

# PROCEEDINGS OF THE MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, March 11, 1952.

This copy for not less than 20 readers. PASS IT ALONG.

CG 129



May 1952



Vol. 9



STATION	LOCATION
ABLE	62-00 N 33-00 W
BAKER	56-30 N 51-00 W
CHARLIE	52-45 N 35-30 W
DOG	44-00 N 41-00 W
EASY	35-00 N 48-00 W
HOW	36-00 N 70-00 W
ITEM	59-00 N 19-00 W
JIG	52-30 N 20-00 W
KING	45-00 N 16-00 W
MIKE	66-00 N 02-00 E

# MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL

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*Chief Counsel*

For each meeting two District Commanders and three Marine Inspection Officers are designated as members by the Commandant.

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Cover Picture: Present Weather and Air Sea Rescue Stations Manned Under International Agreement

# NATIONAL MARITIME DAY 1952

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the American Merchant Marine, in helping to maintain the flow of international trade and travel, is under mounting responsibilities in connection with the determined efforts of our Nation to strengthen the forces of freedom; and

WHEREAS, through the construction of new passenger liners, cargo ships, and tankers, the American Merchant Marine has made significant progress during the past year in expanding the Nation's maritime facilities; and

WHEREAS the Congress by joint resolution approved May 20, 1933 (48 Stat. 73), designated May 22 as National Maritime Day, thus honoring the Merchant Marine by commemorating the departure from Savannah, Georgia, on May 22, 1819, of *The Savannah*, on the first transoceanic voyage by any steamship, and requested the President to issue a proclamation annually calling for the observance of that day:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of America, do hereby urge the people of the United States to observe Thursday, May 22, 1952, as National Maritime Day by displaying the flag of the United States at their homes or other suitable places, and direct the appropriate officials of the Government to arrange for the display of the flag on all Government buildings on that day. I also request that all ships sailing under the American flag dress ship on that day in honor of our Merchant Marine.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 30th day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-sixth.

[SEAL]

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

By the President:

DEAN ACHESON,  
*Secretary of State.*

# WE SAIL TOGETHER

Start talking about the sea and the average youngster scrambles to rapt attention, or perches on an unprotected knee, while wide-eyed his fertile mind races to adventure. Mention your latest cruise and the housewife dreamily clatters the dishes as she sails into the placid, azure blue, intermittently laced with the silver of a tropical moon. Such is the fascination of the uninitiated. To them the sea is the fulfillment of a dream. But, there is more to this mysterious mistress.

From time to time we hear of ships that vanish at sea, founder due to an unknown cause, or are found abandoned under circumstances so strange as to baffle the seaman and the land-lubber alike. What happens then?

Take the case of the Spanish ship, *Fey Antonia*. It was found abandoned off the Ceylon coast just before the end of the 19th century. Her log indicated her position to be 1000 miles east of where she was found. Except for two dead negroes found on board, there was no sign of a crew, yet it was officially established that there had been no negroes aboard her when she sailed from a port in the Philippines.

Another mystery is recorded in the Netherland Board of Trade files. The ship, *Phoebus*, while en route from Middlesborough to New York, found a ship of Dutch origin abandoned in the middle of the Atlantic. This was in 1907. Only one boat was found aboard, the rest having vanished. The ship's clocks were going, the bunks were tidy, and in the saloon a still burning light indicated that the ship had not been deserted very long. Although the build of the ship was unmistakable there was no name anywhere to be found. Even the ship's papers, which showed that there were 30 men aboard, failed to give the name of the ship.

Another case to be considered is that found in the shipping files in North-west Australia regarding a large Tasmanian built schooner-ketch which was found abandoned on the shores of one of the Isles of the Lacapedi Archipelago. Congealed blood marked the decking near the shattered wheel. There was chaos everywhere. The cabins had been stripped and there were signs of either a mutiny or some kind of fight. But, there were no ship's papers aboard and absolutely nothing to show who she was.

We have all heard of instances where crews have abandoned their ship because it seemed to be a total loss, only to have the same ship seen time and time again in later months or years. The American schooner, *Star*,

was one of these. When she struck a submerged reef the captain and the crew of 13 were unanimous in agreeing that she was beyond salvage and abandoned ship. Yet many months afterwards she was seen on several occasions. Various reports placed her in different localities, some as far as thousands of miles away. This occurred over a period of 4 years until she finally went aground for the last time near the place where she first foundered.

Perhaps one of the most perturbing sea dramas occurred in February 1948. Radio silence was broken with an urgent S. O. S. from the *S. S. Ourang Medan*, a Dutch vessel, then proceeding through the Straits of Malacca. The strange distress call, transmitted in Morse Code, eerily read, "S. O. S. from *Ourang Medan* \* \* \* we float. All officers, including the Captain, dead in chartroom and on the bridge. Probably whole of crew dead \* \* \*." A few confused dots and dashes later two words came through clearly. They were "I die." Then, nothing more. Later the *Ourang Medan* was found adrift approximately 50 miles from her indicated position. When the vessel which had stumbled across her sent a boat over to investigate, the sailors swarming aboard the *Ourang Medan* found a sight seldom seen. There wasn't a living person or creature on board. There were dead men every where. Bodies were strewn about the decks, in the passageways, in the charthouse, on the bridge. Sprawled on their backs, the frozen faces upturned to the sun with mouths gaping open and eyes staring, the dead bodies resembled horrible caricatures. Even the ship's dog was found dead. Yet, the bodies seemed to bear no sign of injury or wounds. Then, when a fire was discovered in No. 4 hold, she had to be abandoned. A few minutes later an explosion followed and the *Ourang Medan* sank. To this day no explanation has been offered as to what might have happened to the unfortunate ship's company.

Too often these and similar instances have been dismissed with a shrug. Admittedly, such cases emphasize the unusual. Except that they seem to perturb mankind they perhaps have little value other than to add color to the annals of the sea, because the explanation rests upon the unknown. Nevertheless, the fact that they do make people think is important for unfortunately safeguards ordinarily seem to follow the anguished cries of "Why? and How?" in the wake of some marine tragedy. It

appears to be human nature to glide blissfully along, taking pride in the Merchant Marine, commercializing it, building it up in size, but neglecting to take steps to protect it or the men that sail the individual ships. Then when some major tragedy occurs there is a tremendous wave of public indignation to mark the body strewn trail over the ocean depths. During the panic filled uproar, public demand forces previously neglected consideration of maritime safety measures.

Consider the *Titanic*. More recent than most of the previously mentioned cases, more shocking than any previously known, it led to a common interest between diverse nationalities, whereby presently preventive measures to safeguard the world's seagoing heritage are quite common.

Proceeding peacefully en route to New York, with Southampton well behind her, the *Titanic* unknowingly approached a field of icebergs, while proceeding swiftly through the oil calm waters. Laden with passengers, considered unsinkable, rampant rumors that she had struck an iceberg and was sinking found an unbelieving public.

As rumor became fact, it developed that the star-sprinkled sky had failed to reveal a low lying iceberg in the *Titanic's* path. Hitting it with a glancing blow on the starboard bow, no damage was immediately apparent. Then upon sounding the bilges it was found the vessel was sinking. The ship's officers desperately signaled a nearby vessel to no avail. Flares failed to catch her attention. Pleas for aid on the relatively new wireless went unheard, though they were intercepted by other vessels hundreds of miles away. Range lights skirting the horizon she proceeded into the darkness to the *Titanic's* dismay.

On board the *Titanic* word was passed to abandon ship. Life jackets were passed out; the boats put over. While fortunate survivors scurried to safety the majestic vessel leisurely sucked the ocean brine into its innards, its lights marking its end and darkness. Next morning when the *Carpathia* came upon the scene she found little to mark the tragedy. Except for gently rolling boats containing the survivors, the iceberg strewn waters gave no indication that it had devoured hundreds of souls. Only one bloated body marred the scene.

April 14th, 1912, a day indelibly burned into the minds of all.

As a result of the huge loss of lives on the *Titanic*, Congress adopted a joint resolution proposing that an in-

ternational maritime conference be held for the purpose of providing enforced rules which would prevent disasters in the future. In 1914, in answer to this resolution, and reinforced by world sentiment, the British Government called the first Safety of Life at Sea Conference by that title. It was held in London and attended by Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Russia and the Netherlands. It provided that passenger ships should have minimum standards of sub-divisions, minimum loadage and lifesaving appliances; required the use of radio; established the International Ice Patrol; revised and amplified the Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (RPC); and recommended the use of fixed routes on the North Atlantic run. The final act was signed by all of the participating nations, but owing to the first World War and other causes, it was not brought into force as a Convention, though parts of it were put into force by individual nations under their own national laws. In the United States, the La-Follette Seamen's Bill, enacted March 4, 1915, put into effect parts pertaining to lifeboat equipment and appliances.

After the termination of the war, there was a certain amount of agitation to hold another conference in order to bring the 1914 Convention up to date and to put it in full effect. However, it was not until 1929 that another conference was held.

The second Safety of Life at Sea Conference was convened in London on April 16, 1929, to which the United States sent a delegation composed of representatives of the American Steamship Owners Association, the National Council of American Shipbuilders, the American Bureau of Shipping, and members of the interested departments of the Government. Eighteen nations participated, of which all signed the final act.

This convention was drawn up in five chapters: ship construction, as primarily relating to water-tight subdivision; life-saving appliances; radiotelegraphy; safety of navigation; certificates. Although the United States was a signatory to the convention, it did not deposit its ratification in London until August 7, 1936, and the Treaty did not become effective as far as the United States was concerned until November 7, 1936 and then with certain reservations. The primary reason for the delay was caused by the protest of Andrew Furuseth, President of the International Seamen's Union. His objections were based on an apparent misconception of how the convention would affect

the legislative powers of Congress and certain laws relating to the welfare of seamen not coming within the terms of the convention.

When the United States did ratify the Convention, there was a feeling that its standards were already antiquated and that another convention should be convened. This, of course, was made impossible by the unstable political situation in Europe and the ensuing war.

In 1943, a special shipping committee was organized to advise the Secretary of State on shipping matters, especially with regard to postwar readjustments. Among other things, this committee recommended that it was most desirable that a Maritime Safety Conference be convened as soon as practicable because of the many new developments affecting shipping, particularly in the scientific field, since the 1929 Convention. The committee also recommended the establishment of a continuing technical committee, composed of members from all maritime nations, to study improved international standards of safety of navigation and to present them for adoption by the maritime nations. Because of the predominating administrative interest of the United States Coast Guard in safety of life at sea, the Commandant was designated as Chairman to coordinate the work of drawing up United States proposals for such a conference. Accordingly, in 1945, fourteen technical committees and one policy committee were constituted under the Commandant, bringing together over 200 individuals from all interested branches of the government and the maritime industry.

In the meantime, with the approval of the State Department, representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom held informal conversations in 1943 and agreed that as soon as possible after the close of World War II the United Kingdom would, in accordance with the provisions of the 1929 Convention, invite those nations party to that conference to attend a conference for its revision. Accordingly, on November 25, 1946 the United Kingdom officially invited the United States to attend a safety conference to be held in London on April 23, 1948. (The results of this conference will be discussed in detail in the forthcoming issues inasmuch as it will become effective as far as the United States is concerned during the month of November 1952.)

In the meantime the United Nations, already in the process of forming special agencies in special fields, explored the desirability of setting up such a specialized agency in the field of International Shipping where a

need seemed to be clearly indicated. The Transport and Communications Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations officially recommended that the United Nations sponsor the creation of an international maritime body, and, accordingly, the United Nations Maritime Conference was held at Geneva during the period February 19 to March 6, 1948, resulting in a draft convention for an Inter-governmental Consultative Organization (IMCO). The Geneva Conference recommended that the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea take into account in its deliberation the fact that such a body would probably come into early being. The Commandant of the Coast Guard and his various committees were fully in touch with these steps toward a permanent marine organization, and United States proposals were drawn up to fit within the frame work of that organization.

Whereas no single tragedy marks the development of load line legislation, and though entirely separate from that of safety of life at sea, it developed along similar lines and is closely related. Quite possibly the *Titanic* gave impetus to its development.

In former days, under the stress of competition, and probably in some cases due to the owner's cupidity, ships both properly and improperly constructed, were overloaded and sent to sea where, in the course of their voyages, gales and hurricanes were encountered, and due to lack of buoyancy, weakness of construction, or improper closing of the openings, many of these ships and crews were lost. Even if the vessel were not lost, a lack of buoyancy of the vessel and nearness of the working platform to the water would oftentimes cause the seas to come aboard and wash men overboard.

Public indignation against this condition crystallized first in England, and due to the efforts of Samuel Plimsoll, a member of Parliament who championed the sailor's cause, the first legal requirement for a load line was contained in the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1875. Mr. Plimsoll's name became so associated with load lines that English-speaking sailors all over the world refer to the load lines as the "Plimsoll mark."

This first legislation was not satisfactory, because as it was drawn, the owners themselves were required to place the load line mark at the point to which they considered the vessel could be safely loaded, presumably with the idea that a sailor looking at the mark would know whether a vessel, when fully loaded to this limit,

would be safe and, if he considered her unsafe, would refuse to ship on her.

The British Act of 1875, requiring load lines, was effective but for one year and applied only to foreign-going vessels. Apparently, imperfect though it was, it improved seagoing conditions, for in 1876, one year later, a further act was passed by the British Parliament that required the owners to place the load line mark upon every British ship except those under 80 tons register employed solely in the coastwise trade, fishing, and pleasure yachts. This remained a British law until 1890.

At the time the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1875 was passed, there was in effect the Merchant Shipping Act of 1873, authorizing the detainment of overlaid ships. As the load line mark was placed in any position by the owner, it was not a guide and the administrative officers, lacking standards, did not give much effect to detainment insofar as overloading was concerned. Notwithstanding the imperfections of the act, British Administrative officers and British classification societies continued to work for increased safety at sea. They investigated casualties and compiled data to the end that improper conditions could be corrected. From this data tables of freeboards were prepared and published by the British Board of Trade and by Lloyd's Register of Shipping in 1882. These were used as guides by administrative officers in preventing overloading and by insurers of the ship and cargo.

These tables of freeboards, which were observed by the majority of shipowners, served only as a guide, and could not be directly enforced, but the experience gained was sufficient to prevail on Parliament to pass the Merchant Shipping Act of 1890, making the observance of the tables in fixing the load line obligatory, and provided further that the placing of the load lines in accordance with these tables could be done by Lloyd's Register of Shipping or any other classification society approved by the Board of Trade. It should be noted that legislation in all the maritime countries provides for a classification society to determine the position of the load line.

The British, in preparing the act of 1890, realized that the insistence of safety on British ships would place those ships at a commercial disadvantage with the ships of other nations willing to risk the lives of their subjects and, to protect its own shipping, took steps to require every foreign ship leaving a British port to be marked and loaded to the same load lines as required for a British

ship. This procedure forced the other maritime nations to give more attention to the load line problem.

The United States Congress took legislative cognizance of the problem by passing the act of February 21, 1891 (27 Stat. 766). This act amended the provisions of R. S. 4178 as to the marking of the name of a vessel, her home port, and draft marks by establishing a new requirement that the owner, master, or agent of every inspected seagoing steam vessel or sail vessel indicate on such vessel the draft of water at which such agent, owner or master deemed that his vessel could be safely loaded for the trade in which his vessel was engaged.

Obviously, this statutory requirement was not satisfactory and it was repealed in 1897.

From time to time, thereafter, there was agitation for effective load line legislation. This was particularly true after a series of maritime casualties to vessels of the United States. However, because a lack of unanimity of opinion as to what the load line legislation should take, the agitation went for naught and it was not until 1929 that anything constructive was submitted. Despite the absence of national load line legislation, the Department of Commerce conducted experiments as to the possibilities of establishing weather zones for the oceans of the world within which zones the load lines of vessels could be controlled. These experiments indicated that there are roughly defined belts of weather paralleling the equator that vary with the season of the year. This data was submitted to the International Load Line Convention and was incorporated as a part of the International Load Line Convention of 1930.

The record is not clear as to how load line legislation again came before Congress, but in 1929 an act was passed establishing load lines for merchant vessels of 150 gross tons or over engaged in the foreign trade excepting the Great Lakes. In order to prepare regulations required under the act of 1929, the Secretary of Commerce appointed a load line committee, with Mr. Titus of the Department of Commerce as Chairman. The committee having in mind the contemplated International Conference of Load Lines gave careful study to the history of the British Load Line, both from a technical and administrative standpoint, and to the conclusions of the British Load Line Committee in the matter of load line regulations.

Because of its representative membership, American shipowners furnished the committee with extensive data as to their individual ship ex-

perience with regard to loading and casualties. They held many meetings, to which interested and informed men were invited to contribute the benefit of their experience and advice. This committee found that the proposals of the British were sound as regards cargo ship load lines and represented conservation practice; that American tankers had been so constructed they could safely load deeper than any existing load line regulations would permit; that a cargo ship could safely carry a properly stowed deck load of lumber with a freeboard less than any existing load line regulations would permit; and, that weather zones for the oceans could be defined. This committee reported to the Secretary of Commerce, April 18, 1930, submitting complete regulations for the placing of load lines as contemplated by the act of 1929.

During the load line committee's activity, preparations for an International Conference on Load Lines had been completed and arrangements made for the conference to convene in London, May 20, 1930. The conference closed July 5, 1930, after agreeing upon uniform rules and regulations for placing load lines on all ships of 150 gross tons and above, engaged on international voyages, excepting ships of war, fishing vessels, yachts, and ships without cargo or passengers. The rules adopted followed very closely the British proposals as to cargo ships, but provided for deeper loading of tankers, ships of special type, and ships carrying deck loads of lumber. The convention also adopted weather zones to control the loading therein.

The convention excepted the Great Lakes of North America from its requirements. The convention also took notice that in certain parts of the world foreign voyages were made over sheltered waters, provided, that where such conditions existed that the countries having jurisdiction of such waters could by agreement among themselves exempt from the requirements of the convention such ships as made foreign voyages confined entirely to such sheltered waters.

The International Load Line Convention was ratified by the Senate February 27, 1931 (47 Stat., Part 22,229), and the Secretary of Commerce, acting under the authority of the Load Line Act of 1929, promulgated as load line regulations, the technical requirements and formulas contained in the International Convention.

Perhaps consideration of the presented chart of nations participating in international agreements resulting from the developments discussed will

bring to focus the tremendous importance of the part, no matter how small, each individual plays in modern shipping. Though shipping can claim international brotherhood, it still rests upon the individual to give

spirit to the high purpose for which such diverse parties have banded together.

Clearly, we all sail together. The days of "shifting for yourself" are gone.

## MAJOR INTERNATIONAL MARITIME AGREEMENTS

IAS OF DECEMBER 1951

Country	Gross Tons in Thousands	IMCO (Pending)	SLS '48 (Pending)	RPC '48 (Pending)	SLS '29	LL '30	Ice Patrol
Argentina	824				X	X	
Australia	430	X		X	X	X	
Belgium	440	X		X	X	X	X
Brazil	616			X	X	X	
Bulgaria	10				X	X	
Burma		X		X	X	X	
Cambodia					X	X	
Canada	670	X	X	X	X	X	
Chile	157			X	X	X	
China	416				X	X	
Cuba	26					X	
Danzig					X	X	
Denmark	1,200		X	X	X	X	X
Dominican Republic	5			X	X	X	
Ecuador	14			X	X	X	
Egypt	79			X	X	X	
Estonia					X	X	
Finland	486			X	X	X	
France	3,019		X	X	X	X	X
Germany	648				X	X	
Greece	1,195	X		X	X	X	X
Haiti					X		
Honduras	415					X	
Hungary	2				X	X	
Iceland	32		X	X	X	X	
India	411			X	X	X	
Indonesia	12				X	X	
Iraq				X			
Ireland	36	X		X	X	X	
Israel	85					X	
Italy	2,646		X	X	X	X	X
Japan	1,713				X	X	
Korea	8				X	X	
Laos					X	X	
Latvia						X	
Liberia	626				X	X	
Mexico	151			X		X	
Netherlands	2,859	X	X	X	X	X	X
New Zealand	188		X	X	X	X	
Nicaragua	4			X			
Norway	5,293		X	X	X	X	X
Pakistan	88		X	X			
Panama	3,518				X	X	
Peru	82					X	
Philippines	90				X	X	
Poland	196			X	X	X	
Portugal	390		X		X	X	
Rumania	37				X	X	
Spain	951			X	X	X	
Sweden	1,895		X	X	X	X	X
Thailand	4					X	
Turkey	387			X	X		
Uruguay	48					X	
Union of South Africa	92		X	X	X	X	
USSR	1,457			X	X	X	
United Kingdom	16,904	X	X	X	X	X	X
U. S. A. (active)	13,611	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vietnam					X	X	
Yugoslavia	217		X	X	X	X	


# ATTENTION ALL SEAMEN

A recent report from the American Consulate General at Singapore indicates there has been an increasing number of American seamen who have failed to join their ships due to their misconduct ashore in that port.

British authorities have already expressed their grave concern over the matter. In so doing, they pointed out that this area is involved in serious and deadly warfare with communist bandits, that this fact, coupled with their immigration laws, might require strong measures to be taken against individuals found in the area without visas, landing cards, or other travel documents. Whereas British authorities did not categorically state they would incarcerate all seamen found illegally ashore in this port, they said they may have to resort to such measures.

It is unfortunate that whereas this is an extremely busy port, with ships under most of the flags of the world calling, American seamen should appear to have earned the dubious distinction of being the most frequent and difficult offenders. Such misconduct as has been exhibited on occasion by our American seamen is not tolerated on the part of native citizens, nor citizens of other countries. There certainly is no valid reason why American seamen should feel entitled to a greater latitude of tolerance. If anything, they should consider themselves the envoys of their nation and conduct themselves accordingly.

Needless to say, improved conduct should not be limited to Singapore. This should hold true in all ports in order to preserve our friendly relations in the various ports of call.



Courtesy Maritime Reporter.

# PLEASE, PLEASE, USE THE DISTRESS SIGNAL!

Experts in maritime safety have increasingly recognized the need for a standard, easily understood, audible fire signal for use by berthed or anchored vessels. Today, this dire necessity for uniformity and clarity is even more acutely apparent in the light of the Texas City disaster of April 1947, the fire and explosion aboard the *S. S. Markay* at the Port of Los Angeles, June 22, 1947, and other similar catastrophes. It was, therefore, noted with consternation that a recently promulgated "standard fire signal" for ships afire in the Port of New York has provided additional confusion to the already confused maritime public. This signal, published and distributed by the Sandy Hook Pilots' Association, on a prefatory page of the "1952 Tide Tables, New York Harbor and Vicinity," became effective January 1, 1952, and is to the effect that:

In the event of fire occurring on board any vessel in the Port of New York such vessel will sound seven (7) blasts; namely five (5) prolonged and two (2) short blasts of the whistle or siren as an alarm indicating fire on board, or at the dock to which the vessel is moored. Such signals may be repeated at intervals to attract attention (and is not a substitute for, but may be used in addition to other means of reporting a fire).

The Maritime Section of the National Safety Council, which is by no means opposed to the principle of indorsing and publicizing a uniform whistle signal for fire aboard a vessel not under way in a harbor, has already communicated its objections to this seven-blast fire signal. In so doing, it pointed out the inadequacy of the proposed signal, the confusion likely to result from its use, and expressed its opinion that Article 31 of the International Rules already provides a meaningful signal (by a continuous sounding of the whistle) for such a fire.

The question of a standard, audible fire signal to be used by vessels in port and not under way is certainly a problem worthy of careful consideration. It is commendable that so many diversely related groups should express their interest in this respect. What is so deplorable is the lack of unanimity in recognizing the value of a simple, already established, and highly effective means of dealing with this problem. Instead of making use of an all-inclusive signal which is already provided and lacks but effective adoption, it appears the tendency is to independently create a bewildering maze of inconsistent signals.

Perhaps a brief résumé of the ad-

vantages and disadvantages of the variously proposed fire-alarm signals for use by vessels in port will focus badly needed attention on the need for more effective use of the internationally and nationally accepted means of indicating distress, namely, the continuous sounding of the whistle or other fog signal apparatus.

In October 1944, the International Fire Chiefs Association proposed that a signal of three long blasts be adopted for this purpose in order to eliminate the "boogie" (the delayed alarm). However, investigation quickly showed the proposed signal was not sufficiently distinct as: (1), the proposed signal is quite commonly used by commercial and pleasure craft as "hall and farewell"; (2), it might be confused with the signal for vessels backing, namely, three short blasts, or with the fog signal used by vessels under way in the Great Lakes, namely, three distinct blasts; that (3), it is also used in some private codes between tugs and their tow. Obviously, whereas the purpose was desirable, the means were inadequate.

Subsequently, the American Association of Port Authorities launched a campaign for the adoption of "five prolonged blasts of the whistle or siren" as the standard, audible fire signal by vessels berthed or anchored in port to indicate fire on board or at the dock to which the vessel is moored. This signal was to have been supplementary to existing means of communicating fire, and defined a prolonged blast as 4-6 seconds duration. This proposal likewise failed to receive indorsement by experts in maritime safety. In declining to indorse the proposed signal, the Maritime Section of the National Safety Council pointed out: (1), there are too many signals already in large harbors; (2), shore workers, fire fighters, and seamen would have to be educated in the use and meaning of the additional signal; (3), unless the signal were made mandatory and not merely permissive it might vitiate certain clauses in marine insurance contracts; (4), Article 31 of the International Rules already provides a meaningful signal that covers the situation. Nevertheless, at least 56 American ports proceeded to adopt variations of this signal, some making it compulsory, others merely permissive, while a few even extended it to vessels under way in port. Was this unanimity?

Exponents of the "five prolonged blast" signal claim: (1), their signal is unmistakable; (2), the "continuous sounding of the fog signal apparatus is liable to be confused with the giving

of a "long single" blast of the whistle by vessels shifting berths or nearing a curve or bend in a channel; (3), that the continuous sounding of the fog signal apparatus is the international distress signal and consequently cannot be used to indicate fire in port by vessels not under way.

Suppose we pause to consider the fallacy of this argument.

The objection that the continuous sounding of a fog signal apparatus is the international distress signal and, therefore, disqualified for use by vessels sounding a cry of fire in port is exceedingly naive. If a fire on board, or a fire in the immediate vicinity of the vessel, does not place a vessel in distress, what does? Moreover, since provisions for the continuous sounding of the fog signal apparatus found in Article 31 of the International Rules have been extended by the Pilot Rules to cover all United States ports, it most certainly is not merely an international distress signal, but also our nationally accepted distress signal.

It is not necessary to be an expert mariner to question the supposition a "continuous" and a "long" blast of the whistle or siren are so similar as to be confusing. When some one says long blast, just what does that bring to mind? Doesn't it indicate a sound of limited duration? Certainly, and a long blast is limited to a mere 10 seconds in the rules. On the other hand, what does the word continuous imply? Obviously, it means without cessation or interruption for an indefinite period. That being the case, where is there room for conflict or confusion if each is properly sounded?

Next, look into the claimed unmistakability of the five-blast signal. Is this not debatable? There is little difference between a short and prolonged blast, merely a few seconds. Won't this increase the possibility of confusion with other signals? A vessel under way may sound the danger signal, another a single blast for a entirely different purpose, with the two blending together. On a foggy night, with nearly simultaneous signals being sounded, or on a clear day in a harbor subject to heavy traffic, who could distinguish this signal? There are many more possibilities leading to confusion. A moments thought will bring them to mind.

Thus, a logical and impartial analysis of the pros and cons for the three-blast and five-blast signals clearly shows the need for more emphasis and cooperation in extending the use of the distress signal as a means of indicating fire on board a

(Continued on page 112)

# NARCOTIC SMUGGLING AND SAFETY AT SEA

The Coast Guard is charged by law with the administration of many functions relating directly and indirectly with the safety of life and property at sea. Among the functions for which the Coast Guard is responsible, is that of licensing and certifying American merchant marine officers and seamen in order to promote safety at sea by insuring the competency of such officers and seamen in their calling. It is also responsible for the revocation and suspension of licenses and certificates previously issued to American merchant marine officers and seamen when such officer or seaman has been proved, after investigation and hearing, to have become a threat to the safety of crew, passengers, or vessel.

Many of the cases which result in revocation of licenses or certificates involve the users and traffickers in narcotics, especially of the drug known as marijuana. Histories of such cases show numerous acts of violence and brutality committed by users of this drug. Research and studies show the drug to be responsible for unpremeditated murder, running amok, and grievous hurts, and that the chronic use of this drug results in dementia and insanity. Medical experts agree on the complete unpredictability of the effects of this drug on different individuals ranging from intense intoxication, raving fits, and criminal assaults to profound stupefaction.

One such case shows an oiler, who, after smoking two marijuana cigarettes, laid in wait and attacked with a knife a fellow shipmate, inflicting serious body wounds which would have resulted in death but for the timely action of the master in suturing some thirty-two knife wounds. It was later determined that the seaman attacked was a personal friend of the aggressor and no quarrel or even slight disagreement preceded the unprovoked assault. The oiler who wielded the knife could neither give any reason for his conduct nor was he aware of the identity of the person assaulted. On another occasion a seaman smoked one marijuana cigarette while sitting near a cargo hold and regained consciousness in a marine hospital. He had no knowledge of what had transpired in the meantime.

The principal narcotics smuggled into the United States are opium, heroin, marijuana, and cocaine. Opium is a dark brown or black tarry, gummy substance, having a faint odor. Heroin is a white crystalline powder and is odorless. Cocaine is

in the form of glistening white flakes (it also occurs as large crystals), soluble in water. Marijuana, prepared for smoking, is the dried leaves and tops of the hemp plant, *cannabis sativa*, ground quite fine for rolling into cigarettes. It resembles tea, has a distinctive odor, and when burning, smells very much like burning weeds. Most of these drugs are presently smuggled into the United States from Italy, France, Turkey, Iran, India, Mexico, and Communist China via Hong Kong.

The enforcement agencies of the Treasury are ever on the alert to detect smuggling and have met with much success in the apprehension of persons engaged in the smuggling of narcotics, still there has been a recent rise in narcotic smuggling. The first line of defense against the smuggling of narcotics is the Bureau of Customs, through its agents and searching squads, working in cooperation with the Bureau of Narcotics. These Bureaus work as a team. In addition, agents overseas constantly furnish information concerning illicit shipments of narcotics to the United States.

Due to the present rise in the illegal influx of narcotics the following resolution was submitted by the Commissioner of Narcotics, who is the American representative to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Economic and Social Council, United Nations. The resolution is now under consideration by the commission:

"*Illicit trafficking by the crews of merchant ships*

"The Economic and Social Council, Having been informed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs that there has been an increase in the illicit traffic in narcotics on ships during the past 5 years and that this increase is principally owing to smuggling by merchant vessel personnel,

"Desiring to take all measures possible to combat such illegal activities,

"Requests the Secretary-General to compile a list of merchant vessel personnel who have been convicted, during the years 1946 to 1950 inclusive, of crimes involving the smuggling of narcotics;

"Instructs the Secretary-General to transmit the list to the governments of all States with the recommendation:

"(a) That they take appropriate measures (i) to revoke officers' licenses and seamen's certificates currently held by such persons and (ii) to withhold the issue to such persons of officers' licenses and seamen's certificates;

"(b) That they request the maritime unions in their territories to take steps to bar such officers and seamen permanently from the unions; and

"(c) That they urge all steamship companies in their territories engaged in international commerce not to employ officers and seamen whose names are on the list."

The Coast Guard cooperates wholeheartedly with the United States Customs and Bureau of Narcotics in their efforts to stop the smuggling of narcotics into the United States.

It is obvious that narcotic offenders, whether they be possessors, users, or traffickers, present a potential threat to the safety of passengers, of crew and of property at sea.

It is the firm established policy of the Coast Guard, as it was of its predecessor, the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation, to revoke the licenses or certificates of narcotic offenders who are discovered on American vessels.

This policy has the unqualified support of both American shipping interests and Maritime unions and is showing results. With the continued cooperation of "all hands" connected with shipping both ashore and afloat much further progress will be made. It is incumbent upon all to strive to eradicate this menace to safety at sea.

(Distress Signal Continued from page 111)

vessel not underway in port or in its immediate vicinity. *There can be no question but the continuous sounding of the whistle or siren is more dramatic, more arresting, and means more to seamen and those ashore.* If any doubt remains, consider why a move has already begun to go beyond the five-blast signal. Could it be because it has already proved itself to be inadequate?

That naturally raises the question why it is believed the seven-blast signal recently established in New York will cure the ills of the five-blast signal. The same objections hold. Moreover, one wonders if the possibility of conflict with the signal for boat drill or boat stations has been considered.

Apparently an important factor has been overlooked in the establishment of these conflicting and confusing local signals. The distress signal is a statutory rule which is required to be followed on the high seas and on the inland waters of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and the

Gulf of Mexico. On the Great Lakes and Western Rivers the same distress signal is required by the pilot rules promulgated by the Commandant, United States Coast Guard, which have the force of law. Masters and officers on all merchant vessels know this signal and are liable for its proper application. Different supplementary signals, rather than assisting them in reporting distress, put them in an unfortunate dilemma. Consequently, instead of becoming an added precaution, such a signal actually increases the risk of disaster.

It is not intended to question the right to establish a local audible fire signal for use by vessels in port and not underway. Admittedly, the statutory and regulatory requirements concerning the use of the distress signal apply to vessels underway. What is desired is clarity and unanimity, effectiveness, in dealing with this important problem. The same people man the same ships, whether or not they be underway. They should not be required to flip pages in a desperate search for the local fire signal at a time of stress, nor should they be required to painstakingly give the required combination of exactly timed blasts in the futile hope someone will recognize their need for assistance. How can any community risk its welfare on such a slim margin of human frailty?

The distress signal is well known. It's simple. It's dramatic. It's effective. It is used by mariners for all types of distress when underway, whether in port or at sea. What would be more logical than to have its use extended by local adoption to vessels not underway? Let there be a continuous blast of the whistle on the waterfront and there will be no question of fire. Heads will turn. Traffic will stop. What might have become a conflagration will be of no more consequence than a routine blaze.

It is time to discontinue the establishment of conflicting and confusing local signals. The fates cannot be tempted indefinitely. The situation is dangerous, and its successful resolution rests upon the cooperation of the various communities throughout the land. This is the time for the local adoption of the best signal available, the distress signal.

## Long chances— shorten lives

May 1952

997387-52-2

# Your Fact Forum

**Q.** What does a load line indicate?

**A.** A load line indicates the draft at which for various conditions and types or classes of vessels there will still be left a sufficient percentage of reserve buoyancy to insure the safety of the vessel. The position of this mark depends upon the type and size of the vessel. On it are indicated the maximum safe drafts for fresh and salt water, for winter and summer, and for certain oceans.

**Q.** When should wire rope be condemned?

**A.** Wire rope should be condemned when the outside wires are worn down to one-half their original diameter, or when it is apparent from broken wires or other abnormal indications that it has been subjected to danger by excessive strain.

**Q.** How would you define a motorboat?

**A.** The word "motorboat" includes every vessel operated by machinery and not more than 65 feet in length except tug boats and towboats operated by steam.

**Q.** Do you unhook the forward or after fall first in lowering a boat?

**A.** The forward fall must never be unhooked until after the after fall is free.

**Q.** What is the most dangerous point in lowering a boat?

**A.** The most dangerous point in lowering is at the time of unhooking, when the boat may be smashed against the ship's side. The coxswain must be free at this time to use all his energies to get the boat away from the ship's side.

**Q.** When do you use a square knot?

**A.** To bend two lines together.

**Q.** What is meant by splicing?

**A.** Splicing is a method of permanently joining the ends of two lines or of bending a line back on itself so as to form a permanent loop.

**Q.** What is the wisest procedure to follow when a fuse has blown?

**A.** An electrician should be called, but if it becomes absolutely necessary for a seaman to install a fuse, he should observe the following precautions:

1. Never put in a larger fuse than that for which the line is designed.
2. Never continue to renew fuses which keep blowing, because trouble in the line is indicated, and this must be corrected before the line can be used.
3. Always stand on good, dry, insulated material when removing a fuse; never in water.

4. Always grasp the fuse by the insulated part.

**Q.** When is credit given for service as junior third mate or junior third assistant engineer?

**A.** Service as junior third mate or junior third assistant engineer may be given full credit for raise in grade to second mate or second engineer only if the licensee is in full charge of a watch and holds a license as third mate or third engineer while so serving. The fact that the junior mate was in charge of a watch must be substantiated by documentary evidence.

**Q.** What are two of the most important things to be done before a boat is lowered?

**A.** Make certain that the boat plug is in place and that the painter is carried forward and tended.

**Q.** When should you trip the reeling gear in a boat so equipped?

**A.** Only when the boat is waterborne or within a few inches of the water.

**Q.** What information is found in the Sailing Directions?

**A.** Sailing Directions, or Pilots, are books describing certain divisions of the navigable waters of the globe. They contain information on coast lines, harbors, dangerous winds, currents, tides, approaching and entering harbors, and miscellaneous other information not shown on charts or given elsewhere.

**Q.** What is contained in the Light Lists?

**A.** Light Lists give detailed information of the position and character of lights, with a brief description of the lighthouses and of any accompanying fog signals.

**Q.** What is the purpose of Notices to Mariners?

**A.** Notices to Mariners contain newly acquired information relating to various parts of the world. In addition these Notices furnish the navigators essential corrections to publications issued or sold by the Hydrographic Office.

**Q.** Should the navigator use the largest scale chart available?

**A.** Yes. The chart on the largest scale should always be used on account of its greater detail and the greater accuracy with which positions may be plotted on it. When approaching land or dangerous banks, the mariner should change from the smaller scale chart to the larger scale chart in ample time to plot the best possible fixes of the vessel.

# A ONE BODY FIX

It might be said that the good navigator is one who has learned the "tricks of the trade." There are still occasions when modern navigational standbys, such as radar, loran, et cetera, are inadequate for the particular situation. Then the navigator must resort to the so called "tricks of the trade" or face the embarrassment of explaining the lack of a fix.

The purpose of this article is to present one of the many "tricks of the trade," namely, how to obtain a one body fix quickly. The method has been used successfully in the South Pacific when loran reception has been poor and the lack of a clear horizon prevented the taking of morning and evening sights. At times it proved to be the only means of obtaining a fix due to cloud formations peculiar to that area. It is also susceptible to use elsewhere within its limitations.

Primarily, the method is an extension of the theory of circles of equal altitudes and rests upon the fact that a 1' change in the body's altitude from its zenith corresponds to a 1 mile change in distance by the observer. Consequently, its application is limited. However, with the exercise of reasonable care, satisfactory results may be obtained when the difference between the body's declination and the observer's latitude is 4° or less. Those wishing to do so, will find a good discussion of the theory involved in chapter IX of Dutton's *Navigation and Nautical Astronomy*.

A typical example of its application is as follows:

A vessel departs from Apra Harbor, Guam, M. I., en route Manila, via the San Bernadino Straits, on course 268.5° True, at speed 15 knots. On May 7, 1952, her 0800 D. R. position is LAT. 13°-03.5' N, LONG. 135°-51' E. She is keeping zone time (-9). Since departure her loran reception has been poor and due to typical low hanging clouds obscuring the horizon at sunrise and sunset, higher clouds blanking most of the sky during daytime, no celestial fixes have been possible. Except for a single sun line the trip has been accomplished so far by dead reckoning.

Here you most likely have a frustrated navigator. Yet, the solution to the predicament is quite simple.

Sometime in the morning pick off the 1200 D. R., in this case LAT. 13°-02' N, LONG. 134°-50' E. Then take the nearest whole longitude and convert it to Greenwich Hour Angle (GHA). Here this would be LONG. 135° E and when converted GHA 225° W, for GHA is always west and for east longitudes is obtained by subtracting the longitude from 360°.

Next, open the American Air Almanac, May-August 1952, to page 255, the page for May 7. It will be noted the sun will be at LONG. 135° E (GHA 225° W) sometime between 0250 GCT and 0300 GCT. Since the vessel's zone time is (-9) this means the sun will be at that longitude just prior to 1200 zone time (-9). By interpolation it will then be found the sun will cross this meridian at exactly 02-56-32 GCT or 11-56-32 local zone time. It also will be noted the sun's declination is N 16°-47' for the period 0230 GCT to 0330 GCT.

The navigator now has the following information: ZT (-9); 1200 D. R. LAT. 13°-02' N, LONG. 134°-50' E; Sun's declination N 16°-47'; Sun's GHA 225° W at 02-56-30 GCT (11-56-32 ZT).

Since a body's declination is equivalent to the latitude of its geographical pole, the next step is to draw a latitude line representing the sun's declination at LAT. 16°-47' N. This will represent the path of the sun's subpolar point. Select a plotting sheet large enough to cover latitude 13° N-17° N and plot the sun's declination and the ship's course line as shown on the sample plot.

It so happens the sun's rate of travel with respect to the earth is 15° of longitude per hour, or, 1° of longitude every 4 minutes. In other words, the sun's subpolar point passes a longitude line every 4 minutes. So, having crossed LONG. 135° E at 02-56-32 GCT, it will cross LONG. 136° E 4 minutes earlier, LONG. 137° E 8 minutes earlier, LONG. 134° E 4 minutes later, and LONG. 133° E 8 minutes later. Plot the respective positions of the sun's subpolar point and label them 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Refer to sample plot on opposite page.

The first altitude sight desired will be when the sun is at position #1 at 02-48-32 GCT or 11-48-32 ZT.

In the meantime set the watch to GCT. Check your sextant. Instruct the person taking time to give a 5 second warning before the time for each sight. Shortly before the sun will cross LONG. 137° E take position on the bridge. Then take each sight as the mark is given.

Assume the respective sextant altitudes as taken were: (1) Hs 85°-39.1'; (2) Hs 85°-59.1'; (3) Hs 86°-05.1'; (4) Hs 85°-57.2'; (5) Hs 85°-35.1'. They must be corrected for index error, date, height of eye, and observed altitude. If the I. C. were plus 0.5', the height of eye 30 feet, the date May, the total correction to be applied to the sextant altitude as compiled from the inner cover of H. O.

214 would be plus 10.9'. When applied to the respective sextant altitudes the observed altitudes would be (1) Ho 85°-50.0'; (2) Ho 86°-10.0'; (3) Ho 86°-16.0'; (4) Ho 86°-08.1'; (5) Ho 85°-46.0'.

As stated before a 1' change in altitude of the body from the zenith corresponds to a 1 mile change in distance by the observer. By subtracting the respective observed altitudes it will be found the respective distance between the sun's subpolar points and the observer are (1) 4°-10'; (2) 3°-50'; (3) 3°-44'; (4) 3°-51.9'; (5) 4°-14'. Since each minute of arc represents 1 mile or 1 minute of latitude, all that is now necessary is to advance and retard the subpolar points to compensate for the ship's travel during the 8 minutes before and after the time of the middle sight, (3), pick off the respective distances on the latitude scale and swing arcs from each subpolar point equal to the distances found above. They will intersect at the ship's position at the time of the middle sight.

To summarize the necessary steps for a one body fix:

- (1) Take nearest whole longitude to 1200 D. R., position.
- (2) Find time of sun's GHA for this longitude.
- (3) Plot sun's subpolar position at 4 minute intervals in the vicinity of this longitude.
- (4) Set watch to GCT.
- (5) Take sextant altitudes as sun crosses respective meridians.
- (6) Subtract corrected sextant altitudes from 90°.
- (7) Pick off differences and swing arcs from corrected subpolar points for fix.

Clearly, it takes longer to describe the process of obtaining such a fix than to go thru the necessary mechanics. The work involved is comparatively minute.

There are variations of this method. Instead of swinging arcs, the respective sights could be worked out as ordinary sun lines by H. O. 214. Then, the azimuths could be reversed and plotted from the subpolar points to produce a fix. Or, the method discussed could be combined with the LAN sight.

However, a word of caution. It should be borne in mind that with the sun at such a high altitude, a large arc must be swung with the sextant in order to bring the sun down to the horizon. Otherwise, false observations will result. Too, the sun's azimuth changes quickly in a relatively short time and it is necessary to be alert.





*National Maritime Day  
May 22*

The Commandant takes the greatest pride on the occasion of National Maritime Day, 1952, in pointing out the vital services to the Nation being performed by the United States Merchant Marine. In peace and in war the maintenance of our vital lifelines of trade with the far countries of the world is a matter of primary importance to all citizens and it is a pleasure to again extend our thanks for a job being "well done" by our merchant marine.

*Merlin O'Neill*

MERLIN O'NEILL

*Vice Adm., U.S. Coast Guard  
Commandant.*

# LESSONS FROM CASUALTIES

## GASOLINE VAPORS

When a person is in trouble, good intentions of would-be rescuers are of no avail unless such intentions are based on training and experience. On a ship underway in a rough sea, it would be folly for one crew member to dive into the water with the idea of saving another who fell overboard. There is a standard procedure toward effecting such a rescue. Similarly, in this case, the actions of the chief mate, second mate, and chief pumpman were ill-advised when they rushed to the aid of the second pumpman who had been overcome by gasoline fumes on the floor plates in the pumproom of a large tanker at sea.

The report of the officer who investigated this accident is interesting enough to be quoted practically verbatim. He reported in substance as follows:

"At 0800, the chief pumpman, assisted by the second pumpman, began work in the pumproom, cleaning pump strainers on the first grating below the main deck level. At the time, both pumproom ventilator cowls were trimmed off the light beam breeze, and the blower had not been started. To prevent confusion, which could result in cargo being mixed, the chief pumpman had prepared cardboard tags to be affixed to the wheels of the respective pump valves to indicate their position as 'open' or 'closed,' when cargo was being discharged, or loaded. They were later engaged in affixing tags, standing on the floor plates of the pumproom, when the chief pumpman noticed that the second pumpman had been overcome by gas fumes and had fallen between the pumps.

"The chief pumpman, being unable to personally lift the inert weight of the 145-pound second pumpman, immediately ran up the ladder to give the alarm, which was heard by the master, in his office, and the chief mate, who, assisted by the 12 to 4 quartermaster, was working on the boat deck.

"The master rushed from his room and the chief mate came running from the boat deck. When the master shouted to get a line, the chief mate grabbed the bitter end of the hose boom falls, which was of ample length, and immediately descended into the pumproom, without noticing that the blower was not on, and without waiting to obtain a fresh air mask. The second mate, who was off watch, was awakened by the commotion and was hard on the heels of the chief

mate, to assist him in bending the line on the second pumpman.

"Although the master attempted to prevent him, the chief pumpman reentered the pumproom to assist, becoming a hindrance due to his half gassed condition. The master, at this time, was at the top grating of the pumproom and did not think of getting the blower started, or trimming the pumproom ventilator cowls properly. While the chief mate and the second mate were attempting to affix the line to the second pumpman, they were hindered by the chief pumpman, who was ordered out of the pumproom. The chief mate, having made the line fast to the second pumpman, told the second mate, 'We had better get out of here,' then he collapsed. The second mate, seeing this, and being half gassed himself, then ascended the ladder, pushing the chief pumpman, whom he had found wandering on the second grating, up ahead of him.

"The master ran forward to get the boatswain and dayman to assist in getting the fresh air mask and hose rigged, and sent the quartermaster to the chief engineer to get the blower started. However, the 12 to 4 quartermaster had already trimmed the ventilator cowls properly. The boatswain donned a mask while the dayman manned the pump. Then he entered the lower pumproom, made a line fast to the chief mate, who weighed approximately 190 pounds, and with the second mate hauling from the second grating, the boatswain guiding and pushing from below, the chief mate was being removed.

"When the chief mate was hauled within a short distance of the second grating, the second mate's strength was almost exhausted from hauling alone, and he called for help. The dayman turned the pump handle over to a messman and assisted the second mate. The messman, unfamiliar with the pump rotation, turned the crank backward, creating a vacuum in the hose mask, which the boatswain had to remove. However the bos'n then being well above the gas layer, proceeded out with the chief mate.

"In the meantime the ventilator cowls being trimmed, and the blower having been started, the second pumpman had begun to revive. Finally the dayman, using a fresh air mask, proceeded to remove him from the pumproom.

"Artificial respiration upon the chief mate, unconscious 3 to 5 minutes, and the second pumpman, un-

conscious 15 to 20 minutes, resulted in their quick recovery."

This report brings out several ill-advised actions. Consider, first, those of the two pumpmen who went below to work in the pumproom. They failed (1) to ventilate the pumproom by trimming the cowls and by operating the blower, (2) to notify the chief engineer or anyone else of their activities in the pumproom, and (3) to take reasonable precautions while working in a "gassy" atmosphere by not wearing a fresh air breathing apparatus.

When the chief pumpman sounded the alarm the circus started, resulting in one additional man overcome by fumes and two affected by fumes. If both pumpmen, below in the pumproom, had been overcome by the fumes at the same time, they probably would have succumbed before they were missed and help arrived. There was lacking a well planned system to take care of such an emergency as existed originally. If one man had descended into the pumproom equipped with a fresh air breathing apparatus to aid the fallen second pumpman, and if there were men on deck to assist from above, the second pumpman would have spent far less than the 20 minutes actually spent unconscious below.

## FATE LAUNCHED THIS VESSEL

Many marine casualties are the result of unusual circumstances. It may seem that a combination of events "gang up" to act adversely, with no warning, on the mariner. But in back of most accidents lies a lack of discretion or understanding or a lack of recognition or appreciation of a known hazard. Even the most imprudent operator would probably not smoke in the engine space of a boat propelled by a gasoline engine especially if he discerned a trace of gasoline fumes, but the same operator might board his boat and press the starter button without so much as a check for vapors. Perhaps he has successfully started his plant hundreds of times without first clearing the atmosphere in the bilges of explosive vapors, but sooner or later his name will be mentioned in a casualty report.

A similar lack of discretion resulted in the burning and subsequent total loss of a fishing vessel of 115 gross tons. The error was made during the installation of a new 400-horsepower Diesel-propelling plant. It is assumed that following installation the routine tests were made and apparently all was in order. On its

first trip the vessel suffered its fatal casualty.

The boat was built in 1906, of wooden construction throughout, following the conventional design with the engine room aft; fish hold forward of a watertight bulkhead. Main deck quarters aft were over the engine room and beneath the bridge. In the engine room with the brand new main engine were two fuel tanks, forward, batteries, starboard side, switchboard, port side, an auxiliary generator and a heating boiler aft. Ventilation for the compartment, in addition to the 3 foot by 3 foot hatch, consisted of 2 vents 6 inches in diameter. These facts, plus the fact that the main engine's air intake was located within the engine space, are all that were needed to determine the cause of the casualty.

An engine of the size and horsepower as that installed in this vessel requires approximately 800 cubic feet of air per minute to operate at full speed. With the hatch closed, and it normally would be during inclement weather, the only source of air was the 6-inch vents—and the flue of the heating boiler. To supply the engine with the necessary 800 cubic feet of air per minute, air had to rush through the vents at more than 2,000 feet per minute. In attaining this rate, pressure less than that of the outside atmosphere existed within the engine compartment. As a result, air in the flue of the heating boiler, along with fuel oil in combustion, was drawn into the compartment igniting all combustible material.

The engine was controlled from the pilothouse and several critical gages were also located in the pilothouse so that it was not necessary that a person be stationed at all times in the engine room. Periodic checks into the engine room were made, however, the last about a half hour before the blaze was discovered. Discovery of the fire was credited to an occupant of one of the rooms aft, adjacent to the engine room, which became too hot for him.

The cause of the fire is obvious, and had the installers of the engine stopped to realize the large quantity of air required by an engine of this horsepower, larger or additional vents would have been provided. Two vents each, one foot square, would accommodate a sufficiency of air at a rate of about 400 feet per minute, and the normal draft of the heating boiler would not be disturbed.

### STEERING ASKEW

A victory type vessel, proceeding out of a foreign port, collided with several barges, damaging eight and

sinking one. The cause: from facts available, failure of the mate to properly test the steering gear.

The vessel, having discharged her cargo, had been prepared for sea for the homeward voyage. She was maneuvered out to midchannel by two tugs and full ahead was ordered. The after tug let go, then the forward tug. Immediately thereafter, the bow appeared to take a sheer to port and the wheel was put hard right in an unsuccessful attempt to break the

## INJURIES SMALL ONES, TOO—



"sheer." Since this maneuver failed, the engine was belatedly placed full astern. The chief officer on the bow, operating the windlass to pick up the towline, failed to hear the order to let go both anchors. On the bridge, the master, fearing that the telemotor was inoperative, attempted to shift from telemotor to electric steering, while, in the steering engine room, the chief engineer changed over steering engine motors and pumps from one to the other, reporting back to the bridge the fact that the rudder was at all times amidships.

The vessel made contact with one barge near her port quarter, which was pressed under the stern and sank. The full astern signal swung the bow out in such a manner as to strike several barges secured to pilings. During the confusion and drifting, due in part to a moderate wind acting broadside to the vessel, eight other barges were damaged.

A review of the facts bear out the following conclusion: that the ship did not take a sheer, but was actually without steering since the time it left

If dust or small particles get in your eyes, do not rub them. Get prompt first aid.

the dock. The mate had properly tested the steering gear as far as he went: first tested the telemotor; then opening the bypass in the hydraulic system, he switched over to the electric system which tested satisfactorily. But, the steering gear was left in this condition with the bypass in the hydraulic system open. It should have been realized by the mate that the telemotor would be used in maneuvering the ship out of the channel, requiring that the bypass be closed. Consequently, the master, in shifting from hydraulic to electric steering, closed the telemotor bypass in cross purpose to the steering system desired, accomplishing nothing toward remedying a dangerous situation.

It is not understood why the helmsman could not feel the freedom allowed the wheel by the open bypass when, ordinarily, it does a certain amount of work against the columns of oil.

The point to be emphasized, however, is the responsibility attached to the officers of merchant vessels in their performance of routine duties. The person responsible in this casualty certainly exhibited a lack of responsibility necessary for smooth and trouble-free operation of the vessel.

Efficiency in the operation of a vessel demands that every member of the crew effectively perform his duties to the last detail so that through mutual responsibility and respect each person is assured safety in all phases of vessel operation.

### SYMPATHY SUBSTITUTED FOR DISCRETION

Even where certain requirements for safety are fulfilled, failure to maintain the equipment or installation renders it useless—dangerous, in fact, when it is depended upon as a safety device.

A good example which illustrates the inadequacy of deteriorated safety devices is found in the report of a Marine Board of Investigation into the foundering of a tug. This tug, of 98 gross tons, was built in 1885 as a steam vessel, but during the mid 30's, due to her worn out machinery and possibly due to the fact she could no longer pass inspection, she was converted to a motor vessel and thereafter was exempt from safety inspection and certification requirements.

While towing a coal-laden barge one night, the tug found it necessary to seek shelter due to increasing wind and sea. The barge was anchored and the tug, with a crew of seven, proceeded up the river into port. The after peak tank became flooded, the

after peak bulkhead gave way, the vessel sank, and 6 of the seven members of the crew lost their lives by drowning.

Reconstruction of the events leading up to this casualty takes in several years up to that time when it was learned that the after peak tank would no longer hold water. An attempt had been made by the owners to repair it by placing a cement patch against the bulkhead from the inside. This did not prove successful and no further attempt was made to repair it. Chain ballast was substituted in place of the previous water ballast giving the vessel approximately the same trim aft.

On the night of the casualty, as the wind picked up, water was taken over the side from quartering seas flooding the deck aft. This water found its way into the after peak tank through a manhole on the after deck. When the tank became full the contained water, in combination with the chain, had the effect of doubling the ballast and held the stern below the sea; the increase in draft was sufficient to cause the tug to strike bottom at one point in way of the deteriorated bulkhead which fell away, flooding the engine room. From this time on, the vessel slowly sank.

In this exigency, first consideration would naturally be given to the lifeboat. This old standby had been sitting in its chocks for many months, a symbol of security from the devastation of the sea. It had recently been given a new coat of paint—to all exposed surfaces. One could barely distinguish the three rusted out holes on its bottom.

It was determined that an unseaworthy vessel had been knowingly sent to sea, a criminal violation. But successful prosecution of such an offense would be of little comfort to the families of those whose lives were lost.

#### NO PLACE TO RIDE

A painting punt collapsed while it was being hoisted from the water with two men in it.

A punt which is well designed and constructed to carry its crew in safety while it is in the water may be far from strong enough to be lifted out of the water with a load in it. Unless it were slung in a four-legged bridle or double slings, it would be very likely to capsize, if it did not break.

The men are accustomed to riding up and down in the lifeboats and most all of us would rather ride than climb. Therefore, it would be well for deck officers to give specific orders concerning not riding the painting punts each time they are to be used.

(Seamen's Safety Guide, August 1951.)



I'm on my way to FIRST-AID CLASS, Mope. Is there anything I can do for you first?

# APPENDIX

## Amendments to Regulations

### TITLE 33—NAVIGATION AND NAVIGABLE WATERS

#### Chapter I—Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

##### Subchapter K—Security of Vessels [CGFR 52-11]

##### PART 122—SAFETY MEASURES

##### ATOMIC ATTACK INSTRUCTIONS FOR MERCHANT VESSELS IN PORT

Pursuant to the authority of 33 CFR 6.14-1 in Executive Order 10173 (15 F. R. 7007, 3 CFR, 1950 Supp.) as amended by Executive Order 10277 (16 F. R. 7537), the Commandant may prescribe such conditions and restrictions relating to vessels in port as he finds to be necessary under existing circumstances to achieve the purposes of the regulations relating to the safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities of the United States. The purpose of the new regulations designated as 33 CFR Part 122, regarding safety measures, is to require certain additional safety precautions for vessels. A placard containing atomic attack instructions for merchant vessels in port has been prepared and its initial distribution by the Coast Guard to inspected merchant vessels is now being done. Copies of the placard are to be posted in conspicuous places on board vessels in order that operating personnel will be aware of what to do in an emergency. Because of the urgency in having these instructions available to personnel on board merchant vessels, it is hereby found that compliance with the notice of proposed rule making, public rule making procedure thereon, and effective date requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act is contrary to the public interest.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by Executive Order 10173, as amended by Executive Order 10277, the following regulations are added to Chapter I of 33 CFR and shall become effective on and after date of publication of this document in the FEDERAL REGISTER:

Sec.

122.01 General.

122.10 Atomic attack instructions for merchant vessels in port.

§ 122.01 *General.* The regulations in this part require additional safety precautions for vessels in accordance with § 6.14-1 of this chapter.

§ 122.10 *Atomic attack instructions for merchant vessels in port.* A placard (Form CG 3256) containing atomic attack instructions for merchant vessels in port has been prepared for the information and assistance of persons on board merchant vessels. When given to the master of a vessel by the Coast Guard, the placards (Form CG 3256) shall be posted in conspicuous places in the pilothouse, engine room, and in the seamen's, firemen's and steward's departments of the vessel.

Date: March 7, 1952.

[SEAL] MERLIN O'NEILL,  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,  
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 52-2950; Filed, Mar. 12, 1952;  
8:47 a. m. 17 F. R. 2183-3/13/52.]

##### Subchapter L—Security of Waterfront Facilities [CGFR 52-18]

##### PART 125—IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIALS FOR PERSONS REQUIRING ACCESS TO WATERFRONT FACILITIES ON VESSELS TEMPORARY IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIALS

Pursuant to the authority of 33 CFR 6.10-3 in Executive Order 10173, as amended by Executive Order 10277 (15 F. R. 7007, 3 CFR 1950 Supp., 16 F. R. 7537), the Commandant, United States Coast Guard, may define and designate those categories of vessels and waterfront facilities wherein any person seeking access shall be required to carry identification credentials as prescribed in 33 CFR 6.10-7 and 125.11. The purpose of the new regulation, designated 33 CFR 125.37 (d) is to authorize the issuance and recognition of letters signed by the Coast Guard District Commander or Captain of the Port to serve in lieu of identification credentials listed in 33 CFR 125.11 for a period of time not to exceed sixty days in order to permit employment of members of crews of towing vessels or barges engaged in trade on the Great Lakes or the western rivers pending the issuance of a United States Coast Guard Port Security Card. Since the new regulation is a relaxation of present requirements and procedures, it is found that compliance with the notice of proposed rule making, public rule making procedure thereon, and effective date requirements thereof, of

the Administrative Procedure Act is unnecessary.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by Executive Order 10173, as amended by Executive Order 10277, § 125.37 is amended by adding a new paragraph reading as follows, which shall be in effect on and after the date of publication of this document in the FEDERAL REGISTER:

§ 125.37 *Requirements for credentials; towing vessels or barges engaged in trade on the Great Lakes or the western rivers.* \* \* \*

(d) At the discretion of the District Commander a member of the crew of a vessel defined in paragraph (a) of this section may be furnished a letter signed by the District Commander or the Captain of the Port and this letter shall serve in lieu of a Coast Guard Port Security Card and will authorize his employment for a period not to exceed sixty days, and such a letter issued shall be deemed as satisfactory identification within the meaning of § 125.11. The issuance of the letter shall be subject to the following conditions:

(1) The services of the person are necessary to avoid delay in the sailing of the vessel;

(2) The person does not possess one of the identification credentials listed in § 125.11;

(3) The person has filed his application for a Coast Guard Port Security Card or submits his application before the letter is issued; and,

(4) The person has been screened by the District Commander or Coast Guard Captain of the Port and such officer is satisfied concerning the eligibility of the applicant to receive a temporary letter.

(40 Stat. 220, as amended; 50 U. S. C. 191, E. O. 10173, Oct. 18, 1950, 15 F. R. 7005; 3 CFR 1950 Supp., p. 140)

Dated: March 19, 1952.

[SEAL] MERLIN O'NEILL,  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,  
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 52-3313; Filed, Mar. 21, 1952;  
8:47 a. m. 17 F. R. 502-3/22/52.]

Notices to mariners are public announcements either by broadcast or printed notices disseminating marine information to the public, including items of establishment, change, or discontinuance of aids to navigation, obstructions, changes in channel conditions, etc.

# TITLE 46—SHIPPING

## Chapter I—Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

### Subchapter B—Merchant Marine Officers and Seamen

[CGFR 52-17]

#### PART 12—CERTIFICATION OF SEAMEN

##### SUBPART 12.02—GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION

###### DENIAL OF MERCHANT MARINER'S DOCUMENTS TO CERTAIN ALIENS

The navigation and vessel inspection laws relating to merchant seamen are definite concerning the requirements for a merchant seaman, below the rating of officer, to have one or more documents issued by the United States Coast Guard in the form of a certificate of service, or a certificate of efficiency, or a certificate of identification, or a continuous discharge book, or a merchant mariner's document, depending upon circumstances, before he may be employed in the United States to serve on board a majority of the types of merchant vessels comprising the United States merchant marine. The immigration laws of the United States also make it unlawful to pay off or discharge an alien seaman employed on board any vessel arriving in the United States from any port or place unless such alien is duly admitted pursuant to the laws and treaties of the United States regulating the immigration of aliens; and, furthermore, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has the duty to require either the detention or deportation of any alien crew member of any vessel arriving in the United States when such alien is unlawfully present in the United States.

The United States Coast Guard has been issuing documents to aliens without determining whether or not such aliens have been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. This practice has created difficulties in the enforcement of the navigation and vessel inspection laws by the United States Coast Guard and has created difficulties in carrying out the Coast Guard's responsibility for safeguarding of the national security insofar as shipping is concerned. The work of the Immigration and Naturalization Service is and has been also hampered by the fact that the Coast Guard has issued merchant mariner's documents to aliens whom the Immigration and Naturalization Service must at some later date order detained or deported. It is also apparent that an alien unlawfully present in the United States or lawfully present for a period of twenty-nine days will afford a sufficiently grave security risk so that he should be re-

quired to present evidence of lawful presence for permanent residence in the United States before the Coast Guard issues to him merchant seaman's documents.

The purpose of the following new regulations, designated as 46 CFR 12.02-10 and 12.02-23 (f), is to establish a definite requirement that no alien may be given a merchant seaman's document in the absence of acceptable proof from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service that he is lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence. The acceptable documentary evidence may be in the form of an alien registration receipt card issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, or a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States issued by a naturalization court. Because of the difficulties encountered in the enforcement of the navigation and vessel inspection laws and immigration laws of the United States, as well as the national emergency declared by the President, it is found that compliance with a notice of proposed rule making, public rule making procedure thereon, and effective date requirements thereof of the Administrative Procedure Act is impracticable and contrary to the public interest.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by Treasury Department Order No. 120, dated July 31, 1950 (15 F. R. 6521), as well as the statutes cited with the regulations below, the following amendments to the regulations are prescribed which shall become effective on the date of publication of this document in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

1. Part 12 is amended by adding a new § 12.02-10 reading as follows:

§ 12.02-10 *Applications for documents from aliens.* (a) No application from an alien for a certificate of service, certificate of efficiency, certificate of identification, continuous discharge book, or merchant mariner's document shall be accepted unless the alien presents acceptable documentary evidence from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service that he is lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.

(b) This evidence may be in the form of an alien registration receipt card issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service bearing the certification that the alien was admitted to the United States as an immigrant, or a declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States issued by a naturalization court.

(Interprets or applies sec. 5, 49 Stat. 1935, as amended, sec. 302, 49 Stat. 1992, as

amended, sec. 5, 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 672a, 1132, 50 U. S. C. App. 1275)

2. Section 12.02-23 is amended by adding paragraph (f) reading as follows:

##### § 12.02-23 *Issuance of duplicate documents.* \* \* \*

(f) No application from an alien for a duplicate of a certificate of service, certificate of efficiency, certificate of identification, continuous discharge book, or merchant mariner's document shall be accepted unless the alien complies with the requirements of § 12.02-10 with respect to proof that he is lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.

(Interprets or applies sec. 5, 49 Stat. 1935, as amended, sec. 302, 49 Stat. 1992, as amended, sec. 5, 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 672a, 1132, 50 U. S. C. App. 1275)

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4488, 4551, as amended, sec. 13, 38 Stat. 1169, as amended, secs. 1, 2, 49 Stat. 1544, 1545, sec. 7, 49 Stat. 1936, sec. 1, 52 Stat. 753, 55 Stat. 579; 46 U. S. C. 375, 391a, 481, 643, 672, 967, 689, 672b, 672-1, 672-2)

Dated: March 13, 1952.

[SEAL] MERLIN O'NEILL,  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,  
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 52-3199; Filed, Mar. 18, 1952;  
8:52 a. m. 17 F. R. 2363-3/19/52.]

[CGFR 52-12]

#### EXTRA RECHARGES FOR FIXED OR BUILT-IN FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS

##### PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS

The regulations for portable fire extinguishers on passenger and cargo vessels are in 46 CFR 61.13, 77.13, 95.13, and 114.15. In paragraph (g) of these sections there is a requirement for extra recharges for fixed or built-in fire extinguishing systems installed for lamp and paint lockers, emergency generator rooms, and similar spaces. The practice has been to accept the extinguishing agent for other spaces as being available as the recharge for a particular space in question. Inasmuch as at present there are few, if any, vessels actually carrying a bona fide spare charge for such fixed or built-in fire extinguishing systems, and since there appears to be no special need to require spare charges for each of the smaller hazards when the present regulations permit the use of a single supply for a combination of major hazards (for example, both machinery and cargo protection), therefore 46 CFR 61.13 (g), 77.13 (g), 95.13 (g), and 114.15 (g) are canceled in order to prevent a possible undue hardship in any particular case if a literal interpretation of the regulations were taken.

These amendments shall become effective immediately upon publication

of this document in the Federal Register. These amendments are published without prior general notice of their proposed issuance for the reason that notice, public rule making procedure thereon, and effective date requirements in connection therewith are hereby found to be unnecessary since they are a relaxation and clarification of present requirements.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by Treasury Department Order No. 120, dated July 31, 1950 (15 F. R. 6521), to promulgate regulations in accordance with the statutes cited with the regulations below, the following amendments to the regulations are prescribed which shall become effective upon the date of publication of this document in the Federal Register:

Subchapter G—Ocean and Coastwise; General Rules and Regulations

PART 61—FIRE APPARATUS; FIRE PREVENTION

Section 61.13 *Portable fire extinguishers* is amended by canceling paragraph (g) thereof.

(R. S. 4405, as amended, secs. 1, 2, 49 Stat. 1544, sec. 5, 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375, 367, 50 U. S. C. 1275. Interprets or applies R. S. 4426, as amended, 4470, as amended, 4471, as amended, 4479, as amended, sec. 2, 54 Stat. 1028, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 404, 463, 464, 472, 463a)

Subchapter H—Great Lakes; General Rules and Regulations

PART 77—FIRE APPARATUS; FIRE PREVENTION

Section 77.13 is amended by canceling paragraph (g) thereof and this section will read as follows:

§ 77.13 *Portable fire extinguishers*. (See § 61.13 of this chapter, as amended, which is identical with this section.)

(R. S. 4405, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375. Interprets or applies R. S. 4426, as amended, 4470, as amended, 4471, as amended, 4479, as amended, sec. 2, 54 Stat. 1028, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 404, 463, 464, 472, 463a)

Subchapter I—Bays, Sounds, and Lakes Other Than the Great Lakes; General Rules and Regulations

PART 95—FIRE APPARATUS; FIRE PREVENTION

Section 95.13 is amended by canceling paragraph (g) thereof and this section will read as follows:

§ 95.13 *Portable fire extinguishers*. (See § 61.13 of this chapter, as amended, which is identical with this section.)

(R. S. 4405, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375. Interprets or applies R. S. 4426, as amended, 4470, as amended, 4471, as amended, 4479, as amended, sec. 2, 54 Stat. 1028, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 404, 463, 464, 472, 463a)

Subchapter J—Rivers; General Rules and Regulations

PART 114—FIRE APPARATUS; FIRE PREVENTION

Section 114.15 is amended by canceling paragraph (g) thereof and this section will read as follows:

§ 114.15 *Portable fire extinguishers*. (See § 61.13 of this chapter, as amended, which is identical with this section.)

(R. S. 4405, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375. Interprets or applies R. S. 4426, as amended, 4470, as amended, 4471, as amended, 4479, as amended, sec. 2, 54 Stat. 1028, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 404, 463, 464, 472, 463a)

Dated: March 13, 1952.

[SEAL] MERLIN O'NEILL,  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,  
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 52-3201; Filed, Mar. 18, 1952; 8:52 a. m. 17 F. R. 2363-3/19/52.]

[CGFR 52-10]

LIFESAVING APPARATUS AND DEVICES

MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS

A notice regarding proposed changes in the regulatory specifications for lifeboat mechanical disengaging apparatus and the regulatory requirements for life preservers to be carried on ferryboats navigating on rivers was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER dated August 16, 1951, 16 F. R. 8136-8139, as Items XIII and XIV, respectively, on the agenda to be considered by the Merchant Marine Council, and a public hearing was held by the Merchant Marine Council on September 18, 1951, in Washington, D. C. No written comments were submitted for consideration and the proposed amendments are adopted without change.

The purpose of the amendment to 46 CFR 117.4 (a) is to require children's life preservers on motor propelled river ferry vessels so that no possible error in the intent of the regulation may be made. This amendment is in agreement with previous changes made in 46 CFR 25.4-1 (a), 26.2-1, 27.2-1, and 113.44a, which require that motorboats and motor vessels carrying passengers for hire shall be provided with an approved life preserver for each person on board and with an additional number of approved life preservers suitable for children equal to at least ten percent of the total number of persons carried.

The purpose of the changes in the regulatory specification for lifeboat mechanical disengaging apparatus in 46 CFR Subpart 160.033 is to change these requirements to agree with present regulations in 46 CFR 59.68 and 60.61 or to provide new requirements so that the equipment will comply with shipboard requirements

set forth in 46 CFR 59.3a, 60.21a, 76.15a, and 94.14a in the General Rules and Regulations for Vessel Inspection. The purpose of the amendment to 46 CFR 160.033-2 (c) is to revise the regulation to agree with requirements in 46 CFR 59.68 and 60.61. The purpose of the new regulation, designated 46 CFR 160.033-3 (f), is to require affidavits relative to the materials used in order to insure that subsequent releasing gears will maintain a factor of safety at least equivalent to that provided in the first gear tested. The purpose for revising 46 CFR 160.033-4 (c) (1) is to increase the test load to an amount equivalent to the weight of the fully loaded lifeboat plus ten percent so that the operating test load for initial approval of the gear will not be less than the load used in the shipboard installation test required by 46 CFR 59.3a, 60.21a, 76.15a, and 94.14a in the General Rules and Regulations for Vessel Inspection.

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by Treasury Department Order No. 120, dated July 31, 1950 (15 F. R. 6521), to promulgate regulations in accordance with the statutes cited with the regulations below the following amendments to the regulations are prescribed which shall become effective thirty days after date of publication of this document in the FEDERAL REGISTER:

Subchapter J—Rivers; General Rules and Regulations

PART 117—FERRYBOATS

Section 117.4 (a) is amended to read as follows:

§ 117.4 *Life preservers, life floats, and fire-fighting equipment*. (a) (1) After July 1, 1929, all ferryboats propelled by steam shall be equipped with a life preserver (or float where same is allowed by law) for every 5 square feet or passenger deck surface on single-deck ferryboats and for every 8.5 square feet of such deck surface on ferryboats having more than one passenger deck, such measurement to include all deck space in the team gangways at each end of the cabins: *Provided, however*, That ferryboats navigating on routes where the number of passengers carried is less than the number of life preservers required by this measurement shall be required to carry one life preserver for each person on board.

(2) All motor-propelled ferryboats shall be provided with one approved life preserver for each person on board and with an additional number of approved life preservers suitable for children equal to at least ten percent of the total number of persons carried.

(R. S. 4405, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375. Interprets or applies R. S. 4426, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 404)

Subchapter Q—Specifications

PART 160—LIFESAVING EQUIPMENT

SUBPART 160.033—MECHANICAL DISENGAGING APPARATUS, LIFEBOAT, FOR MERCHANT VESSELS

1. Section 160.033-2 (c) is amended to read as follows:

§ 160.033-2 *General requirements for mechanical disengaging apparatus.* \* \* \*

(c) Other types of mechanical disengaging apparatus will be considered for lifeboats fitted on vessels operating on waters other than ocean and coastwise, or for vessels of 3000 gross tons and under operating in ocean and coastwise service.

2. Section 160.033-3 is amended by adding a new paragraph (f), reading as follows:

§ 160.033-3 *Construction of mechanical disengaging apparatus.* \* \* \*

(f) The manufacturer shall furnish mill or foundry affidavits relative to the physical and chemical properties of the materials used.

3. Section 160.033-4 (c) is amended to read as follows:

§ 160.033-4 *Inspection and testing of mechanical disengaging apparatus.* \* \* \*

(c) *Installation test prior to passing first unit installed.* (1) Each new type or arrangement of mechanical disengaging apparatus shall be tested by suspending a lifeboat loaded with deadweight equivalent to the number of persons allowed in the lifeboat (165 pounds per person) together with the weight of the equipment, plus 10 percent of the total load. The release lever shall then be thrown over with this load suspended until the lifeboat is released. This test shall demonstrate the efficiency of the installation in an actual lifeboat. (This test may be conducted ashore by suspending the lifeboat just clear of the ground.)

(Interprets or applies R. S. 4420, as amended, 4482, 4488, as amended, 4491, as amended, sec. 11, 35 Stat. 428; 46 U. S. C. 396, 404, 475, 481, 489)

(R. S. 4405, 4417, as amended, secs. 1, 2, 49 Stat. 1544, sec. 17, 54 Stat. 166, sec. 3, 54 Stat. 347, sec. 5, 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375, 391a, 367, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275)

Dated: March 13, 1952.

[SEAL] MERLIN O'NEILL,  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,  
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 52-3200; Filed, Mar. 18, 1952; 8:52 a. m. 17 F. R. 2363-3/19/52.]

## Equipment Approved by the Commandant

[CGFR 52-6]

### APPROVAL OF EQUIPMENT AND CHANGE IN NAME AND ADDRESS OF MANUFACTURER

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by Treasury Department Order No. 120, dated July 31, 1950 (15 F. R. 6521), and in compliance with the authorities cited below, the following approvals of equipment are prescribed and shall be effective for a period of 5 years from date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER unless sooner canceled or suspended by proper authority and the following change in name and address of a manufacturer of approved equipment shall be made:

#### LIFE PRESERVERS, FIBROUS GLASS, ADULT AND CHILD (JACKET TYPE)

Approval No. 160.005/5/0, Model 51 adult fibrous glass life preserver, U. S. C. G. Specification Subpart 160.005, manufactured by Victory Apparel Manufacturing Corp., 238-50 Passaic Street, Newark 4, N. J.

Approval No. 160.005/6/0, Model 55 child fibrous glass life preserver, U. S. C. G. Specification Subpart 160.005, manufactured by Victory Apparel Manufacturing Corp., 238-50 Passaic Street, Newark 4, N. J.

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4426, 4481, 4482, 4488, 4491, 4492, 35 Stat. 428, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 164, 166, 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375, 391a, 404, 474, 475, 481, 489, 490, 396, 367, 526e, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 160.005)



Courtesy Maritime Reporter.

### BOUYANT CUSHIONS, KAPOK, STANDARD

NOTE: Cushions are approved for use on motorboats of classes A, 1, or 2, not carrying passengers for hire.

Approval No. 160.007/113/0, Standard kapok buoyant cushion, U. S. C. G. Specification Subpart 160.007, manufactured by Kamor Manufacturing Corp., 426 Great East Neck Road, West Babylon, N. Y.

Approval No. 160.007/114/0, Standard kapok buoyant cushion U. S. C. G. Specification Subpart 160.007, manufactured by Sports Development Co., Oak and Beech Streets, Grafton, Wis.

(R. S. 4405, 4491, 54 Stat. 164, 166, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375, 489, 526e, 526p; 46 CFR 25.4-1, 160.007)

### BUOYANT CUSHIONS, NON-STANDARD

NOTE: Cushions are approved for use on motorboats of classes A, 1, or 2, not carrying passengers for hire.

Approval No. 160.008/505/0, 19" x 21" x 3" rectangular buoyant cushion, 72-ounce kapok, dwg. dated January 11, 1952, manufactured by Seashore Upholstering Co., 1217, Asbury Avenue, Ocean City, N. J.

(R. S. 4405, 4491, 54 Stat. 164, 166, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375, 489, 526e, 526p; 46 CFR 25.4-1, 160.008)

### BUOYS, LIFE, RING, CORK OR Balsa WOOD

Approval No. 160.009/38/0, 30-inch cork ring life buoy, U. S. C. G. Specification Subpart 160.009, manufactured by Elvin Salow Co., 379 Atlantic Avenue, Boston 10, Mass.

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4426, 4482, 4488, 4401, sec. 11, 35 Stat. 428, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 164, 166, 346, and sec. 5 (e) 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 375, 391a, 396, 404, 475, 481, 489, 526e, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 25.4-1, 33.01-5, 33.40-1, 59.56, 60.49, 76.53, 94.53, 113.46, 160.009)

### LIFE RAFTS

Approval No. 160.018/5/1, Type B life raft, for other than ocean and coastwise service, 10.5' x 7.83' x 3.0', 15-person capacity, identified by general arrangement dwg. No. B-10-6-15-1, dated September 10, 1951, manufactured by Frank Morrison & Son Co., 1330 West Eleventh Street, Cleveland, Ohio. (Supersedes Approval No. 160.018/5/0 published in the FEDERAL REGISTER dated July 31, 1947.)

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4426, 4481, 4488, 4491, sec. 11, 35 Stat. 428, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 246, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 375, 391a, 396, 404, 474, 475, 481, 489, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 160.018)

### DAVITS, LIFEBOAT

Approval No. 160.032/123/0, Mechanical davit, straight boom sheath screw, Type 22-25, approved for maximum working load of 7,000 pounds per set (3,500 pounds per

arm), using 2-part falls, identified by arrangement dwg. No. DB-101-2 dated March 24, 1950, and revised October 25, 1951, manufactured by Marine Safety Equipment Corp., Point Pleasant, N. J.

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4426, 4481, 4488, 4491, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 375, 391a, 404, 474, 481, 489, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 160.032)

#### LIFEBOATS

Approval No. 160.035/17/1, 22.0' x 7.5' x 3.17' steel oar-propelled lifeboat, 31-person capacity, identified by general arrangement dwg. No. G-2231 dated July 12, 1951, and revised December 24, 1951, manufactured by C. C. Galbraith & Son, Inc., 99 Park Place, New York, N. Y. (Supersedes Approval No. 160.035/17/0 published in the FEDERAL REGISTER dated July 31, 1947.)

Approval No. 160.035/250/0, 14.0' x 5.29' x 2.17' aluminum, square stern, oar-propelled lifeboat, 9-person capacity, identified by construction and arrangement dwg. No. 3283, dated May 18, 1949, and revised August 5, 1949, manufactured by Welin Davit & Boat Division of Continental Copper and Steel Industries, Inc., Perth Amboy, N. J.

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4426, 4481, 4488, 4491, 4492, 35 Stat. 428, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 375, 391a, 396, 404, 474, 481, 489, 490, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 33.01-5, 59.13, 76.16, 94.15, 113.10, 160.035)

#### KITS, FIRST-AID

Approval No. 160.041/1/0, First-aid Kit, Model M 2, dwg. No. 99, dated July 1, 1951, submitted by E. D. Bullard Co., 275 Eighth Street, San Francisco, Calif.

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4488, 4491, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 375, 391a, 481, 489, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 160.041)

#### FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, PORTABLE, HAND, CARBON-DIOXIDE TYPE

Approval No. 162.005/31/0, Fyr-Fyter Model 33-1, 5-pound carbon-dioxide type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 33-1 dated September 8, 1949, issue of July 11, 1951, name plate dwg. No. 4665 dated May 28, 1951, no revision, manufactured by The Fyr-Fyter Co., Dayton 1, Ohio.

Approval No. 162.005/32/0, Fyr-Fyter Model 34-1, 10-pound carbon-dioxide type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 34-1 dated September 7, 1949, issue of January 31, 1950, name plate dwg. No. 4667 dated May 28, 1951, no revision, manufactured by The Fyr-Fyter Co., Dayton 1, Ohio.

Approval No. 162.005/33/0, Fyr-Fyter Model 35-1, 15-pound carbon-dioxide type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 35-1 dated September 8, 1949, issue of January 31, 1950, name plate dwg. No. 4669 dated May 28, 1951, no revision, manufactured by The Fyr-Fyter Co., Dayton 1, Ohio.

Approval No. 162.005/34/0, Buffalo Model 33-2, 5-pound carbon-dioxide type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 33-2 dated September 8, 1949, issue of July 11, 1951, name plate dwg. No. 4666 dated May 28, 1951, no revision, manufactured by Buffalo Fire Appliance Corp., Dayton 1, Ohio.

Approval No. 162.005/35/0, Buffalo Model 34-2, 10-pound carbon-dioxide type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 34-2 dated September 7, 1949, issue of January 31, 1950, name plate dwg. No. 4668 dated May 28, 1951, no revision, manufactured by Buffalo Fire Appliance Corp., Dayton 1, Ohio.

Approval No. 162.005/36/0, Buffalo Model 35-2, 15-pound carbon-dioxide type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 35-2 dated September 8, 1949, issue of January 31, 1950, name plate dwg. No. 4670 dated May 28, 1951, no revision, manufactured by Buffalo Fire Appliance Corp., Dayton 1, Ohio.

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4426, 4479, 4491, 4492, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 165, 166, 346, 1028, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 375, 391a, 404, 463a, 472, 490, 526g, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 25.5-1, 26.3-1, 27.3-1, 34.25-1, 61.13, 77.13, 95.13, 114.15)

#### FIRE EXTINGUISHERS, PORTABLE, HAND, CHEMICAL FOAM TYPE

Approval No. 162.006/18/1, Alfco Model 3F1-CG Foam, 2½-gallon hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 4X-1331 dated March 2, 1950, Alt. C dated September 21, 1951, name plate dwg. No. 4X-550 dated September 7, 1950, Alt. C dated April 3, 1951, manufactured by American-LaFrance-Foamite Corp., Elmira, N. Y. (Supersedes Approval No. 162.006/18/0 published in the FEDERAL REGISTER dated Oct. 3, 1950.)

Approval No. 162.006/19/1, Kidde CG Foam (Symbol AM), 2½-gallon hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 4X-1352 dated September 30, 1950, Alt. B dated September 21, 1951, name plate dwg. No. 4X-578 dated April 10, 1951, no revision, manufactured for Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., Belleville 9, N. J., by American-LaFrance-Foamite Corp., Elmira, N. Y. (Supersedes Approval No. 162.006/19/0 published in the FEDERAL REGISTER dated Oct. 3, 1950.)

Approval No. 162.006/31/0, Buffalo Better-Built CG Foam (Symbol AM),

2½ gallon hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 4X-1377 dated January 21, 1952, no revision, name plate dwg. No. 4X-585 dated October 17, 1951, no revision, manufactured for Buffalo Fire Appliance Corp., Dayton 1, Ohio, by American-LaFrance-Foamite Corp., Elmira, N. Y.

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4426, 4479, 4491, 4492, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 165, 166, 346, 1028, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 375, 404, 463a, 472, 489, 490, 526g, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 25.5-1, 26.3-1, 27.3-1, 34.25-1, 61.13, 77.13, 95.13, 114.15)

#### FIRE EXTINGUISHER, PORTABLE, HAND, SODA-ACID TYPE

Approval No. 162.007/29/2, Kidde (Symbol AM), 2½ gallon soda-acid type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. 2X-1131 dated March 24, 1948, Alt. D dated September 21, 1951, name plate dwg. No. 2X-427 dated July 17, 1950, Alt. A dated October 22, 1951, manufactured for Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., Belleville 9, N. J., by American-LaFrance-Foamite Corp., Elmira, N. Y. (Supersedes Approval No. 162.007/29/1 published in the FEDERAL REGISTER dated Feb. 8, 1950.)

Approval No. 162.007/30/1, Alfco Model 381, 2½-gallon soda-acid type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 2X-1111 dated August 16, 1946, Alt. L dated September 21, 1951, name plate dwg. No. 2X-426 dated June 6, 1950, no revision, manufactured by American-LaFrance-Foamite Corp., Elmira, N. Y. (Supersedes Approval No. 162.007/30/0 published in the FEDERAL REGISTER dated Feb. 8, 1950.)

Approval No. 162.007/42/0, Buffalo Better-Built (Symbol AM), 2½ gallon soda-acid type hand portable fire extinguisher, assembly dwg. No. 2X-1219 dated January 21, 1952, no revision, name plate dwg. No. 2X-442 dated October 17, 1951, no revision, manufactured for Buffalo Fire Appliance Corp., Dayton 1, Ohio, by American-LaFrance-Foamite Corp., Elmira, N. Y.

(R. S. 4405, 4417a, 4426, 4479, 4491, 4492, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 165, 166, 346, 1028, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 375, 391a, 404, 463a, 472, 489, 490, 526g, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 25.5-1, 26.3-1, 27.3-1, 34.25-1, 61.13, 77.13, 95.13, 114.15)

#### CHANGE IN NAME AND ADDRESS OF MANUFACTURER

The name and address of Oceanic Insul-Lite Corp., 464 Baltic Street, Brooklyn 17, N. Y., has been changed to Ocean-Lite Flooring Corp., 2 Conover Street, Brooklyn 31, N. Y., for Approval No. 164.006/32/0 published

in the FEDERAL REGISTER dated April 1, 1948, for deck covering.

Dated: February 28, 1952.

[SEAL] MERLIN O'NEILL,  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,  
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 52-2546; Filed, Mar. 4, 1952;  
8:50 a. m. 17 F. R. 1944-3/5/52.]

### AFFIDAVITS

The following affidavits were accepted during the period from February 15 to March 15, 1952:

*Hammond Machine & Forge Works, Inc.*, 462 Wilcox Street, Hammond, Ind. Fittings.

*Riverside Foundry & Galvanizing Co.*, Kalamazoo, Mich. Castings.

*Homer Foundry Corp.*, Coldwater, Mich. Castings.

*Bruce Foundry & Manufacturing Co.*, Tecumseh, Mich. Castings.

*Ideal Castings Co.*, Albion, Mich. Castings.

### FUSIBLE PLUGS

The Marine Engineering Regulations and Material Specifications require that manufacturers submit samples from each heat of fusible plugs to the Commandant for test prior to plugs manufactured from the heat being used on vessels subject to inspection by the Coast Guard. A list of approved heats which have been tested and found acceptable during the period from February 15 to March 15, 1952, is as follows:

*The Lunkenheimer Co.*, P. O. Box 360, Annex Station, Cincinnati 14, Ohio. Heat Nos. 424 through 432.

## Merchant Marine Personnel Statistics

### INVESTIGATING UNITS

Coast Guard Merchant Marine Investigating Units and Merchant Marine Details investigated a total of 823 cases during the month of January 1952. From this number, hearings before Examiners resulted involving 24 officers and 91 unlicensed men. In the case of officers, 1 license was revoked, 8 were suspended without probation, 9 were suspended with probation granted, 1 license was voluntarily surrendered, 5 were dismissed after hearing, and no hearings were closed with an admonition. Of the unlicensed personnel 9 certificates were revoked, 24 were suspended without probation, 32 were suspended with probation granted, 5 were voluntarily surrendered, 3 hearings were closed with admonitions and 11 cases were dismissed after hearing.

## WAIVER OF MANNING REQUIREMENTS

[January 1952]

Waivers	Atlantic coast	Gulf coast	Pacific coast	Great Lakes	Total
Deck officers substituted for higher ratings.....	13	1			14
Engineer officers substituted for higher ratings.....	64		8		72
O. S. for A.B.....	664	89	108		861
Wiper or compasses for Q. M. F. D.....	374	21	73		468
Total waivers.....	1,115	111	189		1,415
Number of vessels.....	467	83	91		641

NOTE.—In addition, individual waivers were granted to permit the employment of 68 able seamen holding certificates for "any waters—12 months" in excess of the 25 percent authorized by statute.

## ORIGINAL SEAMEN'S DOCUMENTS ISSUED

[January 1952]

Type of document	Atlantic coast	Gulf coast	Pacific coast	Great Lakes and rivers	Total
Staff officer.....	51	15	41	6	113
Continuous discharge book.....		13			13
Merchant mariner's documents.....	1,747	519	1,059	568	3,893
AB any waters unlimited.....	133	34	81	12	260
AB any waters, 12 months.....	69	23	78	15	185
AB Great Lakes, 18 months.....		1		5	6
AB tugs and tow-boats, any waters.....					
A B bays and sounds.....					
AB seagoing barges.....	1				1
Lifeboatman.....	98	4	86	2	190
Q. M. F. D.....	222	90	115	57	484
Radio operators.....	5	2	4		11
Certificate of service.....	1,717	505	1,041	477	3,740
Tanker mat.....	6	9	3	68	86

\* 12 months, vessels 500 gross tons or under, not carrying passengers.

NOTE.—The last 11 categories indicate number of endorsements made on United States merchant mariner's documents.

### DISTRIBUTION (SDL 49):

- A: a, aa, b, c, d, dd (2); remainder (1).  
B: e (35); c (16); g (5); f (4); h (3); d (2); remainder (1).  
C: All (1).  
D: All (1).  
E: mo (1).  
List 141M.

## MERCHANT MARINE OFFICER LICENSES ISSUED

[January 1952]

DECK		
Grade	Original	Renewal
Master:		
Ocean.....	32	172
Coastwise.....	3	16
Great Lakes.....	25	73
B, S, & L.....	5	61
Rivers.....	4	20
Radio officer licenses issued.....	79	
Chief mate:		
Ocean.....	40	43
Coastwise.....	1	1
Mate:		
Great Lakes.....		
B, S, & L.....	3	5
Rivers.....	6	8
Second mate:		
Ocean.....	40	58
Coastwise.....		
Third mate:		
Ocean.....	28	56
Coastwise.....	1	
Pilots:		
Great Lakes.....	41	89
B, S, & L.....	57	153
Rivers.....	35	48
Masters: Uninspected vessels.....	1	
Mate: Uninspected vessels.....		
Total.....	402	809
Grand total.....		1,211

### ENGINEER

Grade	Original	Renewal
STEAM		
Chief engineer:		
Unlimited.....	29	184
Limited.....	23	121
First assistant engineer:		
Unlimited.....	44	65
Limited.....	10	25
Second assistant engineer:		
Unlimited.....	68	82
Limited.....	11	17
Third assistant engineer:		
Unlimited.....	74	81
Limited.....		2
MOTOR		
Chief engineer:		
Unlimited.....	3	49
Limited.....	16	72
First assistant engineer:		
Unlimited.....	6	18
Limited.....	2	2
Second assistant engineer:		
Unlimited.....	6	10
Limited.....		1
Third assistant engineer:		
Unlimited.....	52	93
Limited.....		1
Chief engineer:		
Uninspected Vessels.....	4	2
Assistant engineer:		
Uninspected Vessels.....	4	1
Total.....	352	818
Grand total.....		1,170

#### MAILING LIST FOR "PROCEEDINGS"

It is required by the Regulations of the Joint Committee on Printing, dated July 1, 1951, that the mailing list for the Proceedings of the Merchant Marine Council be circularized to determine whether this publication is still desired by the persons to whom it is addressed.

To all addressees on the mailing list for the Proceedings a card will be sent requesting an affirmative reply, to be returned to the Commandant (CMC), United States Coast Guard, by no later than July 1, 1952. If you desire to continue to receive the Proceedings and you do not receive a card by June 1, 1952, it is suggested that you send a card to the Commandant (CMC), United States Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington 25, D. C., setting forth the following information:

- (a) Quantity desired.
- (b) Quantity now received.
- (c) Name and address to which the Proceedings are now sent.
- (d) The new postal address if different from that to which the Proceedings are now sent.
- (e) Name of firm, company, corporation, or individual requesting the Proceedings.

In order to reduce the size of the mailing list it is most advantageous to have copies of the Proceedings, when several are involved, mailed under the same cover to the same address.

If no affirmative reply requesting continuance is received by July 1, 1952, the addressee's name will be removed from the mailing list.

#### FILTERS

When filters are fitted arrangements should be made for the maintenance and care of the apparatus, i. e., cleaning and where necessary changing the media to ensure that the apparatus does not become contaminated by bacteria and other foreign matter. It is recommended that the media, i. e., the carbon candles, should at intervals be removed and washed out in chlorinated water and lightly scrubbed with a brush to remove all traces of deposit on the surface of the filter. The frequency with which this should be carried out will, of course, depend on the amount of solid matter in the water, as water which gives a marked deposit on standing will soon clog up the pores of the filter, whereas pure water should allow the filter to work satisfactorily a considerable time. In any case, filters should be cleaned out at least once a month, and more

frequently if water containing an appreciable sediment is being passed through them.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that filters will not guarantee the bacteriological purity of the filtered water. Therefore, whenever there is any doubt as to the quality of the water, chlorination should be carried out in accordance with the instructions laid down in the Ship Captain's Medical Guide.

## Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No. 2-52

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.  
March 12, 1952.

Subj.: Liberty type vessels; fuel oil discharge strainers on, protection and maintenance of.

1. A number of disastrous fires have occurred on Liberty ships which resulted in the death of several crew members and the total loss of the ships concerned. These blazes originated in the firerooms of the vessels and it has been determined that the location of the fuel oil discharge strainers was a prime factor, both in the starting of the fires and in the difficulty of controlling them after they had started.

2. The strainers in question are of the duplex basket type. An integrally fitted cock directs the flow of oil into one or the other of the strainers which carry hot fuel oil under heavy pressure. The caps which are fitted over the strainers are held in place with strongback and screws. During the years these units have been in use, the lugs on top of the caps which provide leverage for the strongbacks, have been squeezed out of shape and in many cases the covers have become slightly warped. These two conditions make it difficult to maintain tight joints between the covers and bodies of the units. In some cases two gaskets, one lead and one fiber, have been used. It sometimes happens after cleaning and replacing a strainer that the strongback is not tightened down sufficiently on the strainer cover or one of the gaskets used is defective. Then when the cock is turned, directing the oil into the recently cleaned strainer, a spray of oil heated to the optimum burning temperature is shot out onto the surrounding objects.

3. In most Liberty ships, the fuel oil discharge strainers are located just forward of the starboard boilers close to the inboard edge of the casing and directly under the starboard fireroom ventilator. In this position, a leaky cover gasket can spray the hot inflammable oil directly across the fireroom onto the furnace front of the port

boiler. This is what happened in the casualties referred to in the first paragraph. The spray of oil then became ignited and the flames prevented anyone getting back to turn the cock to the opposite position. Before the fuel oil pumps could be stopped by the remote controls, the fires were out of hand.

4. To correct these dangerous conditions, two steps must be taken by the owner or operator of a Liberty vessel. First, change the location of the strainer; and, second, install a metal spray shield around the strainer. The Coast Guard will require one of the following methods to be followed to accomplish this:

(a) The strainer may be moved at least five (5) feet outboard from its present location. This will render it extremely unlikely that a leaky cap can spray oil onto the port boiler front. To keep such a leak from striking the casing of the starboard boiler, a 31 B. W. G. or thicker sheet metal spray shield shall be installed between the strainer and the starboard boiler. See figure No. 1.

(b) The strainer may be located on the forward fireroom bulkhead (bulkhead 88). Here, too, a 31 B. W. G. or thicker sheet metal spray shield is required. When it is necessary to lead a short section of the fuel oil discharge piping under the floor plates, such section of piping shall be continuous and a suitable inspection plate shall be installed in the floor plate where deemed necessary by the inspector. See figure No. 2.

(c) The strainer may be located at any other place desired so long as it will accomplish the purpose, but prior approval must be obtained from the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, in the zone where the changes are to be made.

5. Figures Nos. 1 and 2 on page 127 show details of the recommended locations of the oil discharge strainers and may be used as guides in making the required alterations in the fuel oil system.

6. The cooperation of shipowners and operators is sought in taking the above outlined corrective action at the earliest possible date. In any event, the desired change must be accomplished not later than 1 July 1952.

7. The engineer officers are reminded that the maintenance in good condition of fuel oil strainers is one of their responsibilities. Any strainer cap which is warped or defective to the point where more than one gasket is required should be replaced.

8. The Coast Guard marine inspectors in the future will pay particular attention to the maintenance of such equipment and will require replacement of any which are defective.

By direction of the Commandant,

(S) H. C. SHEPHEARD,  
Rear Admiral, U. S. C. G.  
Chief, Office of Merchant  
Marine Safety.




Figure 1




Figure 2

