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Mention of source will be appreciated.

The Merchant Marine Council of the United States Coast Guard

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For each meeting two District Commanders and three Marine Inspection Officers are designated as members by the Commandant.

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Cover Picture: The S. S. *President Harrison* in San Francisco Harbor, Courtesy American President Lines. Photo by PALMER PICTURES.

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The "Noronic" Disaster

Statement of the Minister of Transport on Tabling the Report of the Court of Investigation Into the Loss of the S. S. *Noronic*

November 21, 1949.

On September 17th last I informed the House that under the provisions of the Canada Shipping Act I had appointed the Hon. Mr. Justice Kellock of the Supreme Court of Canada to act as a Commissioner to hold a formal investigation into the loss of the S. S. *Noronic* by fire in Toronto Harbour on September 17th.

The Commissioner sitting as a Court of Investigation was assisted by Captains H. S. Kane and Robert Mitchell as nautical assessors and Mr. Neil B. Gebbie as engineer assessor.

Counsel appeared for the Department of Transport, for Canada Steamship Lines, Limited, and Officers, for the Attorney General of Ontario, for the Attorney General of the State of Ohio, and for the Seafarers' International Union. Mr. W. K. Campbell acted as Registrar of the Court.

The Court held hearings in the City of Toronto on eighteen days in September, October and November and the final sitting was held at the City

of Ottawa on the 21st day of November, 1949.

Many witnesses were called to give evidence and ample opportunity was given to everyone who had personal knowledge of the circumstances of the disaster to come forward and testify.

I think I may say without fear of contradiction that the Investigation was searching, impartial and thorough.

The Judgment of the Court was pronounced this morning in open court as follows:

COURT OF INVESTIGATION S. S. NORONIC

The Honourable Mr. Justice R. L. Kellock, Commissioner

Monday, the 21st day of November 1949.

This matter coming on for hearing before this Court at its sittings held at the City of Toronto in the Province of Ontario on the 28th, 29th and 30th days of September, the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st days of October and the 7th day of November, 1949, and judgment having been reserved until this day and the same coming on this day for judgment.

1. This Court Doth Order and Adjudge that the certificate of William Taylor, being Passenger Inland Waters' Certificate No. 6703 be, and same is hereby suspended until and including the 21st day of November, 1950.

2. AND This Court Doth Further Order and Adjudge that the costs of the Department of Transport of this investigation be taxed upon the scale of the Exchequer Court of Canada and be paid by Canada Steamship Lines Limited.

3. AND This Court Doth Not See Fit to make any further or other order touching the costs of the said investigation.

(Sgd.) R. L. KELLOCK,
Commissioner.

(Sgd.) HUGH S. KANE,
Assessor.

(Sgd.) R. MITCHELL,
Assessor.

(Sgd.) NEIL B. GEBBIE,
Assessor.

The Commissioner's report, concurred in by the Assessors, is embodied in a separate document and has been forwarded to me by the Commissioner in accordance with the provisions of the Canada Shipping Act. I will table a copy of the report and copies will be available for all members of the House.

The report of the Court of Investigation is a lengthy document as befits an investigation of major importance and should be carefully read by all those who are concerned in preventing a recurrence of such a terrible disaster. I shall not attempt in this statement to review the contents of the report at length but will endeavor to point out to members of this House some of the more important observations and findings of the Court.

In the first part of the report the Commissioner reviews the legislation and regulations to which the ship and its owners were subject. He finds that the *Noronic* was built in 1913 and was constructed without fire-resisting bulkheads. Under the regulations the ship, as an existing ship, was exempted from compliance with the regulations which came into force in 1939 and which require new ships to be constructed with fire-resisting bulkheads.

The *Noronic* was equipped with a fire alarm system which was mechanically in good order, with fire extinguishing equipment consisting of hydrants, hoses, fire extinguishers, pumps, smoke helmets and lamps which had been inspected by the Canadian Steamship Inspection Service on April 23, 1949, and had been approved by the Steamship Inspector. The Commissioner expresses the opinion that the laxity of the inspection

in requiring compliance with the regulations could only induce or encourage a similar laxity on the part of the owners and officers of the ship with respect to the vital matter of preparedness for fire.

Pursuant to United States legislation, the provisions of the Canadian regulations were considered by the United States authorities as approximating those in the United States, and a certificate was issued on April 28, 1949, by the Inspection Office of United States Coast Guard admitting the *Noronic* to the exemptions and benefits provided by United States Statutes relating to the inspection of boilers, machinery, hull and equipments. This meant that compliance with Canadian regulations was considered sufficient.

The certificate issued by the Canadian Steamship Inspection Service permitted the ship to carry 600 passengers and 200 crew. At the time of the casualty the ship carried 524 passengers and 171 crew.

There are no regulations applying to Canadian passenger ships on the Great Lakes with respect to the maintenance of any fire patrol system or as to fire drills for either passengers or crew. However, the Commissioner states, that, in his opinion, it is implicit in the regulations relating to fire extinguishing equipment that there shall be provided by the shipowner men trained to use the required apparatus and so organized that the presence of fire on shipboard may be learned at a sufficiently early stage as to make the use of the required apparatus in the hands of such men effective in its control. So far as patrolling for detection of an outbreak of fire is concerned that is a duty which, it was decided as long ago as 1910 by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of the *Dominion Fish Company v. Isbester*, is incumbent upon the shipowner for the protection of sleeping passengers in the case of a ship lying at dock.

In a ship equipped with neither automatic apparatus for detecting an outbreak of fire on board nor an automatic sprinkler system to extinguish it if it did break out, as was the case with the *Noronic*, an efficient patrol for the detection of fire at the earliest possible moment would appear to be essential. The fire patrol actually employed on the ship was inadequate for the purpose.

The report deals with the organization, or lack of it, of the officers and crew of the ship to meet a situation such as occurred. Only 15 crew members were required to be on the ship at the time of the fire, the remainder being free to go ashore.

After reviewing the evidence of certain witnesses, the Commissioner finds that, in his opinion, no one in a responsible position in connection with the ship, either on the ship or ashore, had applied his mind in any serious way to the handling of a situation such as arose on the outbreak of fire on the night in question, although such an eventuality could not be considered otherwise than as one that might occur at any time. Moreover, complete complacency had descended upon both the ship officers and the management. The fire which actually occurred found officers and crew without any organization designed to deal with such a situation.

The Commissioner further states that, in his opinion, it is clear there was no training of the crew with respect to fire or its detection, or what should be done after detection, apart from what might be picked up by attendance at fire drills. The lack of any effective system of patrolling for the purpose of fire detection and the lack of any system by which, when fire was detected, the information of its presence and location could immediately be sent to some central locality, where personnel trained in methods of dealing with fire were available to be sent to the spot immediately, accounts in the Commissioner's opinion, for the loss of life which ensued.

The Commissioner points out that the outbreak of fire on a ship at a time when it has a large number of sleeping passengers on board requires of necessity a prearranged plan for rousing and getting them off the ship. The *Noronic* had no such plan. Any organization which the ship did have was designed to function in other circumstances with a complete crew on board. Accordingly the fire found the ship totally unprepared to deal with the situation. Such efforts as were made to fight the fire were scattered and ineffective, and the heavy loss of life shows clearly the failure of the crew to rouse those sleeping passengers who were unable to escape from the burning ship.

The report states that the evidence establishes the origin of the fire to have been in a small linen closet located just forward of the women's washroom opening onto the port corridor on "C" deck. The actual cause of the fire was not established but there was no evidence of the fire having been deliberately set.

The procedure followed in formal investigations of this kind is for the Department of Transport to propound certain questions for the opinion of the court. The report of the Com-

missioner sets out at the end thereof the questions raised and the answers given by the court. Following these questions and answers the Commissioner makes some observations on the suspension of the master's certificate and gives reasons for awarding costs. The report concludes with certain recommendations made by the court. I should like to read the more important of the questions and answers which are found on pages 94 to 96 of the report, and which are as follows:

Question 15.

When fire was discovered on the S. S. *Noronic* was all possible and proper action taken to save life, to fight, control, localize, and extinguish the fire? If not, in what way and to what extent was the action taken, if any, defective or inadequate?

Answer:

The action taken for the above purposes by the ordinary crew members was no doubt such action as they would be expected to take without direction in such circumstances, no officer of the ship having taken charge of the situation or having attempted to give any general directions, if such was possible at the advanced stage which the fire had reached when the alarm was given.

16. If all possible and proper action was not taken or was not taken soon enough to save life, and fight, control, localize, and extinguish the fire, was the Master or any other person or persons on the vessel to blame? If so, whom?

Answer:

After the alarm had been given the only thing it might have been possible to do, which was not done, was for the Master to have taken general charge of the situation and directed in an organized way the arousing of passengers, instead of acting himself as an ordinary sailor in such parts of the ship as he could reach.

17. Were the fire-fighting appliances on board the S. S. *Noronic* adequate? Had they been found satisfactory and in good working order? If so, when and where were they last tested and found satisfactory and in good working order?

Answer:

The fire-fighting appliances on board appear to have been satisfactory and in good working order. The last departmental inspection was on April 23, 1949. Some of the fire hydrants (probably all the outside ones, but none of those inside) and a few of the fire extinguishers had been used since that time.

18. How many of the crew of the S. S. *Noronic* were lost or injured? How many are missing?

Answer:

There were no losses among the crew.

19. What was the cause of the loss of the S. S. *Noronic* and the cause of the loss of life?

Answer:

The loss of the S. S. *Noronic* and the loss of life was due to the failure on the part of the owners and the Master to have:

(a) a continuous patrol of the ship for the purpose of detecting the presence of fire, such patrol as was in existence being limited to approximately fifteen minutes out of every hour;

(b) in failing to have any organization operative when the ship was in dock with passengers on board by which information as to the outbreak of fire could be promptly despatched to some point from which men trained in the methods of dealing with fire could be immediately despatched to the locality;

(c) in failing to contemplate in any real sense the possibility of fire occurring at a dock and maintaining only fifteen actually on duty out of a crew of one hundred and seventy-one, the others being free to go ashore and who might be, so far as the Master or the officer on duty knew, actually on shore;

(d) in failing to have any plan for arousing and getting the passengers off the ship in the event of fire while the ship was at dock;

(e) in failing to train the crew as to the proper steps to be taken on discovery of fire or in fire-fighting methods beyond giving them a knowledge of how to operate fire extinguishers and hoses.

20. Was the loss of the S. S. *Noronic* and the loss of life caused or contributed to by the wrongful act or default of the owners, Canada Steamship Lines, Limited, the Master, Captain William Taylor, or any other person or persons?

Answer:

The loss of the S. S. *Noronic* and the loss of life was caused by the wrongful default of the owners and of the Master in the respects mentioned in the answers to the last question. While it is true that the owners knew and approved of the organization, or lack of it, designed to deal with the outbreak of fire on the ship while it lay in dock with sleeping passengers on board, the Master was not in any way precluded by any instructions from the owners from taking the proper steps himself.

I should like also to read the recommendations which appear at the end of the report:

Recommendations.

While anything in the way of recommendation for the future probably arises fairly obviously upon a review of the circumstances covered by this report, it may be of value to gather them together in one place. The following are therefore submitted for consideration in connection with ships carrying more than a minimum of passengers on the major fresh waters:

1. That the provisions as to fire-resisting bulkheads in Regulation XVI of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea be made applicable to such ships.

2. That the provisions of Regulation XLIII of the said Safety Convention, as to the maintenance of an efficient and continuous fire patrol system as well as an automatic fire-alarm or fire-detecting system be made applicable but such alarm or detecting

system should not be restricted to parts of the ship not accessible to the patrol system.

3. That the provisions of Regulation XLIV as to muster lists and the assigning of special duties to different members of the crew in connection with the matters therein mentioned, including:

- (a) the muster of passengers;
- (b) the extinction of fire;
- (c) warning of passengers;
- (d) assembling of passengers at muster stations;
- (e) keeping order in the passages and on the stairways and generally controlling the movements of passengers, be applied. This will necessarily require adequate training of the crew in methods of fire fighting, together with the setting up of and maintenance of an effective organization for despatching men so trained to the seat of fire at the earliest possible moment.

4. That such ships be fitted with a sprinkler system protecting all enclosed parts of the vessel.

5. Muster charts should be prominently displayed in order that each member of the crew may become familiar, not only with his own duties and fire and boat stations, but with those of the crew who are to work with him.

6. That such ships be fitted with a public address system for directing passengers in an emergency and that the proper officers be trained as to its use.

7. That ships at dock should provide adequate and more than a single means of exit to shore.

8. That passenger ships docking with the intention of remaining for any extended time be required to be connected with the local telephone system so that the aid of the local fire department may be obtained without delay.

In conclusion I wish to take this opportunity to thank publicly the Commissioner and his Assessors for their untiring efforts in this long and arduous investigation, and also all those who assisted the court in the discharge of their duties. The recommendations made by the court will be carefully considered by the department, and I sincerely hope that this investigation which has been so ably carried out will be the means of preventing disasters of this kind in the future.

STANDARD STATION BILLS AND EMERGENCY DRILLS

This article is reprinted from the "Manual for Lifeboatmen and Able Seamen," CG 175, for the information and instruction of masters, officers, and certificated personnel on merchant vessels, and marine inspectors. This is part V of the manual and contains invaluable information about fire drills and fire-fighting aboard ship and also emergencies such as man overboard, steering gear casualties, and abandoning ship.

Copies of the "Manual for Lifeboatmen and Able Seamen," CG 175, and specimen station bills may be obtained from the officer in charge, marine inspection, United States Coast Guard, in various port cities. The manual should be placed aboard merchant vessels in sufficient numbers to be

readily available for the information and instruction of the merchant-marine personnel.

STATION BILLS

Before sailing, station bills and muster lists must be posted in the crew's quarters and in conspicuous places on every passenger vessel and also on every other vessel of more than 500 gross tons which is subject to inspection. The station bill must contain full particulars of the signals which will be used for calling all members of the crew to their stations for emergency duties.

The duties provided for by the station bill include the following:

1. Closing the airports, watertight doors, fire doors and fire screens, covers and all valves of all scuppers, sanitary, and other discharges through the hull below the margin line, and stopping the fans and ventilating system.

2. The extinction of fire.

3. The equipment of boats, rafts, and buoyant apparatus, and their preparation for launching.

4. The muster of passengers, which includes warning the passengers, seeing that they are dressed and have on properly adjusted life preservers, assembling them and directing them to appointed stations, keeping order, and generally controlling their movements.

Special duties shall be allotted to each member of the crew, and the muster lists shall show all these special duties and indicate the station to which each man must go, and the duties he has to perform. The special duties should, as far as possible, be comparable to the regular work of the individual.

The station bill should be prepared in conformity with specimen standard form station bills, a copy of which may be obtained from the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection. The emergency signals and instructions have been incorporated in this form.

The continuous ringing of the general alarm bells has but one meaning—fire and emergency. The crew, trained to recognize this signal, shall proceed to their emergency stations immediately and carry out their allotted duties quickly and effectively. In the event of an actual collision, or stranding, those men assigned to fire hose, hydrants, axes, extinguishers, etc., must assist in closing all airports, side scuttles, side ports, watertight doors, and ventilator ducts in the vicinity of their stations.

The General Rules and Regulations provide that the master of any vessel may establish such additional emergency signals as will provide that all the officers, crew, and passengers of

the vessel will have positive and certain notice of the existing emergency.

The ten standard instructions provide for emergencies which may occur on board the various types of vessels. Where one or more of these instructions does not apply to a particular type of vessel, they need not be considered. The crew, however, will be familiar with all standard instructions in the event they are transferred to a vessel to which they are applicable.

The advantages of this form are numerous. For instance, when a member of the crew wishes to find his emergency station, he may look under the respective department in the left-hand column and follow down until he arrives at his rating and number and then read to the right in each column for his station and duties at each emergency drill. With this form in use throughout the merchant service, the personnel become thoroughly familiar with it and need not study and interpret a different form each time they change ships. In this manner, the emergency drills become highly efficient and well organized, as crews become familiar with all standard emergency drill signals and procedures prior to reporting aboard and need only to ascertain the specific post and duties of their assignments.

The object of the standard station bill is to provide a uniform system for training the members of crews of all vessels in the duties that they would be required to undertake in the event of any accident to the vessel which may, if not skillfully handled, involve the abandonment of the vessel. Such uniform training builds up an efficient organization so that in an actual emergency such as fire, stranding, or collision, the appropriate members of the crew will immediately proceed to their allotted stations and carry out the duties assigned to them with a view to dealing with the emergency. Should the abandonment of the vessel become necessary, they will promptly prepare the boats and other lifesaving equipment for use, warn the passengers, and control their movements in the interest of safety.

The preparation of station bills is facilitated by indicating the berth or article number (instead of names) of the individual members of the crew, with the emergency duties assigned to them. A number and card should be fixed to each berth or issued to each member of the crew at the time of signing articles. This supplementary station bill card shows the emergency duties in detail, and location of the station. All signals connected with these duties should be included. In order to provide for a permanent assignment to lifeboats, the station bills

should be made up on the basis of maximum passenger and crew capacity.

Station bills must be framed and posted under glass to command the attention of the entire personnel and serve as a guide and constant reminder of what is required and expected of them. On board vessels employing large crews, it is recommended that the station bill be made up in sections and posted in the mess room, quarters, or passageway adjacent to the quarters of each department.

The use to which the lifeboats, life rafts, or buoyant appliances which are provided against the contingency of the vessel having to be abandoned, will be put during an emergency depends on the efficiency of the crew. It is not enough that individual members of the crew should be experts in the management of a boat. Well-organized teamwork is necessary and the organization must cover not only the lowering and handling of the boats or rafts, but also the effective manning of all emergency stations. No amount of material improvement in equipment and arrangement can take the place of a well-instructed disciplined, and properly organized crew. The establishment of uniformity is essential.

The duties connected with the assisting and controlling of the passengers should normally be assigned to certain members of the steward's department. In emergencies they shall warn all passengers, assist them to obtain and put on life preservers and direct them to the assembly or embarkation stations. They are to keep order in the stairways, passages and doorways, and impress upon passengers the serious danger of injury from leaping overboard. In this connection, the importance of using the side ladders for the purposes of entering the boats should be proved necessary to embark after the boats have been lowered into the water, should be pointed out. At drills they should explain to the passengers the process of abandoning ship and emphasize that the general alarm signal is not in itself a signal to abandon ship, but is intended to secure the orderly assembly of passengers at the appointed stations. The steward's department crew should encourage the attendance of all passengers during emergency drills and should be prepared to instruct and assist the passengers. Passengers and crew must be cautioned against attempting to pass through doorways while watertight doors are in motion or the closing signal is sounding.

On all vessels, the allocation of members of the crew to the duties of

closing airports and distributing life preservers to the passengers in various parts of the vessel, and preparing and launching the life rafts and buoyant apparatus, should receive special attention.

Cards posted in staterooms for the instruction of passengers must clearly state the various emergency signals and the location of the allotted assembly station of the occupants, or the number of the lifeboat or lifeboat station to which they are assigned. The lifeboat stations are indicated by signs located on the embarkation assembly deck.

In assigning the crew to stations and duties comparable to their regular work, consideration should be given to the quarters and working station of personnel.

The importance of organizing and training an emergency squad cannot be overemphasized. This squad must be carefully selected from the crew for their experience, intelligence, and endurance. On the signal, the squad assembles near the bridge with fire axes, crowbar, fire extinguishers, extra lengths of hose, gas masks, life lines, first-aid kit, safety lamp, flashlight, etc., and then proceeds to the scene of action under proper direction and takes over the real work of clearing away wreckage, fighting fires, etc. In the event of a man overboard, the emergency squad shall assist the emergency boat crew clear away and swing out the lee boat and tend the boat falls or winch; assist the boat crew into life preservers and, if necessary, fill in the vacant thwarts to man the boat in the shortest possible time. This squad and all officers should be instructed in the operation of the emergency steering gear, auxiliary lighting system, oxygen-breathing apparatus, steam-smothering and CO₂ control valves and cut-off valves to fuel-oil system. On vessels where the size of the crew permits, the carpenter, plumber, machinist, and electrician should be included in this squad.

Men must be assigned to closing all ports and overboard discharge valves (except those in the engine room) below the bulkhead or main deck under proper direction. Watertight doors shall in all cases be closed immediately upon sounding of the emergency signal. After a collision, the machinery for closing these doors may be damaged.

Men from each lifeboat should be assigned to the embarkation deck to assist passengers entering the boat and capable men must be assigned to lead out and tend painters. Painters should be held and tended at the ship's rail in such manner that they may be readily released from that position

even if under severe strain. The painter should be held and tended at a point in its length with due regard to the vessel's draft on each particular voyage so that when the boat is in the water and the painter is taking the strain, the boat fetches up abreast a boat ladder.

A small group of men should be placed under the direction of a deck officer to prepare all lifeboats and swing them out ready for lowering on any emergency signal. In the event the emergency gets beyond control, the boats will then be ready for abandoning ship and the crew assigned to abandon ship stations accordingly.

Only competent men should be entrusted with the command or as second in command of lifeboats. A comprehensive knowledge of the boat problem is necessary so that under various circumstances a lifeboat may be launched successfully. Hesitation and insufficient leadership are direct incentives to accident. This consideration demonstrates that the boat commander and the man attending the releasing gear have responsible tasks and that skilled cooperation is absolutely necessary. The lifeboat commander has charge of the entire operation and should be in the boat during the operation of lowering because he must decide the opportune moment for releasing the boat falls.

The practice of conducting a combined fire and boat drill has apparently been adopted by ship masters because of its convenience. Emergency drills conducted on specific days at the same hour do not demonstrate crew efficiency. This practice finds the crew waiting for the fire signal with their life belts already on and the engineers warned well in advance of the imminent use of the fire pumps. Boat drills should be separated from fire drills occasionally to insure prompt response to the boat station signals. That portion of the crew who are on watch during these prearranged drills seldom are mustered at their emergency stations during the entire voyage.

The fire pumps shall be started immediately upon sounding of the fire and emergency signal and must be properly attended. The relief valves will dispose of excess pressure.

Although the size of the crew is limited on freight and tank vessels, each member of the crew must be assigned to definite duties in emergencies, such as closing shaft alley doors, attending the steam-smothering system, putting the plug in No. 2 boat, forward fall of No. 1 boat, tending a painter, etc.

Many cargo vessels and tank ships are certificated to carry persons in addition to crew under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, therefore, the

steward's department should assist these passengers with life preservers and direct them to the allotted lifeboats.

Cargo vessels equipped with watertight doors should have men assigned to close the doors. The crew, divided as equally as possible and assigned to all lifeboats, must be mustered and instructed during these drills. While it is true that these vessels carry sufficient lifeboats on each side for all persons on board, conditions may exist on the vessel whereby the crew cannot reach their respective boats. Therefore, all boats should be manned and as many as possible launched in case of emergency.

Attention is directed to Coast Guard notices entitled Station Bills, Drills and Reports of Masters (Form CG 809A and B) which are posted about the ship for additional information regarding emergency drills.

EMERGENCY SIGNALS

1. Fire alarm signals. (a) The general fire alarm signal shall be a continuous rapid ringing of the ship's bell for a period not less than 10 seconds supplemented by the continuous ringing of the general alarm bells for not less than 10 seconds.

(b) For dismissal from fire-alarm stations, the general alarm bells shall be sounded three times, supplemented by three short blasts of the whistle.

2. Boat station or boat drill signals. (a) The signal for boat drill or boat stations shall be more than six (seven or more) short blasts and one long blast of the whistle, supplemented by the same signal on the general alarm bells.

(b) Where whistle signals are used for handling boats, they shall be as follows:

To lower boats, one short blast of the whistle.

To stop lowering the boats, two short blasts of the whistle.

For dismissal from boat stations, three short blasts of the whistle.

3. Other emergency signals. The master of any vessel may establish such other emergency signal, in addition to the above, as will provide that all the officers and all the crew and passengers of the vessel will have positive and certain notice of the existing emergency.

EMERGENCY SQUAD

The masters of ocean, coastwise, Great Lakes, bay, sound and river passenger, cargo, and tank ships should organize and train a squad of men for the special duty of handling any emergency that might occur on board ship. This so-called emergency squad, consisting of from 6 to 24 men depending on the size of the crew,

should be selected for their skill in their special calling, such as able seamen, quartermasters, boatswains, carpenters, electricians, and deck engineers, or others. They should be placed under the charge of the chief officer and trained to respond promptly to such emergencies as fire aboard ship, man overboard, steering-gear casualties, and collision; and to handle emergencies effectively.

The master of the ship should designate a signal for calling the emergency squad. On ships that are fitted with a loudspeaker system, the squad may be called by means of loudspeakers placed advantageously in the crew quarters. In case a fire alarm is turned in over the manual alarm-call-box system, fire-alarm bells ring in the pilothouse, engine room, and crew quarters. Immediately upon the sounding of the manual fire-alarm bell, the fire pumps must be started so that by the time the emergency squad arrives at the scene of the alarm, water under pressure will be available for fighting fire. In addition to the manual-alarm system, the fire alarm may be given by the melting of a sprinkler head or the sounding of an automatic fire-detection system. The alarm of fire in a cargo space may be indicated in the pilothouse by either the audible alarm or the detection of smoke through the smoke-detection system.

If the location of the alarm is known, the emergency squad may be dispatched by means of the loudspeaker or other signals directly to the scene, without the necessity of their reporting to the pilothouse. The first of the squad to arrive on the scene leads out adjacent hoses and starts to extinguish the fire. Sometimes the fire may readily be put out by the use of fire extinguishers, which the squad gathers on its way to the fire. A well-trained squad should arrive at the designated location on the largest ship within a minute or two. The chief officer, or officer who first arrives on the scene, immediately estimates the situation and directs a messenger from the squad to inform the officer of the deck watch, either by means of talk-back loudspeakers, telephone, voice tubes, or by proceeding to the bridge, of the location of the fire, probable seriousness of the situation, and whether or not it is necessary to change course or stop the vessel to make a lee. Upon receipt of word on the bridge, it may readily be determined if it is necessary to sound the general fire-alarm signal.

The members of the emergency squad take such immediate steps as the occasion requires to fight the fire

with water, close adjacent fire-screen doors and airports to stop the draft, close ventilator dampers, arrange for the stopping of the ventilation system in that part of the ship, and warn the passengers in adjacent accommodations.

If the general fire alarm has sounded, the squad directs all members of the crew assigned to adjacent hoses to lead in all hoses possible to bear, without delay, in order to apply as large a volume of water as possible on the fire. Hoses may be coupled together, some may be passed from deck to deck, and streams from as many hoses as reach may be played on the fire. The officer in charge shall keep the master informed of the progress attained, and if he believes it necessary he may advise stopping the ship and clearing away the boats, if quick control of the fire is not possible.

The emergency squad shall provide fire axes, crowbars, fire extinguishers, spare length of fire hose, nozzle and spanners, flashlights, gas masks, oxygen-breathing apparatus, and a safety flame lamp.

All members of the squad must be thoroughly trained in the use of gas masks for rescue purposes and instructed in the limitations of possible use of the all-service gas masks and flame safety lamp. The oxygen-breathing apparatus should be reserved for service when it is necessary to furnish oxygen to the would-be rescuer, in cases of oxygen depletion within a compartment. The gas masks or oxygen-breathing apparatus should be kept in the containers until actually necessary to use them. This is to prevent damage to the equipment. Instructions for the use of this equipment are printed inside the cover of the container, and should be carefully observed. Men entering smoke-filled compartments should wear a safety belt fitted with a line so as to enable them to be dragged to safety.

The emergency squad shall respond to all man-overboard calls and prepare to swing out the emergency boat on the designated or lee side, assist the emergency boat crew into life preservers, tend the falls or mechanical lowering gear and frapping lines, and if necessary men from the squad shall fill in vacant thwarts to expedite launching of the boat. If necessary to use storm oil, a man from the squad is detailed for the purpose and at least one man keeps watch on the person overboard until relieved by regular lookouts. At nighttime the searchlights are manned. The squad should hang an ordinary rope net cargo sling over the side, aft of the emergency boat, for picking up the

boat crew in case the boat is overturned when launching. This sling may be used to pick up tired or exhausted persons, in view of the fact that a person may easily entangle his arms and legs in the net and be hoisted aboard in safety. As soon as one boat is cleared away and lowered, the remainder of the squad should prepare the other boat for lowering, and then provide heaving lines to pass the sea painter to the boats and arrange for hoisting the boat or boats upon their return. A pilot's ladder should also be hung over the side to take the crew aboard.

In case of collision, the squad shall report to the scene and immediately start closing hand-operated watertight doors adjacent to the damage, close airports and ventilation ducts passing through the boundary watertight bulkheads, and make every effort to localize the damage. The chief officer should instruct his messenger to report the extent of the damage to the master or officer of the deck watch, with such recommendations as are necessary. All overboard discharges in the vicinity shall be closed and preparations made to effect temporary repairs, if feasible. Soundings shall be taken of adjacent compartments to determine if leakage has occurred. The squad provides topping mauls, crowbars, and wrenches to assist in closing watertight doors that may be sprung and need some forcing to close effectually. Flashlights should be provided at nighttime and cargo lights rigged at the scene as soon as possible to provide illumination.

The emergency squad should be thoroughly trained in the methods of changing over from the regular steering gear to all auxiliary steering gears and instructed in the manning and steering of the ship by all possible steering gears. This instruction should be given by the officers with special instructions regarding the handling of mechanical parts given by the chief engineer. All deck and engine officers should be thoroughly instructed in changing steering gears. All clutches, pins, and couplings should be marked, numbered, or lettered, and a sign should be posted at each station, showing all instructions for changing from one method of steering to another. Members of the squad should take their stations at each steering wheel and man voice tubes and telephones promptly so that the vessel may be steered from any steering station without delay. All members of the squad should be instructed to center the steering wheels and gears amidship before shifting gears or clutches.

A well-trained emergency squad will

prove itself invaluable aboard ship and in many cases emergencies may be met successfully by the squad without calling the entire crew to emergency stations. However, the alert officer of the watch or shipmaster should never hesitate to sound the general alarm without delay if the emergency warrants such action.

MEMORIAL PLAQUE DEDICATED TO 96 MYSTIC STEAMSHIP HEROES

As a lasting tribute to 96 seamen who lost their lives while serving in the Merchant Marine aboard ships operated by the Mystic Steamship Di-

vision of the Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates during World War II, a bronze memorial plaque was dedicated on June 2, 1948, in the B. C. G. Auditorium in Boston, Mass., at an impressive ceremony attended by nearly 200 parents, relatives, and close friends of the seamen. The memorial plaque lists the names of those who made the supreme sacrifice during the war and is a roll of honor in lasting tribute to them, as well as a symbol of gratitude to the many others who served with them.

Capt. F. B. Craven, manager of the marine department, Mystic Steamship Division, presided at the memorial ex-

ercises. Mr. E. H. Bird, vice president of Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, dedicated the memorial "in recognition of unselfish service" and read the honor roll. The Rev. Walter L. Flaherty delivered the dedication address and Mrs. Virginia C. Fisher unveiled the memorial. Photographs of this bronze memorial were presented to the next of kin.

This memorial plaque is a token of esteem in commemoration of those heroic men who helped wage the war of supply. It is also a reminder to those who were more fortunate of a task well done. The Coast Guard joins in a salute to these heroes.

LESSONS FROM CASUALTIES

ANOTHER BLOOD POISONING CASE

The skin is more precious than fine china. We handle china carefully—why not our skin? The efficiency of any worker depends upon keeping the skin protected against scratches and punctures which can easily become infected. Recently while cleaning woodwork aboard a ship a seaman received a sliver in his hand. He removed the sliver and continued to work. The next morning when he awoke with a rapidly swelling and painful hand this man decided to drop his self-appointed role of the strong silent type and report his injury. *Diagnosis: Blood poisoning, in left hand!*

For many years the following has been emphasized:

REPORT ALL INJURIES, NO MATTER HOW SMALL

Also, for many years there has been publicized the danger of puncture wounds; yet we still have this type of injury which is not immediately reported and which causes thousands of dollars in lost wages as well as untold suffering. The immediate reporting of all injuries no matter how slight for first-aid treatment is easier and better than spending unnecessary days at home or in the hospital under medical care for blood poisoning.

20 TONS EQUAL SQUASHED TOES

Speed is often named as a prime cause of accidents when in reality it is not speed or haste that is the real troublemaker. An unusual example of this may be found in an accident recently suffered by a seaman in a shipyard.

A 20-ton test weight was being lowered very slowly from the ship to the dock. When only a few inches off the dock the seaman rigger thought the motion had stopped, so he proceeded to secure a tag line on the test weight. While doing so, he suddenly had the sickening sensation of the load settling on his toes. After frantically informing his shipmates of his predicament, the test weight was lifted so that his toes could be removed from underneath the test weight. At the hospital his injuries were diagnosed as compound fractures of the first and second toes and dislocation of the big toe.

Whether safety shoes could have prevented this injury is academic. The fact remains that the seaman was not wearing them and his toes were squashed. Also the seaman could have checked with whoever was guiding the load down to find out if motion had ceased. This accident once again forcefully points out the extreme importance of KEEPING CLEAR OF MOVING MACHINERY AND SUSPENDED LOADS—JUST IN CASE.

FILE HANDLES

Just because safety razor blades come in packages separate from the holders, you wouldn't try to shave with the blade alone.

A file is like a safety razor blade. It needs a handle before it can be used safely. The sharp tine, if not covered by a handle, is a cinch to cut your palm the first time the file sticks and your hand slips. A handle can be easily made of a thick piece of soft wood if necessary.

Recently a man was filing some work on the lathe and the tine went completely through his hand when the file was kicked back.

When you pick up a file, spend a few seconds more to find and put a handle on it. Why risk injury to save a few seconds!

THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN SHIPBOARD ACCIDENTS

It is surprising that with all the safety devices and safety rules for merchant vessels, yet so many avoidable accidents occur. Many companies have active safety programs which bring home to the merchant seamen the benefits of safety. The mechanical imperfection or failure of equipment accounts for a relatively small portion of the avoidable accidents that occur on shipboard. Seamen know that a vessel acts like a float on top of the water, and the wind and wave action of the water will affect the riding characteristics of the vessel. Nature has in part compensated for this by giving seamen what is commonly known as "sea legs."

The seaman, however, is prone at times to think that safety devices are present and, therefore, no action need be taken to think about safety. Thus the human element may be considered one of the causes of avoidable accidents. Forgetfulness, negligence, and utter disregard for the rules of safety are the contributing causes in a large portion of the avoidable accidents reported.

One way to reduce the avoidable accidents is to organize and develop on shipboard group discussions regarding safety and have the use of safety equipment explained and instructions given on the purpose and availability of safety devices.

It has been noted that the ships which report few injuries among their personnel are those ships which maintain "good housekeeping practices,"

known on board ship as "good sea-going practices." The active leadership and constant efforts of masters, department heads, and all officers to improve the safety and efficiency on their vessels will have the effect of reducing considerably the number of avoidable accidents.

Safety is an individual responsibility and is accomplished by doing the task at hand in the accepted way. Many avoidable accidents then will never occur. The biggest benefit to the merchant seaman will be good health and no suffering from broken bones, burns, etc.

OBSERVATIONS ON TANK CLEANING

Recently, a series of tests was made on the vapor concentrations in tanks on a company vessel gas freeing for the shipyard. While these tests did not reveal anything previously unknown, they serve to focus attention on many things of interest to tankermen. The tanks were tested with a gas indicator under various conditions and at numerous spots throughout the tanks. Some of the results are given below.

One gasoline tank was tested immediately after completion of discharging. The tests showed that the atmosphere of the tank was a mixture of air and petroleum vapors so proportioned as to be explosive. The mixture was in the center of the explosive range and fairly uniform throughout the greater part of the tank.

A gasoline tank was butter worthed with hot water (165° F.) for 40 minutes. Tests showed that the atmosphere of the tank was explosive. From this and other tests, it is confirmed that butter worthing alone will not ordinarily free ships' tanks of explosive gases.

The hatch cover was then opened to see what natural ventilation would do. After 1½ hours the tank tested as follows:

READINGS ON A GAS INDICATOR

5 feet outage	0.3
10 feet outage	0.3
15 feet outage	0.3
20 feet outage	Explosive.
25 feet outage	Explosive.
30 feet outage	Explosive.
35 feet outage	Explosive.

It can be seen here how the hot atmosphere of the tank, heated by the butter worthing, has been replaced by cold air in the upper reaches of the tank only. The lower part of the tank still contained explosive vapors. Eventually, the tank would probably gas free itself from normal ventilation. However, since an open tank containing explosive vapors presents a hazard which should be removed as soon as practicable, it is desirable to augment the natural ventilation by wind sails or a mechanical air blower. If in this case, a wind sail had been used, the tank would have been gas free within a matter of 20 or 30 minutes.

A Diesel tank was butter worthed. The next morning the hatch cover was opened and the tank tested. The atmosphere tested explosive. Investigation showed that the pressure-vacuum relief valve was in the open position. When other gasoline tanks were butter worthed, the atmosphere expanded about one-seventh. These vapors entered the vent system. Some were discharged at the masthead and some entered the Diesel tank in question. This incident emphasizes two points:

FIRST, the value of the rules requiring all tanks to be checked with a gas indicator before men are sent into them. Here was a tank which you would not expect to be gassy, but a test showed that it was.

SECOND, that prior to butter worthing, all pressure-vacuum valves should be closed, opened during butter worthing, and then closed again until the tanks being cleaned and all other tanks on the same venting system are gas free.

—Standard of California.

REST IN PEACE

And then there was the unfortunate AB who, while sleeping in his bunk, dreamed he was in a fight. He kicked his phantom enemy and broke his toe against a very real bunk rail. *Courtesy, Shipboard Safety.*

Daydreaming may end in a nightmare.

APPENDIX

Equipment Approved by the Commandant

[CGFR 49-44]

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commandant, United States Coast Guard, by R. S. 4405 and 4491, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 375, 489; and section 101 of Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946 (11 F. R. 7875, 60 Stat. 1097, 46 U. S. C. 1), as well as the additional authorities cited with specific items below, the following approvals of equipment are prescribed and shall be effective for a period of five years from date of publication in the **FEDERAL REGISTER** unless sooner canceled or suspended by proper authority:

Give the new man a few tips on safety

CLEANING PROCESSES FOR LIFE PRESERVERS

NOTE: Where buoyancy fillers are not removed from envelope covers during cleaning process.

Approval No. 160.006/19/0, Garden City Cleaning Process for kapok life preservers as outlined in letter of October 12, 1949, from Garden City Renovating, 2307-09 Stevens Creek Road, San Jose, Calif.

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 4488, 4492, 35 Stat. 428, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 164, 166, 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 396, 404, 481, 490, 526e, 526p, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 160.006-4)

BUOYANT CUSHIONS, NON-STANDARD

NOTE: Cushions are for use on motorboats of Classes A, 1, and 2 not carrying passengers for hire.

Approval No. 160.008/414/0, 14" x 14" x 2" seat, 14" x 18" x 2" back,

40 oz. kapok, double buoyant cushion, Dwg. No. 20, dated September 19, 1949, manufactured by Seaway Manufacturing Co., Inc., 511 North Solomon Street, New Orleans 19, La.

Approval No. 160.008/415/0, 14" x 14" x 2" seat, 14" x 18" x 2" back, 40 oz. kapok double buoyant cushion, flexible plastic film cover and straps, stitched seams, Dwg. No. 120, dated September 19, 1949, manufactured by Seaway Manufacturing Co., Inc., 511 North Solomon Street, New Orleans 19, La.

Approval No. 160.008/416/0, 15" x 15" x 2" rectangular buoyant cushion, 20 oz. kapok, flexible plastic film cover and straps, stitched seams, Dwg. No. 218, dated September 19, 1949, manufactured by Seaway Manufacturing Co., Inc., 511 North Solomon Street, New Orleans 19, La.

Approval No. 160.008/418/0, 15" x 36" x 2" rectangular buoyant cushion,

ion, 48 oz. kapok, Dwg. No. 319, dated September 19, 1949, manufactured by Seaway Manufacturing Co., Inc., 511 North Solomon Street, New Orleans 19, La.

Approval No. 160.008/419/0, 15" x 36" x 2" rectangular buoyant cushion, 48 oz. kapok, flexible plastic film cover and straps, stitched seams, Dwg. No. 419, dated September 19, 1949, manufactured by Seaway Manufacturing Co., Inc., 511 North Solomon Street, New Orleans 19, La.

Approval No. 160.008/420/0, 15" x 48" x 2" rectangular buoyant cushion, 65 oz. kapok, Dwg. No. 519, dated September 19, 1949, manufactured by Seaway Manufacturing Co., Inc., 511 North Solomon Street, New Orleans 19, La.

Approval No. 160.008/421/0, 15" x 48" x 2" rectangular buoyant cushion, 65 oz. kapok, flexible plastic film cover and straps, stitched seams, Dwg. No. 619, dated September 19, 1949, manufactured by Seaway Manufacturing Co., Inc., 511 North Solomon Street, New Orleans 19, La.

(54 Stat. 164, 166; 46 U. S. C. 526e, 526p; 46 CFR 25.4-1, 160.008)

DAVITS, LIFEBOAT

Approval No. 160.032/115/0, Gravity Davit, Type L0-90, approved for maximum working load of 18,000 pounds per set (9,000 pounds per arm) using 2 part falls, identified by Arrangement Dwg. No. 3160-7, dated June 16, 1948, manufactured by the Welin Davit and Boat Division of Continental Copper & Steel Industries, Inc., Perth Amboy, N. J.

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 4481, 4488, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 404, 474, 481, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 37.1-4, 59.3, 60.21, 76.15, 94.14, 113.23)

LIFEBOATS

Approval No. 160.035/259/0, 24.1' x 7.4' x 2.81' steel oar-propelled lifeboat, 30-person capacity, identified by General Arrangement and Detail Dwg. No. OMS-501A, dated August 1949, manufactured by Tregoning Industries, Inc., Seattle, Wash.

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 4481, 4488, 4492, 35 Stat. 428, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 396, 404, 474, 481, 490, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR 37.1-1, 59.13, 76.16, 94.15, 113.10)

VALVES, SAFETY

Approval No. 162.001/136/0, Consolidated pop safety valve, Type 1553-HCE, cast alloy steel body, nozzle type through seat bushing, open spring

fitted with spring cover, Dwg. No. CODE-1 1/2-1553-HE (9) X9-M, dated June 22, 1949, and Dwg. No. T-5886-BK, dated October 30, 1949, approved for 1 1/2" inlet size for a maximum pressure of 900 pounds per square inch and a maximum temperature of 1050° F., manufactured by Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., Consolidated Safety Valve Division, Elias Street, Bridgeport 2, Conn. (R. S. 4417a, 4418, 4426, 4433, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 392, 404, 411, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275, 46 CFR 52.65)

BOILERS, HEATING

NOTE: Approval covers bare boiler only.

Approval No. 162.003/79/0, Model "Arcoliner" heating boiler, cast iron sectional construction, maximum pressure 15 pounds per square inch, manufactured by American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., P. O. Box 1226, Pittsburgh 30, Pa.

Approval No. 162.003/80/0, Model "Severn," heating boiler, cast iron sectional construction, maximum pressure 15 pounds per square inch, manufactured by American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., P. O. Box 1226, Pittsburgh 30, Pa.

Approval No. 162.003/81/0, Model "Oakmont," heating boiler, cast iron sectional construction, maximum pressure 15 pounds per square inch, manufactured by the American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., P. O. Box 1226, Pittsburgh 30, Pa.

Approval No. 162.003/82/0, Model "Exbrook," heating boiler, cast iron sectional construction, maximum pressure 15 pounds per square inch, manufactured by American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., P. O. Box 1226, Pittsburgh 30, Pa.

Approval No. 162.003/83/0, Model "Redflash," heating boiler, cast iron sectional construction, maximum pressure 15 pounds per square inch, manufactured by the American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., P. O. Box 1226, Pittsburgh 30, Pa.

Approval No. 162.003/84/0, Model "Water Tube," heating boiler, cast iron sectional construction, maximum pressure 15 pounds per square inch, manufactured by American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., P. O. Box 1226, Pittsburgh 30, Pa.

(R. S. 4417a, 4418, 4426, 4433, 4434, 49 Stat. 1544, 54 Stat. 346, and sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 391a, 392, 404, 411, 412, 1333, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR Part 52)

INCOMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS

Approval No. 164.009/25/0, "J-M Six Pound Reinforced Asbestos

Paper", asbestos paper type Incombustible Material identical to that described in National Bureau of Standards Test Report No. TG10210-1643: FP2833, dated October 13, 1949, approved in a weight of 6 pounds per one hundred square feet, manufactured by Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 22 East Fortieth St., New York 16, N. Y.

(R. S. 4417a, 4426, 49 Stat. 1384, 1544, 54 Stat. 1028, sec. 5 (e), 55 Stat. 244, as amended; 46 U. S. C. 367, 369, 391a, 404, 463a, 50 U. S. C. 1275; 46 CFR Part 144)

Dated: November 15, 1949.

J. F. FARLEY,
Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,
Commandant.

[F. R. Doc. 49-9322; Filed, Nov. 18, 1949;
8:48 a. m., 14 F. R. 7013]

THE CAREFUL MAN

He'd walk round the block to avoid a black cat,

But watch for oil spilled on the deck? never that.

Walk under a ladder? He'd rather be dead,

But to lash one he's climbing ne'er enters his head.

It's no use to offer third light on a match,

But he'll flick a hot butt down the square of the hatch.

To break an old mirror would frighten him stiff,

But broken glass on the deck—hell, what's the diff?

Dark glasses in fashion? Then that's what he uses,

But goggles for chipping he flatly refuses.

He's worked out a method of rolling the cubes,

But thinks that safe lifting is only for rubes.

He'd lay his whole stake on a tip from a tout,

But never give heed to the warning, "Look Out!"

He reads every word of each new comic book,

But a sign for his safety gets nary a look.

A lot of small things get his careful attention,

Why not just a little to injury prevention?

Shipboard Safety, June 1949.

Shipboard Safety, June 1949.

Shipboard Safety, June 1949.

Shipboard Safety, June 1949.

Shipboard Safety, June 1949.

Shipboard Safety, June 1949.

Shipboard Safety, June 1949.

Shipboard Safety, June 1949.

revised and brought up to date and are now available upon request from any Marine Inspection Office, United States Coast Guard, or upon written request to the Commandant (HA), United States Coast Guard, Washington 25, D. C.:

Manual for Lifeboatmen and Able Seamen, dated June 1949, pamphlet No. CG 175.

General Rules and Regulations for Vessel Inspection, Ocean and Coastwise, dated November 1949, pamphlet No. CG 170.

AFFIDAVITS

The following affidavits were accepted from November 15 to December 15, 1949:

Climax Engineering Co., Controls Division, 15 North Cincinnati, P. O. Box 1529, Tulsa 1, Okla. Valves and fittings.

Coen Co., Inc., 40 Boardman Place, San Francisco 3, Calif. Valves.

Combination Pump Valve Co., 846 Wiota Street, Philadelphia 4, Pa. Valves.

Erie Bolt & Nut Co., 1325 Liberty Street, Erie, Pa. Bolting.

The Foxboro Co., Foxboro, Mass. Valves and fittings.

Royersford Foundry & Machine Co., Inc., Royersford, Pa. Castings.

Fischer & Porter Co., Hatboro, Pa. Valves and fittings.

The Hanlon-Waters Co. of Tulsa, Okla., has been succeeded by the Climax Engineering Co., Controls Division, 15 North Cincinnati, P. O. Box 1529, Tulsa 1, Okla.

Merchant Marine Personnel Statistics

INVESTIGATING UNITS

Coast Guard Merchant Marine Investigating Units and Merchant Marine Details investigated a total of 421 cases during the month of October 1949. From this number, hearings resulted involving 14 officers and 61 unlicensed men. In the case of officers, no licenses were revoked, 3 were suspended, 6 were suspended with probation granted, 1 was voluntarily surrendered, 1 case was dismissed and no hearings were closed with admonition. Of the unlicensed personnel, 7 certificates were revoked,

20 were suspended, 21 were suspended with probation granted, 8 were voluntarily surrendered, 1 was closed with admonition and 4 were dismissed after hearing.

Coast Guard Merchant Marine Investigating Units and Merchant Marine Details investigated a total of 429 cases during the month of November 1949. From this number, hearings resulted involving 13 officers and 57 unlicensed men. In the case of officers, no licenses were revoked, 2 were suspended, 7 were suspended with probation granted, 2 were voluntarily surrendered, 3 cases were dis-

missed and no hearings were closed with admonition. Of the unlicensed personnel, 9 certificates were revoked, 18 were suspended, 12 were suspended with probation granted, 4 were voluntarily surrendered, 5 were closed with admonition and 8 were dismissed after hearing.

CORRECTION

The number of hearings involving officers and unlicensed men as reported in the December 1949, issue of the "Proceedings" should have read, "that hearings resulted involving 24 officers and 56 unlicensed men."

ORIGINAL SEAMEN'S DOCUMENTS ISSUED MONTH OF NOVEMBER 1949

Region	(1) Staff officer	(2) Continuous discharge book	(3) U. S. merchant mariner's documents	(4) AB any waters unlimited	(5) AB any waters 12 months	(6) AB Great Lakes 18 months	(7) AB tugs and towboats any waters	(8) AB bays and sounds	(9) AB seagoing barges	(10) Lifeboatman	(11) Q. M. E. D.	(12) Radio operators	(13) Certificate of service	(14) Tankerman
Atlantic coast	49	2	372	98	29	2			1	152	93	6	318	8
Gulf coast	6		151	26	6					15	19		141	14
Pacific coast	12		190	70	26	3				106	45	1	196	2
Great Lakes and rivers	1	1	77	6	23	11	1			22	29		55	16
Total	68	3	790	200	84	16	1	0	1	295	186	7	680	40

12 months, vessels 500 gross tons or under not carrying passengers.

Note.—Columns 4 through 14 indicate endorsements made on U. S. merchant mariner's documents.

WAIVERS OF MANNING REQUIREMENTS FROM NOV. 1 TO NOV. 30, 1949

Region	Number of vessels	Deck officers substituted for higher ratings	Engineer officers substituted for higher ratings	Able seamen substituted for deck officers	Ordinary seamen substituted for able seamen	Qualified members of engine department substituted for engineer officers	Wipers or coal passers substituted for qualified members of engine department	Wipers, coal passers or cadets substituted for engineer officers	Ordinary seamen or cadets substituted for deck officers	Total
Atlantic coast	1						1			1
Gulf coast	1					1				1
Pacific coast	2		1			1				2
Great Lakes										
Total	4		1			1	1			4

Note.—In addition, no individual waivers were granted to permit the employment of able seamen holding certificates for "any water—12 months" in excess of the 30 percent authorized by general waiver.

MERCHANT MARINE LICENSES ISSUED DURING NOVEMBER 1949

DECK OFFICERS

		REGION								Total	
		Atlantic coast		Gulf coast		Great Lakes and rivers		Pacific coast			
		O	R	O	R	O	R	O	R	O	R
Master	Ocean	20	110	3	25	2	15	3	48	28	1
	Coastwise	1	13	1	3	0	3	0	3	2	1
	Great Lakes	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	1
	B. S. & L.	8	35	0	2	0	0	1	6	9	0
	Rivers	1	1	0	1	0	10	0	0	1	1
Chief mate	Ocean	18	19	5	8	0	6	8	8	31	0
	Coastwise	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Second mate	Ocean	19	33	4	9	1	10	3	8	27	0
	Coastwise	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Third mate	Ocean	4	33	3	5	0	11	1	15	8	0
	Coastwise	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mate	Great Lakes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	B. S. & L.	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	2	1
	Rivers	0	0	0	0	3	6	0	1	3	1
		0	0	0	0	3	6	0	1	3	1
Pilots	B. S. L. & R.	64	98	13	19	18	28	7	34	102	0
Master	Uninspected vessels	0	2	0	0	1	13	0	4	1	1
Mate	Uninspected vessels	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	3	1
Total		136	346	29	73	28	105	25	129	218	872
Grand total		482		102		133		154			

ENGINEER OFFICERS

Steam	Chief engineer:										
	Unlimited	13	75	4	38	1	8	2	40	20	1
	Limited	2	40	0	6	0	15	0	5	2	1
	First assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	10	37	2	13	0	2	6	18	18	0
	Limited	0	2	0	5	0	1	0	1	0	0
	Second assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	9	52	4	11	1	14	7	25	21	1
	Limited	0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	1
	Third assistant engineer:										
Motor	Unlimited	6	57	2	5	1	33	8	34	17	0
	Limited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Chief engineer:										
	Unlimited	3	10	0	5	0	2	1	8	4	1
	Limited	5	29	0	4	2	10	4	14	11	1
	First assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	1	2	0	1	0	2	2	4	3	1
	Limited	4	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	6	1
	Second assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	2	2	0	2	0	2	3	1	5	1
Uninspected vessels	Limited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Third assistant engineer:										
	Unlimited	4	75	1	9	0	26	4	41	9	0
	Limited	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Chief engineer	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	6	1	1
	Assistant engineer	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	1
Total		59	393	14	99	118	41	197	120	927	
Grand total		452		113		124		238			