Org (RO) Related:** **Not Class Relat**

**Organization Related to Detention:**

**Ship Type:** **Bulk Carrier**
Ship Name: DORIS T  
Flag: Tanzania  
IMO Number: 7626748  
Date of Action: 11/10/2018  
Action Taken: Detention  
Port: Miami, Florida  
Unit: Sector Miami

Deficiencies:  
2500 - ISM related deficiencies

Description: Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following nonconformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM Code through their SMS procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indication that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit.

No. 1 - The company should ensure that the master is fully conversant with the company's safety management system. Vessel's starboard side lifeboat davit is inoperable, Master stated the starboard davit is not required and has been inoperable for at least 30 days. Ships documents and procedures require starboard lifeboat to be operational. No report has been made from the vessel to the company or flag.

No. 2 - The company should establish procedures to ensure that the personnel and personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties. All crew were unfamiliar with firefighting equipment, procedures, and were unable to perform a satisfactory fire drill. 04 crew were unable to properly don SCBA equipment.

No. 3 - The company should ensure that all personnel involved in the company's safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines. Paper charts used for inbound transit on current voyage are not up to date.

No. 4 - The company should ensure that all personnel involved in the company's safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines. Last entry in the garbage record book is 29 September 2018. Master of the vessel confirmed to the PSCO that the book was not being updated.

No. 5 - The company should ensure that all personnel involved in the company's safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines. Last entry is the GMDSS log book is 28 Aug 208. Master or Mate of the
vessel could not confirm that GMDSS check or logs have been completed or recorded.
Ship Name: **DUKE OF TOPSAIL**

Flag: **St.Kitts & Nevis**

IMO Number: **7206770**

Date of Action: **11/26/2018**

Action Taken: **Detention**

Port: **West Palm Beach, Florida**

Unit: **MSD LAKE WORTH (AKA. WEST**

Deficiencies: **Code - Category**

01214 - Endorsement by flagstate

Description: All seafarers serving on board who are required to be certificated in accordance with the Convention hold an appropriate certificate or a valid dispensation, or provide documentary proof that an application for endorsement has been submitted to the administration in accordance with regulation I/10, paragraph 5. Chief Officer with a Panamanian certificate reported to the vessel on 03NOV18 without a St. Kitts and Nevis flag state endorsement, and sailed for a period of 24 days without readily available documentary proof that an application for an endorsement had been submitted to the administration. A copy of an application dated 15NOV18 was provided by the Chief Officer, but no physical or electronic evidence was provided attesting that the administration received and was in the process of reviewing the application. The lack of flag state endorsement or readily available documentary proof that an application for an endorsement has been submitted voids compliance with meeting the minimum safe manning requirements of the administration.

Ship Type: **Ro-Ro-Cargo Ship**

Recognized Org: **International Naval Surveys Bureau**

Recognized Security Organization (RSO): **Not Class Relat**

Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: **Owners, Operators, or Managers**

United Abaco Shipping Co.
Ship Name: ELEKTRA
Flag: Bahamas
IMO Number: 9538153
Date of Action: 12/11/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: New Orleans, Louisiana
Unit: Sector New Orleans
Ship Type: Chemical Tankship
Recognized Org: DNV GL MARITIME
Recognized Security Organization (RSO):
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:
Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Pelican Seacarriers Limited
Super-Eco Tankers Management Inc
Charterers
Petroleo Brazileiro S/A

Deficiencies: Code - Category
07114 - Remote Means of control (opening,pumps,ventila
Description
Oil fuel pipes which if damaged would allow oil to escape from a storage, settling or daily service tank having a capacity of 50 liters and above situated above the double bottom, shall be fitted with a cock or valve directly on the tank capable of being closed from a safe position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in the space in which such tanks are situated. PSCO observed blocking devices in the remote quick closing valves on the fuel oil service tank and diesel oil service tanks. Record indicted last recorded testing of quick-closing valves was November 20, 2018. Furthermore, company issued Live message No.23 addressing testing and the importance of ensuring quick-closing valves are not blocked.
Deficiencies: Code - Category
15102 - Company responsibility and authority

Description
Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM code through their SMS procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements.
Recommend external audit.

No. 1 - The company should establish procedures, plans, and instructions including checklists as appropriate for key shipboard operations concerning safety of the personnel, ship, and protection of the environment. Ship could not demonstrate knowledge of properly logging offloads of oily water or bunkering procedures resulting in discrepancies between the garbage log, oil record book and fuel receipts.

No. 2 - The safety management system should include procedures for ensuring that non-conformities, accidents, and hazardous situations are reported to the company. Master failed to report the collisions resulting in damage to starboard side bulwark and forward railings.

No. 3 - The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations. Crew failed to maintain vessel to the standards provided in the safety management system and applicable conventions. Evidence of a lack of maintenance was evident in excessive frame waste and deck warpage.

No. 4 - The safety management system should provide for measures ensuring that the company's organization can respond at any time to hazards, accidents and emergency situations involving its ships. PSCO had discussions with Master to conduct fire and abandon ship drills. Master did not have confidence in crew's ability to respond in a timely and appropriate matter to emergencies on board. All crew members have been on board for more than a month and have conducted drills previously on board this vessel.

No. 5 - the company should ensure that each ship is
appropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations on board. Despite drills being logged, vessel's crew was unaware of the duties during fire and abandon ship drill.

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02117 - Decks - corrosion</td>
<td>Satisfactory means shall be provided for the protection of the crew in getting to and from their quarters, the machinery space, and all other parts used in the necessary work of the ship. Port side deck leading from accommodations to bow is severely warped making transit on deck hazardous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02110 - Beams, frames, floors-op.damage</td>
<td>The Administration shall satisfy itself that the general structural strength of the hull is sufficient for the draught corresponding to the freeboard assignment. Transverse frames on port and starboard side of the cargo hold are wasted to such a degree that there is visible separation of the frames from the ship's hull and tank top.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02110 - Beams, frames, floors-op.damage</td>
<td>Efficient guard rails or bulwarks shall be fitted to all exposed parts of the freeboard and superstructure decks. Railing mid-ship port side damaged during a collision. The railing is held together with a cargo strap. Forward, starboard side bulwark is substantially deformed from its original condition due to another, separate collision with the River Spirit in Haiti in April 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14604 - Bunker delivery notes</td>
<td>The bunker delivery notes shall be accompanied by a representative sample of the fuel oil delivered taking into account guidelines developed by the organization. The most recent fuel sample available onboard is from 2016. A sample retained on board in 2017 was used by the crew to clean their hands and is no longer available for inspection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14604 - Bunker delivery notes</td>
<td>The bunker delivery note shall be kept onboard the ship in such a place as to be readily available for inspection at all reasonable times. It shall be retained for a period of three years after the fuel oil has been delivered onboard. Chief Engineer could not produce any bunker delivery notes for any of the last several fuel deliveries. Vessel has no evidence of or information concerning Sulphur content of fuel used onboard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01106 - Document of Compliance (DoC/ ISM)</td>
<td>A copy of the Document of Compliance shall be kept onboard the ship in order that the master can produce it on request for verification. ISM-DOC onboard consisted of a copy of the certificate's first page only. PSCOs could not verify whether required annual verifications had been carried out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01104 - Cargo Ship Safety Radio (including exemption)</td>
<td>In the circumstances where a certificate has ceased to be valid, PSCO shall ensure the ship shall not sail. Vessel does not have the appropriate endorsements for required Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate and is therefore invalid.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Every ship shall be provided with a VHF radio installation capable of transmitting and receiving. Vessel did not have a properly functioning VHF radio onboard capable of transmitting and receiving.

Every ship engaged on voyages beyond sea areas A1 and A2, but remaining in sea area A3 shall be provided with an Inmarsat ship earth station capable of initiating and receiving distress priority calls. Ship's Inmarsat stations were not operational.

Every candidate for certification of competency under this regulation for service on a ship which is required by International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, to have a radio installation, shall have completed approved education and training and meet the standard of competence specified in Section A-IV/2 of the STCW Code. GMDSS operators, required to be familiar with NAVTEX onboard the vessel failed to show evidence of satisfactory training by failing to complete functionality/practical test of NAVTEX system in the presence of PSCO.

Seafarers shall receive safety familiarization and basic training or instruction in accordance with Section A-VI/1 of the STCW Code and shall meet the appropriate standard of competence specified therein. Abs Frederic and Pierre could not produce valid proof that they have received the required minimum safety standard basic training.

Such inspection shall be limited to the purpose of verifying that the ship is provided with a valid International Tonnage Certificate. Master presented PSC team with an ITC certificate issued by Tanzania that had no second page as required by the convention. The second page that was presented to the team was from a different document issued under the authority of the Republic of Bolivia.
Ship Name: **FEGULUS**  
Flag: **Barbados**  
IMO Number: **9055709**  
Date of Action: **10/25/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **Wilmington, North Carolina**  
Unit: **Sector North Carolina**

**Deficiencies:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01101 - Cargo ship safety equipment (including exempti</td>
<td>Before the ship leaves port and all all times during the voyage, all lifesaving appliance shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. The starboard lifeboat, also the rescue boat failed to start.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04102 - Emergency fire pump and its pipes</td>
<td>The fixed independently driven emergency pump, which stat be capable of supply. Two jets of water to the satisfaction of the administrations. The emergency fire pump was unable to obtain pressure and could not supply water to hoses on deck.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ship Type:** Refrigerated Cargo Carrier  
**Recognized Org:** Nippon Kaiji Kyokai  
**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):** Not Class Relat  
**Ship Management:** Owners, Operators, or Managers  
Seatrade Groningen BV  
Fegulus Shipping Ltd  
Charterers  
Seatrade Reefer Chartering NV
Deficiencies: **Code - Category**

0635 - Launch arrangements for rescue boats

**Description**

Every rescue boat launching appliance shall be fitted with a power winch motor of such capacity that the rescue boat can be raised from the water with its full complement of persons and equipment. While testing the port side rescue boat launching appliance, the winch motor was discovered to be inoperable, rendering recovery capabilities substandard and insufficient for effective rescue of persons.
Deficiencies:  

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2510 - Safety and environmental policy</td>
<td>Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities. These discrepancies, included with other material deficiencies, are evidence that the ship and/or crew are not meeting the requirements of the ISM code. Recommend an external audit. The company should establish and maintain procedures to ensure that any non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known. Crew verbally reported to the Chief Officer in mid-November 2017 that oil was observed on the sounding tape when sounding 9P ballast water tank. The Master and company stated they never received report of condition from the Chief Officer, as required per safety management system reported procedure and therefore non documented non-conformity was report to the company. The company should ensure that the safety and environmental protection policy is implemented and maintained at all levels of the organization, both ship based and shore-based. Ship is to document ballasting and deballasting operations in the ballast after handling log, as per the vessel's safety management system and ballast water management plan. Between 16 December 2017 and 17 December 2017, the sounding log indicated a tank level change from &quot;10m&quot; to &quot;nil&quot; in the 9S and 9P ballast water tanks. No record of the deballasting operation was documented in the ballast water handling log in accordance with the safety management system and ballast management system. The company should establish a safety and environmental protection policy which describes how the objectives given in paragraph 1.2 will be achieved. The oil record book entries are not being completed on each occasion whenever machinery space operation take place. The ship safety management system only addresses entries limited to those necessary to show the accumulation, proper processing, and appropriate final discharge/disposal of oily waste and sludge produced on board. The collection of oil residue and sludge are not being logged on each occasion as required by MARPOL.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ship Name: **FORTUNATO**  
Flag: **Panama**  
IMO Number: **9347736**  
Date of Action: **1/13/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **San Juan, Puerto Rico**  
Unit: **Sector San Juan**  
Ship Type: **LPG Gas Carrier**  
Recognized Org: **Nippon Kaiji Kyokai**  
Recognized Security Organization (RSO):  
Recognized Org (RO) Related: **Not Class Relat**  
Organization Related to Detention:  
Ship Management: **Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
Fleet Management Ltd.  
Yassan S.A.. Shipping & Fuji Iron Works Co., Ltd  
Charterers  
Geogas Maritime SAS
Ship Name: **FOUR NABUCCO**
Ship Type: **Bulk Carrier**

Flag: **Malta**
Recognized Org: **American Bureau of Shipping**

IMO Number: **9450650**
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): **Not Class Relat**

Date of Action: **3/12/2018**
Organization Related to Detention:

Action Taken: **Detention**

Port: **Portland, Oregon**

Unit: **Sector Columbia River**

Ship Management: **Owners, Operators, or Managers**
  **Premuda SPA**
  **Charterers**
  **Cargill Ocean Transportation**

Deficiencies:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0615 - Rescue boats</td>
<td>Rescue boat shall be stowed in a state of continuous readiness for launching in not more than 5 minutes. Rescue boat is unable to start.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Ship Name:** FPMC 24  
**Flag:** Liberia  
**IMO Number:** 9418573  
**Date of Action:** 2/22/2018  
**Action Taken:** Detention  
**Port:** Pasadena, Texas  
**Unit:** Sector Houston-Galveston  

**Deficiencies:**  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1135 - Dangerous liquid chemicals in bulk</td>
<td>An international Certificate of Fitness (COF) for the carriage of dangerous chemical in bulk shall be issued to a chemical tanker engaged in international voyages. The Certificate shall be drawn up in the form corresponding to the model given in the appendix. Vessel is currently loaded with 2,525 m³ of acetone, a chapter 18 cargo, in cargo tank 1P. Acetone is not listed on the vessel's COF or COF addendum (Vessel does not have separate IPPC-NLS for chapter 18 cargos). This constitutes transport of a substance not authorized/mentioned in the vessel's COF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1135 - Dangerous liquid chemicals in bulk</td>
<td>The quantity of cargo required to be carried in a type II ship shall not exceed 3,000 m³ in any one tank. Vessel currently has 3,180 m³ of 1,3 Cyclopentadiene dimer (molten) in tank #6P. 1,3 Cyclopentadiene dimer (molten) must be carried on a ship type II per column &quot;e&quot; of chapter 17 of the IBC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850 - Fire protection cargo deck area</td>
<td>For tankers of &gt; 20,000 DWT, the protection of cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed inert gas system IAW the requirement of the FSS Code. The system shall be operated as to render and maintain the atmosphere of the cargo tanks non-flammable at all times, except when such tanks are gas free. Vessel is 49,999 DWT. #1 thru #6 port and starboard cargo tanks are &gt;3,000m³ in size so exemption from IG requirement in SOLAS II-2/4.5.5.2.2 does not apply. Vessel is currently loaded with acetone (1P) and benzene (2P, 2S, 3P, 3S, 4P, 4S, %P, 5S 6S). Both cargoes have a flashpoint &lt;60 C (Acetone -9.4 C, Benzene -11 C). Crew stated that tanks were not inerted prior to loading. PSCOs witnessed measuring of O2 content in tanks and found multiple tanks in the flammable range (tanks 4P, 3P, 2P, and 2S at 15.3%, 15.3%, 15.5%, 15.0%, and 16.6% respectively).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklist as appropriate, for key shipboard operations.

The established company procedures were not being followed by vessel crew as observed by the following: SMS CHP-001-7/42 Section 1.8.5 (g) states that "for tanks in excess of 3,000m3 and cargo with a flashpoint of 60 C, tanks must be inerted before loading". This procedure is also incorporated in checklist CHP-FM03, item #25.

Vessel is currently loaded with acetone (a cargo not listed on the vessel's COF is cargo take 1P, flashing -(.4 c) and benzene (2P, 3P, 3S, 3S, 4P, 4S, 5P, 5S, 6S; flashing 111 c). All aforementioned tanks are >3,000m3 in size. Tanks were not inerted prior to loading and during exam PSCOs found multiple tanks to have O2 content of >15% by volume. Based on the seriousness of deficiencies #1 thru #4, an external ISM audit is recommended.
Deficiencies:  
0925 - Musters and drills

Description
Fire drills should be planned in such a way that due consideration is given to regular practice. The muster list shall show the duties assigned to the different members of the crew. The crew failed the first fire drill. They could not access the space, did not setup boundaries, and did not check adjacent space for personnel. There were people in the area of drill working and unaware of the drill. The PSCO witnessed no first responder (firefighting/investigation team) action. Additionally, the crew failed the second fire drill. The first responder checked the affected space, but did not check adjacent spaces. The firefighting team while on air (SCBA), checked each space as opposed to going to the affected space and fighting the fire. It took the crew approximately three hours to prepare and perform satisfactorily for a third fire drill due to the results of the previous drills. Staff Captain acknowledged and concurred with the PSCO’s observation with regards to the crew lack of familiarization in reference to the vessel’s firefighting procedures.
Ship Name: **FWN PAULA**  
Flag: **Antigua and Barbuda**  
IMO Number: **9258222**  
Date of Action: **6/22/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **Texas City, Texas**  
Unit: **MSU Texas City**  

**Deficiencies:**  
0220 - Certificates of competency  

**Description:**  
Each administration shall, for the purpose of preventing fatigue require that watch systems are so arranged that the efficiency of all watchkeeping personnel is not impaired by fatigue and that duties are so organized that the first watch at the commencement of a voyage and subsequent relieving watches are sufficiently rested and otherwise fit for duty. Vessel is operation with an attended machinery space and only two officers in charge of an engineering watch. Previous Recognized Organization classification for periodically unattended machinery spaces was removed upon failure of vessel' watch call/alarm system. The posted schedule has each officer in charge of an engineering watch standing 12 hours of duty a day both in port and at sea. Total work hours for a 7 day period is 84 hours. Vessel cannot provide records of daily hours of rest for seafarers to PSC Officers.
**Ship Name:** GALINI  
**Flag:** Greece  
**IMO Number:** 9311517  
**Date of Action:** 10/4/2018  
**Action Taken:** Detention  
**Port:** San Francisco, California  
**Unit:** Sector San Francisco  

**Ship Type:** Bulk Carrier  
**Recognized Org:** Lloyd's Register of Shipping

### Recognized Security Organization (RSO):
- **Recognized Org (RO) Related:** Not Class Relat

### Organization Related to Detention:

**Ship Management:** Owners, Operators, or Managers  
- Adelfia Navigation Trust Company Complex  
- Blissful Shipping S.A.  

**Charterers:** Western Bulk Pte Ltd.

### Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11129 - Operational readiness of</td>
<td>An immersion suit, complying with the requirement of section 2.3 of the Code or an anti-exposure suit complying with section 2.4 of the Code, of an appropriate size, shall be provided for every person on board. Vessel's fitter is not provided with an immersion suit that fits. Crew member has been on board since July. Vessel's route requires all crew to be provided with immersion suites. No corrective action have been taken in accordance with requirements by SOLAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lifesaving appliances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11129 - Operational readiness of</td>
<td>Before the ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all life-saving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. Each survival craft shall be stowed: in a state of continuous readiness. Vessel's forward life raft was found stowed in forward Bosun's store, not in the assigned location the bow. As per statement made by multiple crew members, life raft was removed due to heavy weather approximately one week before PSC exam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lifesaving appliances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A ship when in a port or an offshore terminal of another party is subject to inspection by officers duly authorized by such party concerning operational requirement under this annex, where either are clear grounds for believing that the Master or crew are not familiar essential shipboard procedures relating to the prevention of pollution by garbage. The entry for each discharge into the sea under Regulation 4, 5, and 6 or section 5.2 of Chapter 5 of Part II-A of the Polar Code shall include date and time, position of the ship (latitude and longitude), category of the garbage, and the estimated amount (in cubic meters) discharge. For discharge of cargo residues, the discharge start and stop positions shall be recorded in addition to the foregoing. Master and Chief Mate state that crew members had discharged cargo hold residues and cargo hold cleaning chemicals without recording the discharge in Part II or Part I of Garbage Record Book, as required by vessel's Garbage Management Plan. In addition, crew is unfamiliar with ship's Garbage Management Plan and reporting requirements.
Ship Name: GAS LEO
Flag: Hong Kong
IMO Number: 9735282
Date of Action: 4/17/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Houston, Texas
Unit: Sector Houston-Galveston

Ship Type: LPG Gas Carrier
Recognized Org: Lloyd's Register of Shipping
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat

Deficiencies:

1138 - Liquefied gases in bulk
Code - Category Description
Electrical installations should be such as to minimize the risk of fire and explosion from flammable products. While conducting a deck walk, PSCOs discovered the electrical power cable going into the alarm outside the airlock is missing the proper approved fitting. The area where the cable goes into the alarm fixture has been filled with silicone.

1138 - Liquefied gases in bulk
Where electrical equipment is installed in gas-dangerous spaces or zones, it should be to the satisfaction of the Administration and approved by the relevant authorities recognized by the administration for operation in the flammable atmosphere concerned. While conducting the deck walk, PSCOs observed salt and/or standing water in almost every light fixture on deck. These lights include all tank domes and all lights around the compressor room. PSCOs also noted that silicone had been added to all light fixtures on deck. Standing water/salt provides objective evidence that the integrity of the enclosure has been compromised.

1138 - Liquefied gases in bulk
A permanently installed system of gas detection with audible and visual alarm should be provided for enclosed spaces in the cargo area where vapor may accumulate including hold spaces. Vessel could not demonstrate satisfactory operation of the fixed gas detection sample system for the cargo hold spaces. The crew used a span gas containing 50% LEL butane, but could not produce a reading on the fixed sample system for the hold spaces. The LEL reading on the fixed gas detection system for the hold spaces never went above 0% LEL.

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Sinogas Management PTE LTD
Fortuen Ricardo Shipping Limited
The safety management system should ensure compliance with mandatory rules and regulation and that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommend by the organization, administrations, classification societies and maritime industry organization are taken into account.

PSCOs discovered objective evidence that the vessel has failed to fully implement the safety management system. PSCOs reviewed the ship/shore safety checklist dated 16 Apr 2018 (Document #D-04) and monthly report of fixed gas analyzer maintenance and calibration record (Document #CCR-03). Both documents state that the fixed gas detection system had been tested satisfactory on 16 Apr 2018 and 13 Apr 2018 respectively. The crew could not prove proper operation of the system during PSC exam. PSCOs reviewed the critical equipment checklist/record for LPG/Ethylene carriers (Document #S-40.1). The crew stated the last monthly check of the deck lighting (Item #42) was 29 Mar 2018 without issue. PSCOs found salt and/or water in almost every deck light.
Ship Name: GELBRAY EXPRESS
Ship Type: General Dry Cargo Ship
Flag: Singapore
IMN Number: 9621211
Date of Action: 10/15/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Unit: Sector Delaware Bay
Recognized Org: RINA Services S.p.A.
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat

Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14104 - Oil filtering equipment</td>
<td>Any ship of 10,000 gross tonnage and above shall be fitted with oil filtering equipment complying with paragraph 7 of this regulation. The electronic actuator for the OWS supply valve was broken causing the OWS system to be non-operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15109 - Maintenance of the ship and equipment</td>
<td>The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in accordance with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. In meeting these requirements, the company should ensure that: any non-conformity is reported, with its possible causes, if known; and ensure appropriate corrective action is taken. The number 2 steering pump was unable to move the rudder more than 15 degrees to starboard under bridge control and the reserve hydraulic oil tank did not contain sufficient oil to recharge the steering system. The thermal fluid heater was observed warped due to excessive heat and diesel fuel was leaking onto the hot surface. Blanks were fitted into the potable water head tank piping, rendering the relief valves nonfunctional which created a risk of over pressurization and possible rupture. The emergency generator fuel tank contained insufficient fuel and the fuel cutoff valve was found in the closed position rendering it unable to function in an emergency. Operational-related deficiencies collectively provide objective evidence of a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of the implementation of the ISM Code. An External audit is recommended to be conducted within 30 days by the flag state or RO to determine whether the ship is operating in accordance with the ISM Code.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Livestock Carrier 5 Pte. Limited
Livestock Express
Charterers
Baladna
Ship Name: GENIUS STAR XII

Flag: Panama

IMO Number: 9644744

Date of Action: 11/14/2018

Action Taken: Detention

Port: Portland, Oregon

Unit: Sector Columbia River

Ship Type: Bulk Carrier

Recognized Org: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai

Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat

Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat

Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Wisdom Marine International Inc
GS Global S.A.

Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1030 - Steering gear alarm</td>
<td>All the steering gear components and the rudder stock shall be of sound and reliable construction to the satisfaction of the administration. When in local control, during test of vessel' emergency steering system, steering gear pumps #1 and #2 experienced solenoid valve failure alarms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500 - ISM related deficiencies</td>
<td>A ship when in port of another Contracting Government is subject to control by officers duly authorized by such Government concerning operational requirements in respect of the safety of ships, when there are clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the safety of the ship. Objective evidence during an expanded ISM exam revealed that solenoid valve alarms for steering gear pumps #1 and #2 were treated as nuisance alarms and not promptly addressed or reported by the crew as per the operation manual in concurrence with ships safety management procedures. Recommend audit of ships safety management system concerning steering gear procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: GEORGIA  

IMO Number: 9221360 

Date of Action: 12/13/2018 

Action Taken: Detention 

Port: Wilmington, North Carolina 

Unit: Sector North Carolina 

Deficiencies: 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07113 - Fire pumps and its pipes</td>
<td>Machinery and associated piping systems and fittings shall be of a design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended. The fire main shows extensive wastage and corrosion along the entire length of the fire main on both sides of the ship. Multiple pinhole leaks are evident as well as several location where water gushes out from pipe while the line is pressured. In addition, it took over 20 minutes for the crew to provide water to the main from the fire pump.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07108 - Ready availability of fire fighting equipment</td>
<td>Fire fighting systems and appliances shall be kept in good working order. Multiple fire extinguishers in engine room and ships spares have gauges indicating low pressure (needle in red) and one EEBD in engine room and one EEBD in ship's spare indication low pressure on the gauge. Flag issued letters granting servicing extension to Jan 2019. However, multiple fire fighting appliances are unserviceable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09109 - Pipes, wires (insulation)</td>
<td>Machinery and associated piping systems shall be of designed and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended. The piping for the main engine air cooler &quot;out&quot; waterline has a soft patch and is leaking in two separate locations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15106 - Shipboard operations</td>
<td>The Safety Management System should ensure compliance with mandatory rules and regulations. PSCO note corrosion, wastage, holing, and soft patches on multiple systems onboard the vessel with overall lack of maintenance on equipment and piping in engine room and on deck. These systems include the fire main on deck, firefighting appliances and systems servicing and operational condition, soft patches and leaks on the cooling water system for the main engine and generators, the fresh water generator, the MSD, and various other pipes throughout the engine room indicating a failure of the SMS across multiple systems as evidenced by deficiencies. An SMS audit is recommended.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: GLOBAL MIRAI
Flag: Panama
IMO Number: 9558256
Date of Action: 11/18/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Portland, Oregon
Unit: Sector Columbia River

Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0936 - Steering gear</td>
<td>The main steering gear and rudder stock shall be capable of putting the rudder over from 35 degrees on one side to 35 degrees on the other side. Steering gear pump #2 is unable to move the rudder to starboard from any position, when operated (tested) from the bridge. The failure occurred in both follow-up and non-follow up mode.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ship Type: Bulk Carrier
Recognized Org: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
Recognized Security Organization (RSO):
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Hachiuma Steamship Co., Ltd.
Global Fortune SA
Deficiencies: 2550 - Maintenance of ship and equipment

Description
Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM examination revealed the vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM code through their Safety Management System (SMS) as evidenced by the observations below and external audit is recommended.

Every company should develop, implement and maintain a safety management system which includes procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations. The crewmembers did not implement the vessel's SMS regarding monthly maintenance (servicing) of portable firefighting equipment and were not familiar with this SMS requirement. PSCO observed a portable fire extinguisher that have been serviced within the last month, others within the last two months and others within the last five months. Logs were produced indicating monthly service was being conducted; however, when asked, the crewmembers were unable to provide maintenance procedures detailing the scope of the monthly examinations (servicing). In addition, crewmembers were unable to show proper operation of rescue boat search light.

Every company should develop, implement and maintain an SMS which includes procedure to prepare for and respond to emergency situations. The crew did not implement and was not familiar with the procedure for enclosed space rescue in accordance with the vessel's SMS.

The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklist as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel. The PSCO observed the Chief Officer enter the freefall lifeboat without the hanging-off pennants (safety equipment) in place. When asked, the Chief Officer was unable to produce safety procedures for entry of free fall lifeboat, not did Chief Officer know if hanging-off pennants were required during lifeboat entry for safety purposes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2035   | **Fire control plan**  
In all ships general arrangement plans (fire control plan) shall be permanently exhibited for the guidance of the ship's officers showing clearly for each deck the control station, the various fire section enclosed by "A" class divisions, the section enclosed by "B" class division together with particulars of the fire detection and fire alarm systems, the sprinkler installation, the fire extinguishing appliance, means of access to different compartments, decks, etc. PSC observed class "A" doors located in the forecastle, steering gear room and galley, indicated as self-closing on the fire control plan, secured open using hold backs and wooden wedges. Additionally, the class "A" fire door located in the forecastle was missing the complete door handle assembly. |
| 0925   | **Musters and drills**  
Crew members with enclosed space entry or rescue responsibilities shall participate in enclosed space entry and rescue drill to be held onboard the ship at least once every two months. The vessel was not conducting enclosed space entry and rescue drills as required. |
| 0999   | **Other (Safety In General)**  
Every ship to which chapter I applies shall carry an appropriate portable atmosphere testing instrument or instruments. At a minimum, these shall be capable of measuring concentration of oxygen, flammable gases or vapors, hydrogen sulfide, and carbon monoxide prior to the entry into enclose spaces. PSCO observed that vessel did not have atmosphere testing instrument capable of measuring oxygen, flammable gases, hydrogen sulfide, and carbon monoxide onboard. |
Ship Name: HAI SOON 61

Flag: Cook Islands

IMO Number: 9276901

Date of Action: 12/7/2018

Action Taken: Detention

Port: Honolulu, Hawaii

Unit: Sector Honolulu

Ship Type: Chemical Tankship

Recognized Org: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai

Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11102 - Lifeboat inventory</td>
<td>Each survival craft shall be stowed: Fully equipped as required by the code. The normal equipment of every lifeboat shall consist of a food ration totaling not less that 10,000 KJ for each person the lifeboat is permitted to accommodate. Vessel did not have food rations for each person the lifeboat is permitted to accommodate. Port and starboard lifeboat is not equipped with any food rations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07114 - Remote Means of control (opening,pumps,ventila</td>
<td>Every oil fuel pipe, which is damaged, would allow oil to escape from a storage shall be fitted with a cock or valve directly on the tank capable of being closed from a safe positon outside of the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in the space in which the tanks are situated. Vessel was found fitted with hold-back device on the quick closing valve form the MGO service tank, which services the ship service generator and boiler.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers

Hai Soon Ship Management PTE, LTD.

Super Shine Development Limited
Ship Name: HAPPY CLIPPER
Flag: Hong Kong
IMO Number: 9218521
Date of Action: 11/2/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Longview, Washington
Unit: Sector Columbia River

Deficiencies: Code - Category
99101 - Other (Safety in general)

Description
A ship when in a port of another contracting government is subject to the control by officers duly authorized by such government concerning operational requirements in respect of the safety of ships, when there are clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the safety of the ships. Vessel's crew failed two fire drills and abandonship drills.

Ship Type: Bulk Carrier
Recognized Org: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
Recognized Security Organization (RSO):
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Grand Seatrade Shipping Company Limited
New Ruler Shipping Company Limited
Deficiencies: Code - Category
1499 - Other (Prop. & Aux. Machinery)

Description
Each generator set arranged to be automatically started shall be equipped with the starting devices approved by the administration with a stored energy capable of least three consecutive starts. A second source of energy shall be provide for additional three starts within 30 minutes unless manual starting can be demonstrated to be effective. The PSCO identified that the crew was not testing the secondary means to start emergency generator and required the crew to conduct a test of the secondary means. The PSCO found that the secondary failed during its test and did not energize. This renders the ship unsafe for the crew and does not conform to prescribed regulations.
Ship Name: **HELLAS POSEIDON**

Flag: **Malta**

IMO Number: **9721140**

Date of Action: **3/14/2018**

Action Taken: **Detention**

Port: **Houston, Texas**

Unit: **Sector Houston-Galveston**

**Deficiencies:**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1138 - Liquefied gases in bulk</td>
<td>A permanently installed system of gas detection with audible and visual alarms shall be provided. Alarms should be activated when the concentration reaches 30% LED (or earlier). Testing and calibration should be carried out at regular intervals. When PSCO requested to test fixed gas detection, crew applied 50% LED propane span gas to test point in panel while in calibration mode (alarm inhibited). System never read higher than 22% LEL. On this ship LEL alarm is set at 20% LEL (with High-High alarm at 30% LEL). When span gas (50% LEL) was applied to sample point inside cabinet in test mode (alarm not inhibited), panel read 22% LEL, which is above 20% alarm set-point, but alarm did not activate. Crew could not demonstrate audible or visual LEL alarm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ship Type:** **LPG Gas Carrier**

**Recognized Org:** **DNV GL MARITIME**

**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):**

**Recognized Org (RO) Related:** **Not Class Relat**

**Organization Related to Detention:**

**Ship Management:** **Owners, Operators, or Managers**

- **Greenwich Shipping S.A.**
- **Consolidated Marine Management Inc.**

**Charterers**

- **Shell International Trading & Shipping Co. Ltd**
The safety management system should ensure compliance with mandatory rules and regulations (ISM 1.2.3.1). The company should establish procedures to ensure the ship is maintained in conformity with the relevant rules and regulations and any additional requirements established by the company.

Vessel's COF authorized 0.275 bar "at sea" and 0.40 bar "in harbor" MARV Setting IAW IGC 4.2.6.4, 8.2.6.2, and 8.2.7.

From review of IAS printout and interview of crew, vessel was using 0.40 bar "in harbor" MARVs while underway from Cristobal anchorage to Houston, TX. Printouts of IAS show that pressure in tanks was between 0.26 - 0.287 Bar on 10-11 Mar 2018. "in harbor" MARV setting shall not be used when underway at sea. Additionally, pressure exceeded 0.275 "at sea" MARV setting.

Shipboard SMS, cargo operation and handling manual, section 2.1.4 states "the cargo tank is designed for a maximum internal pressure to 0.275 bar during sea condition. Consequently, prior to leaving harbor, set point of safety relief valves shall be properly adjusted. Omission of this precaution can jeopardize the safety of the crew and ship." This procedure was not followed as "in harbor" MARV was used while underway.

Shipboard SMS, cargo operations and handling manual, section 1.3 requires monthly calibrations and function check of fixed gas detection using 50% LEL propane span gas. Last two recorded calibrations per shipboard record were 10 Oct 17 and 18 Jan 18. From interviews with crew, function checks have been conducted using cargo rather than span gas. This not permitted by SMS procedure. Based on the seriousness of the deficiencies identified, an external ISM audit is recommended.
**Ship Name:** HONGXIN OCEAN  
**Flag:** Hong Kong  
**IMO Number:** 9660279  
**Date of Action:** 1/21/2018  
**Port:** Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
**Action Taken:** Detention  
**Unit:** Marine Safety Detachment Lewes  

**Deficiencies:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0720 - Fire fighting equipment</td>
<td>Before the ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all lifesaving appliance shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. Upon witnessing crew's testing of ship's rescue boat outboard engine, heavy white smoke was observed billowing from the engine. Additionally, PSCO observed that the engine was not discharging cooling water, as designed from reservoir of raw water supplied to engines' lower unit. PSCO observed engine seize and cease operations. PSCO further observed the ship's crew attempt to start the engine again without success. It is the PSCO's assessment that the ship's rescue boat engine is not operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0663 - Immersion suits</td>
<td>An immersion suit of an appropriate size complying with the requirements of Section 2.3 of the code shall be provided for every person onboard the ship. PSCO observed that the immersion suits on board were severely deficient in their material condition. Specifically, the suits’ watertight seams between the front zipper and the outer/inner layers of thermal protective insulation were delaminated. A total of 35 immersion suits of the entire shipboard complement of 40 immersion suits were found in this condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1410 - Propulsion main engine</td>
<td>Means shall be provided to control leaks of flammable liquids. During examination of ship's machinery, PSCO observed fuel oil leaking from three (3) ship's service diesel generators and the main engine. PSCO observed that the ship's crew had secured rags around the fuel injector housing for cylinders #1, #3, and #5 on the main diesel engine. When questioned about the rags. The ship's crew advised the PSCO that they were attempting to prevent fuel leaks, while absorbing any leakage that did occur.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Parties responsible for fire extinguishing shall be organized. These parties shall have the capability to complete their duties at all times while the ship is in service. Vessel’s crew failed to safely and effectively respond to a simulated fire scenario during a PSCO initiated fire drill. PSCO provided ship’s crew feedback on their performance and provided 30 minutes for the crew to correct errors and conduct training. Upon initiating a second simulated fire scenario, the crew failed to conduct a safe and effective response.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deficiencies</th>
<th>Code - Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2500 - ISM related deficiencies</td>
<td>2500 - ISM related deficiencies</td>
<td>Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM Exam revealed the following nonconformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirements to the ISM Code through their SMS procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirement. Recommend an external audit. 1. The company is responsible for ensuring that adequate resources and shore base support are provided to enable persons to carry out their functions. On 23 July 2018, the vessel sent an e-mail to vessel's superintendent notifying the company of a severe leak in the fire main. Vessel did not receive service for the deficiency in over 20 port calls to Miami COTP Zone over 3.5 month while on dedicated route between Miami and the Bahamas. 2. The safety management system should include procedures ensuring that nonconformities and hazardous situations are reported to the company. The vessel master did not utilize non-conformity form and tracking system established by the company when reporting the leaking fire main in July 2018, instead sending only an e-mail to the vessel's superintendent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0720 - Fire fighting equipment</td>
<td>0720 - Fire fighting equipment</td>
<td>Fire extinguishing systems shall be maintained ready for use. During testing of the starboard side fire pump, PSCO observed excessive leakage from the cracked fire main located on Deck 2 above the starboard side fire pump. Leakage was approx. 20 gallons per minute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0750 - Fire prevention</td>
<td>0750 - Fire prevention</td>
<td>&quot;A&quot; class divisions shall be so constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of smoke and flame. Fire insulation between passenger area and cargo space, which forms &quot;A&quot; class boundary, is rendered ineffective due to water damage from the leaking fire main.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110 - Cargo ship safety equipment</td>
<td>0110 - Cargo ship safety equipment</td>
<td>All cargoes shall be loaded, stowed, and secured throughout the voyage in accordance with the Cargo Securing Manual. Over 50% of the pad-eyes and D-rings on the cargo decks are missing or broken.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: JENNIFER SCHEPERS

Flag: Liberia

IMO Number: 9433157

Date of Action: 12/10/2018

Action Taken: Detention

Port: Staten Island, New York

Unit: Sector New York

Deficiencies:

05102 - Functional requirements

The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. In meeting these requirements, the company should ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken.

The company’s protracted response to requisitions led to a culture of work-arounds in lieu of appropriate corrective measures. Five quick closing fuel valves were circumvented rather than serviced for proper operation. All on deck fire-fighting hose boxes had faulty closures and were lashed shut with rope. Two engine room EEBDs were not properly charged despite the vessel having received detainable deficiencies for engine room EEBDs 12 months ago.

07101 - Fire prevention structural integrity

Oil fill pipes shall be fitted with a device or valve directly on the tank capable of being closed from a safe position outside the space in the event of a fire occurring in the space in which the tanks are situated. Five quick closing valves have been disabled using fabricated devices or bolts.
Ship Name: **KARMA**  
Flag: **Anguilla**  
IMO Number: **399580**  
Date of Action: **4/13/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **St. Thomas, USVI**  
Unit: **MSD ST. THOMAS, USVI**  

**Deficiencies:**  
0220 - Certificates of competency

**Description**  
Verification in accordance with article X(1) that all seafarers serving on board who are required to be certificated in accordance with the Convention hold an appropriate certificate or a valid dispensation, or provide documentary proof that an application for an endorsement has been submitted to the Administration in accordance with regulation I/10, paragraph 5. Master embarked on 27MAR18, he did not have a valid endorsement and has not provided proof that an application for an endorsement has submitted to the Administration.

**Ship Management:**  
Owners, Operators, or Managers  
Karma Shipping Ltd
Ship Name: KONA TRADER
Flag: Marshall Islands
IMO Number: 9374208
Date of Action: 2/9/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Portland, Oregon
Unit: Sector Columbia River

Deficiencies: 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0740 - Pumps</td>
<td>Firefighting systems and appliances shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. The Emergency fire pump is unable to provide adequate water pressure to the ship's fire main. The Chief Engineer indicated that the vessel could not acquire water suction to the emergency fire pump. As a result, the vessel was unable to produce two solid streams of water from the emergency fire pump to the remote outlets on the bow or starboard bridge wing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation</td>
<td>Firefighting systems and appliances shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. The valve on the hypermist system leading to the fresh water tank was found in the closed position. The valve supplying the hypermist system was required to be open at all times, but the crew was operating the vessel with unattended space with the valve in closed position for a period of three days before the PSC exam.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ship Type: Bulk Carrier
Recognized Org: Bureau Veritas
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
 Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Horizon Bulkers S.A.
Nefelia Shipping SA
Charterers
Oldendorff Carriers GMBH & CO. KG
Deficiencies:

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1299</td>
<td>Other (Load Lines)</td>
<td>The administration shall satisfy itself that the general structural strength of the hull is sufficient for the draught to correspond to the freeboard assigned. Significant wastage and penetrations were discovered in the vessel's starboard side ballast tanks. The forepeak tank was found to be leaking into ballast tank #1 starboard side. In addition, when ballast tank #1 was drained, a hole approximately 2 inches by 3 inches in the ship's hull allowed for the passage of sea water into the tank. The last survey in November 2017 found no areas of concern in the affected areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250</td>
<td>Covers (hatchways tarpaulins)</td>
<td>The means for securing and maintaining weather tightness shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration. The arrangement shall ensure that the tightness can be maintained in any sea conditions, and for this purpose tests shall be required at the initial survey and may be required at periodical surveys and at annual inspections or at more frequent intervals. The accordion cargo hatch cover is heavily wasted and has at least 5 holes throughout. Several closing devices used to secure the hatch in the close position are missing or wasted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0299</td>
<td>Other (Crew)</td>
<td>After any survey of the ship under Regulations 7, 8, 9 or 10 has been completed, no change shall be made in the structural arrangements, machinery, equipment and other items covered by the survey, without the sanction of the Administration. The vessel's last survey was in November 2017 with no areas of concerns identified. However, PSCO's found wastage and holes along the steel beams supporting the landing in the ladder wells into the cargo hold.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deficiencies:  

**Code - Category**  

15109 - Maintenance of the ship and equipment

**Description**  

Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities. These discrepancies included with the other material deficiencies are evidence the crew/company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit.

**ISM Code 6.3:** The company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization training with their duties. Instructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given. The crew member clearing cabins during the fire drill was not following company policy (using toilet paper rolls on door handles) and was instead turning lights on and closing cabin doors, which did not externally indicate the cabin had been checked. A stairway guide in the aft stairway, Deck 6, did not know the code for "fire" despite being onboard for three months. The Staff Captain witnessed this answer. A flooding detection sensor on Deck 3, outside of the chlorination room, was alarming due to a certain amount of water within its recess. The crew were ignoring this alarm, which could delay acknowledgment of an actual alarm. The crew were using structural fire protection immediately across the corridor outside of the door to the storeroom converted to a laundry on Deck 4 to hang clothes on clothes hangers by piercing the reflective exterior material within the hanger hooks.

**ISM Code 6.4:** The company should ensure that all personnel involved in the company’s safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes, and guidelines. The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel. SOLAS requires for hoses to be connected to hydrants on passenger ships within interior spaces and for life boats to be stowed with equipment stocked. Three hoses were found disconnected when the responsible crewmember indicated all hose stations were satisfactory via an associated checklist. Tools were missing and
inconsistent with the manufacturer's manual in all life boats when the responsible crewmember indicated equipment was satisfactory via an associated checklist. This issue mirrors a deficiency documented during the last Quarterly COC exam with the fire equipment lockers.

ISM Code 10.2: In meeting these requirements, the company should ensure that: inspections are held at appropriate intervals; any nonconformity is reported with its possible cause, if known; appropriate corrective actions are taken; and records of these activities are maintained. Zero nonconformity reports were submitted for the multiple material deficiencies found onboard, for example: the ventilation ducts with damaged insulation serving the escalators forward of fire door I412 which was improperly repaired, and the wasted piping for fire hydrant 901 with fiberglass soft patch as required by the SMS.

07116 - Ventilation
Ducts provided for ventilation to accommodation spaces shall not pass through ro-ro cargo spaces unless the ducts where they pass through a ro-ro space are constructed of steel in accordance with paragraphs 3.1.1. and 3.1.2. and are insulated to "A-60" standard within the ro-ro space. The insulation on the duct serving the escalators forward of fire door I412 and passing through the ro-ro cargo deck was damaged. The crew wrapped the duct for approximately 10 feet in material that was not "A-60" rated structural fire protection insulation. No nonconformity report was submitted, the crew already had spare "A-60" insulation onboard, and this condition compromised the A-60 fire class division as indicated on the Fire Control Plan.

07108 - Ready availability of fire fighting equipment
Fire fighting appliances shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. Two portable fire extinguishers were observed without a charge, one had been moved from its bracket and both still had a seal indicating they had not been used. The relevant SMS monthly checklist indicated no nonconformities on 08OCT18. The galley fixed firefighting system controls were blocked by a heavy wheeled cart. On Deck 3, multiple fire fighting appliances were found blocked by two cargo containers during stevedore loading. On Deck 4 in the forward starboard side bosun store, a fire extinguisher and fire hose station were blocked by a ladder and miscellaneous stores.

07105 - Fire doors/openings in fire-resistant division
All openings shall be provided with permanently attached means of closing. An A-60 door (I419) was blocked open with a plastic bottle and would not self-close with the bottle removed. In addition, the double leaf fire door to the galley (810) would not self-close. This has been a consistent issue for past exams.
07120 - Means of escape

Safe escape routes shall be provided and additional aids for escape shall be provided as necessary to ensure accessibility, clear marking, and adequate design for emergency situations. Desks and computers were installed in two designated store rooms to use as two makeshift offices (I246 and I405 store rooms). There were no room-in-room alarms installed to alert crewmembers that there is a fire in the adjacent corridor.

07108 - Ready availability of fire fighting equipment

Hoses specified in this Chapter as "fire hoses" shall together with any necessary fittings and tools be kept ready for use in conspicuous positions near the water service hydrants or connections. Additionally in interior locations in passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers fire hoses shall be connected to the hydrants at all times. Three fire hoses were found disconnected from hydrants: one in the ro-ro cargo deck (313) and two in the vicinity of the galley (616 and 805).

09107 - Drainage

On all ships, for closed ro-ro spaces where fixed passage water-spraying systems are fitted, means shall be provided to protect the blockage of drainage arrangements. Two drains were missing gratings to prevent blockage and more than six grates were covered by large drain plugs, reducing the drainage capacity under signage stating clearly: "DRAIN OPENING. DO NOT COVER OR OBSTRUCT."

07101 - Fire prevention structural integrity

The purpose of this regulation is to contain a fire in the space of origin. For this purpose, the ship shall be subdivided by thermal insulation and structural boundaries; thermal insulation of boundaries shall have due regard to the fire risk of the space and adjacent; and the fire integrity of the divisions shall be maintained at openings and penetrations. There was missing segments of the thermal insulation in a penetration through A-60 bulkhead boundaries, compromising the fire protection in the following areas: 1. new laundry located on Deck 4 with missing thermal insulation in several areas and with penetrations that are not sealed, 2. Bulkhead adjacent fire door, number 402, on Deck 4, and 3. in several locations throughout the ro-ro cargo space where insulation had been damaged by moving cargo or the crew storing combustibles in small void spaces under stairs/tapered recesses.
Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11129 - Operational readiness of lifesaving appliances</td>
<td>Before the ship leaves port, and at all times during the voyage, all life saving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. PSCO observed that the grease fittings on both port and starboard side davits had been painted over; bearings, sheaves, and sheave pins were insufficiently greased. The starboard side rescue boat failed to launch upon brake release, and was not able to be successfully lowered for approximately 20 minutes. The port side lifeboat emitted squealing from the sheaves upon lowering, indicating inadequate lubrication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15102 - Company responsibility and authority</td>
<td>The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company in meeting these requirements. The company should ensure that: (1) Inspections are held at appropriate intervals and (2) Records of these activities are maintained. In reference to deficiency No. 01, inspection records were provided by the master. However, the PSC Officer believes that the records provided are not consistent, nor maintained, with the actual maintenance taking place on the identified equipment. Request an additional audit of the vessel’s safety management system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code - Category</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 2510 - Safety and environmental policy | Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM Code through their SMS procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit.  
No. 1 – The company should ensure that the master is fully conversant with the company’s safety management system. Vessel’s master could not readily produce the safety management system when asked by the PSCO and was unfamiliar with the ship’s SMS procedures.  
No. 2 – The company should ensure that each ship is manned with qualified, certificated and medically-fit seafarers in accordance with national and international requirements. One of the vessel’s required navigation watch stander’s II/4 STCW certificate expired in 2016.  
No. 3 – The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company SMS. In accordance with the SMS, the lifesaving and firefighting equipment shall be maintained on a weekly and monthly basis; the engine room maintenance shall be conducted monthly. Vessel is not properly conducting and recording required maintenance of machinery installations, life-saving equipment and firefighting equipment. The last recorded deck maintenance for lifesaving and firefighting equipment was completed in January 2018 and the last recorded engine maintenance was completed in November 2017. |
| 2565 - Certification, verification and control | A certificate, called a Safety Management Certificate, shall be issued to every ship by the Administration or an organization recognized by the Administration. Vessel’s Safety Management Certificate was issued by Conarina behalf of The Republic of Bolivia, and the vessel’s Administration is Republic of Tanzania. |
0220 - Certificates of competency

Failure to comply with applicable safe manning requirements of the administration. The vessel is not manned per the safe manning certificate currently has sailed its last voyage with a navigational watchstander that does not hold a valid STCW certificate. The watchstander's certificate expired in 2016.
Ship Name: MAERA
Flag: Marshall Islands
IMO Number: 9563677
Date of Action: 8/9/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Long Beach, California
Unit: Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach

Ship Type: Bulk Carrier
Recognized Org: Bureau Veritas
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Diana Shipping Services S.A.
Wake Shipping Company, Inc.
Charterers
ST Shipping and Transport Pte, Ltd

Deficiencies:

0710 - Fire prevention
Code - Category Description
07114-REMOTE MEANS OF CONTROL.
OIL FUEL PIPES, WHICH IF DAMAGED, WOULD ALLOW OIL TO ESCAPE FROM A STORAGE,
SETTLING OR DAILY SERVICE TANK HAVING A CAPACITY OF 500L AND ABOVE SITUATED
ABOVE THE DOUBLE BOTTOM, SHALL BE FITTED WITH A COCK OR VALVE DIRECTLY ON
THE TANK CAPABLE OF BEING CLOSED FROM A SAFE POSITION OUTSIDE THE SPACE
CONCERNED IN THE EVENT OF A FIRE OCCURING IN THE SPACE IN WHICH SUCH
TANKS ARE SITUATED. PSCO DISCOVERED A HOLD BACK DEVICE ON THE QUICK CLOSING
VALVE FROM MGO DAY TANK SERVICING THE SHIP SERVICE GENERATORS AND BOILER. 30ABC

07119- (OTHER) FIRE SAFETY.
IN A SHIP IN WHICH OIL FUEL IS USED, THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE STORAGE,
DISTRIBUTION AND UTILIZATION OF THE OIL FUEL SHALL BE SUCH AS TO ENSURE THE
SAFETY OF THE SHIP AND PERSONS ON BOARD AND SHALL AT LEAST COMPLY WITH THE
FOLLOWING PROVISIONS. PSCO DISCOVERED AN ACTIVE FUEL LEAK ON THE NO. 1 CYLINDER
HIGH PRESSURE FUEL PUMP AT A RATE OF 02 LITERS PER MINUTE. 30ABC
**Ship Name:** MAERSK KOWLOON  
**Flag:** Liberia  
**IMO Number:** 9290476  
**Date of Action:** 10/24/2018  
**Action Taken:** Detention  
**Port:** Port Elizabeth, New Jersey  
**Unit:** Sector New York

**Recognized Org:** DNV GL MARITIME  
**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):** DNV GL MARITIME  
**Recognized Org (RO) Related:** Class Related  
**Organization Related to Detention:** DNV GL MARITIME

**Ship Management:** Owners, Operators, or Managers  
V. Ships Greece Ltd  
Nerida Shipping Co  
Charterers  
A.P. Moller- Maersk A/S

### Deficiencies:

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15109 - Maintenance of the ship and equipment</td>
<td>The ship shall comply with the requirements of the ISM code. In meeting the requirements the company should ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken. The company did not ensure appropriate corrective action was taken for the damaged high pressure fuel line between the high pressure fuel pump and fuel injectors. The issue was reported in January, parts provide in May and not replaced. In addition, SMS schedule maintenance for the main engine pipes, valves and fittings checked on 27AUG18 were reported as being found in good condition and failed to identify deterioration of these high pressure fuel lines jacketed protection and fuel leaks. A full ISM audit is recommended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13101 - Propulsion main engine</td>
<td>External high pressure fuel delivery lines between high pressure fuel pumps and fuel injectors shall be protected with a jacketed piping system capable of containing fuel from high pressure line failure. The jacketed protection of eight of the 36 high pressure fuel lines between the high pressure fuel pumps and fuel injectors were severely damaged with fuel leaks including in way of a fuel injector where the leak was wrapped with a cloth rag.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Objective evidence discovered during an expand ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities: The crew failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM Code through their SMS procedures. These identified deficiencies are evidence that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit.

The company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties. The SMS requires the master to complete "master relief notes." The current master departed the vessel without completing the SMS relief notes and providing proper relief notes to the oncoming master.

Every Company should develop, implement and maintain a safety management system which includes the following functional requirements: instructions and procedures to endure safe operation of ships in compliance with relevant international and flag state legislation. There is no reference to the cargo deck's condition and maintenance in the job descriptions of the master, deck officer, or able-bodied seamen. Their job descriptions only reference cargo handling. As a result, the condition of the deck, which carries large tractor trailers, heavy equipment, and intermodal containers with dangerous goods subject to the IMDG Code, has deteriorated substantially through wastage over a long period without apparent notice.

The company should clearly define and document the master's responsibility with regard to: implementing the safety and environmental-protection policy of the company; motivation the crew in observation for the policy; issuing appropriate orders and instruction in a clear and simple manner; and verifying that specified regiments are observed. The SMS clearly defines the master's responsibilities with regard to the points required in the ISM Code. However, the master did not verify SMS requirements were followed. When asked if the crew had submitted any non-conformity reports to him the master stated they had not. The SMS requires that non-conformity reports are completed and submitted to the designated person ashore as necessary. The master was not implementing the SMS requirements
and maintaining the ship in accordance with the SMS guidelines and procedures. Numerous deficiencies were observed visually that have been long outstanding, such as the wastage penetrations in the deck, the excessively leaking fire pump, and deteriorated anchor chain links. Despite numerous deficiencies on items the crew were required to maintain, the master did not verify the ship was being maintained as per the SMS requirements.

The Company should establish procedures by which the ship's personnel receive relevant information on the SMS in a working language or languages understood by them. The engineer does not speak or read English. The SMS is in English, the sections relevant to him are in English, and there is no procedure in place to provide relevant and readily accessible SMS information to him in his language.

The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The SMS requires checklists to be filled out and the crew overall complete them, but the checklists are not being utilized appropriately because non-conformities observed are marked "ok" or "remarks" sections are left blank. For example, the emergency fire pump has been leaking excessively for a prolonged period and on the checklist was marked "ok" and the "remarks" block had been left blank for months.

0988 - Deck - corrosion

The administration shall satisfy itself that the general structural strength of the hull is sufficient for the draught corresponding the freeboard assigned. The material strength of the main deck, which carries thousands of pounds of cargo including dangerous goods in greater that limited or excepted quantities, is severely wasted and compromised; there are currently eight confirmed wastage holes allowing water to enter directly into the main machinery space and under-deck cargo space. The vessel has no proof of recent deck gauging, including during the 2016 dry-dock, and the SOLAS Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate lists the previous dry-dock date as "UNKNOWN."

0750 - Fire prevention

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respect will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board. The ventilation ducts into the main machinery space are severely wasted with multiple penetrations making closure at the vent inlet irrelevant and compromising the fire division of the engine room with the rest of the vessel in addition to adversely affecting distribution of CO2 in the event of an engine room fire.

0750 - Fire prevention

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or person on board. There is a wastage hole in the fire class division between the below deck crew accommodation space corridor and the under-deck cargo space in the top right corner of the fire door frame.
0750 - Fire prevention

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or person on board. According to the crew, the fire door referred to in the above deficiency (between deck crew accommodation space corridor and the under-deck cargo space) had a lock removed about two months ago compromising the class division. An adhesive foam pad was used to cover the hole in lieu of a permanent repair.

0985 - Bulkheads - corrosion

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure the ship will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board. There is a wastage hole, approximately two inches in diameter, in the watertight bulkhead between the engine room and the under-deck cargo space.

0220 - Certificates of competency

Deficiencies which may be deemed to pose a danger to persons, property or the environment include the following: failure of seafarers to have an appropriate certificate. The master's license, endorsed by the Administration with the same limitation, was limited to vessels up to 1,600 gross tons. The vessel's tonnage is 1,827. The master served on board from 30 March 2018 to 12 May 2018.
Ship Name: **MIDNIGHT STONE**  
Flag: **Vanuatu**  
IMO Number: **8123303**  
Date of Action: **3/4/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **San Juan, Puerto Rico**  
Unit: **Sector San Juan**

**Deficiencies:**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2510 - Safety and environmental policy</td>
<td>Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities. These discrepancies, included with the other material deficiencies, are evidence that the ship and/or crew are not meeting the requirements of the ISM code. Recommend an external audit. Crew reported inoperable bilge pump verbally to DPA, but not in accordance with SMS and no shoreside action was taken to resolve issue. Chief Engineer documented inoperable bilge pump for several weeks on weekly checklist, but did not file a non-conformity report with the company. There has never been a non-conformity report filed by the company. Master failed to ensure that all crewmembers onboard had hazard material training as required 49 CFR 172. Ship has checklist form for crewmember required training and the “dangerous, hazardous and harmful cargoes” is blank for all crewmembers onboard. Company failed to acquire flag state endorsement for deck officer despite sending two application to the Administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1440 - Bilge pumping arrangements</td>
<td>At least two power pumps connected to the main bilge system shall be provided, one of which may be driven by the propulsion machinery. The designated bilge and ballast pumps are unable to pump from or drain the machinery space bilge well, rendering the vessel incapable of emergency bilge suction in the event of grounding or taking on water. According to the SMS records, the bilge pump has been inoperable since at least April 2017, and the crew stated the ballast pump has been inoperable since 03 March 2018.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ship Management:**  
**Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
Midnight Marine Holdings Ltd  
**Charterers**  
Crowley American Transport Inc.
In ships which method IC is adopted, a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system of an approved type complying with the requirement of regulation 13 shall be so installed an arranged as to provide smoke detection and manually operated call points in all corridors, stairways and escape routes within accommodation spaces. The vessel does not have a fixed fire detection and alarm system; instead, it has localized household modular smoke detectors fitted in accommodation space not meeting the requirements of regulation 13, including two source of power, hardwiring, a centralize system, etc.

Stairways and lift trunks which penetrate more than a single deck shall be surrounded by at least "A-0" class division and be protected by self-closing doors at all levels. The doors fitted in the stairway from the galley deck, to the accommodation deck, to the navigation bridge are solid wood construction without fire rating, are not self-closing, and are designed with hold-back hooks.

The fire resistance of doors shall, as far as practicable, be equivalent to that of the division in which they are fitted. Doors and door frames in "A" class divisions shall be constructed of steel. Doors in "B" class divisions shall be non-combustible. Doors fitted in boundary bulkheads of machinery spaces of category "A" shall be reasonably gastight and self-closing. Doors required to be self-closing shall not be fitted with hold-back hooks. Doors throughout the ship, except those immediately leading to the exterior of the vessel, are solid wood construction without fire ratings. The doors to the machinery space are watertight doors that are not self-closing.

In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangement for the storage, distribution and utilization for the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and person on board. There were 5,725 gallons of highly oil-contaminated bilge water in the ship's bilges, creating a severe fire hazard.

All exposed surfaces in corridors and stairway enclosures and surfaces including grounds in concealed or inaccessible spaces in accommodation, service spaces and control station shall have low flame spread characteristics. Exposed surfaces of ceilings in accommodation and service spaces and control station shall have low flame spread characteristics. The accommodation spaces are paneled with mobile home construction grade wood laminate and other flammable materials.
The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or person on board. The port propulsion engine and generator have extensive fuel leaks, creating a severe fire hazard. The shaft packing gland for both stern tubes, especially the port side, are leaking excessively and overflowing bilge well, which is constantly adding to the engine room bilge oily waste. The port generator is missing the flywheel guard, creating a moving parts hazard. The generator was running and not currently undergoing maintenance, and no guard was installed. There are numerous electrical cables in the engine room that are disconnected or hanging with exposed wires, creating an electrical shock hazard. The engineer was unable to confirm for prove whether the wiring was properly secured from the source.

For each ship subject to regulation 5 and 6 of this annex, detail of fuel oil for combustion purposes delivered to and used on board shall be recorded by means of bunker delivery note that shall contain at least the information specified in appendix V to this Annex. The bunker delivery note shall be kept on board the ship in such a place as to be readily available for inspection at all reasonable times and retained for a period of three years. The bunker delivery note shall be accompanied by a representative sample of the fuel oil delivered and retained for a period of not less than 12 months from the time of delivery. The vessel has numerous dates listed in the Oil Record Book as bunkering dates and the crew was unable to provide bunker delivery receipts for those dates. None of the bunker delivery notes on board indicate the Sulphur content. In the past 12 months, there were twenty fuel bunkering entries listed in the Oil Record Book and only seven corresponding representative fuel samples, which is a deficiency previously identified during the USCG PSC exam 11 January 2017.

Control exercised by a duly authorized control officer under article X shall be limited to the following: verification in accordance with article X (1) that all seafarers serving on board who are required to be certificated in accordance with the convent hold an appropriate certificate or a valid dispensation, or provide documentary proof that an application for an endorsement had been submitted to the Administration in accordance with regulation I/10, paragraph 5. As documented on the IMO crew list and confirmed by the crew, the deck officer reported onboard on 27 October 2017. The flag state acknowledged the deck officer's application for endorsement on 03 September 2017; however, on 31 January 2018, he received a subsequent 90-day extension for his application—a period of over six months without a valid endorsement nor a copy or acknowledgement from flag that one was issued. At the time of the exam, the deck officer did not have a valid endorsement.
Deficiencies: 2510 - Safety and environmental policy

**Description**
Objective evidence discovered during an expand ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities. These discrepancies, included with the other material deficiencies, are evidence the ship/company is not implementing the requirements of the ISM Code through the approved SMS procedures. An eternal audit is recommended.

**ISM Code 10.1**
The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. The crew connected an unauthorized flexible grey water line, zip-tied and painted to match hard piping of the Type II Marine Sanitation Device (MSD) ’s vent pipe. This modification and the pungent smell of sewage in the main machinery space has called into question whether the introduced gray water and other potential engine room fluids has compromised the system’s technical reliability by diluting the chlorine tablets and contaminating the manufacturer’s intended PH balance to produce the required fecal coliform bacteria count. This modification was made without apparent approval from the company or the class society.

**ISM Code 10.2**
The company should ensure that any non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known, appropriate corrective action is taken, and records of the these activities are maintained. The SMS states all employees are required to report non-conformities. The crew identified an issue with the MSD and ordered piping material to rectify without reporting the condition as a non-conformity. The SMS states "All employees are required to report non-conformities, observations, serious incidents and accidents to the head of the department" (master or chief engineer onboard and the nautical superintendent at the office). The crew failed to file non-conformity reports regarding the MSD despite the strong odor it is producing, and the crew’s suspicion the vent pipe is clogged.
ISM Code 10.3
The company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations. The safety management system should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of such equipment or systems. The SMS does not identify specific equipment and technical systems critical to the vessel's safety and pollution prevention.

ISM Code 11.1
The company should establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data which are relevant to the safety management system. The SMS does not provide for a weekly checklist, and subsequently the engineering department created one of their own. Neither the company nor the master apparently identified this as a document control issue and dissuaded it. The weekly checklist is clearly self-created by the engineering department and is not properly incorporated into the SMS. The checklist does not contain an SMS form or revision number for version tracking as required by the Code.

ISM Code 12.3
The company should periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the safety management system in accordance with procedures established by the company. The SMS does not provide a checklist, as appropriate, for the maintenance of the ship conducted at intervals of less than a month. The current 1st engineer stated the previous 1st engineer created a weekly checklist (WEEKLY ROUND 1st Eng) specific to their role, which they both use, without amendment or inclusion in the SMS. Under the provisions of ISM Code 5 and ISM Code 11, this desired addition to the SMS should have been incorporated as an amendment to keep the company and the master informed and allow for control of a role and procedural based document.

1720 - Control of discharge of oil
After any survey of the ship under regulations 8, 9, or 10 has been completed, no change shall be made in the structural arrangements, machinery, equipment and other items covered by the survey, without the sanction of the Administration. The MSD is not operating as originally certified. The crew has created an unauthorized modification to the MSD by arranging for the gray water produced by the unapproved installation of a workshop air condoning unit to drain into an open-top 55 gallon barrel via a flexible hose, which is connected by way of another flexible hose to the MSD’s vent hard pipe. The bilge well has thick oily residue form prior use as storage for oily waste, which creates a fire hazard and is an unsafe practice. The steering gear room was found without nonslip surfaces required in the event of an oil spill.
The purpose of this regulation is to prevent the ignition of combustible materials or flammable liquids. For this purpose, the following functional requirements shall be met: means shall be provided to control leaks of flammable liquids and means shall be provided to limit the accumulation of flammable vapors. The bilge was coated in a thick oily residue on the structural members and frames forming the bilge wells creating a significant fire hazard.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2530</td>
<td>Resources and Personnel</td>
<td>Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM examination revealed the vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM code through their safety management (SMS) as evidenced by the observations below. An External audit is recommended. The company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying and training which may be required in support of the safety management system and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned. PSCO observed systematic breakdowns onboard vessel regarding the training and familiarization of equipment for crew members. Third officer was unaware of proper trained and maintenance of life saving equipment onboard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0615</td>
<td>Rescue boats</td>
<td>Rescue boats shall be stowed in a state of continued readiness for launching. As per LSA, engine systems and starting aids shall start the engine within two minutes. PSCO observed vessel's crew unable to start the rescue boat after repeated attempts, due to inoperable engine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0999</td>
<td>Other (Safety In General)</td>
<td>Doors required to be self-closing shall not be fitted with hold-back hooks. PSCO observed 15 self-closing fire doors throughout the super structure with hold-back hooks. Additionally, the C deck ladderwell, C deck cable run room, and B deck ladder well door do not close completely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0925</td>
<td>Musters and drills</td>
<td>A ship when in port of another contracting government is subject to control by officers duly authorized by such government concerning operational requirements in respect of the safety of ships, when there are clear ground for believing that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the safety of ships. PSC observed one of the fire team members dressed in a heavily deteriorated fire fighters outfit equipped with an empty SCBA bottle to fight fire during fire drill. Additionally, the firefighting team demonstrated inadequate knowledge on how to enter the space and fight the fire. During second fire drill attempt, one of the firefighting team members entered the space contained fire without a firefighting outfit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2099</td>
<td>Other (SOLAS Related Operational Def.)</td>
<td>Every crew member with assigned emergency duties shall be familiar with these duties before the voyage begins. PSCO observed that 7 out of 20 crew did not sign the training manual for life saving equipment maintenance. The 3rd officer in charge of life saving maintenance was not aware of the manual.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: MONTROSE

 IMO Number: 9223813

 Date of Action: 7/17/2018

 Action Taken: Detention

 Port: Savannah, Georgia

 Unit: MSU Savannah

 Ship Type: Bulk Carrier

 Recognized Org: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai

 Date: 7/17/2018

 Port: Savannah, Georgia

 Unit: MSU Savannah

 Recognized Security Organization (RSO):

 Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat

 Organization Related to Detention:

 Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers

 Iria Investments Co.

 Star Marine Management Inc.

 Charterers

 Ace Shipping A/S

 Deficiencies: Code - Category

 0710 - Fire prevention

 Description

 Fire protection systems and fire fighting systems and appliances shall be maintained and ready for use. The PSCO found four remote fuel oil quick-closing valves blocked in the open positon. The crew explained that two of the valves were blocked in preparation to test with superintendent on 07JUN2018 and forgot to remove. The other two valves have been blocked by previous crew and went unnoticed during monthly tests. The crew would not have been able to isolate fuel oil or diesel oil remotely in the event of a fire in the engine.
Ship Name: MOSCOW UNIVERSITY
Flag: Liberia
IMO Number: 9166417
Date of Action: 1/23/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: New Orleans, Louisiana
Unit: Sector New Orleans

Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0720 - Fire fighting equipment</td>
<td>Fire-fighting systems and appliances shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. PSCO observed all SCBA bottles, 48 of 56 portable extinguishers, and 9 of 12 EEBD were sent ashore with no spares provided. The safety/firefighting items, with regard to firefighting capabilities, were removed without replacement while the vessel was moved and while the vessel transferred flammable cargo within a period of approximately 8 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2550 - Maintenance of ship and equipment</td>
<td>The company should clearly define and document the master's responsibility with regards to implementing the safety and environmental protection policy of the company. PSCOs observed missing SCBAs, portable fire extinguisher and EEBDs ashore during VGO cargo discharge and 2 bunker operations. Vessel SMS states equipment should be partially removed or spares rented when firefighting equipment is set ashore for annual service to ensure safety of ship. Vessel conducted 02 bunkering operations, 01 cargo operation, and transited over 150 miles in the Lower Mississippi River in this condition posing a serious threat to the safety of personnel and the ship.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ship Type: Oil Tankship
Recognized Org: Lloyd's Register of Shipping
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
SCF Management Services (Dubai) Ltd
Fancy Maritime, Inc
Charterers
Seariver Maritime, Inc
Ship Name: MOTIVATOR
Flag: Singapore
IMO Number: 9604392
Date of Action: 2/24/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Houston, Texas
Unit: Sector Houston-Galveston
Ship Type: LPG Gas Carrier
Recognized Org: DNV GL MARITIME
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Unit: Sector Houston-Galveston
Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Motivator Shipping PTE. LTD
Anglo-Eastern Shipmanagement (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.
Charterers
Petredec International PTE. LTD.
Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1825 - Spaces in cargo area</td>
<td>A gas carrier shall comply with the requirements of the international gas carrier code. Electrical installations should be such as to minimize the risk of fire and explosion from flammable products. PSCO observed five (05) deck lights in cargo area that did not appear to be gas tight: two (02) on #4 Tank, two (02) on cargo deck in vicinity of tank #4, one (01) near starboard compressor, and one (01) near forward compressor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825 - Spaces in cargo area</td>
<td>A gas carrier shall comply with the requirements of the international gas carrier code. Airlock doors should be self-closing and without any holding back arrangements. PSCO discovered outside airlock door did not have a self-closing arrangement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: **MSC PAMELA**  
Flag: **Panama**  
IMO Number: **9290531**  
Date of Action: **11/30/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **Newark, New Jersey**  
Unit: **Sector New York**  

**Deficiencies:**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15108 - Reports of non-conf., accidents &amp; hazardous occur.</td>
<td>The company and the ship shall comply with the requirements of the International Safety Management Code. The vessel failed to report multiple known non-conformities. The crew took action to mitigate fuel oil leaks on main engine by wrapping rags around piping and did not report the issues to the company. Vessel crew was unaware of procedures for regular inspection of machinery spaces. Temporary repairs were made to the auxiliary engines without documentation or notification to the company. Inoperable bilge and OWS alarm systems were reported to the company, but not the vessel's class society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07117 - Jacketed high pressure lines and oil leakage a</td>
<td>External high-pressure fuel delivery lines between the high pressure fuel pumps and fuel injectors shall be protected with a jacketed piping system capable of containing fuel from a high pressure line failure. 04 main engine double jacketed fuel lines were damaged on the exterior jacket.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13101 - Propulsion main engine</td>
<td>Connections within the fuel supply and spill lines shall be constructed having regard to their ability to prevent pressurized oil fuel leaks while in service and after maintenance. 04 fuel injectors were spraying and leaking fuel oil onto the cylinder heads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13101 - Propulsion main engine</td>
<td>The arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of oil used in pressure lubrication systems shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and person on board. 07 of 12 main engine exhaust valve lube oil lines were excessively leaking at the top of the pumps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13102 - Auxiliary engine</td>
<td>Provision shall be made to facilitate cleaning, inspection and maintenance of main propulsion and auxiliary machinery. All four auxiliary engine turbo charger oil-regulating valves were leaking oil and require collection via makeshift funnels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08101 - General alarm</td>
<td>An alarm system shall be provided indicating any fault requiring attention. Engine room bilge and OWS alarms are inoperable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ship Management:**  
**Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
**Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.R.I.**  
**Compania Naviera Pamela SA**
09211 - Steam pipes and pressure pipes

Every steam pipe and every fitting connected thereto through which steam may pass shall be so designed, constructed, and installed as to withstand the maximum working stresses to which it may be subjected. 04 significant steam leaks were noted in the STBD generator room, purifier room, above the sewage tank, and on the LSFO settling tank.

13101 - Propulsion main engine

In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. All main engine high pressure fuel oil pump shock absorbers were wrapped with rags because they were leaking fuel.
Deficiencies:

**2515 - Company responsibility and authority**

Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM Exam revealed the following nonconformities. The vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM code through their safety management system (SMS) procedures as evident in the identified deficiencies. Recommend an external audit.

No. 1 - The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provision of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirement which may be established by the company. The vessel failed to document and report non-conformities in accordance with SMS procedures and failed to follow procedures for implementing corrective actions as required by the vessel's safety and quality management system manual procedure number NMB 01/01/010 "Maintenance of the ship equipment."

No. 2 - The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provision of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. The chief engineer failed to document and report non-conformities in accordance with SMS procedures and failed to follow procedures for implementing corrective actions as required by the vessel's safety and quality management system manual procedure number NMB 05/00/008 "Main engine and auxiliary machinery maintenance."

**1420 - Cleanliness of engine room**

In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel used shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. PSC observed below the plates on the lower most level of the engine room approximately 50-100 gallons of HFO and low sulfur MGO in multiple locations throughout the engine room. In addition, 75 percent of the piping beneath the deck plates is coated in oil.

**1040 - Engineers’ alarm**

Bilge wells in periodically unattended machinery spaces shall be located and monitored in such a way that the accumulation of liquids is detected at normal angles of trim and heel. PSCO observed that 04 Bilge alarms were not properly installed within permanent brackets.
1410 - Propulsion main engine

In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangements for the fuel storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be as such to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. PSCO observed diesel fuel leaks on the main diesel engine fuel injectors on cylinders 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8.

1420 - Cleanliness of engine room

In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be as such to ensure the safety of the ship and person on board. In the purifier room, PSCO observed the fuel oil and lube oil purifiers coated in fuel oil and lube oil.

1499 - Other (Prop. & Aux. Machinery)

In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be as such to ensure the safety of the ship and person on board. PSCO observed the #1 and #2 fuel oil booster pumps leaking and outfitted with a catch pan underneath holding approximately 1-2 gallons of oil.

1410 - Propulsion main engine

The machinery, boilers, and other pressure vessels, associated piping systems and fittings shall be of design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended and shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons on board, due to regard being paid to moving parts, hot surfaces, and other hazards. The design shall have regard to materials used in construction, the purpose for which the equipment is intended. PSCO observed a patch made to the main engine cooling seawater valve and piping.

1410 - Propulsion main engine

The machinery, boilers, and other pressure vessels, associated piping systems and fittings shall be of design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended and shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons on board, due to regard being paid to moving parts, hot surfaces, and other hazards. The design shall have regard to materials used in construction, the purpose for which the equipment is intended. PSCO found the main engine cooling seawater pump leaking approximately 1-2 gallons per minute from shaft seal into bilge.

1499 - Other (Prop. & Aux. Machinery)

Cables and wiring shall be installed and supported in such a manner as to avoid chafing and other damage. PSCO observed main diesel engine lube oil tank (15A) quick closing valve with exposed electrical wiring.

0620 - Inflatable liferafts

Each liferaft of group of liferafts shall be stowed with float-free arrangement complying with the requirements of paragraphs 4.1.6 of the Code so that each floats free and, if inflatable, inflates automatically when the ship sinks. PSCO observed 03 hydrostatic releases installed on liferafts upside down.
Ship Name: NAVIGATOR GENESIS
Flag: Liberia
IMO Number: 9531519
Date of Action: 12/12/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Houston, Texas
Unit: Sector Houston-Galveston

Ship Type: LPG Gas Carrier
Recognized Org: DNV GL MARITIME
Recognition Security Organization (RSO):
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Navigator Genesis LLC
Northern Marine Management Limited
Charterers
Vitol Inc

Deficiencies: Code - Category
07109 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation

Description
Ship in which carriage of flammable products is intended should be fitted with fixed dry chemical powder type extinguishing systems for the purpose of fighting fire on the cargo area. The systems should be capable of delivering powder from at least two hose lines to any part of the above-deck exposed cargo area, including above-deck product piping.

Vessel is currently in heel with 130 metric tons of propane, a flammable cargo. PSCOs observed that the #2 DCP hose station's N2 pilot bottle is at 60 bar pressure, where 90 bar is required. Both of these items were noted during the 06JUN2018 shore-side servicing and remain uncorrected to date.
The safety management system should ensure compliance with mandatory rules and regulations [ISM 1.2.31]. The company should ensure that for any non-conformities identified, appropriate corrective action is taken [ISM 10.2.3].

Vessel's COF authorized 0.28 bar "at Sea" and 0.45 "in harbor" MARV setting IAW IGC 4.2.6.4, 8.2.6.2, and 8.2.7. From review of the deck log book, vessel departed Point Lisas, Trinidad and Tobago at 2100 on 04DEC18, but "in harbor" setting was not removed until 0900 on 06Dec18, while vessel was at sea in Caribbean enroute to Houston. This provides objective evidence that "in harbor" MARVS were used at sea in direct violation of IGC 93/4.2.64. Vessel's MARV changing procedure, Document 923, states "the cargo tank is designed for a maximum internal pressure of 0.28 bar during sea condition. Therefore the set point of the safety relief valves should be adjusted down to 0.28 bar prior to leaving harbor." As denoted in deficiency #1, the deficient condition of the DCP hose #2 and N2 pilot cylinder #1 was noted in 06 JUN 2018 technician's report, but no corrective action was taken. The fixed gas detection system has been operation improperly since 10OCT18. The same was reported by the Chief Mate on several occasions, but appropriate correction action was not taken.
Ship Name: NEWSEAS AMBER
Ship Type: Bulk Carrier
Flag: Panama
IMO Number: 9317119
Date of Action: 10/17/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: New Orleans, Louisiana
Unit: Sector New Orleans
Recognized Org: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
Recognized Security Organization (RSO):
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:
Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Xin Hai Li Shipping S.A.
Orient International Logistics Shanghai
Newseas N
Charterers
Pan Ocean Co., Ltd

Deficiencies: Code - Category Description
07123 - Operation of Fire protection systems
Oil fuel pipes, which, if damaged, would allow oil to escape from a storage, settling or daily service tank having a capacity of 500 liters and above situated above the double bottom, shall be fitted with a cock or valve directly on the tank capable of being closed from a safe position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in the space in which such tanks are situated. PSCO observed a blocking device in the remote quick closing valves on the LSMGO service tank. 01 valve was the supply to the ship service diesel generators. Ship’s crew stated the devices were placed in the valves to test quick closing valves on August 27, 2018 and were never removed.
Deficiencies: 07126 - Oil accumulation in engine room

Description:
The purpose of this regulation is to prevent the ignition of combustible material or flammable liquids. For this purpose, the following functional requirements shall be met: means shall be provided to control leaks of flammable liquids. PSCO identified an excessive fuel oil leak of approximately 01 Gal/min. Fuel leak is continuous from the viscosity meter for the main engine fuel supply line in the purifier space, the main engine and associated equipment are offline thus the fuel line is not currently under working pressure. Crew fabricated a catchment under working pressure. Crew fabricated a catchment basin of approx. 20 gal to catch leaking fuel. Crew stated fuel leak started around the time of fuel change over to LSFO. Fuel changeover logged completed 1720 26OCT18. Vessel moored 0530 27OCT18. This has created a severe fire hazard that is detrimental to the safety of the ship and persons onboard.
Ship Name: **OCEAN PRINCESS**  
Flag: **Panama**  
IMO Number: **9268291**  
Date of Action: **7/11/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **St. Croix, USVI**  
Unit: **MSD ST. CROIX**

Deficiencies:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2430 - SOx content exceeds limit for use within ECA</td>
<td>While ships are operating within an emission control area, the sulphur content of the fuel oil used onboard ships shall not exceed 0.10% m/m on or after 01 January 2015. Bunker delivery notes showed for a period of over two years, from 02 March 2016 to 11 July 2018, the range of sulphur content from 0.30% m/m to 0.318% m/m. This fuel oil was being used within the United States Caribbean Sea Emission Control Areas. A sample tested by a third party fuel supplier confirmed that last product bunker was above the permissible limit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2500 - ISM related deficiencies | Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities. These discrepancies, included with the other material deficiencies, are evidence the ship/company is not implementing the requirement of the ISM Code through the approved SMS procedures. An external audit is recommended.  
Master failed to complete his familiarization check-in sheet attesting to familiarization with relevant portions of the ship’s SMS, SMS checklists indicated all crewmembers were aware of MARPOL requirements and the SMS procedure (Ch 7.4.2) requires the company to monitor bunker supply and ensure fuel orders/bunker notes meet MARPOL Annex VI. Vessel utilized non-compliant fuel in United States Caribbean Emission Control Area for over two years. Additionally, master failed to properly document issue with oil content meter as a non-conformity as per the ship’s SMS; only a verbal phone call was made to the company. |

Ship Management: **Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
**Ionian Shipping & Trading Corp.**  
**Lily Shipping Ltd.**

Charterers  
**Atlantic Petroleum Trading Inc**
Deficiencies:

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<tr>
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</thead>
</table>
| 2510 - Safety and environmental policy | Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities: the crew failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM Code through their SMS procedures. These identified deficiencies are evidence that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit. Every company should develop, implement and maintain a safety management system which includes the following functional requirements: instructions and procedures to ensure protection for the environment in compliance with relevant international and flag state legislation. There is no SMS requirement for maintenance of the OWS system in accordance with the provisions of MARPOL and MEPC.60 (33). Therefore, the company did not develop the ability to meet one of the ISM functional requirements: environmental compliance. Furthermore, the SMS rarely mentions the oily water separator. The only two mentions of the system are in the "Engine Watch keeper Familiarization" form for new personnel - which is limited to identifying its location onboard and its operation - and a "Miscellaneous Machinery-Monthly Report" form, which only calls for documenting running hours per month and total cumulative hours. There is no discussion of maintenance or emergency usage procedures.
|                                                                                   | The company should clearly define and document the master’s responsibility with regards to implementing the environmental protection policy of the company and motivating the crew in the observation of that policy. The SMS states the master has overall responsibility and authority to make decision and issue orders that he considers necessary for the prevention of pollution and his duties and responsibilities include prevention of pollution. The engineer was not properly logging Oil Record Book (ORB) entries. For non-automatic discharges, he logged quantity, start/stop time of discharge operation, and the vessel’s latitude/longitude location, both the locations and destination of the oily waster and method of discharge were not logged. Between 1 October 2017 and 1 May 2018, the master signed 16 of these entries without verification they were in accordance with the ORB entries.
The company should ensure that all personnel involved into the company's safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulation, codes, and guidelines. The engineer did not understand the operation of the OWS. He was not familiar with the manual and did not identify that there is no OCM/OCD, which a manufacturer technician confirmed is necessary to ensure the discharge effluent does not exceed 15ppm. As a result, it is possible the engineer unintentionally discharge oil-contaminated bilge water in excess of 15ppm overboard.

The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklist as appropriate, for key shipboard operation concerning the protection for the environment. The SMS does not contain procedures, plans, instructions, or checklists for required maintenance of the OWS. The engineer uses the OWS, but he does not have a maintenance routine. Therefore, he does not conduct proper maintenance of the OWS.

0111 - Cargo ship safety construction

Repairs, alterations and modification which substantially alter the dimensions of a ship shall meet the requirement for ship constructed on or after July 2002\(^*\) (corrected per footnote under II-2/regulation 1) in so far as the Administration deems reasonable and practicable. The ship underwent a modification of a major character while registered with the United States in 2006; however, it was not brought into compliance with 74 SOLAS/II-2 after it was sold foreign and entered international service.

0111 - Cargo ship safety construction

Such certificates, if valid, shall be accepted unless there are clear ground for believing that the condition of the ship does not correspond substantially with the particulars of the certificates or that the ship is not in compliance with the provisions of regulation 11(a) and (b). The design of the vessel is not built in accordance with the fire class divisions or integrity standards of 74 SOLAS, and yet the Recognized Organization issued SOLAS certificates attesting to full compliance with II-2.

0110 - Cargo ship safety equipment

A certificate issued under regulation 12 shall cease to be valid in any of the following cases: if the relevant surveys and inspections are not completed within the periods specified under regulations 8 (a), 9(a), 10(a). The anniversary date of the SOLAS Cargo Ship Safety Construction, Equipment and Radio certificates and the Dangerous Good Document of Compliance is 3 May 2018. The completion date of the survey on which all four certificates is 12 January 2017. Each certificate should have had an annual survey within three months before or after the anniversary date in May 2017. The certificates are not endorsed to indicate a survey was completed. The master stated Flag/RO surveyors had not performed a survey since the initial survey and had only been onboard during the June 2017 detention. The certificates were reissued on 9 June 2017 without an annual survey endorsement.
0150 - Oil pollution prevention (IOPP)

A certificate issued under regulation 7 of the Annex shall cease to be valid in any of the following cases; if the relevant surveys are not completed within the periods specified under regulation 6.1 of this Annex. The anniversary date of the International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate is 3 May 2018. The completion date of the survey on which the certificate is based, is 12 January 2017. In accordance with regulation 6.1 and annual survey should have been completed with three months before or after the anniversary date in May 2017. The certificate is not endorsed to indicate a survey was completed. The master state Flag/RO surveyors had not performed a survey since the initial survey and had only been onboard during the June 2017 detention. The certificates were reissued on 9 June 2017 without an annual survey endorsement.

0715 - Detection

Accommodation and service spaces and control station of cargo ships shall be protected by a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system as follows, depending on a protection method adapted in accordance with regulation 9.2.3.2.1. The fire detection and alarm system throughout the accommodation spaces (crew cabins), low and high risk service spaces (laundry, storeroom, and galley), and control station (navigation bridge) are localized household modular smoke detectors, which are not fixed and do not meet any of the requirements from 9.2.3.1.

0715 - Detection

A fixed fire detection and fire alarm system required in this regulation and other regulation in these part shall be of an approved type and comply with the Fire Safety Systems Code. The vessel does not have a fixed fire detection and alarm system complying with the FSS Code; instead, it has localized household modular smoke detectors fitted in the accommodation spaces, low and high risk service spaces, and the control station, which do not have two sources of power, hardwiring, a centralized system, a two-minute escalating alarm, etc. The category A machinery space has a fixed heat detection system with a corresponding pane that alarms at the control station and the galley has one fixed heat detector. The crew stated the galley heat detector also alerts on the bridge, in direct contravention of FSS Code, Ch. 9, 2.4.4.1. This could not be conclusively verified as the alarm panel was repetitiously sounding even after multiple attempt to acknowledge and silence it.

0750 - Fire prevention

Stairways which penetrate more than a single deck shall be surrounded by at least "A-0" class divisions and be protected by self-closing doors at all levels. The stairway penetrated two decks, and its boundaries are not insulated. The door between corridor/lobby serving the accommodation spaces on deck 2 and the control station on deck 3 is solid-wood construction with no fire rating a is not self -closing, and there is no door in the stairway between the corridor serving the accommodation spaces on deck 2 and the high risk service space (galley) on deck 1.
0750 - Fire prevention
The fire resistance of doors shall be equivalent to that of the division in which they are fitted, this being determined in accordance with the Fire Test Procedures Code. Doors throughout the ship, except those weather tight doors immediately leading to the open deck, are solid wood construction without fire ratings.

0750 - Fire prevention
In cargo ships, non-combustible bulkheads, ceilings, and linings filled in accommodation and service spaces may be faced with combustible material provided such space are in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3.2.2 to 3.2.4 and regulation 6. The accommodation spaces, low and high risk service spaces, and the control station are paneled with mobile home construction grade wood laminate and other flammable material. The crew was unable to provide a certificate attesting to compliance with 3.2.2 to 3.2.4 and regulation 6.

0750 - Fire prevention
In addition to complying with the specific provisions for fire integrity of bulkheads and decks of cargo ships, the minimum fire integrity of bulkheads and decks shall be as prescribed in tables 9.5 and 9.6. The fire integrity of the bulkheads and decks is not in compliance with the structural fire protection tables 9.5 and 9.6. For instance, there is no structural fire protection insulation throughout the category A machinery space and the accommodation spaces (crew cabins) are not insulated to "A-60" class standard on the ceiling forming the control station deck in accordance with table 9.6.

0510 - Ventilation Heating work. spaces
Power ventilation of accommodation spaces, service spaces, cargo spaces, control stations, and machinery spaces shall be capable of being stopped from an easily accessible position outside the space being served. This position shall not be readily cut off in the event of a fire in the spaces served. Two positions for emergency ventilation shut down are marked on the fire control plan. The controls for one of these, on the bridge is not labeled, and the master could not identify it.

1280 - Machinery space openings
Means of control shall be provided for closure of openings in funnels which normally allow exhaust ventilation and closure of ventilator dampers. There are no means to close the exhaust ventilation funnels.

0745 - Fire-dampers remote control, etc.
Ducts provided for the ventilation of machinery spaces of category A and galley shall not pass through accommodation spaces, service space, or control station unless they comply with the conditions specifies in paragraphs 7.2.1.1.1 to 7.2.1.1.4 or 7.2.1.2.1 and 7.2.1.2.2 below. The ventilation system is divided in two; one serves the accommodation spaces; low and high risk service spaces; and the control station and the other serves the category A machinery space. None of the ventilation ducts have automatic fire dampers and none are insulated to "A-60" class standard.

0745 - Fire-dampers remote control, etc.
An automatic fire damper shall be fitted in the galley ventilation duct near the ventilation unit. There is no automatic fire damper in the galley ventilation duct.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0510 - Ventilation Heating work. spaces</td>
<td>Where ventilation ducts with a free cross-sectional area exceeding 0.02 meters squared pass through &quot;A&quot; class bulkheads or decks, the opening shall be lined with a steel sheet sleeve. These ducts, or sleeves lining such ducts, shall be provided with fire insulation. The insulation shall have at least the same fire integrity as the bulkhead or deck through which the duct passes; and ducts with a free cross-sectional area exceeding 0.075 meters squared shall be fitted with fire dampers in addition to the requirements of paragraphs 7.3.1.1. The fire damper shall operate automatically, but shall also be capable of being closed manually from both sides of the bulkhead or deck. Fire dampers shall be easily accessible. Where they are placed behind ceilings or linings, these ceilings or linings shall be provided with an inspection door on which a plate reporting the identification number of the fire damper is provided. The fire damper identification number shall also be placed on any remote controls required. There are multiple ventilation ducts in the engine room which are not insulated and do not have fire dampers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0635 - Launch arrangements for rescue boats</td>
<td>Structural members and all blocks, falls, padeyes, links, fastenings and all other fittings used in connection with launching equipment shall be designed with a factor of safety on the basis of the maximum working load assigned and the ultimate strengths of the materials used for construction. The plaque permanently affixed to the rescue boat states the max loaded weight including persons, engine, and equipment is 1,495 lbs. Accounting for the minimum safety factors, the davit arm and winch should be rated for 6,727.5 lbs and 8,970 lbs, respectively. The rescue boat davit arm and winch do not state service weight limit, and no documentation onboard supports that it was satisfactorily certified before being placed into service for its intended use. The davit was previously identified as deficient for a separate issue during the June 2017 detention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2110 - Oil/oily mixtures machinery spaces</td>
<td>The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present convention to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without presenting and unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment. During the initial test of the OWS, a thick, black oily mixture was observed discharging through the sample outlet past the solenoid valve. The visibly contaminated effluent continued to discharge and the sensor did not appear to register to the contamination. After allowing the engineer to clean the sensor probe in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions and subsequent system tests, the system appeared to be working in-sync and the effluent discharged was no longer highly contaminated. The crew was unable to provide proof of system calibration. Subsequently, a manufacturer’s technician was called and confirmed the system installed without an OCD only cleans the oily water and does not actually ensure the effluent is less than 15ppm. There was no OCD installed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2110 - Oil/oily mixtures machinery spaces

Piping to and from oil residue (sludge) tanks shall have no direct connection overboard, other than the standard discharged connection referred to in regulation 13. The overboard discharge for the OWS runs vertically for approximately 3m and horizontally for approximately 10m to the exact opposite side of the engine room where it directly connect to the bilge system's overboard spool piece. The piping is not painted or sealed and at multiple junctions could easily be disconnected to fit a bypass to the OWS as no means have been implemented to prevent tampering. The piping just before the connection to the spool piece contains a gate and check valve, approximately 13m after the OWS solenoid valve. Neither of the valves are locked or otherwise sealed.

This section of piping, as well as the valves, were contaminated with black oily waste. In addition, there is piping running from the bilge pockets under the water-lubricated port and starboard shaft seals and the aft lazerette passageway with cam-lock fittings that directly connect to the same section of the bilge system’s spool piece. The shaft seal draining piping is by-passing the OWS. There is evidence that fresh water from the leaking propeller shaft seals is being pumped and subsequently cleaning the pipe of any oil residue passing through the gate and check valves.

2035 - Fire control plan

General arrangement plans shall be permanently exhibited for the guidance of the ship's officers showing clearly for each deck the control stations, the various fire sections enclosed by "A" class divisions, the sections enclosed by "B" class divisions together with particulars of the fire detection and fire alarm system, the sprinkler installation, the fire-extinguishing appliances, means of access to different compartments, decks, etc., and the ventilating system, including particulars of the fan control positions, the position of dampers and identification numbers of the ventilating fans serving each section. The fire control plan does not list 'B' class division or the particulars of the ventilation, specifically: the fire dampers and the identification numbers of the ventilating fans serving each section.

1710 - Oil record book

Each operation described in paragraph 2 of this regulation shall be fully recorded without delay in the Oil Record Book Part I, so that all entries in the book appropriate to that operation are completed. The engineer has not been logging all ORB entries as required between 1 October 2017 and 1 May 2018. Entries for non-automatic discharges only state the quantity in barrels, the time of operation start and stop, and the latitude/longitude location while always omitting the method of discharge or disposal (e.g. through oil filtering equipment, to reception facilities, or internally transferred). Consequently, there are numerous unaccounted for entries where it is difficult or impossible to determine through record review which method was employed. Issues with the previous engineer properly and accurately completing ORB entries were identified during the June 2017 detention.
Any discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures from ships of 400 gross tonnage and above shall be prohibited except when all the following conditions are satisfied: the oily mixture is processed through an oil filtering equipment and the oil content of the effluent without dilution does not exceed 15 ppm. There are three bilge pockets from which make-shift piping had been connected to drain them: under the starboard propeller shaft packing gland, under the port propeller shaft packing gland, and in the aft lazerette passageway. This piping connects to the bilge piping overboard discharge spool piece. During the June 2017 detention, automatic submersible bilge pumps were discovered in each of these three bilge wells and were subsequently removed as corrective action. An automatic submerging bilge pump with a direct overboard connection was found installed the bilge well under the starboard propeller shaft packing again on 1 May 2018. This condition direly bypasses the oily water separator and allows for discharging of oily waste in excess of 15 ppm, by simply pouring it into these bilge wells.

Control exercised by a duly authorized control officer under Article X shall be limited to the following: assessment, in accordance with section A-I/4 of the STCW Code, of the ability of the seafarers of the ship to maintain watch keeping and security standard, as appropriate, as required by the convention if there are clear grounds for believing that such standards are not being maintained because any of the following have occurred: the ship is otherwise being operated in such a manner as to pose a danger to the environment. The arrangement of the OWS and associated piping has allowed for the strong possibility of illegal discharges of oily waste. The engineering staff onboard did not identify the arrangement as deficient.

Deficiencies which may be deemed to pose a danger to the environment include the following: absence in a watch of a person qualified to operate equipment essential to the prevention of marine pollution. The engineer was not familiar with the OWS manufacturer’s instructions manual, which includes a sample diagram of how the system should be installed and visually appear. Consequently, he operated the system without realizing it was missing an oil content detector.

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provision of the present regulation to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or person on board. Both forward and aft service generators, particularly the aft one, have severe and excessive oil leaks which are pooling on hot surfaces and steaming. An identical deficient condition was observed during the June 2017 detention.
Ship Name: **PAC ATHENA**  
Flag: **Singapore**  
IMO Number: **9262950**  
Date of Action: **10/7/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **Morehead City, North Carolina**  
Unit: **MSD Fort Macon**

**Recognized Org:** **Lloyd's Register of Shipping**  
**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):**  
**Recognized Org (RO) Related:** **Not Class Relat**  
**Organization Related to Detention:**

**Ship Management:** **Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
PACC Ship Managers Pte Ltd  
Athena Maritime Pte Ltd  
**Charterers**

**Deficiencies:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07106 - Fire detection and alarm system</td>
<td>Fire protection systems and fire fighting systems and appliances shall be maintained ready for use. PSCO observed multiple smoke detector covered in engineering space including; lower engine room aft of main engine covered by plastic bag, workshop covered by plastic cover, air conditioning space by plastic cover, preventing detection of smoke as designed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15101 - Safety and environment policy</td>
<td>The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in accordance with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations established by the company. Due to the objective evidence in the above deficiencies, the vessel is not in substantial compliance with relevant conventions, the COTP questions the adequacy and/or implementation of the vessel's SMS under the ISM Code. An external audit is recommended to be conducted within 30 days by the Flag or RO to determine whether the ship is operating in accordance with the ISM Code. Provide decision to USCG prior to departure from port.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: PEDHOULAS TRADER
Flag: Cyprus
IMO Number: 9296626
Date of Action: 11/8/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: New Orleans, Louisiana
Unit: Sector New Orleans

Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07110 - Fire fighting equipment and appliances</td>
<td>Fire-fighting systems and appliances shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. PSCO observed inoperable self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and concluded, by company/vessel correspondence, that the unit was inoperable since 24 October 2018.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15109 - Maintenance of the ship and equipment</td>
<td>The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. In meeting these requirement the company should ensure that 1) appropriate corrective actions are taken when required and 2) inspections are held at required intervals. The master did not take appropriate action related to the inoperable SCBA, which severely limited the crew's ability to fight a fire or conduct a rescue requiring manned entry into a space. Furthermore, PSCO believes maintenance records do not correspond with actions taken by the shipboard maintainer as indicated by the 2 deteriorated immersion suits and the inaccurate inspection dates listed on the equipment tag vs. the electronic record. Request an additional audit of the vessel's Safety Management System.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
- Petra Shipping Ltd
- Safe Bulkers Management Ltd
Charterers
- Nordic Bulk Carriers A/S

Recognized Org: Lloyd's Register of Shipping
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:
Ship Name: **PRO EMERALD**  
Flag: **Panama**  
IMO Number: **9267948**  
Date of Action: **4/11/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **Apra, Guam**  
Unit: **Sector Guam**

**Deficiencies:**  
**1850 - Fire protection cargo deck area**  
The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulation to ensure that the ship in all respect will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to ship or person on board. Due to substantial deterioration along the fire foam supply line on the cargo deck, multiple failures were observed. And also multiple leaking fire monitors were observed.

**0610 - Lifeboats**  
Before the ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all life-saving appliances shall be in working border and ready for immediate use. During testing of the starboard life/rescue boa the engine malfunctioned. When the engine was engaged to forward, the RPM’s went up at a high rate. The crew was unable to shut down the engine for between one and two minutes until the fuel shut off was activated. Oil was expelled out of the exhaust on to the deck of the ship and into the water.

**Recognized Org:** **Korean Register of Shipping**

**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):** **Not Class Relat**

**Ship Management:**  
**Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
SK Shipping Co, Ltd.  
Emerald Shipholding S.A.

**Charterers**  
SK Shipping Singapore PTE Ltd.
Deficiencies:

**2515 - Company responsibility and authority**
The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulation and with any additional requirement which may be establish by the company. The vessel SMS tracking system, “Ship Manager” indicates numerous past due maintenance items relating to the main engines, including several that indicate the vessel is awaiting tools for completing overhaul on associated machinery. Vessel suffered a main engine fire in February of 2018. Recommend full ISM audit.

**2550 - Maintenance of ship and equipment**
The machinery and associated piping systems and fittings shall be a of design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended and shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons onboard. The vessel has fuel leaks at the #1 HFO purifier, #1 MDO purifier, HFO settling tank valve and the HFO service tank valve.

**13199 - Other (machinery)**
Where gaseous fuel is used for domestic purposes, the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the fuel shall be such that, having regard to the hazards of fire and explosion which the use of such fuel may entail, the safety of the ship and the persons on board is preserved. The #3, 4 and 5 fuel pumps on the main engine are leaking fuel.
Deficiencies:  

2545 - Reports/analysis of non-conformities, etc.

2840 - Cargo and other hatchways

Description

Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities. These discrepancies, included with the other material deficiencies, are evidence the ship/company is not implementing the requirements of the ISM Code through the approved SMS procedures. An external audit is recommended. - ISM Code 1.3

The safety management system should include procedures ensuring non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are reported to the company, investigated and analyzed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention. The SMS states the Master is responsible for reporting non-conformities to the Designated Person using Form-01.1. The crew could not produce evidence of non-conformity reports related to holes in the hatch covers, missing hatch cover gaskets, or excessive oil leaks from the main diesel engine. - ISM Code 9.1

The company should ensure that any non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known; appropriate corrective action is taken; and records of these activities are maintained. The SMS states the Designated Person shall ensure appropriate measures are initialized in response to reports. There is no evidence any corrective actions were taken as it relates to holes in the hatch covers, missing hatch cover gaskets, or excessive oil leaks from main engine. - ISM Code 10.2

All hatchways in position 1 and 2 shall be fitted with hatch covers of steel or other equivalent material, and such covers shall be weathertight. Identified holes in the following locations: Two (02) holes, port side #2 FWD Hold; One (01) hole STBD side, #1 AFT Hold; One (01) hole PORT side, #1 AFT Hold; One (01) hole, STBD side, #2 AFT Hold; Two (02) holes, STBD side #3 AFT Hold. Additional holes likely present throughout hatch covers, in inaccessible locations.
1240 - Cargo and other hatchways

All hatch covers shall be fitted with gaskets and clamping devices. Approximately 60% of all gasket material was missing from hatch covers. Individual hatch covers are missing up to 80% of gasket material.

1420 - Cleanliness of engine room

Arrangements for the distribution and utilization of lube oil shall be such to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. Observed active leaks from main diesel engine block coating entire main diesel engine and pooling at base of engine block, coating deck plates and creating slipping and fire hazards. 74SOLAS(97) II-2/15.3
Ship Name: SAMOANA

Flag: Portugal

IMO Number: 9164550

Date of Action: 6/8/2018

Action Taken: Detention

Port: Honolulu, Hawaii

Unit: Sector Honolulu

Deficiencies:

1799 - Other (MARPOL Annex I)

Description
Oil residue (sludge) may be disposed of directly from the oil residue (sludge) tanks(s) to reception facilities through the standard discharge connection referred to in regulation 13, or to any other approved means of disposal of oil residue (sludge), such as an incinerator, auxiliary boiler suitable for burning oil residues (sludge) or other acceptable means which shall be annotated items 3.2 of the Supplement to IOPP Certificate Form A or B. The sludge tank was found with the cover removed and modified fittings welded to the tank top to make unauthorized transfers. Five transfers were noted in the Oil Record Book to the Fuel Oil Overflow Tank, which is not listed on the IOPP Supplement Form A.

1799 - Other (MARPOL Annex I)

Description
In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and person on board. Several location within the machinery space to include the MDO duplex strainer supply to the main engine, the MDO fuel pump to the main engine, underneath the HFO settling tank, and the HFO transfer pump, had an excessive accumulation of oil, creating a fire hazard to the crew.
Ship Name: **SEACLIFF**

Flag: **Panama**

IMO Number: **9553139**

Date of Action: **11/20/2018**

Action Taken: **Detention**

Port: **Baltimore, Maryland**

Unit: **Sector Maryland-NCR**

**Ship Type:** **Bulk Carrier**

**Recognized Org:** **Nippon Kaiji Kyokai**

**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):**

**Recognized Org (RO) Related:** **Not Class Relat**

**Organization Related to Detention:**

**Ship Management:** **Owners, Operators, or Managers**

Northstar Ship Management LTD

Luster Maritime SA

**Charterers**

TKB Shipping A/S

**Deficiencies:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>0635 - Launch arrangements for rescue boats</strong></td>
<td>The rescue boat launching arrangements shall be such that the rescue boat can be launched in the shortest amount of time. The rescue boat davit hydraulic pump has been inoperative since 27 June 2018, preventing timely launching of the rescue boat for nearly five months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11113 - Launching arrangements for rescue boats</strong></td>
<td>Launching arrangements for rescue boats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: **SEALAND ILLINOIS**  
Ship Type: **Containership**  
Flag: **Malta**  
IMO Number: **9197545**  
Date of Action: **4/29/2018**  
Action Taken: **Detention**  
Port: **Hampton Roads, Virginia**  
Unit: **Sector Hampton Roads**  
Recognized Org: **DNV GL MARITIME**  
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): **Not Class Relat**  
Organization Related to Detention:  
Ship Management: **Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
**Miko Shipping Co**  
**V. Ships Greece Ltd**  
**Charterers**  
**Maersk Line**

**Deficiencies:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td>15 PPM alarm arrangements</td>
<td>Any ship of 10,000 GRT and above shall be fitted with oil filtering equipment with alarm arrangements to indicate when below 15 part per million (ppm) of oily effluent cannot be maintained and automatically stop when other oil content of the effluent exceeds 15 ppm. PSCO observed an unsatisfactory test of the OWS when an oily mixture discharge from the recirculation line while the three way valve way open. After further examination, tool marks were observed on the discharge line, as well as oil inside, outboard of the three way valve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1420</td>
<td>Cleanliness of engine room</td>
<td>Ships shall be provided means to prevent the ignition of combustible material or flammable liquids including the functional requirements to control leaks of flammable liquids. In spaces where penetration of oil product is possible, the surface of insulation shall be impervious to oil or oil vapors. PSCOs observed oily rags and oil soaked lagging in the purifier room. Additionally, buckets and pans of excess oil were observed throughout the space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1470</td>
<td>Insulation wetted through (oil)</td>
<td>Ships shall be provided means to prevent the ignition of combustible material or flammable liquids including the functional requirements to control leaks of flammable liquids. In spaces where penetration of oil product is possible, the surface of insulation shall be impervious to oil or oil vapors. PSCO observed excessive oil soaked lagging on the main engine fuel line.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deficiencies:  
1430 - Auxiliary engines

Description:
Each emergency generation set arranged to be automatically started shall be equipped with starting devices approved by the administration with a stored energy capability of at least three consecutive start. A second source of energy shall be provided for an additional three starts within 30 minutes unless manual starting can be demonstrated to be effective. During the operational test, the observed emergency generator failed to start on primary battery power. The emergency generator also failed on second means of starting.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deficiencies</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1730 - Oily-water separating equipment</td>
<td>Oil filtering equipment shall be designed to ensure that an oily mixture discharged into the sea after passing through the system does not exceed 15ppm. The system will not produce an effluent below 15 ppm despite efforts by crew to test the system for proper operation of the three-way valve and oil content meter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code - Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2535 - Development of plans for shipboard operations</td>
<td>Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM examination revealed the vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM code through their safety management system (SMS) as evidenced by the observations below. An external audit is recommended. The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. PSCOs observed no SMS procedures available on board the vessel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1020 - Fire alarm</td>
<td>Any required fixed fire detection and fire alarm system with manually operated call points shall be capable of immediate operation at all times. PSCOs observed main fire control panel on the bridge was not receiving electrical powered and rendered completely inoperable. Secondary fire control panel located in the engine control room was also disconnected from any electrical power source and rendered completely inoperable. The vessel was not able to receive any fire alarms for the fixed fire detection system installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1020 - Fire alarm</td>
<td>The activation of any detector or manually operated call point shall initiate a visual and audible fire signal at the control panel and incitation units. PSCOs observed fixed fire detection smoke and heat detectors were inoperable and unapproved home smoke alarms installed throughout the vessel. The vessel's fire detection system throughout the entire ship was not connected to a fire control panel, disabling the crew from being alerted of potential fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1060 - Machinery controls alarm</td>
<td>An alarm system shall be provided indicating any fault requiring attention and shall be capable of sounding an audible alarm in main machinery control room. PSCOs observed the main control panel to include all alarms and gauges in the engine room as not operational. The engine control room has no alarms, no gauges and no electrical power rot control panel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1286 - Scuppers inlets etc</td>
<td>The arrangement of the bilge an ballast pumping system shall be such as to prevent the possibility of water passing from the sea from water ballast spaces into the cargo and machinery spaces. PSCO observed ballast water and seawater suction valve stems actively leaking seawater into the engine room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1430 - Auxiliary engines</td>
<td>The capacity of the main source of electrical power shall be such that in the even of any one generating set being stopped it will still be possible to supply those services necessary to proved normal operational conditions of propulsion and safety. Minimum comfortable conditions of habitability shall also be ensured which include at least adequate services for cooling, heating, domestic refrigeration, mechanical ventilation, sanitary and fresh water. PSCO observed vessel utilizing emergency generator in place of main generator. Vessel arrangement plans and various manuals on board showed that the vessel was built with 3 generators. Only 2 generators are currently onboard and are not able to sustain a load for normal operational conditions to include navigation, maneuvering and provide habitable living conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499 - Other (Prop. &amp; Aux. Machinery)</td>
<td>The machinery shall be of design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended. PSCO observed jacket water cooling pumps as well as salt water-cooling pumps were severely deteriorated and actively leading while pumps were in the off position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499 - Other (Prop. &amp; Aux. Machinery)</td>
<td>In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and person onboard. PSCO observed oil leaking from scavenge air box on main diesel engine into a bucket creating a source of ignition. PSC observe evidence of 2-3 gallons of oil in 2 separate buckets on each side of the main engine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499 - Other (Prop. &amp; Aux. Machinery)</td>
<td>In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and person onboard. PSCO observed approximately 6 inches oily water in aft engine room bilge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0699 - Other (Life Saving Appliances)</td>
<td>The electrical power available shall be sufficient to supply all those services that are essential for safety in emergency. PSCO observed inoperative emergency lighting through the entire vessel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1599 - Other (Navigation)</td>
<td>The lights prescribed in these rules shall have an intensity as prescribe in section 8 of annex I of these regulations. PSCO observed several required navigation light not producing any light required in COLREGS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1560 - Charts</td>
<td>All ships shall carry adequate an dup to date charts. PSCO observed the vessel did not have charts for intended voyage in Tampa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1540 - Gyro compass

Ships of 500 gross tonnage and upward constructed on or after 1 September 1984 shall be fitted with a gyrocompass complying with the following requirements: (I) The master gyro-compass or a gyro repeater shall be clearly readable by the helmsman at the main steering position; (II) on ship of 1,600 gross tonnage and upwards a gyro repeater shall be provided and shall be suitably placed for taking bearings as nearly as practicable over an area of the horizon of 360. PSCO observed inaccurate Gyro repeater at the main steering stand, providing 30 degrees difference from the gyrocompass. Additionally the gyrocompass repeater on each bridge wing and steering gear room were not accurate.

1499 - Other (Prop. & Aux. Machinery)

The machinery, boilers and other pressure vessels, associated piping systems and fittings shall be of a design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended and shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons on board, due regard being paid to moving parts, hot surfaces and other hazards. PSCO observe oil soaked air filter on #2 service generator. Chief engineer state that no spares were available.

0899 - Other (accid. prevent.)

Efficient guardrails shall be fitted to all exposed part of the freeboard. PSCO observed multiple missing or deteriorated guard rails, creating a man overboard risk to crew on deck.

1499 - Other (Prop. & Aux. Machinery)

The machinery, boilers and other pressure vessels, associated piping systems and fittings shall be of a design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended and shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons on board, due regard being paid to moving parts, hot surfaces and other hazards. PSCO observed both, the #1 and #2 steering pumps, leaking hydraulic oil and pressure gauges were not operational.

0999 - Other (Safety In General)

All electrical installations shall be such that all electrical auxiliary services necessary for maintaining the ship in normal operational and habitable conditions will be ensured with recourse to the emergency source of electrical power. PSCO observe several daisy chain extensions cords supplying power to at least 16 state rooms from the emergency power on the bridge. Holes were drilled through exterior superstructure to facilitate the extension cords passage to the bridge.

0740 - Pumps

Fire-extinguishing appliances shall be kept in good order and be available for immediate use at all times. PSCO observed the general fire pump would overheat after several minutes of continuous operation, rendering it inoperable for intended service.

0740 - Pumps

Fire-Extinguishing appliance shall be kept in good order and be available for immediate use at all times. PSCO observe the emergency fire pump leak approximately 5 gallons of sea water while running for less than 5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0925</td>
<td>Musters and drills</td>
<td>Fire drills should be planned in such a way that due consideration is given to regular practice in the various emergencies that may occur depending on the type of ship and its cargo. PSCO observed table top fire drills being recorded in the vessel's emergency drills log. During fire drills, PDCO observe that crew was inadequately trained in the use of onboard freighting equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0925</td>
<td>Musters and drills</td>
<td>Crew members with enclosed space entry or rescue responsibilities shall participate in an enclosed space entry and rescue drill to be held on board the ship at least once every two months. PSCO observed no enclosed space entry drills being recorded in a logbook. Additionally, the vessel could not provide the equipment to safely enter an enclosed space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0696</td>
<td>Record of inspections/maintenance</td>
<td>The company should establish and maintain procedures to control all document and date which are relevant to the safety management system. PSCO observed that the chief officer was photocopying lifesaving maintenance log pages which included his signature for future log entries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0915</td>
<td>Signs indications</td>
<td>The company should establish procedures, plans, and instructions including checklist as appropriate for key shipboard operation. The key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection for the environment. PSC observe emergency procedures posted in CO2 room written in Spanish when official language of crew is English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730</td>
<td>Oily-water separating equipment</td>
<td>All ships of 400 gross tons and above shall be fitted with oil filtering equipment. PSCO observed inoperable oily water separator. Oily water separator could not properly function due to repeated &quot;Clean membrane&quot; alarm. Chief engineer requested but has not received required material to maintain OWS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260</td>
<td>Windows side scuttles</td>
<td>Openings in freeboard decks other than hatchways, machinery space openings, manholes an flush scuttle shall be protected by an enclosed superstructure, or by a deckhouse or companionway of equivalent strength and weather tightness. PSCO observed at least 10 window missing throughout superstructure for the installation of portable air conditioning units, compromising the weather tight integrity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1510</td>
<td>Navigational equipment</td>
<td>All ships of 150 Gross tonnage and upwards shall be fitted with a spare magnetic compass, interchangeable with the magnetic compass. PSCO observed vessel could not produce a spare magnetic compass as required by the vessel's soles cargo ship safety equipment certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0830</td>
<td>Pipes wires (insulat.) - accident prev.</td>
<td>All electrical apparatus shall be so constructed and so installed as not to cause injury when handled or touched into the normal manner. PSCO observed loose and expose wiring through the ship to include the engine room, on deck, bride and in state rooms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: **ST. JACOBI**

**Flag:** Singapore

**IMO Number:** **9689160**

**Date of Action:** 1/8/2018

**Action Taken:** **Detention**

**Port:** Portland, Oregon

**Unit:** Sector Columbia River

**Ship Type:** Chemical Tankship

**Recognized Org:** Nippon Kaiji Kyokai

**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):**

**Recognized Org (RO) Related:** Not Class Relat

**Organization Related to Detention:**

**Ship Management:** Owners, Operators, or Managers

Shenlong Maritime Pte Ltd

**Deficiencies:**

**Code - Category**

1499 - Other (Prop. & Aux. Machinery)

**Description**

All the steering gear components and the rudder stock shall be of sound and reliable construction to the satisfaction of the Administration. When operating on any steering pump configuration on the bridge in non-follow up mode, the rudder drifts to starboard.
Ship Name: STELLA  
Flag: Barbados  
IMO Number: 9314363  
Date of Action: 3/30/2018  
Action Taken: Detention  
Port: Texas City, Texas  
Unit: MSU Texas City  

Ship Type: General Dry Cargo Ship  
Recognized Org: Lloyd's Register of Shipping

Deficiencies:  
0615 - Rescue boats

Description
Before the ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all life-saving appliances, shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. During inspection of the vessel’s rescue boat the engine would start but no engage the propeller rendering the rescue boat inoperable and not ready of immediate use.

0740 - Pumps

Description
The arrangement of sea connections, fire pimps and their sources of power shall be as to ensure that in cargo ships, if a fire in any one compartment could put all the pumps out of action, there shall be an alternative means consisting of an emergency fire pump complying with the provisions of the Fire Safety System’s Code with its source of power and sea connections located outside the space where the main fire pumps or their sources of power are located. During explosive handling offload the explosive handling supervisor discovered the vessel’s emergency fire pump was inoperable due to the inability to take suction. During follow up exam by Port State Control team attempted to test the emergency fire pump again and it was unable to take suction. Vessel’s crew stated the emergency fire pump has been inoperable since March 10 from their sea passage to Galveston from Brazil.

Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat

Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Stella Marine Corp
Team Ship Maritime GmbH & Co. KG

Charterers
Intermarine, L.L.C.
The safety management system should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are reported to the company, investigated and analyzed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention. The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company to implement the vessel’s SMS. Chapter 19 of the vessel’s SMS requires that in the case of damage or malfunction of critical equipment or machinery a damage report (Form 53) is to be filled out and submitted to the company office. Vessel could not provide any evidence of a damage report being filed. Chapter 19 also requires maintenance and inspection of critical equipment, regular testing and to report any deficiencies. PSCO’s found the vessel’s computer generated maintenance program to be inoperable for over two months. Vessel does not have a backup system or paper copy of PMS schedule and procedures preventing the vessel’s crew ability to fully implement the SMS.
Ship Name: STELLA KOSAN

Flag: Singapore

IMO Number: 9373591

Date of Action: 2/10/2018

Action Taken: Detention

Port: Houston, Texas

Unit: Sector Houston-Galveston

Ship Type: LPG Gas Carrier

Recognized Org: Bureau Veritas

Recognized Security Organization (RSO):

Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat

Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers

Lauritzen Kosan A/S

LKT Gas Carriers PTE Ltd

Charterers

SABIC Limburg B.V.

Deficiencies: Code - Category

1138 - Liquefied gases in bulk

Description:

Electrical installations should be such as to minimize the risk of fire and explosion from flammable products. PSCO found that cable entries to 6 deck lights and 1 emergency deck light have been modified and do not preserve the explosion-proof integrity of those lights. Electrical connections were made with tubing that was not sealed as designed.

1138 - Liquefied gases in bulk

For permanently installed systems of gas detection alarms should be activated for flammable products when the vapor concentration reaches 30% of the lower flammable limit. When vessel conducted calibration in presence of PSCO, the detection read 55% LEL when a 35.7% LEL span gas was used. Additionally, the system alarmed at 30% LEL for propane. The vessel was not able to show that the system would alarm at 30% LEL for the cargo being carried onboard (Butadiene).
Ship Name: STRATEGIC ENDEAVOR  
Ship Type: Bulk Carrier

Flag: Singapore
Recognized Org: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat

IMO Number: 9475727

Date of Action: 3/6/2018

Port: Portland, Maine
Unit: Sector Northern New England

Deficiencies:

2550 - Maintenance of ship and equipment

Description:
Objective evidence discovered in an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM Code through their SMS procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS which collectively are evidence of a serious failure of the implementation of the ISM Code. Recommend and external audit. In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that: inspections are held at appropriate intervals; any nonconformity is reported with its possible cause, if known; appropriate corrective action is taken; and records of these activities are maintained. The SMS should include procedures ensuring the non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are reported to the Company, investigated and analyzed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention. Vessel did not report and did not take corrective actions with regard to the following non-conformities in accordance with the ship’s SMS.

1.1-Deck Machinery: The starboard side mid-ship accommodation ladder lifting and lowering winch foundation is severely wasted and holed through and it is substantially unsafe for use. The wastage was covered with tape and paint.

1.2-Pollution Containment: Vessel's bunker manifold containment has significant wastage, causing the support legs to give way, leading to a condition that is unsafe for the crew and poses an unreasonable threat of harm to the marine environment.

1.3-Hydraulic Piping: The hydraulic line (operating pressure 280 bar) for cargo hold 4 between FR 75-80 on the port side is wasted, holed, and leaking. Two failed temporary jubilee patches (not approved by Flag or RO) were installed since Dec 2017.

1.4-Crane access/servicing platforms: Between cargo holds 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, and 4-5 were excessively wasted and holed through. Additionally, the port side latter leading to the forecastle has rungs that are wasted and holed through.

1.5-Handrails/Ladders: Several handrails in both the port and starboard side are broken/missing, as well as

Ship Management:

Owners, Operators, or Managers
M.T.M. Ship Management Pte. Ltd.
SBC Endeavor PTE LTD

Charterers
Noordriver Shipping BV
broken handrail stanchion at weld seams to the main
deck in way of port quarter and at the starboard side
accommodation ladder. Also, ladders used for view of
cargo hold internals, and those used as viewing platforms
are wasted and broken due to severe weather.
1.6-Void Space Ventilation: A void space vent-topper on
the starboard side, near FR 173, is wasted through at the
opening protection cover, creating an unsafe condition
that could lead to water ingress, affecting the ship.
1.7-Deck Cables/Wiring: PSCO discovered wiring
hanging in an exposed manner from the forward mast,
posing a significant hazard to the safety of the crew.
1.8-Guardrails/Platforms: Mooring station platforms on
bow and stern were wasted and severely damaged due to
severe weather.

0955 - Pilot ladders
All arrangements used for pilot transfer shall efficiently
fulfill their purpose of enabling pilots to embark and
disembark safety, the appliances shall be kept clean,
properly maintained and stowed, and shall be regularly
inspected to ensure they are safe to use. The starboard
side mid-ship accommodation ladder lifting and lowering
winch support is wasted and holed through, posing a
safety risk to those of whom utilize it.

0999 - Other (Safety In General)
The ship and its equipment shall be maintained to
conform with the present regulations, ensuring that the
ship remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the
ship or persons on board. The hydraulic line for cargo
hold 4 between FR 75-80, port side, is severely wasted,
holed through and (02) temporary repairs are leaking.
With an operation pressure of 280 bar, this condition
presents an immediate danger to persons on board &
environment.

0950 - Electric equipment in general
All main electrical lighting systems shall provide
illumination throughout those parts of the ship normally
accessible to the crew. Embarkation, emergency and
deck lighting not operational on starboard bridge wing,
A deck, B deck, port and starboard accommodation
ladders every crane entry room, forecastle, and the
forward mast.
**Ship Name:** SWIBER ADA  
**Ship Type:** Other  
**Flag:** Mexico  
**IMO Number:** 9502154  
**Date of Action:** 3/21/2018  
**Action Taken:** Detention  
**Port:** Lake Charles, Louisiana  
**Unit:** MSU Lake Charles  

**Recognized Org:** Bureau Veritas  
**Recognized Security Organization (RO):** Not Class Relat  
**Organization Related to Detention:**  
**Ship Management:** Owners, Operators, or Managers  
Swiber Marine Mexico, S. A. DE. C.V.

### Deficiencies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1020 - Fire alarm</strong></td>
<td>A fixed fire detection and fire alarm system shall be provided in accordance with the provision of this regulation. Fire detection test carried out revealed no working detectors in the engine room, rendering the detection system and alarms inoperable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>0615 - Rescue boats</strong></td>
<td>Before the ship leaves port an at all times during the voyage, all life-saving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. During an operational test of the rescue boat, crewmembers were not able to start the ship's rescue boat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2120 - Garbage</strong></td>
<td>The garbage record book, shall be in the form specified in the appendix to this annex. Each discharge operation, or completed incinerations shall be recorded in the garbage record book and signed on the date of the incineration or discharge by officer in charge. The garbage record book on the ship had no entries or receipts for food waste discharged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2525 - Masters responsibility and authority</strong></td>
<td>The company should clearly define and document the master’s responsibility with regard to: implementing the safety and environmental-protection policies of the company including motivating the crew in the observation of these policies. The objective evidence demonstrating the lack of complete SMS implementation includes the numerous firefighting, lifesaving, and waste management deficiencies identified by PSCOs, which per the vessel’s policies should have been identified and corrected by ship personnel. Recommend ISM audit of shipboard procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: TALISMAN
Flag: Norway
IMO Number: 9191319
Date of Action: 5/2/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Seattle, Washington
Unit: Sector Puget Sound

Ship Type: Ro-Ro-Cargo Ship
Recognized Org: DNV GL MARITIME
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:

Deficiencies:
Code - Category
0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation

Description
The means of control of any fixed gas fire-extinguishing system shall be readily accessible and simple to operate and shall be grouped together in as few locations as possible at positions not likely to be cut off by fire in a protected space. At each location there shall be clear instructions relating to the operation of the system having regard to the safety of personnel. The manual isolation valve for the low pressure CO2 system was found in the closed position. Crew would not by able to engage CO2 for protected spaces from the remote location. The wrench to open the manual isolation valve was not present in the local space and took approximately one minute to retrieve. Each location did not have clear instructions that included the opening of the manual isolation valve.

Ship Management:
Owners, Operators, or Managers
Wilhelmsen Ship Management (Norway) AS
Wilhelmsen Lines Shipowning AS
Charterers
Wallenius Wilhelmsen-Stockolm
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15109</td>
<td>Maintenance of the ship and equipment</td>
<td>Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM Exam revealed the following non-conformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM Code through their SMS procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external ISM audit. The Company should ensure that any non-conformity is reported with its possible cause if known. PSCOs discovered significant wastage on 100% of all of deck cargo security equipment. The Chief Officer failed to completed non-conformity reports addressing wasted cargo security equipment. Maintenance logs completed by Chief Officer indicate that all cargo securing equipment was in good condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06104</td>
<td>Lashing material</td>
<td>All cargoes other than solid and bulk liquid cargoes, cargo units, and cargo transport units, shall be loaded, stowed and secured throughout the voyage in accordance with the cargo securing manual approved by the administration. Cargo securing manual requires that container twist locks be welded to the deck. Twist locks are not welded and are wasted and rusted, or are missing locking devices, preventing locking. A boat, a truck and 50% of the containers being shipped were not secured IAW the manual.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: TANGO III
Ship Type: Containership

Flag: Tanzania

IMO Number: 9012513

Date of Action: 12/28/2018

Action Taken: Detention

Port: Miami, Florida

Unit: Sector Miami

Recognized Org: CONARINA

Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat

Recognized Org (RO) Related: Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers

Americas Marine Management Services, Inc.

Trans Titan S. del R.L.

Deficiencies:

15102 - Company responsibility and authority
Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following nonconformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirement of the ISM Code through their SMS procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit.

15104 - Masters responsibility and authority
No. 1 - The company should ensure that all personnel involved in the company's' safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines. The crew failed to ensure the vessel was in compliance with their IOPP and MARPOL by using flexible hoses and a pneumatic pump to pump oily bilge water from the engine room bilges and oily bilge tank to two tanks designated on the vessel's plans as heavy fuel oil tanks. The two heavy fuel oil tanks are not designated on the vessel's IOPP to store or transfer oily bilge water. The oily bilge water was then pumped to a truck shore side using a connection installed by the crew to hook up a line to a vacuum pump ashore. There is no approval from the company or administration for these operations.

15106 - Shipboard operations
No. 2 - The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. The crew is pumping oily bilge water into two tanks designated as heavy fuel oil tanks and then using an onboard manufactured hose connection to pump the oily bilges ashore using a vacuum pump on the truck ashore. There is no evidence of these operations being approved or included in the SMS or approved transfer procedures onboard the
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<tr>
<td>15111</td>
<td>Company verification, review and evaluation</td>
<td>The company should periodically verify whether all those undertaking delegated ISM-related tasks are acting in conformity with the company's responsibilities under the Code. Although the company established procedures for protecting the environment and the SMS stated it is required for the vessel to comply with all applicable rules and regulations for the vessel including MARPOL, the vessel's crew used the fuel tanks for storage and transfer of oily bilge water not designated on the IOPP for such use. The Chief Engineer did not record any use of these two unapproved fuel tanks in the Oil Record Book at any time for storage or discharge of oil residue in accordance with MARPOL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15101</td>
<td>Safety and environment policy</td>
<td>The company should ensure that the policy is implemented and maintained at all levels of the organization, both ship-based and shore-based. The vessel's Safety and Environmental-Protection Policy incorporated into their SMS states that all operations of the vessel must be in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations including MARPOL. The vessel is using two heavy fuel tanks to store and transfer oily bilge water which are not designated on the IOPP under 3.3 to hold or transfer oily bilge water. The transfer and storage of oily water to these tanks is not being recorded in the Oil Record Book in accordance with the vessel's SMS and with MARPOL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14102</td>
<td>Retention of oil on board</td>
<td>After any survey of the ship, no change shall be made in the structure, equipment, systems, fittings, arrangements or material covered by the survey, without the sanction of the Administration. The crew is utilizing flexible hoses and a pneumatic pump to pump water from the bilges and oily bilge tank to two tanks designated as heavy fuel oil tanks. The oily water is then pumped ashore by connecting a hose to an installed connection to the tanks and a vacuum pump from a truck ashore. This has not been approved by administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01315</td>
<td>Oil record book</td>
<td>The Oil Record Book Part I shall be completed on each occasion, on a tank-to-tank basis, whenever the following machinery space operations take place in the ship; collection and disposal of oil residues and discharge overboard or disposal otherwise of bilge water which has accumulated in machinery spaces. The vessel is collecting oil in two heavy fuel oil tanks and then pumping from these tanks to trucks shore side. The crew is not recording these operations in the Oil Record Book.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15102</td>
<td>Company responsibility and authority</td>
<td>Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following nonconformities: The vessel failed to fully implement the requirement of the ISM Code through their SMS procedures as evident by the following deficiencies indicating that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend an external audit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15106 - Shipboard operations</td>
<td>No. 1 - The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment. Vessel crew was unaware that Fuel Oil Tank #1 Portside contained product. Vessel crew opened the tank, which they thought to be empty, and found approximately 1.3 meters of an unidentified oil product inside. Crew could not account for the contents of the tank nor could they explain where it came from or how long it had been there.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14102 - Retention of oil on board</td>
<td>After any survey of the ship under paragraph 1 of this regulation has been completed, no change shall be made in the structure, equipment, systems, fittings, arrangements or material covered by the survey, without the sanction of the Administration, except the direct replacement of such equipment and fittings. In an attempt to verify that ballast tanks were not leaking into fuel tanks, PSCO's had crew members open up #1 Fuel Oil Tank Portside. Crew stated the tank was empty of fuel and not in use. Once opened, the tank was found to contain approximately 1.3 m or an unidentified oil product. Crew could not explain what the product was, how it got there, or how long it has been there.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02122 - Openings to cargo area, doors, ... scuttles</td>
<td>The construction and means for securing the weather tightness of cargo hatchways in positions 1 and 2 shall be equivalent to the requirements of regulations 15 and 16 of this annex. PSCOs observed significant wastage of the gaskets for the cargo hatch covers, preventing weather tightness. In addition, PSCO observed significant wastage of the structure of the cargo hatch covers, eliminating their ability to remain weather tight.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01102 - Cargo Ship Safety Construction (including exem</td>
<td>The condition of the ship...shall be maintained to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board. Ballast wing tanks throughout the cargo hold are severely wasted and holed, allowing water to pass from the tanks and into the cargo hold.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01201 - Certificates for master and officers</td>
<td>Every master and chief mate on a seagoing ship of between 500 and 3,000 gross tonnage shall hold a certificate of competency. The Chief Mate, Jhoanny Jose Ramos Marval, does not possess a valid merchant mariner credential.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Ship Name:** TANJA  
**Flag:** Liberia  
**IMO Number:** 9717527  
**Date of Action:** 3/15/2018  
**Action Taken:** Detention  
**Port:**  
**Unit:** MSD Belfast  

**Ship Type:** Bulk Carrier  
**Recognized Org:** Lloyd's Register of Shipping  
**Recognized Security Organization (RSO):**  
**Recognized Org (RO) Related:** Not Class Relat  
**Organization Related to Detention:**  
**Ship Management:** Owners, Operators, or Managers  
MST Mineralien Schifffahrt Spedition  
Reederei MS "Tanja" GmbH & Co. KG  
Charterers  
Jutta Shipping Ltd  

**Deficiencies:** Code - Category  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0220</td>
<td>Certificates of competency</td>
<td>Deficiencies which may be deemed to pose a danger to person, property, or the environment include an absence in a watch of a person qualified to operate equipment essential to navigation, safety radio communication or the prevention of marine pollution. The Master of the vessel was incapacitated due to alcohol consumption and could not perform duties as required by shipboard and company procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deficiencies:

0715 - Detection

Any required fire detection and alarm system shall be capable of immediate operation at all times. Fire detection system registers a fire alarm and is incapable of alerting the crew to smoke or fire in the engine space.

1470 - Insulation wetted through (oil)

All Surfaces with temperatures above 220 C which may be impinged as a result of fuel system failure shall be properly insulated. There is oil soaked lagging and pools of oil on and around the engine housing.
<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hatch covers shall be weather tight and fitted</td>
<td>03105 - Covers (hatchway-, portable-</td>
<td>Hatch covers shall be weather tight and fitted with gaskets and clamping devices. Majority of cargo hold access covers unable to be secured as dogs are stuck and inoperable. Severe corrosion of #5 cargo hold fwd access, #6 cargo hold fwd access, and #7 cargo hold aft access hatch covers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with gaskets and clamping devices. Majority</td>
<td>, tarpaulins, etc.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>of cargo hold access covers unable to be secured</td>
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<tr>
<td>access hatch covers.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>All access openings in bulkheads at ends of</td>
<td>02101 - Closing devices/watertight</td>
<td>All access openings in bulkheads at ends of enclosed superstructures shall be fitted with doors of steel or other equivalent material, permanently and strongly attached to the bulkhead, and framed, stiffened and fitted so that the whole structure is of equivalent strength to the unpierced bulkhead and weathertight when closed. The door to the battery room is severely corroded and can no longer be sealed weather-tight. The A-60 boundary is also compromised due to this corrosion.</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>compromised due to this corrosion.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The purpose of this regulation is to contain a</td>
<td>07103 - Division - decks,bulkheads</td>
<td>The purpose of this regulation is to contain a fire in the space of origin. The fire integrity of the divisions shall be maintained at openings and penetrations. Port State Control officers found significant corrosion and holes between the deck work shop and the deck through an A-60 boundary near the fire main. The weathertight integrity of the space is also compromised.</td>
</tr>
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<td>fire in the space of origin. The fire integrity</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>compromised.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Company should establish procedures to</td>
<td>01107 - Safety Management Certificate</td>
<td>The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in accordance with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. Due to the objective evidence in the above deficiencies that the vessel is not in substantial compliance with relevant conventions, the COTP questions the adequacy and/or implementation of the vessel’s SMS under the ISM Code. An external audit is recommended to be conducted within 30 days by the Flag State or RO to determine whether the ship is operating in accordance with the ISM Code. Provide decision to the USCG prior to departure from port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SMC/ ISM)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: **TELENDOS**  
IMO Number: **9412086**  
Date of Action: **6/10/2018**  
Flag: **Greece**  
Port: **Houston, Texas**  
Unit: **Sector Houston-Galveston**  
Ship Type: **LPG Gas Carrier**  
Recognized Org: **Lloyd's Register of Shipping**  
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): **Not Class Relat**  
Recognized Org (RO) Related: **Not Class Relat**  
Organization Related to Detention:

Ship Management: **Owners, Operators, or Managers**  
**Eletson Corporation**  
**Telendos II Special Maritime Enterprise**  
**Charterers**  
**Geogas Trading SAS**

Deficiencies:  
**2550 - Maintenance of ship and equipment**

Description:
The safety management system should ensure compliance with mandatory rules and regulations. The company should establish procedures to ensure the ships maintain in conformity with the relevant rules and regulations and any additional requirements established by the company (ISM Code 10.1). Vessel's COF authorizes 0.25 Bar "At Sea" and 0.45 Bar "In Harbor" MARV setting in accordance with IGC Code 4.2.6.4, 8.2.6.2 and 8.2.7.  

While inspecting the pilot and auxiliary relief valves on each tank top, it was discovered that the "Set and Seal" for the auxiliary (In Harbor) relief valve was secured to the pilot (At Sea) relief valve, preventing the two from being separated without removing the "Set and Seal" wire or the top coupler from the pilot (At Sea) relief valve. The ship's official log did not indicate that the relief valves were changed at each port the vessel entered and departed. While questioning the Master and Chief Officer regarding their relief valve change procedures, they each stated that the relief valve setting is never changed from their "In Harbor" settings while they're at sea and required to be at the "At Sea" settings. The vessel provided documentation to attending PSC examiners showing that the vessel relief valves were last adjusted and pressure tested on 04 February 2015 by Lloyd's Register. Shipboard SMS, cargo plant operating manual, requires relief valves to be set and sealed following satisfactory testing and adjustments (Document No. T-0655-N1).
Deficiencies:

<table>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07126 - Oil accumulation in engine room</td>
<td>The arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. The fuel oil supply line, from the main fuel rail to the #8 and #9 high pressure fuel pump was actively leaking approximately 01 liter per minute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07126 - Oil accumulation in engine room</td>
<td>Means shall be provided to control leaks of flammable liquids. PSCO discovered oil soaked lagging on the fuel delivery lines on 04 ship service generators, HFO lines under the forward part of the purifier room, and throughout the purifier room.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07126 - Oil accumulation in engine room</td>
<td>The arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. Fuel oil catchments, made of buckets with fabricated spouts, were discovered hanging under a leaking fuel oil return line the near the M/E #1 cylinder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07106 - Fire detection and alarm system</td>
<td>The following fire protection systems shall be kept in good order so as to ensure their required performance if a fire occurs: Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Engine room workshop's fire detection zone disablement switch was found with its timer removed and was replaced with a hard wired toggle switch. PSCO tested smoke detector in the space satisfactorily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07106 - Fire detection and alarm system</td>
<td>The following fire protection systems shall be kept in good order so as to ensure their required performance if a fire occurs: Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Cargo hold sample extraction system junction boxes in the CO2 room are missing covers and wasted, allowing the sample to escape into the space and preventing it from being detected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ship Name: TIP STOCKHOLM  
Ship Type: General Dry Cargo Ship  
Flag: Malta  
IMO Number: 9277333  
Date of Action: 2/18/2018  
Action Taken: Detention  
Port: Freeport, Texas  
Unit: MSU Texas City  
Recognized Org: DNV GL MARITIME  
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat  
Organization Related to Detention:  
Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers  
Liberty Blue Shipmanagement Gmbh & Co KG  
Tip Stockholm Gmbh & Co KG  
Charterers  
TIP Stockholm Company Limited  

Deficiencies:  
0135 - Minimum safe manning certificate  
For every ship to which Chapter I applies, the administration shall issue an appropriate minimum safe manning document or equivalent as evidence of the minimum safe manning considered necessary to comply with the provisions of paragraph 1. Vessels watch call system extension alarm panel is inoperable. Alarm panel was found to be inoperable on 21DEC17 and company was notified accordingly. Vessel has no documentation from company for notification to Class/Flag. Vessel is classed for an unattended machinery space and its minimum safe manning reflects "if the UMS or bridge control systems are not operational then an engineering watchkeeping officer (Reg III/1) and an engine rating (Reg III/4) must be carried in addition to above". Vessel has been sailing without additional engineering crew members since 21DEC17, as required by the Vessels Minimum Safe Manning Document.  

1499 - Other (Prop. & Aux. Machinery)  
Every oil fuel pipe, which if damaged, would allow oil to escape from a storage, setting or daily service tank situated above the double bottom, shall be fitted with a cock or valve directly on the tank capable of being closed from a safe position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in the space in which such tanks are situated. Upon examination of the remote fuel shutoff for the vessels emergency diesel generator, it was discovered to be seized to the deck rendering it inoperable in the case of fire or other emergency.
Ship Name: TOLI  
Flag: Malta  
IMO Number: 9479670

Date of Action: 12/13/2018  
Action Taken: Detention  
Port: Savannah, Georgia  
Unit: MSU Savannah  

Ship Type: Chemical Tankship  
Recognized Org: Bureau Veritas  
Recognized Security Organization (RSO):  
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat  
Organization Related to Detention:  

Deficiencies: 
07108 - Ready availability of fire fighting equipment  

Description: Firefighting systems and appliance shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. PSCO observed water mist system in manual mode and fresh water valve after of high pressure pump was closed. Chief Engine stated work was conducted this morning, but could not provide record of maintenance; last record was December 1, 2018, after ship's crew changed system. PSCO tested smoke detector above #2 generator and water mist system activated for the a zone. Ship could not provide PSCO manual for system.
Ship Name: UBC STOCKHOLM
Flag: Cyprus
IMO Number: 9426879
Date of Action: 1/18/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: New Orleans, Louisiana
Unit: Sector New Orleans

Ship Type: Bulk Carrier
Recognized Org: Nippon Kaiji Kyokai
Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:

Deficiencies:

0750 - Fire prevention
Oil fuel pipes, which, if damaged, would allow oil to escape from a storage, settling or daily service tank having a capacity of 500L and above situated above the double bottom, shall be fitted with a cock or valve directly on the tank capable of behind closed from a safe position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in the space in which such tanks are situated.

PSCO observed the actuating air line to the Diesel Oil Service Tank was intentionally disconnected preventing the closure of the Quick Closing Valve in the event of a fire in the machinery space. Chief Engineer stated the last testing of the system was conducted on November 14, 2017 during annual class survey.

1430 - Auxiliary engines
Each emergency generating set arranged to be automatically started shall be equipped with starting devices approved by the administration with a stored energy capability of at least 3 consecutive starts. A second source of energy shall be provided for an additional 3 starts within 30 minutes. PSCO observed emergency generator failed to start on primary battery power. Electrician stated battery sets are switched weekly and vessel was currently using #2 battery set as primary. In the event of a blackout the power source would have failed to automatically start.

Charterers
United Bulk Carriers

Owners, Operators, or Managers
Mastermind Shipmanagement Ltd.
Goldbeam International Limited
Ship Name: UNION TRADER
Flag: Marshall Islands
IMO Number: 9445710
Date of Action: 7/11/2018
Action Taken: Detention
Port: Lake Charles, Louisiana
Unit: MSU Lake Charles

Deficiencies: Code - Category
1420 - Cleanliness of engine room

Description
Means shall be provided to control leaks of flammable liquids. Currently, the #2 generator is offline, there is an active leak with an accumulation of fuel near the fuel filters. Fuel line lagging near the fuel filters was saturated; requiring replacement. Number 1 & 3 generators while not running were found with fuel leaks & #3 generator had half inch of fuel pooled in the fuel filter drip tray. Multiple PSCOs witnessed a squeeze test of the lagging. PSCOs observed a stream of oil pouring from the lagging.

Ship Type: Bulk Carrier
Recognized Org: Lloyd's Register of Shipping
Recognized Security Organization (RSO):
Recognized Org (RO) Related: Not Class Relat
Organization Related to Detention:
Ship Management: Owners, Operators, or Managers
Melvin International S.A.
Union Marine Enterprise S.A.
Charterers
Oldendorff Carriers GMBH & CO. KG
Ship Name: ZIM CONSTANZA

Flag: Israel

IMO Number: 9471202

Date of Action: 5/4/2018

Action Taken: Detention

Port: New York, New York

Unit: Sector New York

Ship Type: Containership

Recognized Org: DNV GL MARITIME

Recognized Security Organization (RSO): Not Class Relat

Deficiencies:

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2525 - Masters responsibility and authority</td>
<td>The company should clearly define and document the Masters responsibility to implement the safety policy of the company. The Master has overriding authority on matters affecting safety, according to SMS QP 8.1. The Master failed to implement safety policy on the ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2110 - Oil/oily mixtures machinery spaces</td>
<td>The purpose of this regulation is to limit fire growth potential in every space of the ship. The ship had excessive amounts of oily mixtures in bilges from leaking; main engine, all four generators, purifier #1 feet pump, and shaft seal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation</td>
<td>Carbon Dioxide systems for the protection of spaces shall have a control to ensure the activation of an alarm for the release of carbon dioxide into the space. The alarm limit switches on the CO2 system are disconnected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0750 - Fire prevention</td>
<td>&quot;A&quot; class divisions shall be insulated with approved non-combustible material. The &quot;A-60&quot; boundary insulation has been removed from the CO2 room.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Charterers
Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd

Owners, Operators, or Managers
XT Management LTD.
TACTON SHIPPING INC

Ship Management:

2525 - Masters responsibility and authority
The company should clearly define and document the Masters responsibility to implement the safety policy of the company. The Master has overriding authority on matters affecting safety, according to SMS QP 8.1. The Master failed to implement safety policy on the ship.

2110 - Oil/oily mixtures machinery spaces
The purpose of this regulation is to limit fire growth potential in every space of the ship. The ship had excessive amounts of oily mixtures in bilges from leaking; main engine, all four generators, purifier #1 feet pump, and shaft seal.

0725 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation
Carbon Dioxide systems for the protection of spaces shall have a control to ensure the activation of an alarm for the release of carbon dioxide into the space. The alarm limit switches on the CO2 system are disconnected.

0750 - Fire prevention
"A" class divisions shall be insulated with approved non-combustible material. The "A-60" boundary insulation has been removed from the CO2 room.