U.S. Department of Homeland Security

United States Coast Guard

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Eighth District Outer Continental Shelf
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16711/OCS
D8(ocs) Policy Ltr 01-2017

MAY 23 2017

# MEMORANDUM

From: J. D. REYNOLDS, CAPT
D8 OCS OCMI

Reply to POC
Attn of: CDR Brian Khey

To: Distribution

Subj: MEANS OF ESCAPE ON FIXED PLATFORMS

Ref: (a) 33 CFR 143.101, Current Edition
(b) Marine Safety Manual Volume II, Section G, Chapter 5
(c) Offshore Operator's Committee (OOC) Letter to USCG D8 OCS OCMI dated September 2015
(d) USCG Eighth District Marine Safety Division Letter to Minerals Management Service dated 09 June 2003
(e) USCG Marine Board of Investigation into Explosion and Fire onboard Offshore Platform South Timbalier Block 134-D1, Gulf of Mexico, 26 July 1959, with Loss of Life dated 19 April 1960
(f) 33 CFR 143.05, 1962 Edition
(g) 27 FR 665, Coast Guard Proposed Rulemaking "Artificial Islands and Fixed Structures on the Outer Continental Shelf"
(h) 33 CFR 146.125
(i) Offshore Operator's Committee (OOC) Guidance Document OOC-G-2017-1, dated 26 January 2017

1. **PURPOSE**: This policy letter provides guidance to Eighth District inspectors for verifying compliance with references (a) and (b) regarding means of escape on fixed platforms.

2. **BACKGROUND**:

   a. Reference (c) expressed concern on behalf of operators in the Gulf of Mexico about Coast Guard training to Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) inspectors who perform fixed platform inspections on behalf of the Coast Guard. The concern was BSEE inspectors were trained by the Coast Guard that to comply with reference (a) primary means of escape ladders must not terminate above the water's surface in the environmental conditions at the time of inspection.

   b. In 2015 OOC notified my office that BSEE communicated to OOC members its intention to issue an incident of non-compliance (INC) under potential incident of non-compliance list (Z-PINC updated 2015) number Z-125 when a ladder serving as a primary means of escape terminated above the water at the time of inspection. In 2016 Gulf of Mexico operators received deficiencies from Coast Guard inspectors under reference (a) for primary means of escape that terminated above the water's surface. Specifically, deficiencies were issued

when a ladder did not extend from the lowest personnel landing or level below it to the water's surface in the environmental (including tidal) conditions at the time of inspection.

c. In January 2017, I met with the OCS National Center of Expertise (OCSNCOE), Marine Safety Unit Morgan City Investigators, BSEE Gulf of Mexico Region staff, OOC staff and several OOC members who operate in the Gulf of Mexico to discuss proper application of references (a) and (b). The meeting included a discussion of investigations into platform emergencies where personnel had successfully escaped into the water by jumping from the lowest designed personnel landing. We noted Coast Guard policy -- communicated to MMS for over a decade as reflected in reference (d) -- allowed jumping into the water from the lowest accessible designed point on the platform is an acceptable means of emergency egress. OCSNCOE said they would do additional research on the intent of the regulation.

d. As a follow up to the meeting, OCSNCOE researched past Federal Registers and regulations to determine the intent of reference (a). They presented me with references (e) through (g). Reference (e) outlined how a fire on the drill floor cut off the means of escape for those in the living quarters above the drill floor. Industry interpretation of reference (f) was that the means of escape should extend from the drill floor; therefore two means of escape were not provided from the living quarters above the drill floor and sole means of escape was blocked by the fire. This forced some crew to jump from the living quarters eighty feet above the water, resulting in a death and injuries. Crew that evacuated from the personnel landing did not receive injuries from jumping into the water. Because of this and similar casualties where the crew was forced to jump into the water from heights of 50 feet or more, the Coast Guard amended reference (f) to ensure means of escape extended from the uppermost platform level that contains living quarters or that personnel occupy continuously. Reference (g) was the proposed rule explaining this amendment. Even though reference (e) conclusion 2 recommended extending the means of escape "to the surface of the water at the low range tidal mark", the Coast Guard purposely chose to drop the phrase "at the low range tidal mark". This removed prescription because the distance between the lowest personnel landing or level and the water's surface varies with tides (it also varies with sea states; the lowest platform or level below it can be submerged in high sea states). I have seen no evidence in the past 50 years of death or injuries to crew resulting from jumping from the designed personnel landing as a means of emergency escape.

e. The intent of reference (a) is to ensure crew members can escape from the platform without further endangering themselves from a large drop. Given this I determined that an equivalent level of safety with references (a) and (b) is achieved when two primary means of escape extend from the uppermost platform level that contains living quarters or that personnel occupy continuously to the lowest designed personnel landing required by 33 CFR 143.105 or level, when that level is below the personnel landing. The distance between the water level and the lowest landing or level at the time of inspection should not be excessive in the judgment of the inspector. The best way to determine effective means of escape in an emergency scenario is the evacuation drill described in reference (h).

f. The OOC developed a guidance document, reference (i), which I find a useful aid for determining compliance with references (a) and (b).

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Subj: MEANS OF ESCAPE ON FIXED PLATFORMS

3. **POLICY**: If an Eighth District Coast Guard marine inspector is on a manned fixed platform that has not had an emergency evacuation drill witnessed by a Coast Guard or BSEE inspector in over a year, the inspector must witness a drill (weather and operations permitting) prior to departing the facility. Inspectors will consider primary means of escape that extend to the lowest designed personnel landing required by 33 CFR 143.105 or level below it as compliant with references (a) and (b). Inspectors should refer to reference (i) for additional explanation and illustration of primary means of escape on fixed platforms. Where the lowest designed personnel landing or level below it is inaccessible due to lack of maintenance, the inspector should issue a deficiency to rectify to the satisfaction of the OCMI.

4. **POINT OF CONTACT**: Questions regarding this policy may be directed to any member of my staff at (504) 671-2268.

#

Dist: BSEE New Orleans District
BSEE Houma District
BSEE Lafayette District
BSEE Lake Charles District
BSEE Lake Jackson District
Sector Mobile
Sector New Orleans
MSU Morgan City
Sector Houston/Galveston
MSU Port Arthur
MSU Texas City
Sector Corpus Christi

Copy: COMDT (CG-CVC)
OCS National Center of Expertise
D8(dp)
BSEE GOM Region
Offshore Operators Committee

# OOC Guidance: Fixed Platform Means of Escape

## 1 Regulatory Background & Intent

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) under 33 CFR 143.101 outlines required means of escape from fixed offshore platforms. These requirements cover manned and unmanned OCS facilities with the intent to provide offshore workers at least two means of escape from a fixed platform in the event of an emergency. The intent of the regulation is not to have stairways or ladders that extend into the water, but to enable accessibility to a personnel landing or level closest to the water surface. These escape paths must be free of obstructions and maintained in a safe condition at all times.

## 2 Means of Escape

There are two categories for means of escape, primary and secondary.

### 2.1 Primary Means of Escape (PME)

A primary means of escape must be a fixed stairway or a fixed ladder of metal construction, which is accessible from the uppermost deck level that contains living quarters or that personnel occupy continuously, to each successively lower working level and then to the personnel landing.

### 2.2 Secondary Means of Escape (SME)

A secondary means of escape can be either the same as a primary means or portable, flexible ladders, knotted man ropes or other devices approved by the OCMI that extend from the uppermost working level to or beyond the elevation of the personnel landings.

***For single well caissons, a Secondary Means of Escape (SME) can be jumping from the work deck if it is: (a) no more than 20-feet by 20-feet (or 400 square feet) in size, and (b) no more than 20-feet above mean low water.***

## 3 Requirements for Means of Escape

### 3.1 Manned OCS Fixed Platforms

Each manned OCS fixed platform must have at least two Primary Means of Escape.

### 3.2 Unmanned OCS Fixed Platforms

Each unmanned OCS fixed platform must have at least one Primary Means of Escape. When personnel are on board, you must also have at least one Secondary Means of Escape in addition to the one Primary Means of Escape.

### 3.3 Functional Demonstration (Drills)

The USCG or designee may require personnel to demonstrate adequate and functional primary means of escape. This functional demonstration may include the movement along the escape path(s) to the personnel landing.

***This functional escape demonstration does not include entering the water or demonstration of Secondary Means of Escape. Equipment associated with Secondary Means of Escape is subject to inspection upon request of USCG or their designee.***


EXAMPLE: Manned Fixed Platform
2 PME
PME - Stairs
Personnel Landing
PME - Stairs
Personnel Landing


EXAMPLE: Unmanned Fixed Platform
1 PME, 1 SME
PME - Stairs
Personnel Landing
SME – Ladder & Knotted Rope

reference (a)



person who placed the tags, that person's immediate supervisor, or their respective reliefs.

[CGD 79–077, 51 FR 25059, July 10, 1986; 51 FR 28382, Aug. 7, 1986]

# PART 143—DESIGN AND EQUIPMENT

## Subpart A—General

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143.1 Purpose.
143.15 Lights and warning devices.

## Subpart B—OCS Facilities

143.100 Applicability.
143.101 Means of escape.
143.105 Personnel landings.
143.110 Guards and rails.
143.120 Floating OCS facilities.

## Subpart C—Mobile Offshore Drilling Units

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143.201 Existing MODUs exempted from new design requirements.
143.205 Requirements for U.S. and undocumented MODUs.
143.207 Requirements for foreign MODUs.
143.208 Hazardous location requirements on foreign MODUs.
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## Subpart D—Vessels

143.300 Applicability.
143.301 Load line requirements.
143.302 Hazardous location requirements on foreign vessels engaged in OCS activities.

## Subpart E—Standby Vessels

143.400 Applicability.
143.401 Vessel certification and operation.
143.405 Equipment.
143.407 Manning.

AUTHORITY: 43 U.S.C. 1333(d)(1), 1348(c), 1356; 49 CFR 1.46; section 143.210 is also issued under 14 U.S.C. 664 and 31 U.S.C. 9701.

SOURCE: CGD 78–160, 47 FR 9382, Mar. 4, 1982, unless otherwise noted.

## Subpart A—General

### § 143.1 Purpose.

This part prescribes design and equipment requirements for units engaged in OCS activities.

### § 143.15 Lights and warning devices.

(a) OCS facilities must meet the lights and warning devices requirements under part 67 of this chapter concerning aids to navigation on artificial islands and fixed structures.

(b) Vessels, including attending vessels but excluding MODUs under paragraph (a) of this section, must meet the lights and warning devices requirements under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 or under local rules provided for in Rule 1 of those Regulations.

[CGD 78–160, 47 FR 9382, Mar. 4, 1982, as amended by USCG–1998–3799, 63 FR 35530, June 30, 1998]

## Subpart B—OCS Facilities

### § 143.100 Applicability.

This subpart applies to OCS facilities except mobile offshore drilling units.

### § 143.101 Means of escape.

(a) "Primary means of escape" shall be fixed stairways or fixed ladders of metal construction.

(b) "Secondary means of escape" shall be types approved for "primary means of escape" or portable, flexible ladders, knotted man ropes, and other devices satisfactory to the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection.

(c) Manned OCS facilities shall be provided with at least two "primary means of escape" extending from the uppermost platform level that contains living quarters or that personnel occupy continuously, to each successively lower working level and to the water surface. Working levels without living quarters, shops, or offices in manned facility structural appendages, extensions, and installations that personnel occupy only occasionally shall be provided with one "primary means of escape" and, when necessary in the opinion of the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, one or more "secondary means of escape."

(d) Unmanned OCS facilities shall be provided with at least one "primary means of escape" extending from the uppermost platform working level to each successively lower working level

reference (a)



and to the water surface. When personnel are on board, unmanned facilities shall also be provided with one or more "secondary means of escape," but not more than one will be required for every 10 persons extending from the uppermost working level of the facility to each successively lower working level and to the water surface, excluding facility appendages and installations, unless "secondary means of escape" from such appendages and installations are necessary in the opinion of the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection.

(e) "Means of escape" shall be suitably accessible to personnel for rapid facility evacuation.

(f) When two or more "means of escape" are installed, at least two shall be located as nearly diagonally opposite each other as practicable unless such requirement is unreasonable or impracticable in the opinion of the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection.

### § 143.105 Personnel landings.

(a) Sufficient personnel landings shall be provided on each manned OCS facility to assure safe access and egress. When due to special construction personnel landings are not feasible, then suitable transfer facilities to provide safe access and egress shall be installed.

(b) The personnel landings shall be provided with satisfactory illumination. The minimum shall be one-foot candle of artificial illumination as measured at the landing floor and guards and rails.

### § 143.110 Guards and rails.

(a) Except for helicopter landing decks which are provided for in paragraph (b) of this section, and areas not normally occupied, the unprotected perimeter of all floor or deck areas and openings shall be rimmed with guards and rails or wire mesh fence. The guard rail or fence shall be at least 42 inches high. The two intermediate rails shall be so placed that the rails are approximately evenly spaced between the guard rail and the floor or deck area: *Provided,* That if a toe board is installed then one of the intermediate rails may be omitted and the other rail placed approximately half way between the top of the toe board and the top guard rail.

(b) The unprotected perimeter of the helicopter landing deck shall be protected with a device of sufficient strength and size as to prevent any person from falling from such deck.

(c) Each catwalk and each stairway shall be provided with a suitable guard rail or rails, as necessary.

### § 143.120 Floating OCS facilities.

(a) Before construction is started on a proposed floating OCS facility, the owner or operator of the facility must submit to the Coast Guard for approval all plans and information listed in subpart C of 46 CFR part 107 which relate to the facility. All plans and information must be submitted according to the procedures in that subpart.

(b) The facility must comply with the requirements of subchapters F (Marine Engineering) and J (Electrical Engineering) of 46 CFR chapter I and 46 CFR part 108 (Design and Equipment). Where unusual design or equipment needs make compliance impracticable, alternative proposals that provide an equivalent level of safety may be accepted. These requirements do not apply to production systems on the facility.

(c) The Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, determines whether a floating OCS facility meets the requirements of paragraph (b) of this section and issues a certificate of inspection for each facility which meets these requirements. Inspection of the facility may be required as part of this determination.

(d) Each floating OCS facility that is constructed after April 2, 2018 must comply with the requirements of 46 CFR subpart 111.108 prior to engaging in OCS activities.

[CGD 78–160, 47 FR 9382, Mar. 4, 1982, as amended by USCG–2012–0850, 80 FR 16990, Mar. 31, 2015]

## Subpart C—Mobile Offshore Drilling Units

### § 143.200 Applicability.

This subpart applies to mobile offshore drilling units when engaged in OCS activities.

### 6. Lifesaving/ Firefighting Equipment

a. Variances. BSEE consults with the local OCMI to determine suitable options, temporary measures or restrictions during the repair or replacement of required firefighting equipment and lifesaving appliances. BSEE initiates this process with the local OCMI. In cases where the owner/operator contacts the Coast Guard directly, BSEE shall be notified immediately.

b. Approval process. The Coast Guard shall continue to approve equipment for use on fixed offshore facilities and publish the list of approved equipment in the Federal Register and COMDTINST M16714.3 (Series) in accordance with 33 CFR 140.15(b). The Coast Guard shall also notify BSEE of any newly approved equipment and provide training as needed.

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### 7. Catwalks – Manned Platforms

33 CFR 143.101 (c) requires all manned OCS facilities be provided with at least two primary means of escape extending to the water. 33 CFR 143.101 (a) defines primary means of escape as fixed stairways or ladders of metal construction. For OCS facilities that are connected to adjacent facilities by bridges, or catwalks which allow free access from one facility to another, the catwalk may serve as one of the primary means of escape provided:

a. The catwalk leads to another location that provides a primary means of escape extending to the water, and

b. There is a sufficient amount of primary lifesaving gear per 33 CFR 144.01-1 or 144.01-15 at this alternate location to accommodate 100% of the personnel onboard the manned facility if they cross the catwalk and egress to the water via this alternate escape route.

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### 8. Single Well Caissons – Unmanned Platforms

33 CFR 143.101(d) requires unmanned OCS facilities be provided with one primary means of escape and, when personnel are onboard and one secondary means of escape for every 10 persons onboard. In the case of small single-well caisson type facilities, the primary means of escape is usually a fixed ladder from the topside structure (work deck) to the waterline. Since the work deck on these platforms is typically very small, a worker cannot become trapped far from the primary escape route. Furthermore, the risk to workers attending these facilities is quite low because there is usually very little processing equipment onboard, plus the limited frequency and duration in which personnel visit these facilities further lessens the risk. Taking all this into consideration, a

single-well caisson type facility must have one primary means of escape but will not be required to have a secondary means of escape, even when workers are on the platform, provided:

a. The work deck is no more than 20 ft x 20ft (or 400 square feet) in size, and

b. The work deck is no more than 20 ft above mean low water.

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**9. Swing Ropes and Knotted Man Ropes**

A primary means of escape shall be installed to meet the requirements in 33 CFR 143.101. A secondary means of escape shall be constructed and installed to the satisfaction of the cognizant OCMI. Item (8) of Fixed Platform Inspection Program, CCGD8INST 16711.1 (series) is the recommended standard for construction and maintaining man ropes and swing ropes. Particular attention should be given to man ropes and swing ropes due to weathering of the ropes and the dangers that are encountered when using these devices.

Man ropes should be replaced immediately if there is any evidence or wear, dry rot, mildew or ultraviolet deterioration. Swing ropes are subject to all the same considerations as man ropes.

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OFFSHORE OPERATORS COMMITTEE

September 18, 2015

reference (c)

Eighth Coast Guard District
OCS Division – OCMI
13th Floor, Room 1341
500 Poydras Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
Attn: Captain Reynolds

Dear Captain Reynolds,

One of our member companies brought to my attention a recent effort by the Coast Guard's OCS National Center of Expertise (OCS NCOE) to train Coast Guard and BSEE personnel on aspects of inspecting fixed offshore production platforms. The company representative I spoke with expressed some concern regarding information that was passed by the Coast Guard concerning escape/egress ladders. Specifically, that escape/egress ladders must extend below the water and no longer terminate above the surface of the water. The reasoning behind this was to provide access out of the water should someone fall in.

As you know, the regulatory intent of egress ladders is to provide a means off of the platform in case of emergency and there are no specific requirements to provide access back onto a platform via a fixed ladder. This very issue was the subject of further clarification by your office (then Captain Dan Ryan) back in June 2003. That letter is attached for your reference as well. It has also come to my attention that BSEE may start to actively enforce this "requirement" based on the information passed in the training.

I am concerned that information related to matters of interpretation of inspection issues, no matter how well-intended, may create unnecessary regulatory constraints for our members and could result in costly modifications for items that are not required by regulation or policy. As I'm sure you can well appreciate, the level of oversight the Coast Guard provides on fixed offshore platforms has largely waned since granting the authority to BSEE (then MMS) to inspect these structures on behalf of the Coast Guard in 2002. Since that time, there has been varying levels of interaction between the agencies with regard to the level of training the Coast Guard was to provide so that BSEE could better understand the items and systems under the purview of the Coast Guard. Further exacerbating this effort has been the continual loss of expertise of both Coast Guard and BSEE personnel as they rotate into and out of their respective positions.

While we welcome any effort the Coast Guard undertakes to help train BSEE in aspects of fixed platform inspections, we have concerns about the level of oversight or involvement that may or may not be provided by the actual regulatory authority which, in this case, is your office as the OCMI. Our understanding of the role of the OCS NCOE is that they support and advise the OCMI but they do not represent the OCMI and they do not necessarily have any OCMI authorities vested within their structure. If I have mischaracterized that relationship, please let me know.

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***TEXAS OFFICE***
*10777 Westheimer Rd., Suite 700*
*Houston, Texas 77042*
*(713) 589-6710 Office / (504) 455-0868 Fax*

In order for any effort to succeed that provides updated training on the aspects of items under Coast Guard jurisdiction on fixed platforms, it should have engagement and input from the industry. The OOC has the resources and historical perspective that can assist you with closing any perceived gaps in policy or regulation for fixed platform inspections. Some of these have been captured in legacy District Eight instruction letters; others may only be evident in letters to individual companies. Before any further training or development of jobs aids the Coast Guard may be working on to aid BSEE in fixed platform inspection, I respectfully request a meeting with you and representatives of the OSC NCOE. I would like to ensure that we move forward in manner that takes into account established regulation and policy guidance. Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

Evan H. Zimmerman
Executive Director
Offshore Operators Committee

c.c.: Mr. Lars Herbst, BSEE GOMR

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16613
9 June 2003


Mr. Don Howard
Minerals Management Service
1201 Elmwood Park Blvd.
New Orleans, La 70123

Dear Mr. Howard

I am writing this letter to provide policy guidance on two inspection issues relating to offshore production platforms, specifically lifeboat davits and means of egress. This policy applies to fixed production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, within the boundaries of the Eighth Coast Guard District.

Lifeboat Davits:

I understand your inspectors have found about 40 lifeboat davits that do not have any markings or documentation to indicate they were approved by the USCG. As you know, 33 CFR 144.01 requires manned platforms to have life floats with sufficient capacity to accommodate all of the personnel onboard. Per 33 CFR 144.01-15, lifeboats may be substituted for the life floats and if installed they must have an approved means of launching (i.e. approved davits). For existing davit installations that do not have any approval markings or documentation, it will be acceptable to require them to be weight tested to 1.1 times the full load weight ("B" weight) of the lifeboat to ensure the integrity of the davits. Details on how to conduct this weight test can be found in the USCG's Marine Safety Manual, Volume II, Section B, Chapter 1, Part P.2.a.(3). You can access this manual on the internet: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nmc/pubs/msm/vol2.htm, but for your convenience I have included this specific guidance as enclosure (1). The testing of the davits should be conducted as soon as practical, and the record of this test should be retained on the platform to be furnished at an inspector's request.

Also, please note that the lowering cables, or falls, on the davits must be replaced at intervals not to exceed five years, and whenever the falls are replaced a weight test to 1.0 times the full load weight ("B" weight) of the lifeboat is required. This requirement can be found in Part 6(d) of Enclosure (2) in the Eighth District Instruction entitled "Fixed Platform Inspection Program," which is provided as enclosure (2) to this letter.

Means of Escape:

a. Catwalks: I understand a question has arisen as to whether a catwalk can be considered one of the primary means of escape for a manned platform. As you know, 33 CFR 143.101(c) requires all manned OCS facilities to be provided with at least two "primary means of escape" extending to the water, and 143.101(a) defines "primary means of escape" as fixed stairways or ladders of metal construction. For OCS facilities that are connected to adjacent OCS facilities by bridges, or "catwalks", which allow free access from one facility to another, the catwalk may serve as one of the primary means of escape provided:

16613
9 June 2003

(i) The catwalk leads to another location that provides a primary means of escape extending to the water, and
(ii) There is a sufficient amount of primary lifesaving gear, per 33 CFR 144.01-1 or 144.01-15, at this alternate location to accommodate 100% of the personnel onboard the manned platform if they cross the catwalk and egress to the water via this alternate escape route.

This policy supercedes the guidance put forth in Part 1(b) of Enclosure (2) in the Eighth District Instruction "Fixed Platform Inspection Program," provided as enclosure (2) to this letter, that indicates catwalks can only be considered as secondary means of escape.

b. Single-Well Caissons: I understand a question has arisen as to whether a single-well caisson can be exempted from the requirement for a secondary means of escape. As you know, 33 CFR 143.101(d) requires unmanned OCS facilities to be provided with one primary means of escape and, when personnel are onboard, one secondary means of escape for every 10 persons onboard. In the case of small "single-well caisson" type platforms, the primary means of escape is usually a fixed ladder that the personnel climb to reach the topside structure (work deck) from the water. Since the work deck on these platforms is typically very small in size, a worker cannot become trapped far from the primary escape route. If for some reason the ladder is not accessible, as long as the work deck is not too high above the water then a reasonably safe alternative for emergency egress is to jump into the water. Furthermore, the risk to workers attending these facilities is quite low because there is usually very little processing equipment onboard, plus the limited frequency and duration in which personnel visit these facilities further lessens the risk. Taking all this into consideration, we will allow a single-well caisson type platform to have one primary means of escape but no secondary means of escape provided:
(i) The work deck is no more than 20ft x 20ft (or 400 square feet) in size, and
(ii) The work deck is no more than 20ft above mean low water.

Should you have any further questions, please contact Lieutenant Commander John Cushing of my staff at (504) 589-6260.

Sincerely,

D. F. RYAN II
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Chief, Marine Safety Division
By direction of the Commander
Eighth Coast Guard District

Encl: (1) Excerpt from USCG Marine Safety Manual, Vol. II, Section B, Chapter 1, Part P.2.a
(2) CCGD8INST 16711.1, dtd Mar 14, 1997, "Fixed Platform Inspection Program"

Copy: COMDT (G-MOC)
Am
D8 Coastal MSOs

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

ADDRESS REPLY TO:
COMMANDANT
U. S. COAST GUARD
HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MVI
(OFFSHORE PLATFORM
SOUTH TIMBALIER BLOCK
134-D1 a-8 Bd)
19 APR 1960

reference (e)

Commandant's Action

on

Marine Board of Investigation; explosion and fire on board OFFSHORE PLATFORM SOUTH TIMBALIER BLOCK 134-D1, Gulf of Mexico, 26 July 1959 with loss of life

1. The record of the Marine Board of Investigation convened to investigate subject casualty, together with its Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Recommendations has been reviewed.

2. At about 2330, 26 July 1959, an explosion and fire occurred on the OFFSHORE DRILLING PLATFORM SOUTH TIMBALIER BLOCK 134-D1, Gulf of Mexico when the well began to blow during the drilling operations. Of the 12 men on the platform, one drowned and two were seriously injured when they jumped from the upper level of the burning platform to the water. Five men suffered varying degrees of burns and four were unharmed. Damage to the rig was estimated to be $300,000.

3. The OFFSHORE DRILLING PLATFORM 134-D1, owned by the Gulf Oil Corporation, is a rectangular structure approximately 120 feet by 50 feet having three decks. Atop the platform was SALT DOME OIL RIG NO. 10, a two-deck structure consisting of the drilling derrick and living quarters. The living quarters were on the uppermost deck approximately 80 feet above the water surface. The RIG NO. 10 had previously been inspected by the Coast Guard in another location as an unmanned platform because at that time the crew was accommodated on an attending vessel. At the time of this casualty 5 of the 12 man crew were being quartered and subsisted on the rig. RIG NO. 10 was owned by the Salt Dome Production Company who was under contract to the Gulf Oil Company to drill the well.

4. At about 2330 the crew was drilling at a depth of 4,880 feet when drilling mud began spilling over the top of the mud pit indicating that the well was about to blow. Attempts to contain the pressure were unsuccessful and within a matter of seconds an explosion occurred and the escaping gas torched off. As the flames enveloped the top deck of the platform and the lower deck of the RIG NO. 10 the crew began to abandon

the structure. Of the men actively engaged in the drilling operation at the time four were able to reach the ladders leading to the boat landing platform and three slid down a four inch rubber sanitary discharge hose to the water when the escape route was cut off by the flame. There were five men in their quarters at the time of the explosion whose escape was blocked when the fire engulfed the single ladder leading from the quarters level to the deck below. All five donned life jackets which were stowed in their quarters and one man threw two or three additional jackets into the water for use by the others. Three men then jumped from the quarters level and the other two slid down the sanitary discharge hose although one fell off part way down. The three who jumped suffered the most serious injuries. The 67 year old cook apparently landed flat and as a result was rendered unconscious and drowned despite his life jacket. The other two entered the water in more favorable attitudes. The injuries they sustained were primarily to the chest and back.

5. A radio report of the fire was intercepted by the MV RIG SERVICE which was approximately 9 miles away on rig standby for another company. Without awaiting orders the master immediately directed his vessel to the scene and recovered seven men from the water and removed three men from the landing platform of the burning structure. The 11th survivor was picked up from the water by a Coast Guard vessel.

## REMARKS

1. The Board found that the explosion and fire resulted from the ignition of combustible gases escaping under pressure of the blowout. Although the source of ignition could not be determined sand abrasions in the bleeder line, hot exhaust lines from the diesel motors or an arc from the operating generators were suggested possibilities. In any event the cause is considered to have occurred solely within the scope of oil well drilling operations.

2. The Board's conclusion that the artificial island composed of the OFFSHORE PLATFORM SOUTH TIMBALIER BLOCK 134-D1 and the SALT DOME OIL RIG NO. 10 constituted a manned platform by virtue of the fact that five crew members were continuously living and being accommodated on board is concurred in. In accordance with the Board's recommendation the Commander, 8th Coast Guard District is hereby directed to refer the record in this case to the U. S. Attorney having jurisdiction for possible prosecution for the violations of the equipment requirements for manned platforms uncovered by this investigation.

3. The Board's recommendation for amendment to the regulations concerning the definition of artificial islands, (46 CFR 140.10-5); means of escape, (46 CFR 143.05-1); and the recommended promulgation of a new regulation to provide for additional emergency means of escape

for artificial islands will be referred to the Merchant Marine Council for study.

4. The recommendation that the Coast Guard seek legislation to authorize administrative penalties for violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 USC 1333) and regulations issued thereunder will be taken under consideration as a possible means of facilitating enforcement.

5. Appropriate recognition of the commendable action on the part of Junius J. LeBlanc, master of the tug MV RIG SERVICE, for his part in recovering the survivors will be given.

6. As further recommended by the Board, a copy of the record in this case will be forwarded to the Department of Interior for information.

7. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the record of the Marine Board of Investigation is approved.

[redacted]

A. C. RICHMOND
Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard
Commandant

reference (e)

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

ADDRESS REPLY TO
Commander
Eighth Coast Guard District
New Orleans, Louisiana

SEP 4 - 1959

From: Marine Board of Investigation
To: Commandant (MVI)
Via: Commander, 8th Coast Guard District

Subj: Explosion and fire on board Offshore Platform South Timbalier Block 134-D1, Gulf of Mexico, on 26 July, 1959, resulting in loss of life of Claude F. Bulliard, and injury to seven offshore oil rig workers

Findings of Fact:

1. At about 11:30 P.M., 26 July 1959, an explosion and fire occurred on board Offshore Platform South Timbalier Block 134-D1, Gulf of Mexico, resulting in the loss of life of Claude F. Bulliard and injuries to seven other personnel of the rig.

2. Offshore Platform South Timbalier Block 134-D1 is owned by Gulf Oil Corporation. This platform is located at 28 degrees, 37 minutes, 35.5 seconds North and 90 degrees, 14 minutes, 20.3 seconds West and had been placed in this location on 25 June 1959. A well was being drilled at this location for Gulf Oil Corporation by Salt Dome Production Company. Salt Dome had placed Salt Dome Oil Rig No. 10 atop Platform 134-D1 on about 5 July 1959 and commenced drilling operations on 13 July 1959. Neither the rig nor the platform had ever been inspected by the Coast Guard in its present location. The rig portion had been aboard Platform 132-A during November 1958 at which time an inspection had been made of that artificial island. At the time of that inspection (November 1958), the island was considered as an unmanned platform inasmuch as rig tender PELICAN furnished accommodations for personnel. In its present location, Platform 134-D did not have rig tender PELICAN alongside but instead did have persons aboard the rig who, actually and continuously, were living and accommodated thereon.

3. Lateral dimensions of the platform were approximately 120 feet by 50 feet. A general outline of the various levels of this island is shown in Exhibit A to the record. The uppermost level or quarters level is approximately eighty feet above the surface of the water.

4. Weather conditions at the time of this casualty were as follows: wind southeasterly, 15 to 20 miles per hour; clear, dark night, good visibility

with seas 4 to 6 feet. Weather conditions had no bearing on this casualty.

5. As a result of this casualty, Claude F. Bulliard, [redacted], male, [redacted] years of age, lost his life. Mr. Bulliard had been employed by General Marine Catering Service and was assigned to Platform 134-D1 as the cook. Next of kin is Mrs. [redacted], widow, residing at above address. Notification to next of kin was made by employers. At the time of his death Bulliard was apparently in good health.

6. Injured as a result of this casualty were the following men:

[redacted] - burns on arm, back and foot.

[redacted] - burns on face and arms.

[redacted] - burns on face and arms.

[redacted] - nausea due to swallowing sea water and minor burns.

[redacted] - minor burns to face and eyes.

[redacted] - back and chest injury.

[redacted] - back, leg and chest injuries.

7. Of the injured men, the most serious injuries were those suffered by [redacted]. These men were injured as a result of jumping from the quarters level of the island to the water, a distance of approximately 80 feet.

8. On the island at the time of the explosion and fire, there was a total of 12 men. Of these 12, one died, seven received injuries and four escaped unharmed.

9. At about 11:30 P.M., 26 July 1959, a drilling crew of six men employed by Salt Dome Production Company were drilling at a depth of 4,880 feet on the Salt Dome Rig No. 10 located on Platform 134-D. In charge of the drilling crew was [redacted]. Four of the drilling crew, including [redacted] were working on the rig floor, on which the drilling equipment is operated. Two men, [redacted] and [redacted] were working the level below the rig floor called the platform floor.

10. The first indication to any of the personnel of anything out of the ordinary drilling routine was when the drilling mud started to spill over the top of the mud pit. The derrick man, [redacted] who was working in

this area, proceeded up the ladder to notify the driller of this but saw that the driller was already aware that the well was "blowing" and was attempting to close the blow out preventers to control the blow. The driller was able to close the uppermost preventer called the hydril. This momentarily contained the pressure but within 2 or 3 seconds an explosion occurred on the platform level in the vicinity of the shell shaker and mud pit (indicated on Exhibit A). Immediately after this explosion the natural gas escaping was on fire and this fire covered most of the platform level and the rig floor. At about this time the driller was also attempting to close the other blowout preventers. The controls for these preventers are located on a single manifold and he succeeded in pulling the lever for one more preventer. However, this preventer, called the blind ram could not close as the drilling pipe in the casing was in its way. The ram did pinch the pipe but could not stop the pressure of the blowout.

11. As the fire enveloped the rig floor and platform level, all personnel on the rig started to abandon the island. Four men in the drilling crew were able to work their way down ladders at the back of the island to the landing platform. The back of the rig is the side on which the quarters are located. The two other men of the drilling crew were able to climb down a four inch rubber hose which was the toilet drain leading from the quarters to the water surface. The tool pusher, [redacted], who was the person in charge of the platform, had been asleep in the quarters when the well started to blow. He immediately dressed, grabbed a lifejacket and went down to the rig floor. By this time, however, the fire had started and he too, reached the water by climbing down the drain hose. Two other men who were in the quarters when the explosion occurred also used the drain hose as a means of escape.

12. The three remaining men, including the deceased, were also on the quarters level when the explosion occurred. Bulliard, who had been preparing food for the drilling crew when the casualty occurred, started to get some lifejackets out of the locker in the quarters. All persons who were in the quarters did manage to get life jackets on before they abandoned the rig. Bulliard did get a life jacket on himself and threw two or three additional jackets over the side for the men who he knew were below and unable to get one. Bulliard then proceeded to jump from the quarters level to the water. He was, however, unable to control himself during this fall of eighty feet and hit the water in a horizontal position, face down. He apparently never regained consciousness and as a result drowned with his life jacket on. The other two men who jumped managed to hit the water in a better attitude than Bulliard although both were injured as a result of the jump.

13. Six of the men who abandoned the rig worked their way in the water to a mooring buoy located 200 yards from the platform when they were able to

hang on until picked up by MV RIG SERVICE approximately two hours after the explosion. Three of the men did not have life jackets and were forced to stay on the landing platform of the rig, while it was burning, until they were picked up by MV RIG SERVICE. Two other men stayed in the water, floating free with life jackets on, until they were picked up. One of these was picked up by MV RIG SERVICE. The other was the last man to be picked up, after 3½ hours in the water, by CGC BLACKTHORN. The body of Claude F. Bulliard was picked up by MV SINCLAIR SERVICE and was later transferred to CGC BLACKTHORN.

14. MV RIG SERVICE, with master [redacted] aboard was on rig standby duty for Sinclair Oil Company near a platform located approximately nine miles north of Block 134. Captain [redacted] heard the report of the casualty over the Sinclair radio circuit. He plotted the position of the casualty and proceeded immediately, without orders to the vicinity. Upon his arrival at the scene, Captain [redacted] took ten survivors aboard his vessel. To pick up three of these, it was necessary for Captain [redacted] to maneuver his vessel alongside the burning rig, with waves 4 to 6 feet present at the time.

15. The fire on the rig was extinguished on the day following the explosion. Monetary value of fire damage to the rig was estimated to be $300,000.00. An inspection of the rig revealed that a bleeder line which led from between two of the blowout preventers to the mud pit had holes in it as a result of sand abrasion when the well was blowing. This line was also found to have all valves open in the line. Drilling operations are carried on normally with this line closed.

16. The blowout preventers had been tested on the rig approximately three days before the casualty and were found to be in satisfactory condition. In the testing of these preventers, it was necessary to open and close the valves on the previously mentioned bleeder line. The Board was unable to obtain any other testimony as to whether or not these valves were closed or opened at any other time since the test.

17. On the island, two means of escape were available from every level, except the top or quarters level, to the surface of the water. There was only one means of escape from the quarters level to the rig floor. In the usual terminology of the offshore oil industry, however, the quarters would be considered as being on the "rig" which sits atop the "platform" and not therefore a part of the platform.

18. There were no life floats of any type on the structure at the time of this casualty. There were a sufficient number of approved life rings with lights, and life preservers aboard.

19. There was no general alarm system on the structure.

20. There was no system of emergency signals established on the structure.

21. There was no station bill or muster list posted on the structure setting forth the special duties and duty stations of personnel for various emergencies.

Conclusions:

1. It is concluded that the cause of this casualty was the explosion and fire which resulted from the well blowing. The explosion had been caused by the ignition of combustible gases which escaped from the bleeder line under the pressure of the blowouts. The Board was unable to determine the exact cause of ignition but concludes that ignition probably resulted from one of the following causes (1) spark caused by sand abrasion in bleeder line as the well started to blow; (2) Hot exhaust lines from either the diesel engines or generators which were running at the time or (3) Arc or spark from the generators which were running at the time of the explosion and located on the same level as the mud pit.

2. It is concluded that Claude F. Bulliard died by drowning as a result of this casualty. It is further concluded that the primary cause of death must be considered to be the loss of consciousness as a result of falling 80 feet and striking the water in a horizontal attitude.

3. It is concluded that although the majority of injured personnel suffered burns of varying degrees, the most seriously injured personnel in this casualty were those men who jumped into the water from the quarters level.

4. It is concluded that, inasmuch as personnel were living and accommodated continuously on the island since its erection, this structure was a manned platform as defined by 33 CFR 140.10-25. Testimony of Gulf Oil Corporation area supervisor indicated that at some level of Gulf's organization it would have been known that personnel were living on the island. There is no question that Salt Dome Production Company was aware that personnel were living on the platform. Supervisory personnel from both companies indicated that it was their intention to eventually operate the platform with the rig tender PELICAN alongside. This intention, however, cannot alter the status of this island at the time of the casualty, i.e., a manned platform.

5. It is concluded that several violations of Rules and Regulations for Artificial Islands and Fixed Structures on The Outer Continental Shelf (33 CFR 140-146), were noted. These were:

a. There were no approved life floats on the manned platform in violation of 33 CFR 144.01-1.

b. There was no general alarm system on the manned platform in violation of 33 CFR 146.05-5.

c. No system of emergency signals had been established on the manned platform in violation of 33 CFR 146.05-10.

d. No station bill or muster list had been prepared and posted on the manned platform in violation of 33 CFR 146.05.

6. It is concluded that the above noted violations had no bearing on this casualty and none of the effects of the casualty can be considered as a result of any such violation.

7. It is concluded that no failure of any inspected material was involved in this casualty. It is concluded that inspected material, namely, the approved life preservers and life rings actually saved the lives of seven men who were in the water for periods varying from 2 to 3½ hours.

8. It is concluded that there was no actionable negligence on the part of any licensed or documented person, or of any Federal employee, involved in this casualty.

9. It is concluded that presence of only one means of escape from the quarters level to the rig floor cannot be considered a violation of 33 CFR 143.05. This requirement states "at least two means of escape shall be provided for each manned platform" and further that such means of escape ... "shall extend from the platform to the surface of the water...." The platform did have two fixed stairways from the rig floor to the surface of the water. As has been previously stated, the terminology of the oil industry defines the platform as the structure upon which the drilling rig and equipment are placed. Using this definition there is no question that there were two means of escape from the platform. Even if the Board were to conclude that the failure to provide two means of escape from the quarters level to the rig floor was a violation, it would also have to conclude that the presence of an additional means of escape would have had no bearing on this casualty.

10. It is concluded that the explosion and rapid spread of fire precluded the use of fire fighting equipment on the platform.

11. It is concluded that the actions of Captain [redacted], master of MV RIG SERVICE, were commendable in that he risked his life and vessel and contributed to the saving of lives. His actions were also commendable in that his actions were prompt and solely on his own initiative.

12. It is concluded that the enforcement of the regulations could be improved by the addition of civil or administrative penalties to the present possibility of criminal prosecution.

13. It is concluded that the violations noted in paragraph 5 must be considered to have been committed by both the Gulf Oil Corporation in the capacity of owner and for whom drilling operations were being conducted and also by Salt Dome Production Company inasmuch as that company was acting as an agent of Gulf Oil Corporation and did have immediate charge of the platform.

14. It is concluded that the presence of an additional emergency means of escape from the top of the island to the water, such as a knotted life line or a wire ladder extending from the platform might have prevented the death and serious injuries which were a result of this casualty. It is noted that in a similar casualty on Offshore Drilling Platform 45-E in the Gulf of Mexico, 15 October 1958, that the Marine Board of Investigation Report dated 4 December 1958 stated "many men received injuries from jumping into the water from a height of fifty or more feet." The possible value of such additional emergency means of escape was clearly shown in this instant casualty by the fact that five men did escape from the platform using a rubber drain hose in the same manner that a life line or wire ladder would be used.

Recommendations:

1. It is recommended that the matter of violations by Gulf Oil Corporation and Salt Dome Production Company be referred to the U. S. Attorney for possible action under the provisions of 43 USC 1333.

2. It is recommended that consideration be given to amending 33 CFR 143.05-1 to read "Means of escape shall be fixed stairways or fixed ladders. They shall be constructed of metal and shall extend from each level of the artificial island or fixed structure to the next lower level and from the lowest level to the surface of the water at the low range tidal mark."

3. It is recommended that consideration be given to amending 33 CFR 140.10-5 by adding the following sentence to the present wording "This also includes all fixed or mobile structures such as quarters, drilling rigs or derricks, etc., which are fixed to such building or platform."

4. It is recommended that the matter of additional emergency means of escape for artificial islands be made the subject of a study by the Merchant Marine Council.

5. It is recommended that consideration be given to the possibility of obtaining legislation to authorize administrative penalties for non-compliance with the safety regulations contained in 33 CFR 146.

6. It is recommended that recognition be given to the commendable actions of [redacted], master of MV RIG SERVICE, by a letter or other appropriate means.

7. It is recommended that a copy of this report be forwarded to the

Department of Interior for the information of that agency.

[redacted]
BRET H. BRALTER
Captain, U. S. Coast Guard
Chairman

[redacted]
JOHN F. KETTLER
Captain, U. S. Coast Guard
Member

[redacted]
Lieutenant, U. S. Coast Guard
Member and Recorder

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SEP 4 1959

**FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Marine Board of Investigation report of 4 September 1959**

From: Commander, 8th Coast Guard District
To: Commandant (MVI)

Subj: Explosion and fire on the SALT DOME PRODUCTION COMPANY DRILLING RIG NO. 10, Gulf of Mexico, 26 July 1959, with loss of life

1. Forwarded.

[redacted]
CARL B. OLSEN

terpret or apply sec 4 67 Stat 462 43 U S C 1333

SOURCE §§ 142 01 to 142 20 contained in CGFR 56-4 21 F R 902 Feb 9 1956

### § 142 01 Application

The provisions of this part shall apply to all artificial islands and fixed structures located on the outer continental shelf

### § 142 05 Inspection requirements

The Officer in Charge Marine Inspection, will perform or have performed the inspections of artificial islands or fixed structures within his area of jurisdiction to determine that the requirements in this subchapter are met These inspections will be at such time or times as he may deem necessary

### § 142 10 Scope of inspections

In the inspection of an artificial island or a fixed structure, the person assigned will inspect the lifesaving appliances firefighting equipment, emergency equipment observe emergency drills (if necessary) and otherwise satisfy himself that all provisions of the regulations in this subchapter have been complied with and that the emergency equipment is in good condition and satisfactory in every respect

### § 142 15 Deficiencies

Any deficiency will be reported to the owner The owner shall have the deficiency corrected as soon as practicable Any equipment required by the regulations in this subchapter found to be deficient or unsatisfactory by the person performing an inspection will be condemned Such condemned equipment shall be repaired or replaced as soon as practical Condemned lifesaving or firefighting equipment which cannot be satisfactorily repaired, shall be so mutilated that it cannot be used for the purpose for which it was originally intended

### § 142 20 Authority to perform inspections

Persons assigned to this work may at any time lawfully inspect an artificial island or fixed structure

## PART 143—CONSTRUCTION AND ARRANGEMENT

Subpart 143 01—General

Sec
143 01-1 Application
143 01-5 Scope of requirements

Subpart 143 05—Means of Escape

Sec
143 05-1 Types
143 05-5 Manned platform
143 05-10 Unmanned platform

Subpart 143 10—Personnel Landings

143 10-1 Manned platforms
143 10-5 Illumination

Subpart 143 15—Guards and Rails

143 15-1 Floor or deck areas and openings
143 15-5 Catwalks and stairways

AUTHORITY §§ 143 01-1 to 143 15-5 issued under sec 633 63 Stat 545 14 U S C 633 Interpret or apply sec 4 67 Stat 462, 43 U S C 1333

SOURCE §§ 143 01-1 to 143 15-5 contained in CFGR 56-4 21 F R 902 Feb 9 1956

## Subpart 143 01—General

### § 143 01-1 Application

The provisions of this part apply to all artificial islands and fixed structures

### § 143 01-5 Scope of requirements

No requirements are established with respect to the construction and arrangement of artificial islands and fixed structures except as necessary to comply with safety requirements contained in this subchapter

## Subpart 143 05—Means of Escape

### § 143 05-1 Types

Means of escape shall be fixed stairways or fixed ladders They shall be constructed of metal and shall extend from the platform to the surface of the water at the low range tidal mark

### § 143 05-5 Manned platform

At least two means of escape shall be provided for each manned platform

### § 143 05-10 Unmanned platform

At least one means of escape shall be provided for each unmanned platform

## Subpart 143 10—Personnel Landings

### § 143 10-1 Manned platforms

Sufficient personnel landings shall be provided on each manned platform to assure safe access and egress When due to special construction personnel landings are not feasible then suitable transfer facilities to provide safe access and egress shall be installed

### § 143 10-5 Illumination

The personnel landings shall be provided with satisfactory illumination

The minimum shall be one-foot candle of artificial illumination as measured at the landing floor and guards and rails

## Subpart 143 15—Guards and Rails

### § 143 15-1 Floor or deck areas and openings

(a) Except for helicopter landing decks which are provided for in paragraph (b) of this section, and areas not normally occupied, the unprotected perimeter of all floor or deck areas and openings shall be rimmed with guards and rails or wire mesh fence The guard rail or fence shall be at least 42 inches high The two intermediate rails shall be so placed that the rails are approximately evenly spaced between the guard rail and the floor or deck area *Provided,* That if a toe board is installed then one of the intermediate rails may be omitted and the other rail placed approximately half way between the top of the toe board and the top guard rail

(b) The unprotected perimeter of the helicopter landing deck shall be protected with a device of sufficient strength and size as to prevent any person from falling from such deck

### § 143 15-5 Catwalks and stairways

Each catwalk and each stairway shall be provided with a suitable guard rail or rails as necessary

# PART 144—LIFESAVING APPLIANCES

### Subpart 144 01—Manned Platforms

Sec

144 01-1 Life floats
144 01-5 Location and launching of life floats
144 01-10 Equipment for life floats
144 01-15 Alternates for life floats
144 01-20 Life preservers
144 01-25 Ring life buoys
144 01-30 First-aid kit
144 01-35 Litter
144 01-40 Emergency communications equipment

### Subpart 144 10—Unmanned Platforms

144 10-1 Life preservers
144 10-5 Ring life buoys
144 10-10 Other lifesaving appliances

AUTHORITY §§ 144 01-1 to 144 10-10 issued under sec 633 63 Stat 545 14 U S C 633 Interpret or apply sec 4 67 Stat 462 43 U S C 1333

SOURCE §§ 144 01 to 144 10-10 contained in CGFR 56-4 21 F R 903 Feb 9 1956 except as otherwise noted

## Subpart 144 01—Manned Platforms

### § 144 01-1 Life floats

Each manned platform shall be provided with at least two approved life floats The life floats shall have sufficient capacity to accommodate all persons present at any one time

### § 144 01-5 Location and launching of life floats

The life floats shall be distributed in accessible locations and mounted on the outboard sides of the working platform in such a manner as to be readily launched

### § 144 01-10 Equipment for life floats

(a) Each life float shall be provided with a painter This painter shall be a manila rope or equivalent, not less than 2¾ inches in circumference and of a length not less than three times the distance from the low water line to the deck or place where the life float is stowed

(b) An approved electric water light shall be provided for each life float The water light shall be attached to the life float by a lanyard not less than one fathom nor more than two fathoms in length The water light shall be mounted in a bracket so that when the life float is launched the water light will pull free of the bracket

(c) Two paddles shall be provided for each life float The paddles shall not be less than five feet nor more than six feet long The paddles shall be stowed in such a way that they will be readily accessible from either side of the life float when in the water

### § 144 01-15 Alternates for life floats

(a) Approved lifeboats, approved life rafts or approved inflatable life rafts may be used in lieu of approved life floats for either all or part of the capacity required When either lifeboats or life rafts are used approved means of launching will be required Inflatable life rafts when used, shall be distributed and mounted as required for life floats under § 144 01-5

(b) The equipment required for a lifeboat is a bailer boat hook bucket, hatchet, lantern, life line two life preservers, matches full complement of oars and steering oar painter, plug, and rowlocks, of the same type, kind and character as required for lifeboats carried on vessels engaged in navigating bays sounds and lakes other than the Great Lakes, and rivers

reference (g)



detached fuel tank. Therefore, until recently there was no need for any ventilation requirements for fuel tank compartments in outboard motorboats as fuel tanks were integral with the motors and carried outside the hulls of the vessels.

93. The authority to prescribe regulations regarding uninspected vessels (motorboats) is in R.S. 4405, as amended, 4462, as amended, and secs. 8, 17, 54 Stat. 165, as amended, 166, as amended; 46 U.S.C. 375, 416, 526g, 526p.

ITEM IX—ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS AND FIXED STRUCTURES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF

94. It is proposed to amend 33 CFR 143.05–1, 143.05–5, and 143.05–10 regarding emergency means of escape from artificial islands and fixed structures. These proposals were initiated as a result of the recommendations by the Marine Board of Investigation which investigated an explosion and fire on the "Offshore Platform Timbalier Block 134–01," Gulf of Mexico, July 26, 1959, with loss of life. It was the opinion of the Board as a result of the casualty that present regulations regarding means of escape required clarification. The Board determined that in this casualty there was only one means of escape from the quarters level to the rig floor but that there were two fixed stairways from the rig floor to the surface of the water. Since the terminology of the oil industry describes the platform as the structure on which the drilling rig and equipment are placed, this platform had two means of escape. Therefore, the purpose of this proposal is to amend regulations so that two means of escape are required from each level to the surface of the water. These proposals were considered and endorsed by the National Offshore Operations Panel at its meeting on February 7, 1961, at Washington, D.C.

95. The authority to prescribe regulations regarding artificial islands and fixed structures is in sec. 633, 63 Stat. 545; 14 U.S.C. 633. These regulations interpret or apply sec. 4, 67 Stat. 462; 43 U.S.C. 1333.

Dated: January 12, 1962.

[SEAL] J. A. HIRSHFIELD,
*Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard,*
*Acting Commandant.*

[F.R. Doc. 62–731; Filed, Jan. 22, 1962; 8:50 a.m.]

# DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

## Agricultural Marketing Service

## [ 7 CFR Part 26 ]

## GRAIN SORGHUM

### Official Grain Standards of the United States; Notice of Proposed Rule Making

*Correction*

In F.R. Doc. 62–368 appearing at page 409 of the issue for Saturday, January 13, 1962, the table in § 26.553 is corrected by changing the second entry under the Percent column headed "Heat-damaged kernels" to read ".5".

## [9 CFR Part 201]

## REGULATIONS UNDER PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT

### Notice That Amendments to Registration and Bonding Regulations and Related Regulations Are Under Consideration

On September 28, 1961, there was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (26 F.R. 9136), a notice that consideration was being given as to whether certain regulations under the Packers and Stockyards Act (9 CFR Part 201) should be amended or revised in view of the changes in current marketing conditions and the 1958 amendment to the Act which extended the scope of the Act in certain respects. The notification invited any interested persons who wished to do so to submit proposals with respect to changes in §§ 201.10 to 201.13, inclusive, concerning registrations, and §§ 201.29 to 201.34 inclusive, concerning market agency and dealer bonds (9 CFR 201.10–201.13, 201.29–201.34).

Recommendations which have been received from interested persons, if adopted, may require changes or revisions in regulations other than those specified in the notice of September 28, 1961. Specifically those regulations which may require changes are §§ 201.59, 201.60, 201.61, 201.66, 201.67, 201.68, 201.79, and 201.81, concerning certain trade practices and services of persons subject to the Act (9 CFR 201.59, 201.60, 201.61, 201.66, 201.67, 201.68, 201.79, and 201.81).

Any interested person who wishes to submit proposals and the reasons therefor, or comments with respect to these regulations may do so by filing them with the Director, Packers and Stockyards Division, Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington 25, D.C., not later than 30 days after publication hereof in the FEDERAL REGISTER. The time for filing proposals with respect to §§ 201.10–201.13 and 201.29–201.34 is hereby extended for the same period. Copies of the present regulations may be obtained on request from the Director. If it is decided after consideration of all proposals and comments received pursuant to this notice and consideration of all other relevant matters that the regulations should be amended a notice of proposed rule-making will be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER setting forth any specific proposed amendments. At that time all interested persons will have an opportunity to submit their views on such proposed amendments.

Done at Washington, D.C., this 17th day of January 1962.

CLARENCE H. GIRARD,
*Director,*
*Packers and Stockyards Division.*

[F.R. Doc. 62–707; Filed, Jan. 22, 1962; 8:46 a.m.]

## Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service

## [ 7 CFR Part 1064 [1] ]

[Docket No. AO–23–A20 and AO–23–A22]

## MILK IN GREATER KANSAS CITY MARKETING AREA

### Decision on Proposed Amendments to Tentative Marketing Agreement and to Order

*Correction*

In F.R. Doc. 61–12366, appearing at page 12710 of the issue for Friday, December 29, 1961, the following words should be inserted immediately preceding the signature of James T. Ralph: "Signed at Washington, D.C., December 22, 1961.".

# DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

## Wage and Hour Division

## [ 29 CFR Part 541 ]

## EXECUTIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROFESSIONAL EXEMPTIONS

### Notice of Proposed Rule Making

Section 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1)), provides an exemption from the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Act for any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions of the Department of Labor is authorized to define and delimit these terms. The regulations established pursuant to this authority are contained in 29 CFR Part 541. These regulations provide, among other things, that no person shall be considered a bona fide executive if he is paid less than $80 a week on a salary basis ($55 a week if employed in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands), and that no person shall be considered a bona fide administrative or professional employee if he is paid less than $95 a week on a salary or fee basis ($70 a week if employed in Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands). These regulations also contain special provisions for such employees who are paid $125 a week or more. The widespread increases in wage and payroll levels which have taken place since these salary tests were established in February, 1959, indicates that consideration should be given to further changes of these rates.

Accordingly, notice is hereby given of proceedings to be held on Monday, March 26, 1962, at 10 o'clock a.m., in Conference Room B, Departmental Auditorium, Constitution Avenue, between 12th and 14th Streets NW., Washington, D.C., before Hearing Examiner, Clifford P. Grant, at which time interested persons may submit oral data, views, or arguments on the following question: What, if any, changes should be made in 29 CFR 541.1(f), 541.2(e), and 541.3(e) with respect to the level

[1] Formerly Part 913.

OCS location where the owner or operator plans to perform OCS activities; or

(2) If the most recently submitted NOA, or NOA update, differs by less than 24 hours from the current estimated time of arrival, the owner or operator of the foreign floating facility must provide an updated NOA as soon as practicable but at least 12 hours before the floating facility arrives at the OCS location where owners or operators plan to perform OCS activities.

(f) *Towing vessels.* When a towing vessel controls a foreign floating facility required to submit an NOA under this subpart, the owner or operator of the towing vessel, or lead towing vessel if there is more than one, is responsible for submitting only one NOA containing the NOA information items required for towing vessels, under §146.405, and the foreign floating facility under paragraph (a) of this section.

(g) This section does not apply to a foreign floating facility merely transiting the waters superjacent to the OCS and not engaged in OCS activities.

[USCG–2008–1088, 76 FR 2261, Jan. 13, 2011]

### §146.105 General alarm system.

Each manned facility must have a general alarm system. When operated, this system shall be audible in all parts of the structure on which provided.

### §146.110 Emergency signals.

(a) The owner, the owner's agent, or the person in charge shall establish emergency signals to be used for calling the personnel to their emergency stations.

(b) The signal to man emergency stations shall be an intermittent signal on the general alarm system for not less than 10 seconds. The abandon facility signal shall be a continuous signal on the general alarm system.

### §146.115 Duties of personnel during an emergency.

(a) The owner, the owner's agent, or the person in charge shall assign to each person on a manned facility special duties and duty stations so that in event an emergency arises confusion will be minimized and no delay will occur with respect to the use or application of equipment required by this subchapter. The duties shall, as far as possible, be comparable with the regular work of the individual.

(b) The duties shall be assigned as necessary for the proper handling of any emergency, and shall include the following:

(1) The closing of air ports, watertight doors, scuppers, and sanitary and other discharges which lead through the facility's hull.

(2) The stopping of fans and ventilation systems.

(3) The donning of life preserves.

(4) The preparation and launching of life floats, lifeboats, or life rafts.

### §146.120 Manning of survival craft.

The owner, the owner's agent, or the person in charge shall assign a person to each life float, lifeboat, life raft, or survival capsule who shall be responsible for launching it in event of an emergency.

### §146.125 Emergency drills.

(a) Emergency drills shall be conducted at least once each month by the person in charge of the manned facility. The drill shall be conducted as if an actual emergency existed. All personnel should report to their respective stations and be prepared to perform the duties assigned to them.

(b) The person in charge and conducting the emergency drill shall instruct the personnel as necessary to insure that all persons are familiar with their duties and stations.

(c) *Emergency evacuation drills.* The following emergency evacuation drills must be conducted:

(1) At least once a year, all the elements of the Emergency Evacuation Plan (EEP) under §146.140 relating to the evacuation of personnel from the facility must be exercised through a drill or a series of drills. The drill(s) must exercise all of the means and procedures listed in the EEP for each circumstance and condition described in the EEP under §146.140(d)(9).

(2) At least once a month, a drill must be conducted that demonstrates the ability of the facility's personnel to perform their duties and functions on the facility, as those duties and functions are described in the EEP. If a

reference (h)



standby vessel is designated for that facility in the EEP, the vessel must be positioned as described in the EEP for an evacuation of that facility and the vessel's crew must demonstrate its ability to perform its duties and functions under the EEP.

(d) The date and time of such drills shall be reported in writing by the person in charge at the time of the drill to the owner who shall maintain this report record for a year and furnish it upon request to the Coast Guard. After one year, such records may be destroyed. When it is impossible to conduct emergency drills as required by this section during a particular calendar month, during the following month, a written report by the owner shall be submitted to the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, stating why the drills could not be conducted.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 1625–0018)

[CGD 78–160, 47 FR 9383, Mar. 4, 1982, as amended by CGD 84–098b, 54 FR 21572, May 18, 1989; USCG–2006–25150, 71 FR 39209, July 12, 2006]

### § 146.130 Station bill.

(a) The person in charge of each manned platform shall be responsible for and have prepared a station bill (muster list). This station bill must be signed by the person in charge. Copies shall be duly posted in conspicuous locations on the manned platform.

(b) The station bill shall set forth the special duties and duty stations of each member of the personnel for any emergency which involves the use or application of equipment required by this subchapter. In addition, it shall contain all other duties assigned and considered as necessary for the proper handling of other emergencies.

(c) The station bill shall contain the various signals to be used for calling the personnel to their emergency stations, and to abandon the facility.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB control number 2115–0542)

[CGD 78–160, 47 FR 9383, Mar. 4, 1982, as amended by CGD 86–011, 51 FR 5712, Feb. 18, 1986]

### § 146.135 Markings for emergency equipment.

(a) Markings shall be provided as considered necessary for the guidance of persons on manned facilities.

(b) The general alarm bell switches shall be identified by red letters at least one inch high with a contrasting background: "General Alarm."

(c) All general alarm bells shall be identified by a sign at each bell in red letters at least one inch high with a sharp contrasting background: "General Alarm—When Bell Rings Go to Your Station.

(d) All life floats, lifeboats, life rafts, and survival capsules, together with paddles or oars, shall be conspicuously marked with a name or number of, or other inscription identifying, the facility on which placed. The number of persons allowed on each life float, lifeboat, or life raft shall be conspicuously marked thereon in letters and numbers 1½ inches high. These numbers shall be placed on both sides of the life float, lifeboat, or life raft. Inflatable life rafts shall be marked in accordance with Subpart 160.051 of 46 CFR Part 160 and no additional markings are required.

(e) All life preservers and ring life buoys shall be marked with the name or number of, or other inscription identifying, the facility on which placed except those which accompany mobile crews to unmanned platforms may be marked with the operator's name and field designation.

### § 146.140 Emergency Evacuation Plan.

(a) The operator of each manned OCS facility shall develop an Emergency Evacuation Plan (EEP) for the facility which addresses all of the items listed in paragraph (d) of this section. The EEP may apply to more than one facility, if the facilities are located in the same general geographic location and within the same Coast Guard Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI) zone; if each facility covered by the EEP is specifically identified in the EEP; and if the evacuation needs of each facility are accommodated. The EEP must be submitted to the OCMI having jurisdiction over the facility, 30 days before placing the facility in operation. The OCMI reviews the EEP to